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SPURIOUS RELIGIOUS EXCITEMENTS.¹

IT is believed all thoughtful Christians are alive to the fact that religious excitements, which consist of temporary movements of the emotions devoid of any saving operation of the Truth on the reason and conscience, are equally frequent and mischievous in America. This judgment not seldom expresses itself in very queer and inaccurate forms. Thus: good brethren write to the religious journals grateful accounts of a work of grace in their charges, and tell the editors that "they are happy to say, the work has been purely rational and quiet, and attended by not the slightest excitement." They forget that the efficacious (not possibly, tempestuous) movement of the feelings is just as essential a part of a true religious experience, as the illumination of the intellect by divine truth; for indeed, there is no such thing as the implantation of practical principle, or the right decisions of the will, without feeling. In estimating a work of divine grace as genuine, we should rather ask ourselves whether the right feelings are excited, and excited by divine cause. If so, we need not fear the most intense excitement. This misconception is parallel to the one uttered by public speakers, when they assure their hearers that, designing to show them the respect due to rational beings, and to use the honesty suitable to true patriots, "they shall make no appeal to their feelings, but address themselves only to their understandings." This is virtually impossible. On all practical subjects, truth is only influential as it stimulates some practical feeling. There is no logical appeal of the rhetorical nature which does not include and appeal to feeling. Does the orator proclaim, for instance, that waiving all appeals to passion, he will only address his hearers' intellects to prove what is for their interest, or "for their honor," or "for the good of their country"? What is he really doing except appealing to the emotions of desire for wealth, or love of applause, or patriotism?

¹ From *The Presbyterian Quarterly*, October, 1887.

In the *Southern Presbyterian Review*, 1884, I presented a discussion on the psychology of the feelings. I wish to recall a few of the fundamental positions there established. The function of *feeling* is as essential to the human spirit, and as ever present, as the function of cognition. The two are ever combined, as the heat-rays and the light-rays are intermingled in the sunbeams. But the consciousness intuitively recognizes the difference of the two functions, so that it is superfluous to define them. "Feeling is the temperature of thought." The same kind of feeling may differ in degree of intensity, as the heat-ray in the brilliant winter sunbeam differs from that in the fiery glare of the "dog days"; but the thermometer shows there is still caloric in the most wintry sunbeam, and even in the block of crystal ice. So a human spirit is never devoid of some degree of that feeling which the truth then engaging the intelligence tends to excite. No object is or can be inducement to volition unless it be apprehended by the soul as being both in the category of the true and of the good. But, that function of soul by which the object is taken as a good, is desire, an act of feeling. Whence it follows, that an element of feeling is as essential to every rational volition as an act of cognition. The truly different sorts of feelings were distinguished and classified. But this all important division of them was seen to be into the passions, and the active feelings; between those impressions upon the sensibility of the soul, caused from without, and in receiving which the soul is itself passive, and its spontaneity has no self-determining power (as pain, panic, sympathy) on the one hand, and on the other hand those subjective feelings which, while occasioned from without, are self-determined by the spontaneity from within and in which the soul is essentially active, (as desire, benevolence, ambition, etc.)

It may be asked here: Does the writer intend to rest the authority of his distinction between genuine and spurious religious experiences on a human psychology? By no means. The Scriptures are the only sure source of this discrimination. Its declarations, such as that sanctification is only by revealed truth, its anthropology, its doctrine of redemption, and its examples of saving conversions, give the faithful student full guidance as to the conduct of gospel work, and the separation of the stony-

ground hearers from the true. But it is claimed that the psychology outlined above is the psychology of the Bible. It is that theory of man's powers everywhere assumed and postulated in Scripture. It gives that theory of human action on which all the instances, the narratives, and the precepts of Scripture ground themselves. Hence these mental laws and facts are of use, not as the mistress, but as the hand-maid of Scripture, to explain and illustrate those cautions which the Bible gives us.

One inference is simple and clear. The excitement of mere sensibilities, however strong or frequent, can offer no evidence whatever of a sanctified state. The soul is passive in them; their efficient cause is objective. An instinctive susceptibility in the soul provides the only condition requisite for their rise when the outward cause is applied. Hence the excitement of these sensibilities is no more evidence of change or rectification in the free agency, than the shivering of the winter wayfarer's limbs when wet by the storms. Now the doctrine of Scripture is that man's spontaneity is, in his natural state, wholly disinclined and made opposite (yet freely) to godliness, so that he has no ability of will for any spiritual act pertaining to salvation. But it is promised that, in regeneration, God's people shall be willing in the day of his power. He so enlightens their minds in the knowledge of Christ, and renews their wills, that they are both persuaded and enabled to embrace Jesus Christ. The very spontaneity is revolutionized. Now the stimulation of merely passive sensibilities, in which the will has no causal part, can never be evidence of that saving change. No evidence of it appears, until the subjective desires and the will exhibit their change to the new direction. That fear, that selfish joy, that hope, that sympathy are excited, proves nothing. But when the soul freely exercises a "hungering and thirsting after righteousness," hatred of sin, desire of God's favor, love of his truth, zeal for his honor, this evinces the sanctifying revolution.

Shall we conclude then that the excitement of the passive sensibilities by the pastor is wholly useless? This class of feelings presents the occasion (not the cause) for the rise of the subjective and spontaneous emotions. This is all. It is this connection which so often misleads the mental analyst into a confusion of the two classes of feelings. The efficient cause may

be restrained from acting by the absence of the necessary occasion; this is true. But it is equally true, that the occasion, in the absence of the efficient cause, is powerless to leaving any effect. If the pastor aims to move the sensibilities merely for the purpose of gaining the attention of the soul to saving truth, and presents that truth faithfully the moment his impression is made, he does well. If he makes these sensibilities an end, instead of a means, he is mischievously abusing his people's souls.

People are ever prone to think that they are feeling religiously because they have feelings round about religion. Their sensibilities have been aroused in connection with death and eternity, for instance; so, as these are religious topics, they suppose they are growing quite religious. The simplest way to clear away these perilous illusions is, to ask What emotions, connected with religious topics as their occasions, are natural to the carnal man? These may be said to be, first, the emotions of taste, or the mental-æsthetic; second, the involuntary moral emotion of self-blame, or remorse; third, the natural self-interested emotions of fear and hope, and desire of future security and enjoyment; and fourth, the emotion of instinctive sympathy. The following conclusions concerning these feelings need only to be stated, in order to be admitted.

The æsthetic feeling may be as naturally stimulated by the features of sublimity and beauty of God's natural attributes, and of the gospel-story, as by a cataract, an ocean, a starlit sky, or a Shakespearean hero. Now it is most obvious that the movements of taste, in these latter cases, carry no moral imperative whatever. They have no more power to reform the will than strains of music or odors of flowers. Yet how many souls are deluded into supposing that they love God, duty, and gospel-truth, because these æsthetic sensibilities are stimulated in connection with such topics!

When the ethical reason pronounces its judgment of wrongfulness upon any action or principle, this may be attended by the feeling of moral reprehension. If it is one's own action which must be condemned, the feeling takes on the more pungent form of remorse. But this feeling is no function of the soul's spontaneity. Its rise is purely involuntary; its natural

effect is to be the penal retribution, and not the restrainer of sin.

How completely this feeling is disconnected with the correct regulation or reformation of the will, appears from this: that the transgressor's will is usually striving with all his might not to feel the remorse, or to forget it, while conscience makes him feel it in spite of himself. A Judas felt it most keenly while he rushed to self-destruction. It is the most prevalent emotion of hell, which gives us the crowning proof that it has no power to purify the heart. But many transgressors are persuaded that they exercise repentance because they feel remorse for conscious sins. Man's native selfishness is all-sufficient to make him desire the pleasurable, or natural good, and fear and shun the painful, or natural evil. Those desires and aversions, with the fears and hopes which expectation suggests, and the corresponding terrors and joys of anticipation, may be stimulated by any natural good or evil, more or less remote, the conception of which occupies the mental attention distinctly. Just as the thoughtless child dreads the lash that is expected in the next moment, and the more thoughtful person dreads the lash of next week or next month, just so naturally a carnal man, who is intellectually convinced of his immortality and identity, may dread the pains, or rejoice in the fancied pleasures, of another life. He may fear death, not only with the unreasoning instinct of the brute, but also with the rational dread (rational, though purely selfish) of its penal consequences. Selfishness, with awakened attention and mental conviction, suffices fully for all this. In all these feelings there is nothing one whit more characteristic of a new heart, or more controlling of the evil will, than in the wicked sensualist's dread of the colic which may follow his excess, or the determined outlaw's fear of the sheriff. Yet how many deluded souls fancy that, because they feel these selfish fears or joys in connection with death and judgment, they are becoming strongly religious. And unfortunately they are encouraged by multitudes of preachers of the gospel to make this fatal mistake. Turretin has distinguished the truth here by a single pair of phrases, as by a beam of sunlight. He says: Whereas the stony-ground believer embraces Christ solely *pro bono jucundo*, the gospel offers him mainly *pro bono honesto*. True faith desires

and embraces Christ chiefly as a Saviour from sin and pollution. The false believer embraces him only as a Saviour from suffering and punishment. Holy Scripture is always careful to represent Christ in the former light. His "name is Jesus because he saves his people from their sins." He gives himself to redeem us from all iniquity, and to purify us unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works. But preachers so prevalently paint the gospel as God's method of delivering sinners from penal pains and bestowing the enjoyment of a sensuous paradise, and the guilty selfishness of hearers is so exclusively exercised about selfish deliverance, that we apprehend most men are permitted to conceive of the gospel remedy solely as a *bonum jucundum*, a provision for simply procuring their selfish advantage. It is true that, if asked, Is not the gospel to make you good also? many of them might reply with a listless "Yes." They have a vague apprehension that their grasping the *bonum jucundum* is somehow conditioned on their becoming better; and they suppose they are willing to accept this uninteresting formality for the sake of the enjoyment that follows it, just as the epicure tolerates the tedious grace for the sake of the dainties which are to come after at the feast. But were one to tell this gourmand that the grace was the real chief-end of the feast, and the eating a subordinate incident thereto, he would be exceedingly amazed and incredulous. Such would also be the feeling of many subjects of modern revivals, if the Bible conception of redemption were forced on their minds. Hence, one great reform in our preaching must be to return to the scriptural presentation of the gospel in this particular. A grand reform is needed here. This grovelling, utilitarian conception of redemption must be banished. Men must be taught that the blessing is only for them "who hunger and thirst after righteousness," not for those who selfishly desire to grasp enjoyment only, and to shun pain. They must be made to see clearly that such a concern does not in the least differentiate them from reprobate souls in hell, or hardened felons on earth; not even from the thievish fox caught in a trap.

The fourth and the most deceptive natural feeling of the carnal man is instinctive sympathy. It will be necessary to state the nature and conditions of this feeling. First, it belongs to

the passive sensibilities, not to the spontaneous appetencies. It is purely instinctive, appearing as powerfully in animals as in men. Witness the excitement of a flock of birds over the cries of a single comrade, and the "stampede" of a herd of oxen. Next, it is even in man an unintelligent feeling in this sense: that if the emotion of another be merely seen and heard, sympathy is propagated, although the sympathizer understands nothing of the cause of the feeling he witnesses. We come upon a child, who is an utter stranger, weeping; we share the sympathetic saddening before he has had time to tell us what causes his tears. We enter a room where our friends are drowned in laughter. Before we have asked the question, "Friends, what is the jest?" we find ourselves smiling. We see two strangers afar off exchanging blows; we feel the excitement stimulating us to run thither, while ignorant of the quarrel. Sympathy is in its rise unintelligent and instinctive. The only condition requisite for it, is the beholding of the feeling in a fellow. Third, this law of feeling extends to all the emotions natural to man. We so often connect the word with the emotion of grief, that we overlook its applicability to other feelings, and we forget even its etymology: *παθος*, in Greek philosophy, did not mean grief only, but every exercise of feeling; so *συμπαθεῖν* is to share by spiritual contagion any *παθος* we witness in our fellows. We sympathize with merriment, joy, fear, anger, hope, benevolence, moral approbation, courage, panic, just as truly as with grief. Fourth, the nature of the emotion witnessed determines, without any volition of our own, the nature of the feeling injected into us. Sympathy with joy is a lesser joy. The glow is that of the secondary rainbow reflecting, but usually in a weaker degree, precisely the tints of the primary arch.

The reader is now prepared to admit these conclusions: that sympathy may infect men with a phase of religious emotion, as of any other; that the sympathetic emotions, though thus related as to their source, have no spiritual character whatever in themselves—for they are involuntary, they are unintelligent, they are passive effects on an instinctive sensibility, giving no expression to the will, and not regulating it nor regulated by it. The animal feels these sympathies as really as the man.

The reader should notice that these propositions are asserted

only of the simple sensibility, the immediate reflex of strong feeling witnessed. It is not denied that the capacity of sympathy is a social trait implanted by a wise Creator for practical purposes. It is the instrumental occasion of many useful results. Thus, upon the excitement of sympathy with grief follow the appetency to succor the sufferer, and the benevolent volition. The first is the occasion, not the cause, of the second. On our natural sympathy with the actions we witness, follows our impulse to imitate. But imitation is the great lever of education. So sympathy has been called the sacred "orator's right arm." Let us understand precisely what it could and cannot do in gaining lodgment for divine truth in the sinner's soul. This truth and this alone is the instrument of sanctification. To Presbyterians the demonstration of this is superfluous. It is impossible for the truth to work sanctification except as it is intelligently received into the mind. Light must reach the heart through the understanding, for the soul only feels healthily according as it sees. To the inattentive mind the truth being unheard, is as though it were not. Hence it is of prime importance to awaken the listless attention. Whatever innocently does this is therefore a useful preliminary instrument for applying the truth. This, sympathy aids to effect. The emotion of the orator arouses the slumbering attention of the sinner, and temporarily wins his ear for the sacred word. Another influence of awakened sympathy may also be conceded. By one application of the law of association, the warmth of a feeling existing in the mind is communicated temporarily to any object coexisting with it in the mind; though that object be in itself indifferent to that soul. The stone dropped into the heated furnace is not combustible, is no source of caloric; but by contact it imbibes some of the heat which flames there, and remains hot for a little time after it is drawn out. So the mind warmed with emotion, either original or sympathetic, is a furnace which gives some of its warmth to truth or concepts coexisting in it, otherwise cold and indifferent to it. But the warmth is merely temporary.

The whole use, then, of the sympathetic excitement is to catch the attention and warm it. But it is the truth thus lodged in the attention that must do the whole work of sanctification. Here is the all-important discrimination. Attention, sympa-

thetic warmth, are merely a preparation for casting in the seed of the Word. The preacher who satisfies himself with exciting the sympathies, and neglects to throw in at once the vital truth, is like the husbandman who digs and rakes the soil, and then idly expects the crop, though he has put in no living seed. The only result is a more rampant growth of weeds. How often do we see this mistake committed! The preacher either displays, in his own person, a high-wrought religious emotion, or stirs the natural sensibilities by painting in exciting and pictorial words and gestures, some natural feeling connected by its occasion with a religious topic, as a touching death or other bereavement; or he stimulates the selfish fears by painting the agonies of a lost soul, or the selfish desires and hopes by a sensuous description of the pleasures of heaven. Then, if sympathetic feeling is awakened, or the carnal passions of hope, fear and desire are moved, he acts as though his work were done. He permits and encourages the hearers to flatter themselves that they are religious, because they are feeling something round about religion. I repeat: if this stimulation of carnal and sympathetic feeling is not at once and wisely used, and used solely as a secondary means of fixing a warmed attention on didactic truth, which is the sole instrument of conversion and sanctification, then the preacher has mischievously abused the souls of his hearers. The first and most obvious mischief is the encouragement of a fatal deception and self-flattery. Unrenewed men are tacitly invited to regard themselves as either born again, or at least in a most encouraging progress towards that blessing; while in fact they have not felt a single feeling or principle which may not be the mere natural product of a dead heart. This delusion has slain its "tens of thousands."

The reader will remember the masterly exposition by Bishop Butler of the laws of habit as affecting the sensibilities and active powers. Its truth is too fully admitted to need argument. By this law of habit, the sensibilities are inevitably dulled by repeated impressions. By the same law, the appetencies and will are strengthened by voluntary exercise. Thus, if impressions on the sensibilities are followed by their legitimate exertion of the active powers, the soul as a whole, while it grows calmer and less excitable, grows stronger and more energetic in

its activities, and is confirmed in the paths of right action. But if the sensibilities are stimulated by objects which make no call, and offer no scope for right action, as by fictitious and unreal pictures of human passion, the soul is uselessly hackneyed and worn, and thus depraved. Here we find one of the fundamental objections to habitual novel reading. The excitement of the sympathies by warmly colored, but unreal, portraiture of passions, where there cannot possibly be any corresponding right action by the reader inasmuch as the agents and sufferers are imaginary, depraves the sensibilities without any retrieval of the soul's state in the corresponding cultivation of the active powers. The longer such reading is continued, the more does the young person become at once sentimental and unfeeling. The result is a selfish and morbid craving for excitement, coupled with a callous selfishness, dead to the claims of real charity and duty. The same objection lies against theatrical exhibitions, and for the same reason. Now this species of spurious religious excitement is obnoxious to the same charge. In its practical results it is fictitious. The merely sensational preacher is no more than a novelist or a comedian, with this circumstance, that he connects topics, popularly deemed religious, with his fictitious arts. He abuses and hackneys the souls of his hearers in the same general way, rendering them at once sentimental and hard, selfishly fond of excitement, but callous to conscience and duty.

Once more ; spiritual pride is as natural to man as breathing, or as sin. Its only corrective is sanctifying grace. Let the suggestion be once lodged in a heart not really humbled and cleansed by grace, that the man is reconciled to God, has "become good," is a favorite of God and heir of glory—that soul cannot fail to be swept away by the gales of spiritual pride. Let observation teach us here. Was there ever a deceived votary of a false religion, of Islam, of Buddhism, of Brahmanism, of Popery, who was not in reality puffed up by spiritual pride? It cannot be otherwise with a deceived votary of a Protestant creed. The circumstance that there is divine truth in this creed, which has no vital influence on his heart, is no safeguard. The only preventive of spiritual pride is the contrition which accompanies saving repentance. Here, also, is the explanation of the

fact, that the hearty votaries of those professedly Christian creeds which have more of Pelagianism than of gospel in them, are most bigoted and most hopelessly inaccessible to truth. Their adamant shield is spiritual pride, fostered by a spurious hope, and unchastened by sovereign grace. Of all such self-deceivers our Saviour has decided that "the publicans and harlots enter into the kingdom before them."

These plain facts and principles condemn nearly every feature of the modern new measure "revival." The preaching and other religious instructions are shaped with a main view to excite the carnal emotions and the instinctive sympathies, while no due care is taken to present saving, didactic truth to the understanding thus temporarily stimulated. As soon as some persons, professed Christians, or awakened "mourners," are infected with any lively passion, let it be however carnal and fleeting, a spectacular display is made of it, with confident laudations of it as unquestionably precious and saving, with the design of exciting the remainder of the crowd with the sympathetic contagion. Every adjunct of fiery declamation, animated singing, groans, tears, exclamations, noisy prayers, is added so as to shake the nerves and add the tumult of a hysterical animal excitement to the sympathetic wave. Every youth or impressible girl who is seen to tremble, or grow pale, or shed tears, is assured that he or she is under the workings of the Holy Spirit, and is driven by threats of vexing that awful and essential Agent of salvation to join the spectacular show, and add himself to the exciting pantomime. Meanwhile, most probably their minds are blank of every intelligent or conscientious view of the truth; they had been tittering or whispering a little while before, during the pretended didactic part of the exercises; they could give no intelligent account now of their own sudden excitement, and, in fact, it is no more akin to any spiritual, rational, or sanctifying cause, than the quiver of the nostrils of a horse at the sound of the bugle and the fox-hounds. But they join the mourners, and the manipulation proceeds. Of course, the sympathetic wave, called religious, reaches them more and more. As I have shown, it is the very nature of sympathy to assume the character of the emotion with which we sympathize. Thus this purely natural and instinctive sensibility takes on the form of *religious feeling*,

because it is sympathy with religious feeling in others. The subject calls it by religious names—awakening, conviction, repentance—while in reality it is only related to them as a man's shadow is to the living man. Meantime, the preachers talk to them as though the feelings were certainly genuine and spiritual. With this sympathetic current there may mingle sundry deep original feelings about the soul, to which, we have seen, the dead, carnal heart is fully competent by itself. These are fear, remorse, shame, desire of applause, craving for future, selfish, welfare, spiritual pride. Here we have the elements of every spurious grace. The "sorrow of the world that worketh death" is mistaken for saving repentance. By a natural law of the feelings, relaxation must follow high tension—the calm must succeed the storm. This quiet is confounded with "peace in believing." The selfish prospect of security produces great elation. This is supposed to be spiritual joy. When the soul is removed from the *stimuli* of the revival appliances, it of course sinks into the most painful vacuity, on which supervene restlessness and doubt. So, most naturally, it craves to renew the illusions, and has, for a time, a certain longing for and pleasure in the scenes, the measures, and the agents of its pleasing intoxication. These are mistaken for love for God's house, worship and people. Then the befooled soul goes on until it is betrayed into an erroneous profession of religion, and a dead church membership. He is now in the position in which the great enemy of souls would most desire to have him, and where his salvation is more difficult and improbable than anywhere else.

The most fearful part of these transactions is the unscriptural rashness of the professed guides of souls. They not only permit and encourage these perilous confusions of thought, but pass judgment on the exercises of their supposed converts with a haste and confidence which angels would shudder to indulge. Here, for instance, is a hurried, ignorant young person, no real pains having been taken to instruct his understanding in the nature of sin and redemption, or to test his apprehension of gospel truths. In his tempestuous excitement of fear and sympathy, he is told that he is unquestionably under the influence of God's Spirit. When he has been coaxed, or flattered, or wearied into

some random declaration that he thinks he loves his Saviour, joyful proclamation is made that here is another soul born to God, and the brethren are called on to rejoice over him. But no time has been allowed this supposed convert for self-examination; no care to discriminate between spiritual and carnal affections, or for the subsidence of the froth of animal and sympathetic excitements; no delay is allowed to see the fruits of holy living, the only test which Christ allows as sufficient for other than the omniscient judgment. Thus, over-zealous and heedless men, ignorant of the first principles of psychology, and unconscious of the ruinous effects they may be producing, sport with the very heart-strings of the spiritual life, and that in the most critical moments. It were a less criminal madness for a surgeon's raw apprentice to try experiments with his master's keen bistoury on the patient's jugular vein.

These abuses are the less excusable in any minister, because the Scriptures which he holds in his hands tell him plainly enough without the lights of philosophy, the wrongness of all these practices. No inspired apostle ever dared to pass a verdict upon the genuineness of a case of religious excitement with the rashness seen on these occasions. Christ has forewarned us that converts can only be known correctly by their fruits. Paul has sternly enjoined every workman upon the visible church, whose foundation is Christ, to "take heed how he buildeth thereupon." He has told us that the materials placed by us upon this structure may be genuine converts, as permanent as gold, silver, and costly stones; or worthless and pretended converts, comparable to "wood, hay and stubble;" that our work is to be all tried by the fire of God's judgments, in which our perishable additions will be burned up; and if we are ourselves saved, it will be as though we were saved by fire. The terrible results of self-deception and the deceitfulness of the heart are dwelt upon, and men are urged to self-examination.

The ulterior evils of these rash measures are immense. A standard and type of religious experience are propagated by them in America, as utterly unscriptural and false as those prevalent in Popish lands. So long as the subjects are susceptible of the sympathetic passion, they are taught to consider themselves in a high and certain state of grace. All just and scrip-

tural marks of a gracious state are overlooked and even despised. Is their conduct immoral, their temper bitter and unchristian, their minds utterly dark as to distinctive gospel truths? This makes no difference; they are still excited and "happified" in meetings; they sing and shout, and sway to and fro with religious feelings. Thus these worthless, sympathetic passions are trusted in as the sure signatures of the Spirit's work.

Of the man who passes through this process of false conversion, our Saviour's declaration is eminently true: "The last state of that man is worse than the first." The cases are not few which backslide early, and are again "converted," until the process has been repeated several times. These men are usually found most utterly hardened and profane, and hopelessly impervious to divine truth. Their souls are utterly seared by spurious fires of feeling. The state of those who remain undeceived, and in the communion of the church, is almost as hopeless. "Having a name to live, they are dead." Their misconception as to their own state is armor of proof against warning.

The results of these "revivals" are usually announced at once, with overweening confidence, as works of God's Spirit. A minister reports to his church paper that he has just shared in a glorious work at a given place, in which the Holy Ghost was present with power, and "forty souls were born into the kingdom." Now, the man of common sense will remember how confidently this same revivalist made similar reports last year, the year before, and perhaps many years previously. He was each time equally confident that it was the Spirit's work. But this man must know that in each previous case, time has already given stubborn refutation to his verdict upon the work. Four-fifths of those who, he was certain, were converted by God, have already gone back to the world, and declare that they were never converted at all. The means he has just used in his last revival are precisely the same used in his previous ones. The false fruits wore at first just the aspect which his last converts now wear. Is it not altogether probable that they are really of the same unstable character? But this minister declares positively that these are God's works. Now, the cool, critical world looks on and observes these hard facts. It asks, What sort of people are these special guardians and expounders of Christianity? Are

they romantic fools, who cannot be taught by clear experience, or are they conscious and intentional liars? The world is quite charitable, and probably adopts the former solution. And this solution, that the representatives of Christianity are men hopelessly and childishly overweening in their delusions, carries this corollary for the most of worldly men who adopt it: That Christianity itself is an unhealthy fanaticism, since it makes its chosen teachers such fanatics, unteachable by solid facts. Thus, the Christian ministry, who ought to be a class venerable in the eyes of men, are made contemptible. Civility restrains the expression of this estimate, but it none the less degrades the ministry in the eyes of intelligent men of the world, as a class who are excused from the charge of conscious imposture only on the theory of their being incurably silly and fanatical.

In the denominations which most practice the so-called "revival measures," abundance of facts obtrude themselves which are conclusive enough to open the eyes of the blind and the ears of the deaf. Instances may be found, where annual additions have been reported, such that, if the sums were taken, and only subjected to a fair deduction for deaths and removals, these churches should number hundreds, or even a thousand members, and should be in a splendid state of prosperity. But the same church-reports still set these churches down as containing fifty or seventy members. Others, which have been boasting these magnificent processes, are moribund, and some have been "revived" to death.

But the men who work this machinery, notwithstanding the fatal condemnation of the facts, are not blind! What are the causes of their perseverance in methods so worthless? One cause is, doubtless, an honest, but ignorant zeal. In the bustle and heat of this zeal, they overlook the unpleasant facts, and still go on, "supposing that they verily do God service." Another subtle and far-reaching cause is an erroneous, synergistic theology. The man who believes in the efficient coöperation of the sinner's will with the divine will, in the initial quickening of his soul, will, of course, seek to stimulate that human will to the saving acts by all the same expedients by which men seek to elude in their fellows carnal acts of will. Why not? Why should not the evangelist practice to evoke that act of will from

the man on which he believes the saving action of the Almighty pivots, by the same kind of arts the recruiting sergeant practices—the martial song, the thrilling fife and palpitating drum, the spectacular display of previous recruits in their shining new uniforms—until the young yeoman has “committed” himself by taking the “queen’s shilling”? That volition settles it that the queen is to make him her soldier. It must be the youth’s decision, but, when once made for a moment, it decides his state. Thus a synergistic theology fosters these “revival measures,” as they, in turn, incline towards a synergistic creed. Doubtless, many ministers are unconsciously swayed by the natural love of excitement. This is the same instinct which leads school-boys and clowns to run to witness a dog-fight, Spaniards to the cock-fight and the bull-fight, sporting men to the pugilist’s ring, and theatre-goers to the comedy. This natural instinct prompts many an evangelist, without his being distinctly aware of it, to prefer the stirring scenes of the spurious revival to the sober, quiet, laborious work of religious teaching. But it is obvious that this motive is as unworthy as it is natural.

Another motive which prompts men to persevere in these demonstrably futile methods is the desire to count large and immediate results. To this they are spurred by inconsiderate, but honest zeal, and by the partisan rivalries of their denominations. These unworthy motives they sanctify to themselves, and thus conceal from their own consciences the real complexion of them. No word is needed to show how unwise and unsuitable they are to the Christian minister. Here should be pointed out the intrinsic weakness of the current system of employing travelling revivalists in settled churches. No matter how orthodox the man may be, the very nature of his task lays a certain urgency and stress upon him, to show, somehow, immediate results before the close of his meeting. If he does not, the very ground of his vocation as a “revivalist” is gone. He has been sent for to do this one thing, to gratify the hopes, zeal and pride of the good people by, at least, a show of immediate fruits. If he fails in this, he will not be sent for. This is too strong a temptation for any mere mortal to endure without yielding. But the prime fact which decides all true results of gospel means is, that the Holy Ghost alone is the Agent of effectual calling; and

He is sovereign. His new-creating breath "bloweth where it listeth." His command to the sower of the word may be expressed in Solomon's words: "In the morning sow thy seed; and in the evening hold not thy hand; for *thou* knowest not which shall prosper, whether this or that." The best minister on earth may be appointed by God's secret purpose to the sad mission given to Isaiah, to Jeremiah, and even to their Lord during his earthly course, "to stretch forth their hands all the day long to a disobedient and gainsaying people." Hence, this evangelist has put himself under an almost fatal temptation to resort to some illicit expedients which will produce, in appearance, immediate results. How few, even of the orthodox, escape that temptation!

An old and shrewd practitioner of these human means of religious excitements, was once asked by a man of the world, "if it were possible he could be blind to the futility of most of the pretended conversions?" The answer was: "Of course not; we are not fools." "Why then," said the man, "do you employ these measures?" The preacher answered: "Because a few are truly converted, and make stable, useful Christians; and the rest when they find out the shallowness of their experiences, are simply where they were before." The worldly-wise preacher's statement involved two capital errors. It assumed that the "revival measures" were the effective instruments of the conversion of the genuine few; and that without these expedients they would have remained out of Christ. This is utterly false. The solid conversion of those souls took place not by cause of, but in spite of, the human expedients. The work was the result of sober Christian example, and previous didactic teaching in gospel truths, and had there been no "revival measures" these souls would have come out for Christ, perhaps a little later, but more intelligently and decisively. The mistake as to the second class, "the stony ground believers," is far more tragical. *They are not left where they were before*; "the last state of these men is worse than the first." I will not repeat the explanation of the depraving influences sure to be exerted upon the heart; but I will add one still more disastrous result. These deceptive processes usually *end in making the subjects infidels*. Some who keep their names on the communion rolls are secret infidels;

nearly all who withdraw their names are open infidels, unless they are too unthinking and ignorant to reflect and draw inferences. First, every young person who has a spark of self-respect is mortified at being thrust into a false position, especially on so high and solemn a subject. Pride is wounded. He feels that he has been imposed on, and resents it. This wounded pride, unwilling to take the blame on itself, directs its anger against the agents of the mortifying cheat. But to despise the representatives of Christianity is practically very near to despising Christianity. The most earnest and clear-minded of these temporary converts has now what appears to him, with a terrible plausibility, the experimental argument to prove that evangelical religion is a deception. He says he knows he was honest and sincere in the novel exercises to which he was subjected, and in a sense he says truly. The religious teachers themselves assured him, in the name of God, that they were genuine works of grace. Did they not formally publish in the religious journals that it was the Holy Spirit's work? If these appointed teachers do not know, who can? Yet now this backslider says himself, "I have the stubborn proof of a long and sad experience, a prayerless and godless life, that there never was any real spiritual change in me." Who can be more earnest than he was? It is, then, the logical conclusion, that all supposed cases of regeneration are deceptive. "Many," he says, "have had the honesty like myself to come out of the church candidly, shoulder the mortification of their mistake, and avow the truth." Those who remain "professors" are to be accounted for in two ways. The larger part know in their hearts just as well as we do, that their exercises were always a cheat, but they prefer to *live a lie*, rather than make the humiliating avowal, and for these we feel only contempt. The minority remain honestly self-deceived by reason of impressible and enthusiastic temperaments. For these, if they are social and moral, and do not cant, we can feel most kindly, and respect their amiable delusion. It would be unkind to distrust it. This reasoning having led them to discredit entirely the work of the Holy Ghost, leads next to the denial of his personality. The backslider sinks to the ranks of a gross Socinian, or becomes a Deist or an Agnostic. Let the history of our virtual infidels be examined and their early reli-

gious life traced ; here will be found the source and cause of their error. "Their name is Legion." He who inquires of the openly ungodly adults of our land, will be astounded to find how large a majority of them were once in the church. They conceal, as well as they can, what they regard as the "disgraceful episode" in their history. Their attitude is that of silent, but cold and impregnable skepticism, based, as they think, on the argument of actual experience. In fact, spurious revivals we honestly regard as the chief bane of our Protestantism. We believe that they are the chief cause, under the prime source, original sin, which has deteriorated the average standard of holy living, principles, and morality, and the church discipline of our religion, until it has nearly lost its practical power over the public conscience. Striking the average of the whole nominal membership of the Protestant churches, the outside world does not credit us for any higher standard than we are in the habit of ascribing to the Synagogue, and to American Popery. How far is the world wrong in its estimate? That denomination which shall sternly use its ecclesiastical authority, under Christ's law, to inhibit these human methods and to compel its teachers back to the scriptural and only real means, will earn the credit of being the defender of an endangered gospel.

One corollary from this discussion is: How perilous is it to entrust the care of souls to an ignorant zeal! None but an educated ministry can be expected, humanly speaking, to resist the seductions of the "revival measures," or to guard themselves from the plausible blunders we have analyzed above. And the church which entrusts the care of souls to lay-evangelists, self-appointed and irresponsible to the ecclesiastical government appointed by Christ, betrays its charge and duty.

No man is fit for the care of souls, except he is deeply imbued with scriptural piety and grace. He must have a faith firm as a rock, and humble as strong, with profound submission to the divine will, which will calm him amidst all delays and all discouragements that God will bless his own word in his own chosen time. He must have that self-abnegation which will make him willing to bear the evil repute of an unfruitful ministry, if the Lord so ordains, and unblenchingly refuse to resort

to any unauthorized means to escape this cross. He must have the moral courage to withstand that demand of ill-considered zeal in his brethren, parallel to the *ardor purus civium juvenium* in politics. He must have the unflagging diligence and love for souls which will make him persevere in preaching the gospel publicly, and from house to house, under the delay of fruit. Nothing can give these except large measures of grace and prayer.

ANTI-BIBLICAL THEORIES OF RIGHTS.¹

WHEN the friends of the Bible win a victory over one phase of infidelity, they naturally hope that there will be a truce in the warfare and they may enjoy peace. But the hope is ill-founded. We should have foreseen this, had we considered that the real source of infidelity is always in the pride, self-will and ungodliness of man's nature. So that, when men are defeated on one line of attack, a part of them at least will be certainly prompted by their natural enmity to God's Word to hunt for some other weapon against it. Rational deism, from Bolingbroke to Hume, received a Waterloo defeat at the hands of Bishop Butler and the other Christian apologists, and well-informed enemies surrendered it. But neology raised its head, and for two generations opened a way for virtual infidels. History and biblical criticism in the hands of the Bengels, Delitzschs, Leuthards, have blocked that way, and Tübingen is silent, or at least discredited. Then came the anti-Mosaic geology and evolution—the one attacking the recent origin of man, the flood, etc., the other presuming to construct a creation without a creator. These two are now passing into the "sere and yellow leaf." More correct natural science now points with certainty to a deluge, to the recency of the last glacial epoch, the newness of the present face of the continents, and consequently to the late appearance of man upon the earth. Agassiz, M. Paul Janet and Sir William Dawson reinstate the doctrines of final cause and fixed genera of organic life upon their impregnable basis.

But we may expect no respite in the warfare. Another hostile banner is already unfurled, and has gathered its millions of unbelievers for a new attack upon God's Holy Word. This assault proceeds from the side of professed social science. It appears

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dogmas of social rights which are historically known as the Jacobinical, and which have been transferred from the atheistic French radicals to the free Protestant countries. The object of the Scriptures is to teach the way of redemption and sanctification for sinful man; yet incidentally they teach, by precept and implication, those equitable principles on which all constitutional governments are founded. So far as God gave to the chosen people a political form, the one which he preferred was a confederation of little republican bodies represented by their elderships. (Ex. xviii. 25, 26; Ex. iii. 16; Num. xi. 16, 17; Num. xxxii. 20-27.)

When he conceded to them, as it were under protest, a regal form, it was a constitutional and elective monarchy. (1 Sam. x. 24, 25.) The rights of each tribe were secured against vital infringement of this constitution by its own veto power. They retained the prerogative of protecting themselves against the usurpations of the elective king by withdrawing at their own sovereign discretion from the confederation. (1 Kings, xii. 13-16.)

The history of the secession of the ten tribes under Jeroboam is often misunderstood through gross carelessness. No divine disapprobation is anywhere expressed against the ten tribes for exercising their right of withdrawal from the perverted federation. When Rehoboam began a war of coercion he was sternly forbidden by God to pursue it. (1 Kings, xii. 24.)

The act by which "Jeroboam made Israel to sin against the Lord" was wholly another and subsequent one—his meddling with the divinely appointed constitution of the church to promote merely political ends. (1 Kings, xii. 26-28.)

Thus, while the Bible history does not prohibit stronger forms of government as sins *per se*, it indicates God's preference for the representative republic as distinguished from the levelling democracy; and to this theory of human rights all its moral teachings correspond. On the one hand, it constitutes civil society of superiors, inferiors and equals (see Shorter Catechism, Question 64), making the household represented by the parent and master the integral unit of the social fabric, assigning to each order, higher or lower, its rule or subordination under the distributive equity of the law. On the other hand, it protected

each order in its legal privileges, and prohibited oppression and injustice as to all.

In a word, the maxim of the scriptural social ethics may be justly expressed in the great words of the British Constitution, "Peer and peasant are equal before the law," which were the guide of a Pym, a Hampden, a Sydney, a Locke, a Chatham, and equally of Hancock, Adams, Washington, Mason and Henry. Their theory assigned to the different classes of human beings in the commonwealth different grades of privilege and of function, according to their different natures and qualifications; but it held that the inferior is shielded in his right to his smaller franchise, by the same relation to the common heavenly Father, by the same Golden Rule and the equitable right which shields the superior in the enjoyment of his larger powers. The functions and privileges of the peer are in some respects very different from those of the peasant; but the same law protects them both in their several rights, and commands them both as to their several duties. This theory thus established between all men a moral, but not a mechanical equality. Higher and lower hold alike the same relation to the supreme ruler and ordainer of the commonwealth, God; yet they hold different relations to each other in society, corresponding to their differing capacities and fitnesses, which equity itself demands. Job understood this maxim of Bible republicanism, as he shows (chap. xxxi. 13, 14, 15): "If I did despise the cause of my man-servant or of my maid-servant, when they contended with me; what, then, shall I do when God riseth up? and when he visiteth, what shall I answer him? Did not he that made me in the womb make him?" So Paul, two thousand years later (Eph. vi. 9; Col. iv. 1). *Κύριοι* give to your *δούλοι* those things which are just and equal. The two teach the same doctrine. On the one hand, they assert the relation of superior and inferior, with their unequal franchises; on the other hand, they assert in the same breath the equal moral obligation of both as bearing the common relation to the one divine maker and judge.

The radical social theory asserts, under the same name, a totally different doctrine; its maxim is "all men are born free and equal." It supposes the social fabric constituted of individuals naturally absolute and sovereign as its integers, and

this by some sort of social contract, in entering which individual men act with a freedom equally complete as to God and each other. It defines each one's natural liberty as freedom to do whatever he wishes, and his civil liberty, after he optionally enters society, as that remainder of his natural prerogative not surrendered to the social contract. Consequently the theory teaches that exactly the same surrender must be exacted of each one under this social contract, whence each individual is inalienably entitled to all the same franchises and functions in society as well as to his moral equality; so that it is a natural iniquity to withhold from any adult person by law any prerogative which is legally conferred on any other member in society. The equality must be mechanical as well as moral, else the society is charged with natural injustice.

Every fair mind sees that this is not only a different but an opposite social theory. Yet its advocates are accustomed to advance it as the equivalent of the other, to teach it under the same nomenclature, and to assert that the difference between them is purely visionary. So widespread and profound is this confusion of thought, that the majority of the American people and of their teachers practically know and hold no other theory than the Jacobin one. They assume, as a matter of course, that it is this theory which is the firm logical basis of constitutional government; whereas history and science show that it is a fatal heresy of thought, which uproots every possible foundation of just freedom, and grounds only the most ruthless despotism. But none the less is this the passionate belief of millions, for the sake of which they are willing to assail the Bible itself.

The least reflection points out that this theory involves the following corollaries: (1), There can be no just imputation of the consequences of conduct from one human being to another in society; (2), No adult person can be justly debarred from any privilege allowed to any other person in the order or society, except for conviction of crime; (3), All distinctions of "caste" are essentially and inevitably wicked and oppressive; (4), Of course every adult is equally entitled to the franchise of voting and being voted for, and all restrictions here, except for the conviction of crime, are natural injustice; (5), Equal rights and suffrage ought to be conceded to women in every respect as to

men. If any advocate of the Jacobin theory recoils from this corollary, he is absolutely inconsistent, by reason of his bondage to former prejudices and unreasoning habits of thought: so argues John Stuart Mill irrefragably in his treatise on the *Subjection of Women*. If the Jacobin theory be true, then woman must be allowed access to every male avocation, including government, and war if she wishes it, to suffrage, to every political office, to as absolute freedom from her husband in the marriage relation as she enjoyed before her union to him, and to as absolute control of her own property and earnings as that claimed by the single gentleman, as against her own husband. That Mill infers correctly from his premises needs no arguing. If it is a just principle that no adult male shall be debarred from suffrage or office by reason of "race, color, or previous condition of bondage," then indisputably no adult female can be justly debarred from them by reason of sex, or previous legal subjection under the "common law." If it is a natural injustice to debar an adult male from these rights because of a black or yellow face, it must be an equal injustice to debar other adults because of a beardless face. If kinky hair should not disfranchise, then by parative reasoning flowing tresses should not disfranchise. (5). Last, if the Jacobin theory be true, then slavery in all its forms must be essentially unrighteous; of which institution the essential feature is, that citizens are invested with property in the involuntary labor of adult human beings, and control over their persons. The absolute necessity of this corollary is now asserted by all who hold the Jacobin theory intelligently: as, for instance, by Mr. Mill. They invariably deduce their doctrine from those principles, and they say, that since those principles are established, argument on the subject of human bondage is absolutely closed; and history gives this curious illustration of the necessity of this logical connection; that the first application of the doctrine of theoretical abolitionism ever made was that applied by Robespierre, the master of the French Jacobins, to the French colonies. We are told that he prided himself much on his political philosophy, and that one day when he was expounding it in the national assembly, some one said: "Monsieur, those dogmas, if carried out, would require the emancipation of all the Africans in the

colonies, which would, of course, ruin those precious appendages of France." To which he angrily replied: "Then let the colonies perish, rather than this social philosophy shall be denied." Of which the result was, in fact, the St. Domingo of to-day.

Now my purpose in this essay is not at all to discuss these two theories of human rights, or to refute the latter and establish the former. Although such discussion would strictly belong to the science of moral philosophy, and is indeed a vital part thereof, the fastidious might perhaps deem it unfit for a theological review in these "piping times of peace." My sole object is to examine the scriptural question, whether or not the integrity of the Bible can be made to consist with the Jacobin theory and its necessary corollaries; and this inquiry is purely religious and theological. The Christian church as such has no direct didactic concern with it, and no legislative and judicial concern with it, except as it furnishes infidelity weapons to assail God's Word. Our church has always properly held, that whenever any science so-called, whether psychological, moral, or even physical, is used to assail the integrity of the rule of faith, that use at once makes the defensive discussion of that hostile science a theological function, both proper and necessary for the church. I cite from our Confession a notable instance: For centuries the psychological problem concerning the rise of volition has been debated between philosophers, the Scotists approving, and the Thomists denying, the equilibrium and self-determination of the will. The Westminster Assembly perceived that the Scotists' psychology was employed to sophisticate the revealed doctrines of original sin and effectual calling. They, therefore, in Chap. ix., "Of Free Will," determine and settle so much of this doctrine of psychology as is needed to substantiate the Scriptures. So, recently, our Assembly, upon perceiving that a doctrine of mere physical science, evolution, was liable to be used for impugning the testimony of Scripture, dealt with that foreign doctrine both didactically and judicially. They were consistent. For, I repeat, whenever any doctrine from any whither is employed to assail that divine testimony which our Lord has committed to the church, there the defensive discussion of that doctrine has become theological, and is an obligatory part of the church's divine testimony.

But my purpose does not go so far as even this. My object is merely to point out the coming contest, and to warn the defenders of the faith of its certainty. My wish is to make all Christians face this plain question: Will you surrender the inspiration of the Scriptures to these assaults of a social science so-called? If not, what? That the issue has been made and must be met, I shall show by laying two sets of facts alongside of each other. One is, that the Jacobin theory, already held by millions and confidently claiming for itself all the honors of republicanism and liberty, does assert, and must assert, all the corollaries above stated. The other set of facts is, that the Scriptures deny every one of them, and that with a fatal distinctness which no honest exposition can evade. Doubtless, during this long and tremendous conflict we shall see the same thing repeated which we have seen in recent decades: timid and uncandid minds, anxious still to "ride a fence" after it is totally blown away by the hurricane of anti-christian attack, attempting to reconcile opposites by various exegetical wriggings. But we shall again see it end in futility, and candid assailant and candid defender will both agree that the Bible means what it says, and must either fall squarely or must stand by the overthrow of all attacking parties. The rest of our work will therefore be little more than the examination of the actual teachings of Scripture.

1. The Jacobin theory totally repudiates all imputation of the consequences of moral conduct from one person to another as irrational and essentially unjust. It declares that "imputed guilt is imputed nonsense." From its premises it must declare thus, for it asserts that each individual enters social existence as an independent integer, possessed of complete natural liberty and full equality. But the Bible scheme of social existence is full of this imputation. I shall not dwell upon the first grand case, the sin and fall of the race in Adam, although it is still determining, in a tremendous manner, the conditions of each individual's entrance into social existence. I add other instances, some of which are equally extensive. "The woman was first in the transgression," for which God laid upon Eve two penalties (Gen. iii. 16), subordination to her husband and the sorrows peculiar to motherhood. The New Testament declares (1 Tim. ii. 11 to end) that it is right her daughters shall continue to en-

duce these penalties to the end of the world. (See also 1 Peter, iii. 1-6.) In Genesis ix. 25-27, Ham, the son of Noah, is guilty of an unfilial crime. His posterity are condemned with him and share the penalty to this day. In Ex. xx. 5, God declares that he will visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generations. Amalek met Israel in the time of his flight and distress with robbery and murder, instead of hospitality. Not only were the immediate actors punished by Joshua, but the descendants of Amalek are excluded forever from the house of the Lord, for the crime of their fathers. (Deut. xxv. 19.) It is needless to multiply instances, except one more, which shall refute the favorite dream of the rationalists that Jesus substituted a milder and juster law. For this Jesus said to the Jews of his own day (Matt. xxiii. 32-36): "Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers: . . . that upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar. Verily I say unto you, all these things shall come upon this generation." We thus find this principle of imputation extended into the New Testament, by the authority of Jesus himself, as a just principle.

2. Whereas Jacobinism asserts that no privilege or franchise enjoyed by some adults in the state can be justly withheld from any other order of adults, God's word entirely discards this rule. Not to speak of the subordination of women and domestic bondage (of which more anon), God distributed the franchises unequally in the Hebrew commonwealth. The priestly family possessed, by inheritance, certain teaching and ruling functions which the descendants of no other tribe could share. There was a certain law of primogeniture, entitled the right of the first-born, which the younger sons did not share equally, and which the father himself could not alienate. (Deut. xxi. 15, 16.) The fathers of houses (Ex. xviii. 21; Josh. xxii. 14), in virtue of their patriarchal authority, held a senatorial dignity, and this evidently for life. (See also the history of Barzillai.)

In the New Testament, the apostle Peter (1 Eph. ii. 13) enjoins Christians to submit themselves "to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the king as supreme, or unto

governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers and for the praise of them that do well." Here a distribution of powers between different ranks, emperor, proconsuls, and subjects, is distinctly recognized. "Render, therefore, to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor." (Rom. xiii. 7.) "Likewise, also, these filthy dreamers defile the flesh, despise dominion, and speak evil of dignities." (Jude, 8.)

3. Nothing is more obnoxious to the principles of Jacobinism than what it denounces as "caste." It delights to use this word because it is freighted with bad associations derived from the stories we hear of the oppressive hereditary distinctions of the people in Hindostan. Of course there is a sense in which every just conscience reprehends inequalities of caste. This is where they are made pretext for depriving an order or class of citizens of privileges which belong to them of right, and for whose exercise they are morally and intellectually qualified. But this is entirely a different thing from saying that all the different orders of persons in a state are naturally and morally entitled to all the same privileges, whether qualified or not, simply because they are men and adults. The Jacobin trick of sophistry is to confound these different propositions together; and when they denounce "wicked caste," the application they make of their denunciation includes not only oppressive inequalities, but every difference in the distribution of powers and privileges. Now, the Scriptures recognize and ordain such distribution; or, if the reader pleases, such distinctions of caste in the latter sense. Such is the stubborn fact. Thus, in the Hebrew commonwealth, the descendants of Levi were disfranchised of one privilege which belonged to all their brethren of the other tribes; and enfranchised with another privilege from which all their brethren were excluded. A Levite could not hold an inch of land in severalty. (Num. xviii. 22, 23.) No member of another tribe, not even of the princely tribe of Judah, could perform even the lowest function in the tabernacle. (Heb. vii. 13, 14.) These differences are nowhere grounded in any statement that the children of Levi were more or less intelligent and religious than their fellow-citizens. Another "caste distinction" appears among the descendants of Levi himself. The sons

of Aaron alone could offer sacrifices or incense in the sanctuary. The Levites could only be underlings or assistants to their brethren the priests. Among the sons of Aaron another hereditary distinction presents itself. The individual who had the right of the first born took the high priesthood, with its superior prerogatives. He alone could go into the Holy of Holies. He alone could offer the sacrifice on the great annual day of atonement. But this privilege was limited by a certain hereditary disqualification. He could only marry a virgin (Lev. xxi. 13, 14), and was forbidden to marry a widow (as his fellow-citizens might legally do), however virtuous and religious. A "caste distinction" is also found among the bondmen, whose subjection was legalized by the constitution. A person of Hebrew blood could only be enslaved for six years. A person of foreign blood could be held in hereditary slavery, although born within the land of Israel as much as the other. It was also provided that the treatment of bondmen of Hebrew blood should be more lenient. (Lev. xxv. 42-47.) A "caste distinction" was also provided concerning the entrance of persons of foreign blood into the Hebrew state and church. (Exodus xvii. 16; Deut. xxiii. 3-8.) The descendants of Amalek were forever inhibited. The descendants of Ammon and Moab were debarred to the tenth generation. The Egyptians and Edomites could be admitted at the third generation; the one, because their patriarch Esau was brother to Jacob, the other, because the Israelites had once lived in Egypt.

Let the inference from these histories be clearly understood. It is not claimed that these caste distinctions established by God himself obligate us positively to establish similar distinctions in our day. But the fact that God once saw fit to establish them does prove that they cannot be essentially sinful. To assert that they are, impugns the righteousness of God. Whence it follows, in direct opposition to the Jacobin theory, that should suitable circumstances again arise such "caste distinctions" may be righteous. It will be exclaimed that the New Testament reversed all this. We shall be reminded of Paul's famous declaration (Col. iii. 11): "Where there is neither Jew nor Greek, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free, but Christ is all and in all"; or this (Gal. iii. 28): "There is

neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female, for ye are all one in Christ Jesus." But before a literal and mechanical equality can be inferred from these, it must be settled what the Holy Spirit meant by being "one in Christ," and whether the parts which are combined to construct a component unity are not always unequal instead of equal. The latter is certainly the apostle's teaching when he compares the spiritual body to the animal body, with many members of dissimilar honor. The apostle himself demonstrates that he never designed the levelling sense to be put upon his words by proceeding after he had uttered them to subject women in one sense to an inequality by imposing upon them ecclesiastical subordination, and even a different dress, in the church. The Scriptures thus teach that all distinctions of caste are not unjust in the sense charged by the current theory.

4. God's commonwealth was not founded on universal suffrage. That he rejected the Jacobinical principle is plain from the history of the Gibeonites. They were exempted by covenant with Joshua from the doom of extinction, and retained a title to homes for many generations upon the soil of Palestine, and, as we see from 2 Sam. xxi. 6, they were very carefully protected in certain rights by the government. They were not domestic slaves, neither were they fully enfranchised citizens. From the higher franchises of that rank they were shut out by a hereditary disqualification, and this was done by God's express enactment. (Josh. ix. 27.) This instance impinges against the Jacobin theory in two other ways, indicated in our second and third heads. Individual descendants of the Gibeonites, however law-abiding and gifted with natural capacity, did not enjoy "*la carrière ouverte aux talents*" equally with the young Israelites, which the Jacobin theory demands indiscriminately as the inalienable right of all. And to make the matter worse, the Scripture declares that this disqualification descended by imputation from the guilt of the first generation's paganism and fraud upon Joshua.

5. We have shown that the claim known as that of women's rights is an inevitable corollary of the radical theory. Our purpose here is not to debate the wisdom or equity of that claim, but to show what God thinks of it. In Gen. iii. 16, he legislates

for Eve as the representative of all her daughters, putting her in subordination to the authority of her husband: "Thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee." If a Hebrew landholder had male descendants when he died, his daughters inherited no share in his land. They could inherit land in cases where there was no male heir. And this was the legislation, not of Moses, but of God himself. (Num. xxvii. 8.) It is more decisive to add, that the New Testament continues to assign subordination to women. 1 Cor. xi. 3: "The head of the woman is the man." 1 Cor. xiv. 34: "Let your women keep silence in the churches, for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but they are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law." Eph. v. 22-24: "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord, for the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church. . . . Therefore as the church is subject unto Christ, so let the wives be to their own husbands in everything." 1 Tim. ii. 11, 12: "Let the woman learn in silence, with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence," (*οὐδὲ ἀθροιστεῖν ἀνδρὸς*, "nor to dominate man." The concept of usurpation is only implicit in the Greek verb.) 1 Tim. v. 14: "I will, therefore, that the younger women marry, bear children, guide the house, give none occasion to the adversary to speak reproachfully." Titus, ii. 4, 5: "That they may teach the young women to be sober, to love their husbands, to love their children, to be discreet, chaste, keepers at home, good, obedient to their own husbands, that the word of God be not blasphemed." 1 Pet. iii. 1, 5, 6: "Likewise, ye wives, be in subjection to your own husbands, that if any obey not the word they also without the word may be won by the conversation of the wives; for after this manner in the old time the holy women also, who trusted in God, adorned themselves, being in subjection to their own husbands, even as Sarah obeyed Abraham, calling him lord."

Thus, explicit and repeated, are the precepts of the Scripture on this head. In the new dispensation they are even plainer than in the old. How many thousands of women are there, professed members of Christ's church, who rid themselves of all these precepts with a disdainful toss, saying: "Oh! Paul was but

a crusty old bachelor. It was the men who legislated thus in their pride of sex. Had women written, all would have been different." I would request such fair reasoners to look this question steadily in the face. Is this the legislation of men, or of God speaking by men? If they say the former, is not this virtual infidelity? If the latter, had they not better take care, "lest haply they be found even fighting against God." instead of against a "crusty old bachelor"?

One of the weak evasions attempted is to plead that this subordination of the women of Peter's and Paul's day was enjoined only because of their low grade of intelligence and morality, these female Christians being supposed to be but sorry creatures, recently converted from paganism. The apostles refute this, as does church history, both of which give the highest praise to the Christian women of the primitive church. Especially does the apostle Peter ruin this sophism when he illustrates the duty of obedience by the godly example of the noblest princesses of Israel's heroic age.

6. The sixth and last issue between Jacobinism and the inspiration of Scripture is concerning the lawfulness of domestic slavery. The two sides of this issue are defined with perfect sharpness. The political theory says the subjection of one human being in bondage to another, except for conviction of crime, is essentially and always unrighteous. The Scriptures indisputably declare, in both Testaments, that it is not always essentially unrighteous, since they legitimate it under suitable circumstances, and declare that godly masters may so hold the relation as to make it equitable and righteous. I shall not now go fully into the scriptural argument on this point, because my whole object is gained by showing that the contradiction exists, without discussing which side has the right, and because I have so fully discussed the whole question in my *Defence of Virginia and the South*. It is only necessary to name the leading facts: (a,) That God predicted the rise of the institution of domestic bondage as the penalty and remedy for the bad morals of those subjected to it (Gen. ix. 25); (b,) That God protects property in slaves, exactly as any other kind of property, in the sacred Decalogue itself (Exod. xx. 17); (c,) That numerous slaves were bestowed on Abraham, the "friend of God," as marks of the

favor of divine providence (Gen. xxiv. 35); (*d*,) That the relation of master and bondman was sanctified by the administration of a divine sacrament, which the bondman received on the ground of the master's faith (Gen. xvii. 27); (*e*,) That the angel of the covenant himself remanded a fugitive slave, Hagar, to her mistress, but afterwards assisted her in the same journey when legally manumitted (Gen. xxi. 17-21); (*f*,) That the civil laws of Moses expressly allowed Hebrew citizens to purchase pagans as life-long and hereditary slaves (Lev. xxv. 44-46); (*g*,) That the law declares such slaves (that is, their involuntary labor) to be property. The reader is advised to consult here the irrefragable exegesis of Dr. Moses Stuart of Andover. He will see that this argument is no construction of sectional prejudice. The New Testament left the institution with precisely the same sanction as the Old. Were there any ground for the plea that the Old Testament also legalized polygamy and capricious divorce, which we now regard as immoral, this fact would utterly refute it. For while the New Testament prohibited these wrongs, it left slavery untouched. But I also deny that the Old Testament anywhere legalized polygamy and capricious divorce. To charge it in the sense of this evasive plea impugns the inspiration of Moses and the prophets. That is to say, it is virtual infidelity. And this infidel assault upon Moses and the prophets equally attacks Christ and his apostles. It is vain to advance the theory (which is but the old Socinian theory) that the New Testament corrected and amended whatever was harsh or barbarous in the Old. For, in the first place, I utterly deny the assertion. The New Testament left the relation of master and bondman just where Moses placed it. And, in the second place, Jesus and his apostles expressly guarantee the inspiration of Moses, without any reservation (see Luke xvi. 31; John v. 46; Luke xxiv. 26, 27; 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17; John xii. 36; Acts, xxviii. 25; Heb. iii. 7; 2 Peter i. 21), so that they have embarked their credit as divine and infallible teachers along with that of Moses. Both must stand or fall together. Whenever a person declares that whatsoever he speaks is given to him to speak from God (John xvii. 8), and then assures us that another person has spoken infallibly and divinely, upon ascertaining that the latter has in fact spoken erroneously and immorally, we can only con-

demn the former as both mistaken and dishonest. (The blasphemy is not mine!) This stubborn corollary every clear mind must draw sooner or later, and not all the rationalistic glozings of deceitful exegesis can prevent it. He who attacks the inspiration of Moses attacks also the inspiration and the moral character of Jesus. "No man can serve two masters." Let every one make up his mind honestly either to reject the Bible as a fable, and thus preserve his Jacobin humanitarianism, or frankly to surrender the latter in order to retain the gospel.

But let us see what the New Testament says concerning the relation of master and bondman. It does indeed command all, if they assume this relation, to fulfil it in a Christian spirit, in the fear of an impartial God. (Eph. vi. 9.) It also prohibits all unrighteous abuses of the relation, whether by masters (Col. iv. 1) or by bondmen. (Col. iii. 22-25.) Slave-holders, like the godly centurion (Luke vii. 2-9) and Cornelius (Acts x. 34, 35), are commended for their Christian consistency, without a word of caution or exception, on account of this relation. The Redeemer, in Luke xvii. 7-10, grounds his argument to prove that not even the truest Christian obedience can bring God in our debt, upon a logical analogy, whose very point is that the master is legally invested with a prior title to, and property in, the labor of his bondman. In the beautiful parable of the prodigal son (Luke xv. 19), when Christ would illustrate the thoroughness of his contrition, he does it by using the acknowledged fact that the condition of the hired servant in the slave-holder's household was the lowest and least privileged, *i. e.*, the *δοῦλος* was above the *μισθωτός*. The apostles enjoin on bondmen conscientious service to their masters, even when unjust (1 Pet. ii. 18, 19); but so much the more willing and conscientious when those masters are brother members in the Christian church. (1 Tim. vi. 1, 2.) The Apostle Paul holds that, if masters do their duty, the relation may be lawfully continued, and is just and equitable. The Apostle Paul remands a fugitive slave to his master Philemon, after that slave's conversion, and that although he is at the time in great need of the assistance of such a servant. And so distinctly does he recognize Philemon's lawful property in the involuntary labor of his fugitive slave that he actually binds himself, in writing, to pay its pecuniary value himself, that

thereby he may gain free forgiveness for Onesimus. In 1 Tim. vi. 3-5, the apostle condemns such as would dare to dispute the righteous obligation of even Christian bondmen, as proud, ignorant, perverse, contentious, untruthful, corrupt in mind and mercenary; and he requires believers to separate themselves from such teachers.

The glosses which attempt to evade these clear declarations are well known. They assert that, though Christ and his apostles knew that the relation was intrinsically wicked, they forbore to condemn it expressly, on account of its wide prevalence, the jealousy of owners, the dangers of popular convulsions and politic caution; while they secretly provided for its extinction by inculcating gospel principles in general. Such is the most decent reconciliation, which even the pious and evangelical Scott can find between his Bible and his politics. Every perspicacious mind sees that it is false to all the facts of the history, dishonorable to Christ, and inconsistent with all true conceptions of his inspiration and Messiahship. He and his apostles absolutely deny that they keep back any precept from any consideration of policy or caution. (John xvii. 8; Acts xx. 20, 27.) They expressly repudiate this theory of their mission, as though they had this deceitful theory then before their eyes. They invariably attack other evils, such as idolatry, polygamy, and impurity, which were far more prevalent and more strongly entrenched in prejudices than domestic slavery. They ground the spread and protection of their gospel on the omnipotence of God, not on the policy of men, and reject with a lofty and holy disdain all this species of paltering to sin which this gloss imputes to them.

The honest student, then, of the New Testament can make nothing less of its teachings on this point than that domestic slavery, as defined in God's word and practiced in the manner enjoined in the Epistles, is still a lawful relation under the new dispensation as well as under the old. Let me be allowed to pause here, and add a few words in explanation of the relation which the orthodox Presbyterian Church in America has always held to this subject. Since domestic bondage is a civic and secular relation, which God has declared may be lawfully held under suitable conditions, the church may not prohibit it cate-

gorically to her members, nor may she interfere with the commonwealth by her spiritual authority, either to institute it or to abolish it. Had her Lord declared it to be intrinsically sinful, then it would have been her duty to prohibit it to her members, and to enforce this prohibition by her spiritual discipline, in spite of the commonwealth's allowance, or even positive injunction. The church and her presbyters, then, have no concern to favor or oppose this civic relation, but only to protect the integrity of her divine rule of faith as involved in the debate concerning it. Her only other concern with it is so to evangelize masters and bondmen as to make the relation a blessing to both, and to retrench all its sinful abuses. Now, then, if the opponents of this relation object to it and urge its overthrow on the ground that it is economically less profitable or less promotive of economic advantage than the hireling systems of labor, we, as presbyters, have nothing whatever to say, although fully aware that the testimony of facts and the government itself have repeatedly contradicted that position. Had its opponents claimed any legal or constitutional arguments entitling them to meddle with it or restrict it in States other than their own, we, as presbyters, should have been absolutely silent. Had its opponents asserted that we were grievously neglecting the duties of the relation and permitting abuses of it so as to impair the happiness of our dependent fellow-creatures, and to displease the God of the poor, we, as Christians, should have bowed meekly, as to the faithful rebuke of friends, and should have been thankful for their aid and instruction to teach us how to use the relation more righteously and mercifully. It is when they assert that the relation is intrinsically wicked, and that even its maintenance without abuses is to be condemned by the spiritual authority of the church and prevented by her discipline, that they obtrude the issue, and the one issue, which we, as presbyters, are entitled and bound to meet; for they thereby assail the morality, and thus the truth, of those Scriptures which God has given to the church as her testimony, which, if she does not uphold, she ceases to be a church, and "they teach for doctrines the commandments of men," which Christ prohibits his church either to do or to endure. What I thus declare concerning this last point of domestic bondage I now also assert

concerning the five previous ones. The church has no commission to advocate or to oppose any political doctrines, logical or illogical, Jacobinical, republican, or royalist, as such. It is only when they are so advanced as to taint the integrity of her divine rule of faith that they concern her, and then her concern is only to defend the testimony her Lord has committed to her, which she must do against "all comers," be their pretext what it may.

It is from this point of view that I say it behooves the watchmen upon the walls of Zion to consider and estimate the extent of the danger now arising from this source. If they observe intelligently they will see that peril is portentous. They will detect this radical theory of human rights and equality, born of atheism, but masquerading in the garb of true Bible republicanism, everywhere teaching corollaries—which they teach inevitably because they follow necessarily from their first principles—which contradict the express teachings of Scripture. We see this theory passionately held by millions of nominal Christians in the most Protestant lands, perhaps by the great majority of such, with the blind and passionate devotion of partizanship. Every sensible man knows the power of political partizanship as one of the most difficult things in the world to overcome, by either truth or conscience. Hence, we have no right to be surprised that this collision between the popular political theory, so flattering to the self-will and pride of the human heart, and so clad in the raiment of pretended philanthropy on the one part, and the Holy Scriptures on the other part, requiring men, as they do, to bow their pride and self-will to a divine authority, has become the occasion of tens of thousands making themselves blatant infidels, and of millions becoming virtual unbelievers. Those who wish to hold both the contradictories have indeed been busy for two generations weaving veils of special pleadings and deceitful expositions of Scripture wherewith to conceal the inevitable contradiction. But these veils are continually wearing too thin to hide it, and the bolder minds rend them one after another and cast them away. The only permanent effect of these sophisms is to damage the respectability of the Christian bodies and scholars who employ them, and to debauch their own intellectual honesty. Meantime, the authority

of Holy Scripture as an infallible rule of faith sinks lower and lower with the masses of Protestant Christendom. Is it not now a rarity to find a Christian of culture who reads his Bible with the full faith which his grandparents were wont to exercise; and when an educated man now-a-days avows that he still does so, does he not excite a stare from other Christians? The recent history of the church presents startling instances of this departure of her spiritual power and glory. When the fashion of the day betrayed the excellent Dr. Thomas Scott into the insertion of the wretched sophism exposed above in his commentary on the Epistles, the "Evangelical party" in the Anglican Church was powerful, respectable and useful. It stood in the forefront of English Christianity, boasting a galaxy of the greatest British divines, statesmen and scholars. Now who so poor as to do it reverence? Romanizers, Ritualists, Broad Churchmen, in the Anglican body, speak of it as a dead donkey, and glory over its impotency. So the great evangelical Baptist body was a glorious bulwark of the gospel in the days of Robert Hall, Ryland, and Andrew Fuller. To-day we see it so honey-combed with rationalism that Mr. Spurgeon can no longer give the Baptist Union the countenance of his orthodoxy; and he testifies that attacks may be heard from its pulpits upon every distinctively evangelical point. What is it that has so woefully tainted these once excellent bodies? Is not a part of the answer to be found here: that the Quaker Clarkson, with his pretended inner light his preferred guide rather than God's written word, and his Socinianizing theory of inspiration in attacking the British and New England slave trade (which deserved his attack), also attacked the relation of domestic servitude with indiscriminate rage, and supported his rationalism with arguments of human invention, piously borrowed even from French atheism? British Christianity, awakened at last to tardy remorse for the bad eminence of their race as the leading slave catchers of the world, was seized with a colic-spasm of virtue on that subject, and very naturally sought to atone for its iniquities in the one extreme by rushing into the other. Thus it not only aimed to seize the glory of suppressors of the African slave trade—a glory which belonged to Virginia, first of all the commonwealths of the world, by a prior title of forty years—but became fanatically aboli-

tionist. Then the problem for evangelical fanatics was how to reconcile their anti-scriptural dogma with the Scriptures. With this problem Exeter Hall Christianity has been wrestling for fifty years by the deplorable methods above described, and while they have not made the reconciliation, they have succeeded by those methods in making the world skeptical of their sincerity, and in sowing broadcast the seeds of a licentious rationalism. Their pupils, when taught to interpret the unpalatable political truth out of the declarations of Jesus, Moses and Paul, continue to use the same slippery methods to interpret the unpalatable theological truths also out of the Bible, as depravity, predestination, gratuitous justification, inability, eternal retribution.

The most sorrowful aspect of the matter is that, as fast as the candor of these Christians forces them to recognize the contradiction as real, they usually elect to throw their faith overboard rather than their politics. This election they not seldom carry out openly, but more often covertly and gradually, giving up first their faith in plenary inspiration, then in the Mosaic inspiration, at last in the Bible itself, and employing progressive forms of exegetical jugglery, to ease themselves down from the lower position to the lowest. Perhaps the most melancholy and notorious of such election is that seen in the great American divine and expositor, who has done more than any other Presbyterian to spread the humanitarian theology through the bulk of his denomination, whose doctrines indeed, overflowing the earlier and safer teachings of the senior Alexander and Hodge, have covered them out of sight in the present current of religious thought. This great man declares deliberately and solemnly in his published works, that were he shut up to the alternative between accepting the sense of Scripture so obvious to the old interpreters, which recognizes domestic servitude as a relation which may be lawful under suitable conditions, or of surrendering his political opinions on that subject, he should throw away his Bible in order to retain those opinions; and he solemnly warns that class of expositors represented by Drs. Hodge, Thornwell and N. L. Rice, that they had better stop their efforts to substantiate that exposition of Scripture, because if they succeeded the only effect would be, not to defend old institutions, but to drive all right-

minded Christians like himself into infidelity. Let the reader look also at the case of Bishop Colenso, who, when he had expended the whole learning and labor of his latter years in attacking the inspiration of the Old Testament, which in his ordination vows he had sworn to defend, expressly accounted for and justified his course by the fact that he had adopted the new humanitarian politics. The reader may see a more flagrant instance nearer home. Ingersoll, the son of an Old School Presbyterian minister, glories in trampling his father's Bible in the mire of foulest abuse. He tells the public that his abolitionism is a prime moving cause with him to spurn Christianity.

Such is the outlook. On the other side, adverse circumstances virtually paralyze all the human powers which should be arrayed in defence of the Bible. Doubtless, many divines remain in the countries and communions infected who see the truth and believe it. They are called conservative, and wish to be considered so. But the only element of conservatism which they call into action at this critical juncture is caution, a caution which prevents their jeopardizing their own quiet and prosperity by coming to the front and meeting the insolent aggression of the new opinions. They dissent, but practically they acquiesce. They commit the same mistake in tactics which General Charles Lee committed one hundred and ten years ago at the battle of Monmouth, and which he himself expressed so pungently in his impertinent reply to his commanding general. When Washington met him retiring instead of attacking, as he had been ordered, he asked him, with stern dignity: "General Lee, what does this mean?" To which the witty Englishman replied: "I suppose it means that I am imbued with rather too much of that rascally virtue, caution, in which your excellency is known to excel." Washington was cautious, but he knew when to be cautious and when overcaution became the most fearful rashness, and vigorous audacity the only true prudence. There seems no encouragement to expect that these more enlightened friends of Scripture inspiration will employ the Washingtonian tactics in the impending conflicts. History teaches us that thus far in its preliminary stages, while still possessed of the superior weight of character, position, and even numbers, they have in every instance so misplaced their caution as to give the victory to which they were

entitled to the insolent and aggressive minority. How will such men act now that that minority has become a majority flushed with triumph?

Thus circumstances make it, humanly speaking, certain that there is but one small quarter of Protestant Christendom from which frank opposition to the new opinions is to be expected. The current sweeps too strongly, the error is too popular. Such determined opposition as would be adequate to stem it would be too inconvenient. Now the circumstance which is so untoward for the cause of truth is this, that the conquering section in America, in order to carry out its purposes, found it desirable to load that obscure district of Christendom with mountains of obloquy, heaped on it with a systematic and gigantic diligence for more than a generation, and they have succeeded to their heart's content in making that district odious and contemptible throughout the Protestant world. Thus, whatever of hard-earned experience, whatever of true insight, whatever of faithful and generous zeal the good men of that section may desire to bring to the defence of the common Christianity, the world is determined beforehand to reject. "Can any good come out of Nazareth?" The world has been told, that of course warnings and declarations coming from that quarter have a perverse source. This will be believed. All that the enemies of the Bible need do to neutralize our honest efforts in the great defence will be to cry, "Oh, those are the extravagances of a sour pessimist!" or, "These are but the grumblings of defeated malice and spite against the righteous conquerors!" Now, that an individual servant of God and truth should be subjected to such taunts is of exceedingly little moment. The momentous result against the interest of the truth is, that the only part of the king's army which is in condition to do staunch battle for his truth is to be discounted in the tug of war. Thus the enemy of the truth has adroitly succeeded in so arranging, beforehand, the conditions of the campaign as to neutralize the powers of resistance, and, humanly speaking, to insure the victory for himself, because the professed friends of the truth will be crushed for want of that sturdy assistance which they themselves had previously disabled by slanders, prompted by their own interested purposes. There will be seen in the result the grimmest "poetic

justice" of divine providence. But the Lord still has faithful servants, and the truth still has steadfast witnesses, who will recognize no duty as superior to that of maintaining Christ's testimony against all odds.

The facts just stated show that the struggle cannot but be long and arduous. The friends of truth must therefore "with good advice make war." While never shirking ecclesiastical discussion when the aggressiveness of error challenges them to it, their chief reliance for victory must be upon the faithful preaching of the old-fashioned gospel and upon godly living. Like the martyr church of Revelation they must "conquer by the blood of the Lamb and by the testimony of Jesus, and by not loving their lives unto the death." Divisions in the ranks of the defenders of the truth, professedly united up to a recent date, are a discouraging sign; but the general decline in the standard of Christian living which these have imbibed as an infection from the rationalistic side is a far more ominous sign; "the battle is the Lord's, not man's." He will not deem it worth his while to work a victory for the sake of a mere dead ecclesiastical orthodoxy, which is to be as barren of the fruits of holy living as the code of its assailants. If the communions which profess to stand up for the integrity of Scripture have the nerve to resume strict church discipline, to enforce on their professed members a strict separation from the world, and thus to present to it a Christian life beautiful and awful for its purity as of old, they will conquer. If they lack this nerve and shirk this purification of themselves, they will be defeated; they will also be corrupted; and after a deceitful season of bustle and pretended Christian progress, having the form of godliness but denying the power thereof, a wide and long eclipse will come over Protestant Christendom, the righteous judgment of a holy God. His true people, perhaps for dreary generations, will be his despised and scattered ones mourning in secret places; and when his times of revival shall return again he will raise up new instruments of his own.

The friends of truth must contend in the spirit of humility. "God resisteth the proud, but giveth strength unto the lowly." They will, of course, recognize themselves as still possessed of the honorable trust, God's truth; they must, of course, believe those who assail them as less honored with this noble trust than

themselves; for else what cause have they to contend? But they must always remember the apostle's word, "What have ye that ye did not receive? Now then, why do ye glory in it as though ye had not received it?" If we really have this loyalty to Scripture and to him who gave it, it is of grace. It is God's inworking, not our personal credit. Had he not wrought it in us, "the natural mind," which is just as native to us as to the other sons of Adam, would doubtless be prompting us, like other rationalists, to treat the old gospel claims as "foolishness." And there is a special reason for such Christian modesty in the case of Southern Christians. The fact that we are now standing on the side of Christ is due in part to a train of secular circumstances with reference to which we had no free agency, and therefore no personal credit. Providence ordained that the modern rationalism should select as its concrete object of attack our form of society and our rights. God thus shut us up to the study and clear apprehension of the religious issue, and decided the side we should take in the contest. But on the other hand, the sophism is obtruded at this point which is just as silly and absurd as pride in us would be misplaced. This asserts that our claim of a mission to testify for God's truth against any professed Christians is necessarily the sinful vainglory in us. According to this absurdity the purest church on earth could not dare to testify that any other professed communion of Christians, even prelatists, papists, Greeks, Socinians, were any less orthodox than themselves. And if these are no less orthodox, what right has this purest church to contend against any of them? "God resisteth the proud," but we apprehend also that he does not like sham charity and contemptible logical dishonesties.

Since the opinions and practices hostile to the Scriptures are so protean, so subtle, and so widely diffused, there is no chance for a successful defense of the truth except in uncompromising resistance to the beginnings of error; to parley is to be defeated. The steps in the "down-grade" progress are gentle, and slide easily one into the other, but the sure end of the descent is none the less fatal. He who yields the first step so complicates his subsequent resistance as to insure his defeat. There is but one safe position for the sacramental host: to stand on the whole Scripture, and refuse to concede a single point.

As to the secular and political doctrines which involve the points of assault upon the rule of faith, the church's true position is wholly defensive. She has no secular institutions, good or bad, to advocate as her ecclesiastical mission. That is simply and solely to deliver the whole revealed will of God for man's salvation. She has no spiritual power to make anything sin, or anything duty, which the Bible has not made such. But if she would not walk into the fatal ambuscades of the enemies of Scripture, she must have a clear and exact perception of the extent of this defensive duty. When encroachers usurp spiritual authority to lay upon the consciences of Christians any extra-scriptural doctrine or requirement, they thereby make that encroachment a part of their ecclesiastical code. And they thus make it the right and duty of the friends of truth, in the exercise of their spiritual and ecclesiastical power, to examine and reject such new doctrine claiming to be spiritual and ecclesiastical. The friends of truth are to do this, not in order to encroach upon, but to protect, liberty of conscience in God's children. Failing to understand this part of their defensive duty, they betray the cause entrusted to them to the cunning aggression.

It is the fashion to say that the metes and bounds between the kingdoms of Christ and of Cæsar have always been, and must continue to be, very undefined and vague. This I utterly deny. They have, indeed, been constantly overstepped, but this is because there have always been churchmen greedy of power, worldly-minded and dictatorial. Men demand of us that we shall draw an exact dividing line between the two jurisdictions, defining everywhere the points at which they meet. The demand is preposterous, because the two kingdoms are not spread upon one plane, but occupy different spheres. There is no zigzag mathematical line to be drawn in such a case, but the clear space separating the two spheres is all the more easy to be seen by honest eyes. It is pretended that there is great room for debate between fair constructions of the famous rule that church synods must handle and determine nothing except what is ecclesiastical. I am sure the wise men who stated it saw no room at all for such debate. I remember that when they selected these words for their rule, they had also declared

that Holy Scripture was the sufficient and sole statute-book of Christ's *ecclesia*. Hence, their rule means plainly that church synods must handle and determine just what Holy Scripture determines, and nothing else; and they must determine what they handle precisely as Scripture does. Is not that distinct enough? Or, if any one seeks further definition, it may be found very simply in this direction. Let us premise first, that whatever is expressly set down in Scripture, and whatever follows therefrom by good and necessary consequence, are binding on the Christian conscience. Now, all possible human actions must fall in one of these three classes: (1,) Actions which Scripture positively enjoins; (2,) Actions which Scripture positively forbids; (3,) Actions which Scripture leaves indifferent. In the first case, church courts are to enjoin all that God enjoins, and nothing else, and because he enjoins it. In the second case, they are to prohibit what he prohibits, and on the ground of his authority. In the third case, they are to leave the actions of his people free to be determined by each one's own prudence and liberty, and this because *God has left them free*.

THE STANDARD OF ORDINATION.¹

IT is a pungent affliction to me to read two overtures from the respected Presbyteries of Wilmington and East Hanover, asking of the General Assembly the repudiation for our church of its time-honored and most vital attribute, an educated ministry. Those who advocate this revolution are doubtless moved by laudable zeal to multiply ministers faster, and thus to extend the operations of our church more rapidly. This zeal is commendable, but it out-runs all discretion.

Surely it ought to be enough to bring cautious men to a stand to witness the sweeping and summary way in which it is proposed to forsake the whole past policy of our church on this point. One of their amendments requires that when presbyteries proceed to ordain ministers they shall not require them to exhibit any classical scholarship whatever, nor any knowledge of philosophy, nor of either of the languages of inspiration. Here are whole continents of those acquirements our wise fathers deemed essential, swept away by one rash touch of a pen!!! This takes one's breath away.

The overture does indeed indicate a compensation, when it says that such requirements, out of place at ordination, are to find their appropriate position at licensure. I seek in vain for any consolation in this deceptive intimation. For, first, the arrangement proposed, if carried out in good faith, would be utterly illogical. According to our constitution, licensure is an advancement merely provisional and contingent; it merely makes the licensed man a "probationer *for* the ministry," and leaves him a mere layman invested with no franchise of office, whom the presbytery may degrade at its discretion without any judicial trial whatever. But it is ordination which makes the man official presbyter and herald, and that for life. Here, then,

¹From the *Christian Observer*, of May, 1891.

is the vital step of the governing presbytery. Here, then, should be the crucial tests of fitness. To neglect them here, and remit them to the previous non-essential stage is, both in the classical and popular sense of the word, preposterous.

This inversion would of itself ensure neglect of proper tests throughout the whole course of trial without any more bad legislation; but when we come to the new provision for licensure, the last ghost of a consolation vanishes. For presbyteries are forbidden to require any Latin exegesis, and are authorized at their discretion to dispense with every other test of classical, philosophical, and biblical scholarship. Everybody who knows presbyteries knows that this dispensing power, if granted, would usually be exercised. Thus, our time-honored requirements of real education are first kicked out of the rules for ordination. Conservative men are told that they shall be consoled by finding these requirements in the rules for licensure. But when we come to them, we find them virtually absent there also. Thus, practically, they are kicked adroitly outside of our church.

Moreover, were the requirements faithfully retained at licensure, the change would work the worst possible expediency; for it would offer a tacit premium to the probationer to cease his liberal studies in the interval between licensure and ordination, which is the very time when he ought to be most diligent in them. He is thus deliberately invited to become a poorer scholar just as he approaches the fuller responsibilities of his arduous vocation. I know not what expedient could be adopted better suited to teach our young ministers a practical contempt for scholarship.

I would oppose this perilous innovation with all my might by these further arguments.

I. The manner in which our presbyteries are already employing the existing provision for licensing and ordaining "*extraordinary cases*," renders any change utterly needless, even from the point of view of the innovators. This useful provision is doubtless much abused, so much so that without any further loose legislation, all the half qualified men whom the loosest lover of change desires, may easily find their way into our ministry. The provision is plainly intended by the constitution to meet this case only: Here is a Christian gentleman who ex-

hibits, in addition to holy character, experience, wisdom and prudence, and the aptness to teach and talent of command required by the Apostle of Timothy, thorough mental culture, and intelligence as acquired and attested in some other educated profession, such as the law, medicine, or the professor's chair; which thorough culture acquired in a different direction, may be honestly accepted as a real equivalent for classical and Hebrew-istic learning.

"The law hath that extent, no more."

But how do we see it applied? To such cases as these: To some zealous middle aged man who has no culture, and never will have any in either direction, neither in classical English literature, nor in the ancient classics, nor in the languages of inspiration, nor in sciences, medicine, nor law. Here is a younger man who is said to be a good fellow, but without income, who thinks he cannot get his own consent to go through the long course of studies required by our book, so he claims to be made an "extraordinary case;" when the only thing "extraordinary" about him is, that he lacks the pluck and conscientious industry which alone could give assurance of permanent usefulness in the ministry, for a person deprived of early education. Here is another young man who, without any thorough culture, has some natural gift of fluent, plausible speech, in whose favor some congregation sends up to presbytery the assurance that he preaches abundantly well enough for them. The soft-hearted presbytery makes him an "extraordinary case," when they ought to have foreseen that the most certain and ordinary result would be that this fluency, unchastened by thorough mental discipline, is going to be his snare and his ruin. And here is another uneducated man, a very good fellow, who has a sweetheart, and who thinks he must marry at once, and that he never could stand the postponement required by a thorough course of study. So some kind presbytery makes him an "extraordinary case," with the most regular and ordinary result of forever spoiling the career of him and a very amiable young woman.

These are no travesties. I make here two points—the door into our ministry is already made too wide, instead of needing to be further widened; and, secondly, "if these things be done

in the green tree, what will be done in the dry?" With our present explicit and strict laws, we already have a mischievous looseness. The adoption of the loose laws demanded by the revolutionists in the hands of such presbyteries as ours, will gradually result in total looseness. Practically, we should have no barrier at all against an ignorant ministry.

II. The overture asserts that their design is "to remove those barriers for which no sufficient reason can be found either in the word of God, or in the dictates of human expediency, that now debar from our ministry many men who are qualified both by nature and by grace for the exercise of its functions."

I expressly take issue with this declaration as to every proposition and every intimation it includes. I shall show expressly that each one is a mistake, and is contrary to the facts. What are the supposed needless barriers? The overture defines them for us: a knowledge of the Latin language, of philosophy, of science, and of the languages of inspiration. I assert that none of them are "barriers" to the fit minister, but suitable requirements. I assert that in fact no qualified man is kept out of the Presbyterian ministry by these supposed barriers. Some *suppose* they are kept out by them? Yes. But the fact that they allow these proper requisitions to estop their progress is the perfect demonstration that they are not qualified men. These righteous requirements never kept the carpenter, John D. Matthews, nor the penniless plow boy, John H. Rice, nor the middle aged sailor, Dr. Harding, out of the ranks of our learned ministry. And let us notice the cardinal omission of the overture in its enumeration of qualifications. It mentions qualities of nature and qualities of grace, but the Bible and the Constitution of our church insist on a third which the overture adroitly omits. This is *acquired knowledge*. "The priest's lips should keep knowledge." Every line of Scripture which touches upon the topic teaches us that native vigor of faculty can be no substitute for the acquired knowledge to be employed in the sacred profession, any more than the muscular symmetry of a carpenter's two arms enables him to build a wooden house without tools and lumber.

Our church has provided a mode of entrance into the ministry for all proper extraordinary cases. To all other candidates she

offers pecuniary assistance which she will continue for seven years, if necessary, until the scholastic requirements are obtained. Whence it follows as matter of fact that no man whom God has called is "debarred" from the ministry by these requirements. The things which really debar such supposed cases are self-sufficiency, the arduous nature of the calling, impatience, indolence. And these, when indulged, prove them not to be "qualified by grace."

But I can tell brethren, from an intimate acquaintance of forty-seven years with candidates and theological education, how numerous young men of real value are deterred from our ministry. *It is by a natural disgust at the facility and unfaithfulness with which its honors are bestowed.* Let the reader represent to himself the kind of young Christian whom we ought to wish to get into our ministry. He will be one distinguished for strictness of conscience, thoroughness of effort, high and noble aspirations, intelligence, and an exalted reverential conception of the sacred office. Is not this the kind of young man we want? Well, as an eager spectator, he sees the presbyteries shirking a part of their duty in trying their candidates, and many of these candidates consequently shirking much of their duty in study; known in colleges as the self-indulgent, slack-twisted student, and unfaithful reciter in class, and consequently an unenergetic herald of salvation. The honorable young man is disgusted, grieved, chilled, and repelled. He no longer feels any aspiration to belong to ranks whose honors are thus disparaged, and bestowed as easily upon the unworthy as the worthy.

But if that young man witnessed what our Constitution designs, the strict and honest requirement of good scholarship and exalted Christian diligence; if he saw that the honors of the calling were hard to win, and worth winning, his sanctified ambition would be fired. He would remain eager to press into these worthy ranks.

This is human nature. Society and universities are full of illustrations of this powerful principle. When I began to teach in Union Seminary, in 1853, there were eleven students. In 1860, there were thirty-eight, and these were not drawn from inferior sources, but from the best Christian material of the

States. I do know, that the main influence under God which wrought this improvement was the increase in that institution of the thoroughness of the course of studies and strictness of the examinations.

The overture asserts "that no sufficient reason can be found in the word of God," for the constitutional requirements of our book. This I expressly contradict. Hear the words of the Saviour: "If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch." He tells the heralds of the cross they must be "like unto householders who bring forth out of their treasure things new and old." The Apostle says: "They are stewards of the mysteries of God." They must be "apt to teach." They must be "workmen who need not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth." They must "continue in reading and in doctrine, giving themselves wholly to them." "Thou, therefore, which teachest another, teachest not thou thyself?" As elders, they must be "*able men*, such as fear God, men of truth, hating covetousness." (Ex. xviii. 21.) The first heralds of the new dispensation, notwithstanding their gifts of nature and of grace, were kept by their divine Master under three years' tuition.

What, now, is the plain amount of these precedents and express commands? It can be nothing less than this, that every minister must have, in addition to endowments of natural faculty and grace, an acquired knowledge, competent to teach the system of divine truth correctly and fully, and to defend that system by refuting all gainsayers. But that system is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. The Holy Spirit gave these in the Hebrew and Greek languages. It is these alone which are our infallible rule of faith, not any version, however honest and respectable. Every judicious student of exposition knows that when the question is raised upon him, whether a given explanation of a given text presented in English by a pious Scott, or Henry, or Ryle, or Alexander is really the mind of the Spirit, that question is not fully settled until the original is examined. No teacher has full right to adopt and indorse such uninspired explanations unless he is able to test them by the originals, at least with the help of text-books and lexicons.

Does one say the piety and the concilience of these English

expositors give a good probability that they explain the mind of the Spirit correctly? Let us grant it. But can that teacher who can give his pupils but a probability of what is the real mind of the Spirit, be called a "workman who needeth not to be ashamed, correctly dividing the word of truth"? Plainly not. Will one say the great mass of the laity cannot learn Greek and Hebrew and have only their English Bibles? I reply: So much the more reason is there that their authorized teachers shall be able to go to the real spring heads of truth.

But a much more important point remains. In construing the mind of the Spirit contained in any precept of Scripture, it is absolutely necessary to take into account the state of facts environing the men who first reviewed the precept. For instance, our Lord commanded his disciples to procure an upper room for his last passover, and "there to make ready" for it. Must they understand this express commandment as requiring them to provide chairs on which to sit around the supper table? Such would unquestionably be the meaning of the command to "make ready," upon the servitors of a modern supper. But we know very well, as the disciples knew, that our Lord did not mean chairs, but did mean the customary dinner couches. Now how are we so sure of this? Because we know with perfect certainty, though chiefly from uninspired witnesses, that chairs at meals were not then customary in Jerusalem, while these couches were generally used instead. The state of facts known to the disciples and their Lord must interpret to them the meaning of his precept. Now, then, when we hear the Lord and his apostles requiring ministers to be able expounders of Scripture, we know that he meant the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, because we know that these were the languages in which believers then had the Scriptures, and in which the Holy Ghost had given them.

We are now at a point of view from which we easily see the sophistry of a favorite argument of the innovators. They exclaim, Paul authorized the church at Ephesus, under Timothy's moderatorship, to choose any male member their minister who possessed the aptness to teach and other qualifications. He might be a merchant or an intelligent mechanic. Paul did not require him to learn any dead language or foreign literature.

What right have we to require it now? Why not do as Paul did; elect any pious mechanic, merchant or farmer who knows the English language, and has good natural gifts?

I reply, that this would be virtually doing exactly the opposite thing to what Paul did. Here was the all-important fact conditioning Paul's requirements; that the Greek language (the more important of the two languages of inspiration) was the native vernacular of that sensible Ephesian mechanic; to us it is a learned dead language. Hebrew was also a living vernacular to most Jews. Now, then, this Ephesian minister was already possessed, even from childhood, of a competent and correct knowledge of the main language of inspiration. Its syntax was perfectly familiar to him by daily usage in his business and reading. The idiomatic force of its phrases was as clear to him as our English is to us. Moreover, all the social usages, civic institutions, religious opinions and customs of the day and country, which were the subjects of perpetual allusion and illustration in the sacred writings, were equally familiar to him.

But now that copious language is to us a dead language, all those familiar facts and usages in the light of which it was so perfectly easy for that Ephesian mechanic to understand the meaning of the apostles, all has passed away, and is to us matter of learned antiquarian research. How much laborious classical study is needed to put one of us English-speaking citizens abreast with that Ephesian mechanic in the knowledge of that language and all those facts and usages which were his familiar knowledge, but to us must be the learned science of antiquity. I confess as to myself that I do not believe that my classical and biblical studies, continued through a long and laborious life have brought me up to the practical level of that fortunate Greek mechanic, as to the correct apprehension of the Greek Scriptures.

But, when the apostle required of the ministers of that day a certain competency to teach the gospel, we must understand him as requiring a similar competency of all ministers of all subsequent ages. It would be mere dishonest paltering with the precept to understand it otherwise. If the passage of the languages of inspiration and the usages of the day and country out of

vernacular use into antiquity calls for more study from us, in order to attain that grade of competency, then it must be ours to give that additional study. How can the honest mind dispute this conclusion? Dare we say to our divine Lord that because the right performance of a duty has, in his providence, become more laborious, we shall shirk a part of it, and put him off with half-way service? Surely not. We see, then, that this plausible argument is deceitful; it "keeps the word of promise to the ear, but breaks it to the sense." Under the pretence of nominally following the apostles' method it introduces a principle exactly opposite to theirs in practical effect.

The duty of apologetic defence against errorists, so solemnly laid upon the pastors by the apostle, presents a powerful argument. Hear him, 2 Tim. iv. 2, "Reprove, rebuke, exhort with all long-suffering and doctrine." Titus i. 9, "That he may be able, by sound doctrine, both to exhort and to convince the gainsayers." The pastor is required to be competent, not only to instruct his flock in the revealed science of redemption, but to defend their faith by refuting and convincing all assailants. He must be able to do this "with *all* doctrine." How much *διδασκαλία* then must this pastor have? Just so much as the assailants of the gospel employ against it. If he is a good knight he must be so armed and equipped as to be able "to meet all comers." Now when we remember how rapidly the provinces of human knowledge are extended, and how audaciously infidels use the resources of every province to attack the gospel, is this a time for the faithful warriors of Christ to be divesting themselves of any part of their armor or weapons? Take not the mere letter, but the true spirit of the scriptural injunction, and we see that this Bible principle must require of pastors continually widening qualifications instead of contracted ones, as the expansion of secular knowledge furnishes the enemies of the cross with new and varied weapons. "To whom much is given, of them shall much be required." This is the law of Christ's kingdom and the measure of our responsibility. We Americans of this age are continually glorying in the *privilege* of our fuller light and culture. Is this only braggart lying, or do we really believe that we do enjoy this privilege of an advanced age? If we say the latter, then we are bound to admit that the fair prin-

ciple of that requirement which demanded competency of earlier ministers demands of us continually higher competency and wider knowledge. Scripture expressly requires us to be a better educated ministry than any that ever went before. Is this a time, then, for diminishing the learning of our ministers? It is going backward exactly when the Master says go forward.

In one word, if anything is made clear in the Bible concerning ministerial duty, this is clear: that Christ has appointed the pastors and evangelists of his church to be the teachers of religion to men, the appointed school-masters of the world in the one science of theology. But as Lord Bacon shows, this is the splendid apex of the whole pyramid of human knowledge. It is the mistress of all sciences to whom all the rest are tributary, history, ethnology, zoölogy, geology, literature, and especially philosophy, her nearest handmaid. The mistress must dominate all and rule all lest, becoming insurrectionary, they should use their hands to pull down the foundations of her throne. The teachers of the supreme science must not be ignorant of any other science. They ought to be strong enough to lead the leaders of all secular thought; for if they do not, the tendencies of the carnal mind will most assuredly prompt those secular leaders to array their followers against our King and his gospel.

Let us pause to see how practical this is, and how true. Somebody is asking, why may not a sensible good man, well acquainted with his English Bible, suffice to instruct his plain neighbors in this science of redemption? Possibly he might suffice if he and they were the only sorts of people in the world. But they are not. Our world is also full of authors, legislators, lawyers, physicians, scientists, historians, antiquaries, philosophers, all equipped with the resources of learning. Just so surely as Satan is hostile to Christ and the carnal mind is enmity against him, these learned classes will refuse to let this plain pastor and this plain people alone. Just so surely as hawks will eat pigeons, the very spirit of this "progressive learning" will insure perpetual interference by every channel which this intellectual activity opens up. As surely as this pastor lives, he will have to defend his plain people from all these pretentious assaults. And he will find that the less education his people

have the more educated skill will he have to employ to save them from seduction. Moreover, the learned assailants also have souls which need salvation, very sinful, miserable souls. This pastor owes missionary duty to them; in order to teach the supreme science to the learned does not he himself need to be learned?

Surely, then, this is no time to reduce the education of our ministers when every other profession is making gigantic efforts to increase this learning, and when the sister denominations, once satisfied with an unlettered ministry, are just learning the wiser lesson taught by our example in the past, and are making gigantic efforts to secure for themselves a learned ministry.

The untimeliness of this retrograde movement is powerfully illustrated in the matter of the Hebrew language. A new law is now proposed, the effect of which may be to exclude all knowledge of this language from every Presbyterian minister of the coming generation, and must be to make the knowledge of it rare among them. And this is proposed at the very time of day, not only when this remains one of the languages of inspiration, but when it is rapidly becoming again a living language in Christendom, having weekly newspapers published in it and translations made into it from English literary and infidel books; when the language is more studied than ever in great institutions of learning, and especially when Hebrew philology and criticism are just becoming the prime arsenal which furnishes the weapons to attack God's church. Is not this overture a fearful anachronism?

III. It is asserted that no reason for our standard of education can be found in "the dictates of human expediency." This again I expressly deny.

The whole experience of the patristic ages, and of the reformed churches for three hundred years, is on my side. In the Latin church the languages of inspiration were dead languages. The people had the word of God only in versions (*Vetus Italica* and *Vulgate*), but take notice! The method of recruiting the ministry was precisely that now recommended to us and now followed by the churches which we are bidden to imitate. Some ministers, as Jerome, were learned; the majority were not. *That was the ministry which created the whole popish apostasy!*

That was the ministry which invented the fatal errors of human priesthood, baptismal regeneration, real presence, and sacrifice in the supper, apostolic succession, monkery, prelacy, celibacy of clergy, persecution, penance and indulgence, false miracles, pelagianism, saint worship, idolatry, purgatory, and popery. The close reading of church history convinces any sober student that it was the ignorance of these men concerning the languages of inspiration and Hebrew archæology which was the main occasion of their fatal errors. Ought not this lesson of history to be vast and black enough to open the eyes of Protestants?

I assert that the strength, usefulness and respectability of the Presbyterian Church are chiefly due under God to her standard of education in her ministry. Had she adhered more faithfully to her legal standard she would be just so much stronger than she is.

It is well known that the innovators take the data of their supposed argument from expediency, from the apparent progress of sister churches which do not require a learned ministry. They suppose that these churches are thus enabled to multiply ministers more rapidly than we do, and that this is the valuable cause of their more rapid growth.

This argument is wholly deceptive. The growth of a church is, in fact, the consequence of a large complex of various causes. That must, therefore, be a fallacious argument which pitches upon one of these causes and assigns to it the whole result. If the superior growth is sound, the most effective cause of all is undoubtedly the secret agency of that Spirit who is sovereign, and "bloweth where he listeth." A Presbyterian must be the last man to dispute this. Then, it is bad reasoning for him to put the main stress upon any external trait, since all of them must be of very subordinate force. It would, perhaps, be more correct for him to infer that it is the superior prayerfulness, zeal, and holy living of these churches which make them more prosperous, if they are more prosperous. Or it may be the great fact that mankind are born carnal must make the Presbyterian Church less popular, whatever line of expediency it might adopt, because it presents to the world only the simple church order of the Bible, and the strict and humbling doctrines of orthodoxy stripped of all the accessories which might conciliate

bigotry, ritualism, or self-righteousness. This would have to be settled before a safe inference could be drawn.

Is it argued that the other churches present us with really useful ministers, devoid of classical training? I am happy to grant this. But I have two answers. These honored ministers would have been yet more useful with a Presbyterian training; and second, our Presbyterian rule would have saved those churches from the incumbrance of that larger number of untrained ministers at the other end of the scale who have done more harm than good.

I urge again, that before we throw away our time-honored system to imitate these churches, it is all important that we ascertain how much of their supposed rapid progress is real and solid. An honest sifting of statistics would result in a surprising shrinkage.

I will recall an authentic incident of this. In the early stages of this ill-starred discussion against our educational standard, it was asserted that in a given commonwealth where the Presbyterians could count only eleven thousand communicants, a sister denomination, with an uneducated ministry, claimed seventy-five thousand. But when close inquiry was made of a competent and learned leader of that denomination in that State, he answered that those statistics had been gotten together irresponsibly upon a spread-eagle plan, and that, coming down to hard-pan, his denomination had about fifteen thousand actual communicants!

There is a vital reason for this shrinkage in the very nature of an uneducated ministry which furnishes me another powerful argument. American Protestantism is characterized by a peculiar evil which I may describe by the term "spurious revivalism." It has been often called the "New Measure System." The common mischief resulting from all its forms is the over-hasty reception into the communion of the churches, of multitudes of persons whom time proves to have experienced no spiritual change. This disastrous result is in some churches wrought without the machinery of sensational excitements, as where Pelagian or ritualistic teachings encourage men to come in heedlessly and coldly upon a mere profession of historical faith. In most cases, however, these mischievous accessions are brought about

by sensational human expedients. The ill-starred artists stimulate natural remorse and the merely sympathetic excitements of the natural feelings, and deceive themselves and encourage their victims to be deceived into mistaking these agitations for the real and saving work of the Holy Spirit with a criminal recklessness. They overlook the vital distinctions which the religious guide ought to make, which I have pointed out in the twenty-first article of my *Collected Discussions*, Vol. I., in exposition of 1 Cor. iii. 10-15.

This lamentable art has grown in America to great dimensions; the victims of its deception are to be counted by myriads. Its effects for good are so evanescent, that a religious profession has become contemptible in the eyes of critical worldly men. Many churches are loaded down with dead members. Church discipline becomes impracticable. This nominal membership includes tens of thousands of silent infidels who have inferred from the manifest deceitfulness of their own hot religious experience the deceptiveness of the gospel itself. The average standard of Christian morals is degraded throughout the country. The experience of a long life compels me sorrowfully to testify against this method of accessions as the grand peril and curse of American Protestantism. It has shorn the gospel among us of the larger part of its purifying power, and Christ of his honor, until our average Protestantism can scarcely boast of higher moral results than American popery. The mortifying result is, that after ninety years of boasted activity and asserted success in this species of evangelism in these United States, breeding and good manners, domestic purity, temperance, business morals and political morals, are at a lower ebb than in any nation in Protestant Christendom. The evil has become gigantic, and demands solemn protest and resistance.

I know it is an unpopular thing for a minister of the gospel to bear this witness. But it is true. And my regard for that account which I must soon render at a more awful bar than that of arrogant public opinion demands its utterance. Now, rational investigation and the induction of facts concur to prove that a lowering of the education of the ministry is ever the main promoter of this spurious revivalism.

There are certain motives which make it popular with its

practitioners in spite of the hard lessons of experience and the cautions of God's word. Those motives are of a coarse nature. They are the love of power, the ambition to count numbers, the hasty lust for visible success, the craving for theatrical excitements, with mistaken zeal for the good cause. In a free country the only antidotes for this mental disease are an enlightened conscience and the refining influence of mental culture. Many uncultivated spirits revel in these mental intoxications, but to the man of refined culture they are odious and repellant. It is of more importance to say that it is the accurate knowledge of theology, psychology and exegesis which enables the true scholar to discriminate between these spurious excitements and spiritual excitements. It is the half-taught Christian heated with misdirected zeal and untrained in the analysis of motives who is ever prone to make the fatal confusion. Indeed we find the craving for this power over the crowd is so seductive, that many are swept away by it who ought to know better. And none seem to be safe from the unwholesome infection unless they combine most thorough conscientiousness with high mental cultivation and a right knowledge of church history. So long as we fill the pulpit with half-educated men, we need expect nothing else than the obstinate prevalence of this coarse counterfeit method, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of past experience.

This explanation is exactly confirmed by the facts. Which are the denominations most notoriously characterized (and cursed) by these "new measure" revivals, so-called? Precisely those which permit an uneducated ministry, and among them the most obstinate practitioners of the false method will never be found in the persons of their best educated pastors. If we are unwilling to have our church corrupted and blighted by this false fire, we must raise, instead of lowering, our standard of ministerial education.

Since 1861, our church and church courts have been blessed with a delightful unity and harmony of orthodox doctrine. Is there any one who is willing to part with this happy harmony? But there is a consideration infinitely more exalted and sacred than our own religious enjoyment. God has committed to us as a church the one true doctrinal testimony. He has made it our

solemn duty to maintain it, and it alone. This is our stewardship; we have to give an awful account for it. But I assert that the only guarantee of doctrinal unity and orthodoxy, next to the inworking of God's Spirit, is a thoroughly educated ministry. The ministry are the main teachers of the churches' doctrinal system. When they divide, they infallibly divide the people. Again, I prove by both reason and fact that the only human safe-guard, under God, for orthodox unity is the requirement of thorough education in pastors.

Consider: Our Scriptural, Calvinistic theology has ever been to the opinionative a stumbling block, and to the carnal mind foolishness. Its doctrines are profound. They involve the most fundamental points of rival philosophies. The root principles of the opposing systems of theology are intricately related to each other and to these philosophies. In order that a man may be intelligently and logically grounded in the Calvinistic system, and able to distinguish all erroneous plausibilities from it, he needs to have his faculties disciplined by the highest philological and logical training. Again, our candidates for the pastoral office need to be kept together, and kept together long, during this formative period, while they are constructing for themselves their permanent systems of thought. Students educate each other more than their professors educate them.

Every active-minded young man comes to the Seminary with some doctrinal crotchet of his own. If he is left to nurse it by himself it becomes the root of dissent and of dissension. But in his three years' intercourse the friction of other minds rubs off the angle, and the man is saved from what would have proved a mischievous tangential movement. He learns to walk freely and of his own choice in the King's established highway. The whole body of students is kept under the guidance of the church's most enlightened and approved teachers long enough to establish them in the straight paths.

And let facts speak. The Southern Presbyterian Church, by virtue of her requirement of thorough training, enjoys orthodox harmony. The churches who admit uneducated ministers lack it. The confession of Alexander Campbell was notorious, "that in his communion all sorts of doctrine were preached by all sorts of men." The Cumberland Presbyterian Church is now agitated by doctrinal dissensions.

I greatly respect the immersionist churches, known as "Missionary Baptist." Many of their ministers preach the soundest doctrine. Some of their congregations present the best standard of Christian morals and discipline which I see anywhere in our backslidden land. But I have myself heard in Baptist pulpits all grades of doctrine, from Pelagianism, through evangelical Arminianism, up to strict Calvinism. Hear Mr. Spurgeon's testimony on this point against his own denomination in England. So even in the Southern Methodist Church the greatest theological antagonisms are found. Some are moderate Calvinists, the most are evangelical Arminians. I have heard some avow the deadliest dogmas of Pelagius, by reason of their lack of theological learning, ignorant of the fact that John Wesley, in his treatise on original sin (against Dr. Taylor, of Norwich), had condemned them as sternly as Turretin, Edwards or Hodge.

I must now remind my readers that when the innovators argue from the seeming success of a partially educated ministry in other churches, they forget a cardinal difference between our constitution and theirs. It is this: They all have a wide safety escape through which to rid themselves of their clerical failures. Our Constitution gives us none. Our principle is, Once a minister, always a minister. A man whom we ordain may show himself upon trial to be half furnished, or unfurnished; he may lose all relation to any congregation as either pastor or stated supply; no company of God's people chooses him to be either teacher or ruler to them; still we make him until death a full presbyter and minister, with power of rule in Presbytery, Synod and Assembly, over Christians who refuse to elect him as their representative. He cannot be stripped of this power except by judicial process, or upon his own request by a semi-judicial process.

But in the Methodist Church, when an inadequately furnished minister evinces his lack of acceptance, and ceases to serve a pastoral charge or a district, he ceases to be a member of the Conference. He is no longer a ruler in their church, but becomes virtually a lay-preacher. Or else a similar result is reached by putting him on the superannuated list. The Missionary Baptist and Campbellite communions are independent

in church government, and this gives them the same safety-valve. The ill-furnished minister, when he ceases to be a pastor, practically ceases to be a ruler, for there is no authoritative church court above the pastoral charge.

We find, then, that while these powerful churches have a wide front door for the entrance of the ministers, they save themselves from the disastrous consequences of a partially educated ministry by keeping open a very wide back door. We have no back door at all; yet some would have us imitate the imprudence of these churches without their safe-guard. They seem to find, practically, that they need a very wide back door indeed.

I was conversing with a distinguished Baptist divine concerning the numbers and power of his denomination in one of the great Southern commonwealths. He said that they counted six hundred ministers. I asked him how many were engaged in actual ministerial work? He replied, About two hundred. In my astonishment I exclaimed, Then what are the four hundred doing? He answered that many were teaching, many farming; some were practicing medicine; a few were lawyers; and many, from age or infirmity, were doing nothing. A similar inquiry as to the Methodist ministry in a large commonwealth gave like results.

Much more might be said. I trust enough has been said to convince the sober reader that what our church needs is a more faithful and strict execution of our rules by the presbyteries, instead of a degradation of them; well would it be for our church to listen at this juncture to the voice of her dead fathers. Dr. John Holt Rice, Sr., was undoubtedly one of the greatest and wisest of his illustrious generation of great men, perhaps the one Virginian entitled to a place abreast with Thomas Jefferson in transcendent abilities, learning, and vigor of style. I wish every Presbyterian could now read his masterly essay upon the evils of an uneducated ministry, in the *Virginia Literary and Evangelical Magazine*, Volume VIII.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.¹

THEY to whom the Bible is a sufficient rule of faith have this great question happily settled for themselves. For in the gospel, life and immortality are clearly brought to light. The doctrine is expressly asserted in a multitude of places, and is necessarily implied in the whole moral system which the Bible teaches. But unfortunately there are now many who hold the word of God as not authority. Christendom is infested with schools of evolution and materialism, which attempt to bring this great truth in doubt by their "philosophy, falsely so-called," and which mislead many unstable souls to their own undoing.

To such as will not look at the clear light of Scripture, we propose to offer the inferior light of the natural reason. The sun is immeasurably better than a torch, but a torch may yet save the man who has turned his back on the sun and plunged himself into darkness, from stumbling over a precipice into an unseen gulf. We claim that we are entitled to demand the attention of all such doubters to the rational argument; for as they have set up philosophy against the Bible, mere honesty requires them to listen to philosophy, the true philosophy, namely:

There is certainly probable force in the historical fact that most civilized men of all ages and countries have believed in the immortality of their souls, without the Bible. Even the American Indians have always believed in the Great Spirit, and expected a future existence in the happy hunting grounds. The ancient pagans universally believed in gods and a future state, except where they were corrupted by power and crime like the later Romans and Athenians, towards the verge of national putrescence. Their mythologies express the real forms of

¹ From *The Presbyterian Quarterly*, of October, 1892.

their original popular beliefs. Their philosophers, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, held the immortality of the soul free from the fabulous coloring of the myths, but upon more solid and rational grounds. The fact that the ancient Egyptians certainly expected the future existence, not only of the soul but of the body, is manifest from their extraordinary care in embalming and preserving all the corpses of their dead. The ancient and the modern Chinese believe firmly in the future existence of the dead, otherwise their ancestor-worship, which is nearly the whole of their practical religion, would be an absurdity. The Indian races are firm believers in immortality, except as the pantheism of the Buddhist doctrine modifies their hope of an individual personal consciousness beyond death. The Scythians, Goths, and Scandinavians were firm believers in a future existence. The whole Mohammedan world holds immortality and a certain form of future rewards and punishments, just as distinctly and firmly as the Christian. We are also entitled to use the fact that immortality has always been the corner-stone of the Bible religion, among both Hebrews and Christians of all ages, as the factor in this historical argument. For this religion has either a divine origin, or it has not. To those who hold the former origin the question of immortality is settled; those who deny its divine origin must, of course, teach that Christianity, like the other religions of mankind, is the outgrowth of some natural principles of reason and feeling belonging to human nature. Our argument is, that on this lower ground Christianity must still be admitted to be the most highly developed, the most beneficial and the most intellectual of human religions. So that the question which agnostics are bound to answer is this: How comes this highest and noblest development of the religious thought of mankind to grasp the doctrine of immortality most clearly and strongly of all, unless there be in the human *essentia* a rational basis necessitating such a conclusion? And here is presented the point of this logic from the almost universal *consensus* of mankind. How is it that nearly all men, of the most different ages and religions, when they think, are lead to think to this conclusion, concerning a fact purely invisible and beyond the range of all earthly experience? There must be rational and active principles in human nature controll-

ing this result of the thought of mankind. Is it not a strange fact and one entitled to give men pause, that the supposed materialistic results of recent speculations, claiming to be scientific and advanced, bring their civilized advocates precisely to that lowest and grossest ignorance concerning man's spirit and destiny which characterizes the stupidest and filthiest savages in the world, Australian Blacks, and African Bushmen? It is these wretches nearest akin to brute beasts, who do the least thinking of all human beings, who are found to have thought downward to the same blank and grovelling nescience, which this pretended advanced science glories in attaining.

Let not the followers of Auguste Comte and of Büchner and Spencer claim to be the original positivists and agnostics. The honor of their conclusions was anticipated long before precisely by those members of the human family lowest down towards the level of the ostriches and gorillas.

The proposition which soundest reason teaches us is this: that while the bodies of men after death return to dust and see corruption, their souls which neither die nor sleep have an immortal subsistence, which is continued independent of the body in individual consciousness and activity. This, of course, involves the belief that the earthly human person includes two distinct substances, an organized animal body, and an immaterial spiritual mind. It is of the continued substantive existence of this latter we are to inquire. Obviously the preliminary question must be concerning the real existence of such a spiritual substance in man. For if there is such a thing in him, it is at once a matter entirely credible that this thing may continue to exist, after the body is dissolved. It is a question for evidence; and affirmative evidence, if found, is, in the nature of the case, fully entitled to our credence. In order to determine the preliminary question it is desirable to clear away certain very shallow misconceptions, and to settle certain principles of common sense.

What do men mean by a substance? The correct answer is in general, that substance is that permanent underlying *thing* to which our minds refer those clusters of properties, or qualities which our senses perceive. What the bodily senses immediately perceive is the qualities—the mind's own power of thought always

leads it to believe in the underlying substance. Let us take a most familiar instance: A sensible child says, "I have an orange." If we ask him how he knows he has one, he will say: "I see it, handle it, smell it, and taste it." Just so; with his eyes he sees the yellow color, rough surface, and spherical shape; with his fingers he feels also its shape, its pimpled surface, and its solidity; with his nostrils he smells its odor; with the gustatory nerves in his mouth he tastes the flavor of the juice. Thus all that his bodily senses directly give him, is a cluster of qualities, yellowness, roughness, roundness, moderate solidity, fragrance, savor. But this child knows that he has in his hand something more than an associated cluster of qualities, a substantial orange. His common sense cannot be embarrassed by reminding him that he has not eyed or fingered, or smelt, or tasted, substance, but only properties. This child will answer: "That may be true, yet my mind makes me know that there is substance under all these properties." For while I see yellowness, if I should ask myself the question, Yellow what? I should try to answer, yellow nothing. This would be almost idiotic. If I know there is yellowness, then my mind makes me know there must be a *something* yellow. If I see roundness, I know there must be a something that is round, and so with all the other properties. If you forbid me to judge thus that there is a substantial orange in which all these properties abide, you will practically make me idiotic. I gave one simple instance. The same facts are true concerning every perception which rational human beings have concerning every concrete object.

This principle of common sense has also another class of applications. Whenever we see actions or functions going on, we must think an *agent* in order to account for them. It does not matter whether we see the agent or not; if we know the actions or functions are going on, our minds compel us to believe that there is an agent producing them. Let us suppose for instance, that a clear-headed country child or red man, who had never seen nor heard of a church bell, should come to a town and there hear one ringing. His mind would prompt him to ask: "What makes that sonorous noise, the like of which I never heard before?" He is compelled to believe before he sees anything, there is some substantive agent that makes the

noise, though as yet unknown to him. Try to persuade him out of this conviction; ask him: Do you see anything making the novel noise? No. Then why not conclude that nothing makes the noise? He will answer: because I am not an idiot; I hear the noise; if there were nothing there could be no noise to hear; I must know there is a substantive thing, an agent producing noise; otherwise noise could not be.

Now, these are the simple principles of common sense, which inevitably and universally regulate the thinking of every human being who is not idiotic or crazy, about every object of sensible knowledge. If the reader doubts this, let him watch the perceptions and thinking of himself and his fellow-creatures until he is fatigued and satisfied.

We come now to the simple application. Every man is absolutely conscious that he is all the time thinking, feeling, and willing; then there must be a substantial agent which performs these functions. Every man is conscious of powers and properties, of thought and feeling; then he is obliged to know there is a substance in him in which these powers and properties abide.

But what do we mean by the notion of substance? We are so familiar by perception with material substances, that possibly thoughtless persons may conclude that we have no valid notion of substance, except that which possesses the material properties, such as color, weight, solidity, size, shape; and such a thoughtless person, though compelled to admit that where so much thinking, feeling, and willing go on there must be a substance which thinks, might conclude hence that this substance must be material, the body, namely, or some part thereof. But the use of a little grain of common sense corrects this folly. Anybody knows that air is a substance as truly as granite rock, but air has no color nor shape, nor do we find out by our senses that it has any weight. Every person not idiotic believes that light is a substance, or else a motion in a substance, ether. But this ether has no color, or shape, or weight, nor is visible or tangible, nor did anybody ever smell it, or taste it, or hear it. Yet all teachers of physics tell us they are as certain of its substantial reality as of that of granite rock. For why? Because our common sense makes us know that, if there were not such a substantive thing as ether, there could never have been any

light for anybody to see. Thus we prove that the gross qualities of matter are not necessary to the rational notion of true substance. We are bound to believe in substances which have not those material properties. Then human souls may be one real kind of substances.

Does some one ask, What, then, belongs to the true notion of substance? Our common sense answers, It is that which is the real thing, a being possessed of sameness and permanency, the enduring basis of reality on which the known properties abide. This description includes spirit as fairly as matter. We assert that we shall find spirit to be that kind of substance which has no material sensible properties, but which lives, thinks, feels, and acts.

Suppose, now, some student of material science should tell us that none of his scientific observations have detected any spirit in any human anatomy. He means the observations made by his bodily senses. Now, how idle and silly is this! Of course, the bodily senses do not detect the presence of spirit, since it is correctly defined as a true substance, which has no bodily properties. This talk is just as smart as that of the booby who should say: "I don't believe there is any such substance as air in that hollow glass globe, because my eyes don't see anything in it; and when I poke my finger into it, I don't feel anything; and when I poke my nose and my tongue into it, I neither smell nor taste anything." Of course he does not, because what is air? A gas transparent and colorless, without solidity, tasteless and odorless. Yet everybody except that booby knows that that glass globe is full of a real substance named air, for its presence there is proved by other reasonable evidences to common sense. So it is mere babble for the materialist to say that the presence of spirit is not attested to him by the observation of any bodily sense. For the question is, may there not be in man another substance not possessed of sensible, material properties, and yet as real and as permanently substance as any stone or metal?

Let our common sense now take another step in advance. When I am directly conscious of a thing, I know it as absolutely as I can possibly know anything. If I were to doubt my own consciousness, I should have to doubt everything else, because everything I know is known to me only through the medium of

this consciousness. I now assert that the reality of the spiritual substance in me, is known to me by my immediate consciousness, and must be so known, every time I know anything outside of myself. For, the reality of the self which knows, is necessarily implied in the act of knowing everything else than self.

We are here stating the simplest possible truth of common sense. Let us take the plainest instance possible. We hear a wide-awake child exclaim: "I see the mule!" Who sees it, child? I do. Then there must be a *me* to do the seeing even more certainly than there is a mule to be seen. Child, if you are certain there is a mule, then you are still more immediately certain there is a *me*, a self, an *ego*. As soon as you state this the child sees that it is and must be so, unless he is an idiot.

This is exceedingly simple. Yes, so simple that no doubt the child often looks at mules, trees, houses, etc., without stopping to think about it. But when he is stopped by the question, he inevitably thinks it. He is more certain of the existence in himself of the *ego*, the substance which thinks, than he is of the reality of any and everything else about which he thinks.

These views of common sense are so simple, so easy, so indisputable, that people are tempted to overlook how much there is involved in them. Let us pause then and review. We have found that wherever we see properties we must believe in substances to which the mind refers these properties. Wherever we see action going on we must believe in substantive agents. Sensible material properties are not necessary to a true and permanent substance. Since every man is conscious of much thinking, feeling and choosing, he must believe in the real existence in himself of a substantive agent which does this thinking, feeling, and acting. If he did not believe in the reality of the *me* which sees and thinks, he could not believe in anything he saw or thought. Therefore he knows there is in him a thinking substance, more certainly than he knows anything else or everything else in the world; and these principles of common sense are so simple, so fundamental, so regulative of all thinking and knowing that if you could really make any man deny their force you would make that man an idiot. So direct and perfect is our demonstration.

The doubter may reply: "Of course, so much is indisputable. I must know there is a substance in me which thinks; but may not that substance be body, the whole *sensorium* or nervous structure inside the bones and muscles? or the brain? or the little cluster of lobes between the top of the spinal marrow and the base of the brain? or the pineal gland in the centre of that cluster?" This is a fair question, and it shall be fairly met. We know the properties of matter pretty well through the perception of our bodily senses. The inquiry now must be, whether we cannot know through the perceptions of consciousness the essential properties of this something which thinks. When we have informed ourselves certainly of these, we can compare them with the material properties, and decide this plain question of common sense: *Whether or not the two kinds of properties are enough alike to belong possibly to the same kind of substances?*

As intimated, we learn the properties of material things by the observations of our bodily senses. We learn the properties of the something in us that thinks, chiefly by the observations of consciousness, and also by watching and comparing the actings forth of the thinking agent in our fellow-creatures. Now, we are actually told that some are silly enough to assert that no observations are valid except those made upon outward things by our senses. When a child uses his eyesight to look at an orange, he finds out correctly that it is yellow. When he uses his ears to listen to the bell, he finds out certainly that it is sonorous. But they think this child finds out nothing certain concerning the being within, which does the seeing and listening, by watching its inward consciousness, because, forsooth, this is not sensuous observation! How stupid this is may appear by a plain question: would that child's hands and ears tell him anything about the properties of the orange and the bell, unless his sense perceptions of them were reported in his consciousness? Suppose he were asleep when the bell rang. These sonorous wavelets would pass through the air and agitate the *tympanum* and inner nerves of his ear just the same, but the child would know nothing about the bell. Why not? Because his consciousness does not take in the sound. Suppose that child is awake, and you hold the orange before his eyes, but his mind is so monopolized with an entrancing vision of next

Saturday's picnic that he fails to notice it at all. Again, his eyes tell him nothing about the orange. Why not? He was not attending to it, which is to say, the perception of it did not enter his consciousness. It is only by the mediation of consciousness that the observations of the senses tell us anything certain. Then it is the testimony of consciousness which is immediate and primary, while that of the senses is secondary and dependent. If the observations of consciousness are not to be trusted, those of the senses are for the stronger reason not to be trusted.

Hence it follows, that of all the things which we certainly know, the things of the inner consciousness are the most certain. First, then, I am immediately conscious that the something in me which thinks and feels, the self or *ego*, is all the time completely identical; however I may notice it at different times, I am conscious of its complete sameness; for instance, I go to sleep, that is, my bodily senses shut themselves up and for a time remembered consciousness is suspended. I wake, consciousness revives, and immediately I know that it is the same identical self which went to sleep some hours before. Sleep has made a deep gap in my sensations and my remembered thoughts and feelings; but I am certain it has made no gap at all in the sameness of the self. For, again, I am conscious of feeling the heat of fire, then afterwards of feeling the intense cold of the north wind; or at one time of being frightened by a malignant bull, and afterwards of being charmed by a mocking-bird; now of looking at an ugly clod, then of looking at the splendid sun. Now heat and cold are opposite sensations; fear and pleasure are opposite emotions; the ugly little image of the clod extremely different from the image of the sun; but I know that the self, the *me*, which experiences these different and opposite sensations and thoughts is completely the same. I believe in its perfect continuous identity; and let the reader notice that this belief cannot be a result from any process of comparison or reflection; because I must be sure beforehand of the sameness of the mind which does the comparing, or else the comparison is worthless, and concludes nothing. For instance, suppose two pairs of two children's eyes in separate rooms were looking at two apples; could there be any comparison determining which apple was the larger? What would the dispute be worth be-

tween the two little fools, each repeating that his apple was the bigger? Let one and the same pair of eyes look at both apples, then only comparison is possible deciding which is the bigger apple.

I purposely make these instances perfectly simple. They are fair, they convince us that the conviction of the mind's own identity has to be presupposed in order to authorize the mind to draw any other conclusions, by any process of reflection or comparison whatsoever. So that the first and most certain truth which I am obliged to know, concerning the something in me which thinks, is its perfect identity, its absolute sameness. But I see that nothing organized has this perfect sameness. No animal body, no tree, or plant remains the same two days, every one is losing something and gaining something, growing, dwindling, changing. Even the rock and the mountain change. The rain and the frost are continually washing off or scaling off parts. But I repeat; especially is perpetual change the attribute of every living, material organism, change of size and form, and even of constituent substance. Now, none of those who deny the spirituality of the mind ever dream of saying that thought can be the function of inorganic matter. No, they try to say, thought may be the function of organized matter, of matter most highly organized. But they admit that the most highly organized material substances are those which change most quickly. I make, then, this point: the self which thinks must be immaterial, because it possesses absolute identity, and no organized body of matter ever remains the same, in that high sense, two days together. In the second place, I know that the something in me which thinks is an absolute unit. This is involved in its identity. It is impossible for me to think of this *me* as divided or divisible. I am conscious it is undergoing constant changes or modifications in the form of different successive thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and volitions; but I know that this *me* is the unit-centre in which all these meet and out of which all my volitions go. I experience a variety of mental modifications, but each one of these is qualified by the same absolute unity. If I try to think of my sensation, my idea, my feeling, my volition, divided into halves or quarters, the statement becomes nonsense to me. But with all matter the case is exactly opposite; the smallest body of matter is divisible into

smaller. Each part subsists as an aggregation of smaller parts. The properties of matter are all divisible along with its masses. The whiteness of this wall may be literally divided along with the substance of the plastering into the whiteness of a multitude of points in the wall. Let an electrified steel rod be cut in two, we have two electrified rods; so the electricity may be subdivided along with the matter itself; but each affection of the mind is as complete a unit as the mind is. Thus I am bound to think that mind is immaterial. In the third place, my perceptions make me acquainted with the attributes of matter, and I perceive that they all belong to one class; they are all attributes of extension. The smallest material bodies have some size, all must have some shape or figure, they all weigh something, though some are lighter than others, they all subsist in the form either of gasses, or liquids, or solids. Most of them have colors. But when I turn to mind and its processes, I know that none of these attributes of extension can apply to them at all. Let us make the attempt. Let us try to say that this fine mind is finer than that other, because it has a circular or elliptical shape while the inferior one is three-cornered. Attempt to explain the fact that Mr. Calhoun's mind was greater than a peasant's because it was so many inches bigger, or so many pounds heavier. Let us attempt to give figure to our thoughts and feelings, or color, saying that some are three-cornered, some square, some circular, some red, some blue, and some black. Let us try to think of the top and bottom of a sentiment or a volition as we do of the top and bottom of a brick or a house. We speak of arguments sometimes as solid, but what we mean is that they are logically valid. We know that we cannot think them solid in the material sense of stones or wooden blocks. The very attempt to fix any attribute of matter upon mind or upon its processes becomes mere idiotic nonsense. This shows that the attributes of matter are not and cannot be relevant to mind. Why? Because they are opposite substances. Mind is pure, immaterial spirit; all the bodies our senses see are extended, divisible, ponderous, figured, in a word material.

In the fourth place, when I watch myself I am immediately conscious of my free-agency. In certain respects I choose for

myself what I attempt to do; nobody and nothing outside of self make me choose what I choose. The *me*, the thinking self, has this remarkable faculty of power, of self-determination. Thus self is an original spring-head of new actions and effects. Let no one deceive himself with the shallow notion that this power of free-agency is merely unobstructed execution by the muscles and members of purposes or volitions put into the soul. This is but half of the fact; the soul is free in forming those volitions. It is not forced to them, but is self-determined in them. Minds are originators of new actions and effects. Now matter has not and cannot have such free-agency. Science pronounces absolute *inertia* to be the first law of matter. Experience shows that if a material mass was once lying still it will be still in the same place forever, unless a force from without pushes it. If it is moving in any line with any given speed it is obliged to move on thus forever, unless something outside of itself stops it. Matter can receive effects; it can transmit them; it never originates any effect. It is impossible to conceive of matter as exercising intelligent choice, endowed with rational free-agency. He who tries to think thus of matter makes himself to that extent idiotic. But mind has free-agency, it chooses, it originates. Therefore mind must be a different substance from matter, an opposite substance. Mind is spiritual, matter is corporeal.

In the fifth place, corresponding to our conscious free-agency is our consciousness of our accountability, or moral responsibility for our conduct. This is an immediate conviction of our conscience which it is impossible for us to escape. It is equally impossible for us to ascribe accountability to material bodies. If I, by a volition of my free-agency, strike and wound the head of a man without provocation, I know it is a sin for which I am morally responsible. The wounded man knows it, every spectator knows it. Another man when walking in the forest has his head struck and wounded by a falling branch which the wind blows from a tree; this is not a sin but an accident; neither the wind nor the dead branch is accountable for it. The man would be idiotic to seriously judge either of them morally responsible. Here then is the crowning contrast between mind and matter: minds are accountable because they are intelligent and free-agents;

material bodies cannot be accountable; therefore we conclude again that minds and bodies are opposite kind of substance. Minds are immaterial substances distinct from the bodies which they inhabit for a time. They are indeed combined in the animated human person in a mysterious and intimate manner. Such combinations are credible, for similar ones frequently occur. But the two substances combined must be distinct, because it is impossible that any essential attribute of the one substance can be attached in thought to the other. Now let no one say that this is but a metaphysical argument. In the sense of such charges I deny it. It is not metaphysics, but the unavoidable conclusion of common sense. I ask the reader to go over these five steps again carefully. He will find that there is not a single position assumed which every man does not know to be true by his own necessary consciousness without being a philosopher at all. Every point in my argument is one of those necessary principles of knowledge which are found universally regulating the thoughts of all the people in the world who are in their right minds, principles of thinking which no man can reject from his mind without reducing himself towards the position of a lunatic or an idiot. It is from these simple principles I have drawn the conclusion that the mind, the something in us which thinks, is not a mere function or quality of something else, but a true permanent substance in itself; and since all its essential properties are the opposites of those of material bodies, souls are distinct kind of substance, immaterial spirits. I invite the reader to break these conclusions if he can do it honestly and truthfully. The more he tries the more he will be convinced that he cannot, because the premises are the necessary first facts of knowledge, and the conclusions follow by the force of common sense.

This fact that our spirits are naturally monads, shows that they will never cease to exist, by a powerful analogical argument. They may be justly called spiritual atoms, single and indivisible, in the same high, absolute sense with the ultimate atoms of matter. All science teaches us that no such atom of substance, once brought into existence by the Creator, is ever annihilated. This is the fixed conclusion of the material sciences themselves, as astronomy, chemistry, physics, and biology. None of these

sciences know of any kind of destruction of beings except dissolution and separation of their parts. The parts still exist as really as before in new states and places. When a piece of fuel is consumed in the fire, it is only ignorance which supposes that any of its substance is annihilated. All educated persons know that though the fuel is consumed, every atom of it still exists; science is able to catch and weigh every one of them. The mineral atoms remain in the ashes; the watery atoms have floated upward as vapor; a part of the carbon particles are sticking in the chimney-flue in the form of soot; another part is floating off in the form of smoke, as volatilized matter, and a part in the form of transparent carbonic acid gas; not an atom ceases to exist. Every fact in the whole range of experience goes to prove that not an atom of existing substance is annihilated in the greatest changes known to man; they only change places and states. Why then should people suppose that any change can annihilate the spiritual atoms—rational souls? He who ignorantly thinks that death does so, has the whole analogy of human science and knowledge against him. On which side then does the burden of proof lie? Manifestly on the side of the unbeliever. Every probability is against him: he must bring us positive proof on the opposite side demonstrating that souls are annihilated at death; otherwise the whole powerful probability arising out of this analogy remains in force in favor of immortality, and I assert there is not a spot in all the realms of human knowledge where the materialist can find one real ray of rebutting evidence. Every fact of physical science is against him; every doctrine of mental science is against him. He discredits the resurrection of Moses, Lazarus, Jesus, and Tabitha as fabulous. Then according to him, not a single witness has ever come back from the invisible region beyond the grave to testify whether men's souls live there or not.

I admit that I have not yet proved the immortality of the spirit positively and affirmatively. But I have shown that this proposition is credible and may be capable of proof. For, since spirits are substantive beings, and distinct kind of substances from bodies, the destruction of the bodies they inhabit no longer presents any necessary evidence that the spirits are destroyed by bodily death. It is just as possible and credible that the

death of the bodies may have no more influence on the continuing existence of the spirits than the stripping off of a child's clothing has upon his personal life. I am ready to admit that the first impression made on our sensations when we witness a death is different. The death of a human body is very impressive and awful. When we see the marble complexion, the glazed eye, the absolute and final arrest of sense and motion, the irreparable change from visible activity to dissolution and dust, it is not surprising that the first impression should be, with us sensuous creatures, This is the end of the whole being. The fact that the spirit of the deceased never returns in the ordinary course of nature to tell us whether it is still alive and active, awes the imagination, and suggests to the fancy the negative. But here we must remember how frequently the first sensible impressions are entirely delusive, and how they are contradicted by reason and fuller observation. The first impression with the child when he sees the acorn drop from the tree and lie frozen in the wintry earth, is that the acorn is dead. It is hard for him to believe that this little dry fragment of matter is the germ of a tree which will live for centuries a monarch of the forest. Nearly all the actual exploits of chemistry and electricity are equal surprises, wholly contrary to first impressions. Who supposed at first that gas tar, a thing black, stinking, and filthy, contained all the glories of the aniline dyes, until Hoffman proved it? How hard is it to believe that all the planets except two are much larger than this huge globe of ours, when they appear to us nothing but minute points of light in the nocturnal sky! Yet the astronomers prove by strict mathematics that they are larger than the earth. All intelligent persons see so many instances of the falsehood of these first impressions on sensation and fancy, that they cease to regard them as any tests of truth. We know that we must look beyond them for more reasonable proofs, and the question for us is, whether facts and reason do not prove that the immaterial spirit survives the death of the body.

The answer is, Yes.

For, *first*, strong probable proof appears in this fact, that the identity of the living spirit does certainly remain unchanged throughout sundry great changes undergone by the body. We

know that every human body changes from a living *fœtus* to a living infant. It then changes into a grown man in his full vigor. It then passes into the decrepitude of age. But these impressive changes in the conditions of the body result in no change in the identity of the spirit which inhabits it. This is conscious of its own sameness throughout the changes. Hence there is a clear probability that the next change, bodily death, also may not interrupt the being of the living spirit. The body not only grows, but it may lose half its substance by emaciation from sickness; it may lose a whole limb by wounds or amputation; but the spirit consciously lives on without change or diminution of spiritual powers. This shows it to be probable that the final amputation, cutting off all its limbs from its use, will not interrupt the spirit's life. Indeed, we are assured by physiologists that there is a constant change in the material molecules which make up our bodies at any one time. Every tissue experiences wear and tear and nutrition. Particles which yesterday were vital parts are now "*necrosed*," and are expelled out of the system as alien matter, while their places in the living tissues are taken by new particles which yesterday belonged to a different vegetable or animal. It is every way probable that there is not one single molecule at this time in our bodies which was there some years ago. But while, between these two dates, our bodies have undergone this sweeping change, and those of that previous year have as literally and absolutely returned to their dust as will the corpse of the friend whom we bury to-day, our spirits are certain of their unchanging life and identity. In one word, every man's body is daily undergoing gradual death; this makes no change in the life and identity of the spirit. Hence the summary death of such a body presents no real evidence of the destruction of the spirit.

Second, Every time we go to sleep and awake we have probable proof that the spirit remains awake after the sleep of death. We are familiar with this nightly change. It does not frighten us or impress the imagination. But let us consider it as a rational man would, should it have come to him as an entire novelty. When we grow drowsy we are conscious of approaching insensibility. The senses are all ceasing to act and closing up. If the mind had no experience to teach it better and listened to the first

impression it would doubtless conclude: "This insensibility will be final; this last moment of consciousness is the last I shall ever experience." But every morning serves to correct this awful impression. Every awakening teaches us that this mimic death of the body has not in the least interrupted the life and conscious identity of the spirit. Hence the probability grows strong that the deeper sleep of death will not interrupt it, that this also will have its sure awakening.

Third, It is urged by materialists that so far as all experience goes the thinking being is dependent for all its perceptions upon its bodily sense organs and for the execution of all its volitions upon its nerves and muscles; hence they would have us infer that the soul is entirely dependent on its body for all its knowledge and activity, which is practically being dependent on the body for its existence, since without either knowledge or activity the soul would be practically non-existent. But how does the soul use its bodily organs of sense and motion? Obviously in the same general mode in which it uses external instruments.

The soul feels external bodies with its arms as it would feel bodies somewhat more distant with a stick. The soul sees luminous objects with its eyes just as it sees with a telescope or opera-glass. It hears sounds with its ears, much as it hears them with an ear-trumpet. The blind man does not lose his power of feeling by dropping his stick. The huntsman does not lose sight by breaking his field-glass nor the sense of hearing by losing his ear-trumpet. We know perfectly well that these bodily organs are not our minds but only instruments which our minds employ; therefore the loss of the instruments does not imply the destruction of the mind: it only leaves us in ignorance as to the other instruments of knowledge and action which the mind will learn how to employ when it shall lose these bodily ones. But more correct thought shows us that the spirit in its disembodied state will most probably not need or employ any organic instruments of perception. The only reason why she needs them now is probably because she is immured in an animal body. Her case is that of a state prisoner, who is confined for a time within the walls of a castle. He has been allowed five loop-holes in these walls in order to hold some intercourse with the outer world. At death the liberator comes

and proposes to demolish the roof and walls of his prison. Shall the prisoner be so thoughtless as to complain and object that in destroying his walls they are depriving him of his loop-holes, in consequence of which he will be able to see nothing of the outer world? The answer is plain: the only reason he needed loop-holes was that the wall imprisoned him; now that it is gone he needs none. He has free unobstructed light and vision all around him.

Fourth, The independence of the separate thinking substance is more strongly proved by this fact: that a number of its higher functions are performed without any dependence upon any bodily organ. Our eyes are the instruments with which we receive visual perceptions; through the ears we receive the acoustic; through the fingers the tactual; through the nostrils the olfactory; through the palate the gustatory. But our abstract general ideas, our cognitions of God, of time, of space, of infinity, of subjective consciousness, are ministered by no sense organ. Every avenue of sense may be locked up or disused, and yet these highest functions of spirit are in full activity. The animated body is still there, but it is contributing nothing to these most important functions of soul. Especially does the spirit assert its essential independence in its self-prompted volitions. We will rest this argument more especially upon that well known class of volitions whose object is not to move any bodily organ or member, but to direct the mind's own attention at will to its own chosen topic of inward meditation; and whose impulse does not come at all from any outward impression, but from the preference and purpose of the mind itself. Every man knows that his mind frequently performs these acts of voluntary attention prompted by nothing outside the mind, and directed to nothing outside of it. Here are cases of the mind moving itself, with which the body has nothing to do. The mind in these actions is as virtually disembodied as it will be when it shall have passed at death into the spirit world.

Some recent physiologists do indeed assert, in the interest of materialism, that we are partly mistaken in these facts. They say that every action, even the most abstract and subjective, in the mind is attended with brain action in the form of some molecular changes or readjustments in the nerve filaments and the

particles of grey matter forming the outer surface of the cerebrum. They would have us believe that when a man, meditating with closed eyes, revives the mental idea of the horse or the tree which he saw a year ago, there is as real nerve action, and indeed the same nerve action, in the brain as that by means of which he first got his visual perception of that object. They would have us believe that when we think our most abstract cognitions of God or eternity, there must be as real brain action as when we are hearing the sound of a trumpet. Thus they would make out our premises to be false, denying that the mind performs any functions of thoughts or volitions independently of brain motions.

When we ask them how they prove all this, we find there is no valid proof, and the theory remains a mere wilful, idle guess. We ask them, Has anybody ever *seen* these motions of nerve matter and changes of relative position between filaments and particles of grey matter? They confess, Nobody. They confess that they will be too minute to be perceived by the human eye. They know that no human eye ever had, or ever can have, an opportunity to watch them, because no vivisection could uncover the ganglia at the base of the brain, where they imagine these things go on, without instantly killing the subject of the experiment. Their indirect arguments are nothing but vague suppositions. The only real source of the fancy is the stubborn determination to reject the teaching of common sense that there is a separate spirit in man, and to make him no more than a material animal. Their real logic amounts only to this worthless argument in a circle: We do not choose to admit the existence in man, no matter how strong the proofs, of anything except animated matter. We are conscious that a great deal of thinking goes on in man; therefore animated matter does it all; therefore nothing exists in man except animated matter. This theory of universal molecular brain actions has never been proved, it is only guessed; it never can be proved.

But were it necessary, we might admit that coördinate nerve actions in the brain attend and wait upon every, even the most wholly abstract, process of mind, without in the least weakening our fourth argument. There are three remarks to which we ask the close attention of the reader, either one of which is sufficient

to prove this. First, the wonderful faculty of memory must be accounted for, whatever theory is adopted. This materialistic theory must teach, as it avowedly does, that the brain is literally and materially the storehouse of memory. It must teach that the way ideas are retained in memory is this: A new mark is imprinted on a portion of the brain matter when the idea first comes through sense-perception; and the reason why the idea remains in memory, and may be revived in recollection, is that the mark remains permanently on the brain matter, like a scratch, for instance, made by a diamond upon a pane of glass; and the immediate cause why the idea revives again in recollection is this, that the portion of brain matter has moved again with a counter-movement, the exact reaction of that which took place when the mark was first printed on it.

Some of them give us descriptions of what they suppose the action and counter-action of the mark to be which are all as imaginative and as truly without proof as the history of Jack the Giant-killer and his beanstalk. The most popular guess is this, that when the sense-impression first came into the brain it caused a change of adjustment between the ends or tips of certain nerve filaments and certain little masses of grey matter. So when the idea is revived in recollection, this results from the reactionary change of position between those little masses and nerve filaments. We care not to discuss the particular shape of any of this idle dreaming. According to its authors every idea received into memory and stored up is represented by a distinct material mark upon a material mass. Now one remark breaks all this down into hopeless folly, viz., that the brain is a limited body while the power of human memory is indefinite and unlimited. The more ideas an educated man has the more new ideas he can acquire. Some great men know a hundred or a thousand times as much as other stupid and thoughtless people. But their brains if they differ in size at all are only larger by a few ounces at most. Voltaire had a multitude of ideas and a marvelous memory. His brain was one of the smallest found in a grown person. What is the use of saying that the mark printed on the brain by each idea may be very small? When the number that may be printed is absolutely unlimited the surface must get full no matter how small each mark, long before

the stock of ideas in memory is completed. Now add another fact, that it is most probable no idea once gained by the mind is ever lost wholly from the memory, but that all remain there unconscious and latent, and capable of being revived by some mental stimulus of suggestion during our future existence: this theory of material nerve markings becomes worthless and idle.

Second, Every man's mind knows that it usually directs its own attention by its own will. When he is lying in darkness with closed eyes he thinks of absent and abstract ideas of God, of duty, of eternity, and not because he is made to do so by physical causes, but *because he chooses*. He directs his own attention to these supersensuous thoughts. We know that sometimes men's minds do drift in involuntary reverie, but we know that men can stop this when they choose. We know that in most cases the mind directs its own thoughts, that it is not led by the nose, by exterior physical causes, but guides itself by its subjective will. Now let it be granted that all our mind processes, even the most supersensuous, are *accompanied by* molecular movements in the brain. Consciousness gives the highest of all evidence. This assures us that if there are any such molecular movements they are only consequences and not causes of the supersensuous actions of the mind. It is the mind that starts the process, it is the brain which responds. Let us suppose that never having seen horses and mounted men until recently it so happens that every time that we have seen the men they were mounted upon their horses; thereupon some chopper of logic like these materialists begins to argue: Gentlemen, you have never seen those men except upon their horses; you have never seen the men move but what you saw the horses move with them; therefore you are bound to believe that the man and the horse are the one and the same being, that each is the literal Centaur. We should reply to him: Nay but oh fool! have we not seen that it is the men who govern the horses, that the horses only move when the men spur them; therefore we know without waiting to see the man dismount that the horse is not one and the same being with the man but an inferior being and the servant of the man.

Third, We know that we are free-agents better than we know

any physiology, false or true. We know that we are free-agents even better than we know that we have vitalized brains inside our skulls, for we know our free-agency by immediate consciousness; but we know every fact of outward observation only as it is reported through this consciousness. Now if this materialistic theory of thought were true, we could not be free-agents. Every thought, feeling, volition, which arises in us would be the effect of a material movement. But matter cannot have any free-agency; and if matter thus governed us we could have none, our very nature would be a lie. Our own hourly experience gives us a perfect illustration of this argument. Our minds do have a class of ideas and a class of feelings whose immediate causes are found in certain movements of our corporeal nerve organs; they are what we call sensations. And about having them, when once those nerve organs are impressed by any external body beyond our control, we have no free-agency at all. If the norther has struck us, we have no more free-agency about feeling chilly, if a stone thrown by a bully has struck us, we have no more free-agency about feeling pain, if another man holds a rose under our nostrils, we have no more free-agency about smelling fragrance than if we were machines or blocks of stone. The knowing subject, mind, has indeed gotten the idea, the feeling; but it has gotten it from a material nerve organ; hence the mind wields no freedom in having it. So, if this materialistic theory of thought were true, if all our supersensuous thoughts, feelings and volitions were propagated from material nerve organs, we could have no free-agency anywhere. But we know we are free-agents to a certain degree.

At this point the solution becomes easy with those cavils against the spirituality and immortality of the soul, which are drawn from the results of concussions of the brain, suspending consciousness, and of lunacy and dotage. If the reader has attended to the remarks last made he will easily see that these facts do not prove the soul to be the brain. They only prove that in our present life the soul uses the brain as its instrument for a part of its processes. In dotage it is the bodily organs which are growing dull and decaying; this is the reason that recent impressions made through the senses are weak and consequently transient. But the facts impressed by sensation in

previous years, when the old man was in his bodily prime, are as strong and tenacious as ever. The old man forgets where he laid his pipe half an hour ago, but he remembers the events of his youth with more vividness than ever. This proves that the decay is only organic. Were it spiritual it would equally obliterate early recollections and recent ones. Again, in the infirm old man, while the memory of recent events seems dull, the faculties of judgment and conscience are unimpaired. His advice is as sound as ever, his practical wisdom as just. The best scientific men now regard all cases of mental disease as simply instances of disease in the nerve-organs, which the mind employs while united to the body. Borrowing the language of pathology, cases of lunacy are but "functional derangements" of the mind. There is no such thing as "organic disease" of the spirit. Whenever the wise physician can cure the nervous excitement by corporeal means, sanity returns of itself to the mind. If lunacy continues until death, it is because the disease of the nerve organ remains uncured. The mind is not released from the disturbing influences of the incurably morbid action of its instrument until the mysterious tie which unites mind to body in this life is finally sundered.

Another objection may here be noted: that a parallel argument may be constructed to prove the spirituality and immortality of the souls of brutes. The higher animals seem to have some mental faculties, as sensation, passions, memory, and a certain form of animal spontaneity. It is asked: Why do not the same arguments prove that the cause in brutes which perceives, feels, remembers and acts, is a distinct spiritual substance, and therefore capable of separate and independent subsistence without the body? One answer is, suppose they did! This would be no refutation. The conclusion might clash with many of our prejudices, might surprise us greatly, might perhaps dictate a change in much of our conduct towards the animals. If the premises of a given reasoner are found to prove another conclusion in addition to that which he had asserted from them, this is no proof at all that his argument is invalid. Let us suppose that a prosecutor of crime has argued that certain established facts prove John and Thomas to be guilty. It is no answer to cry that the same facts would also prove Richard to be

guilty. What if they do? It is still proved that John and Thomas are guilty. The only change in the case is that we now find the guilt extends further than was at first asserted. But in the second place, an argument for the spirituality and immortality of the higher animals will be found very defective when compared with the full argument for man's immortality. The heads of argument which we shall hereafter urge for the latter, are found to have no application to the brutes. But they are far the strongest arguments. The real nature of that principle in them which feels and remembers, is very mysterious to us; the medium of speech is lacking between us and them. The real nature of the brute's faculties is extremely obscure to us, and for this reason we are ignorant of what becomes of that principle when their bodies die. But the nature of the human faculties we can know thoroughly, and therefore we are able to infer what becomes of that spiritual substance endowed with those high faculties when men's bodies die. But obscure as is the nature of the sentient principles of brutes to us, it seems very clear that they lack those faculties and powers on which our argument, as to man, is chiefly founded.

Brutes have sense-perceptions, sensibilities, and memory. But there is every reason to believe that their memory is only of individual ideas of particular material objects. They never form rational, general concepts; they cannot reason concerning collective classes of things. They think no abstract, general truths; they have no judgments of taste or of conscience. Of all these, which are the truly spiritual functions of mind, of all notions and judgments of the beautiful, of the sublime, the obligatory, the morally meritorious, the regulative principles of logic, the rational purposive volition, they seem as incapable as is a vegetable. But these are precisely the functions of human minds, which, we are conscious, go on independently of corporeal organs. These are our crowning proofs of the spiritual independence of human minds.

Fifth, Our argument for man's immortality must now involve as a premise another great truth, the existence of a rational, personal God. We shall not pause to argue this, because it needs no argument. Men can only deny it at the cost of outraging every principle of common sense. The very existence of

a temporal universe proves an eternal God. The universal order of this universe, the appearance of design and contrivance everywhere in it, prove the existence of an intelligent and wise Creator. Every function of conscience within us recognizes a righteous, divine Ruler above us. Since the Creator is wise, we know that he had rational purposes for all that he has created. Therefore we know that if man had been made only for a brute's destiny, God never would have given man capacities and faculties so much above the brute's, so useless and out of place in a temporal and corporeal existence. The brute's instincts, animal sensibilities, and partial memory of particular ideas, coupled with his lack of reason, lack of forecast, lack of conscience, incapacity for religious and abstract knowledge, and lack of all desire for them, qualify him exactly for a temporary, corporeal life. But man's rationality, his unavoidable forecast concerning the future, his moral affections and intuitive judgments of duty, merit, and guilt, his religious nature, his unquenchable hopes and desires for unlimited moral good, are utterly out of place in a creature destined to only an animal and temporal life. No sensible man who believes in a God can believe that the Creator has made such a mistake. Does a rational man furnish sails to his ploughs, destined only to turn the soil of his fields, or cart-wheels to his ships, destined only to navigate the water, or eagles' wings to his gate-posts, planted fast in the soil?

Human experience fully confirms the verdict of Solomon, that the rational man who seeks his chief end in the enjoyments of the mortal life always finds it "vanity of vanities." Did not the wise Creator know that? Did he also perpetrate a vanity of vanities in creating a being thus needlessly endowed for a mere mortal existence, or dare we seriously charge upon him the reproach which the human anguish, in view of this futility and the death which ends it, only suggested: "Lord, wherefore hast thou made all men in vain"? Nay, this were blasphemy. To assert man's mere mortality is a parallel outrage upon all that is noblest in his nature. This outrage evolutionism, the recent and fashionable form of materialism, attempts to perpetrate. We ask it, whence man's mind with its noble and immortal endowments? It has to answer that it is only a function, evolved from mere matter, through the animals. Just as Dr. Darwin accounts for the

evolution of the human hand from the fore paw of an ape, so all the wonders of consciousness, intellect, taste, conscience, volition, and religious faith, are to be explained as the animal outgrowth of gregarious instincts and habitudes cultivated through them.

To any man who has either a single scientific idea touching the facts of consciousness, or a single throb of true moral feeling, this is simply monstrous. It, of course, denies the existence of any substance that thinks, distinct from animated matter. It utterly misconceives the unity which intuitively must be found underlying all the processes of reason in our minds. It overlooks utterly the distinction between instinctive and rational motives, thus making true free-agency, virtue, moral responsibility, merit and moral affection, impossible. It supposes that as the sense-perceptions and instincts of the beast have been expanded by association and habit into the intellect of a Newton, so the fear and habit of the beast cowering under his master's stroke, or licking the hand that feeds and fondles him, are the sole source of the noble dictates of conscience and virtue. The holy courage of the martyr, who braves the fire rather than violate the abstract claims of a divine truth, is but the outgrowth of the brutal tenacity of the mastiff, when he endures blows, and torments rather than unlock his fangs from the bloody flesh of his prey. The heroic fidelity of the patriot, in the face of the grimest death, is but the quality of the dog which will fetch and carry at his master's bidding. The disinterested love of Christian mothers, the heavenly charity which delights to bless an enemy, the lofty aspirations of faith for the invisible and eternal purity of the skies, the redeeming love of Jesus, all that has ever thrilled a right soul with deathless rapture of admiration and elevated man towards his divine father, are destined to have neither a future nor a reward, any more than the fragrance of a rose, or the radiance of the plumage of the bird, or the serpent's scales. After a few years, all that shall forever be of the creature endowed with these glorious attributes, will be a handful of the same dust which is left by the rotting weed. The spirit which looked out through Newton's eye, and read through the riddles of the phenomenal world the secrets of eternal truth and the glories of an infinite God, went out as utterly in everlasting night as the light in the eye of the owl or bat, that could

only blink at the sunlight. These are the inevitable conclusions of evolutionism, and they are an outrage to the manhood of our race. What foul juggling fiend has possessed any cultivated man of this Christian age, that he should grovel through so many gross sophistries in order to dig his way down to this loathsome degradation? The ancient heathens worshipped brute beasts, but still they did not forget that they were themselves the offspring of God. It remained for this modern paganism to find the lowest deep, by choosing the beast for his parent, and casting his God utterly away.

Sixth, Pursuing this argument from the wisdom of God, we prove yet more clearly that he designs man for immortality by this marked human trait, that the faculties of man's spirit are so formed as to be capable of unlimited improvement and progress. The case of the brutes who are not designed for immortality is opposite. They can be trained and improved up to a certain very narrow limit, but there the progress stops. Some of their instincts are very wonderful, but the earliest generations had them just as fully as the latest. Neither individual animals nor races are capable of making continuous progress, and doubtless the bees of Abraham's day built their honey-comb just as mathematically as those of our enlightened century. We presume that the literary pigs of the ancients were just as well educated as those of the modern showmen. The mahouts of King Porus of India, trained their elephants to be precisely as sagacious as those of Barnum, and the ancient Hindoo jugglers managed their snakes and dancing monkeys so as to present the same surprising tricks exhibited by the moderns. But with man it is wholly otherwise. He also like the animals has a body and a few animal instincts. These are capable of improvement, precisely like those of the brutes, within certain narrow limits. Gymnastic exercises enable the athlete to run somewhat faster, jump somewhat higher, lift somewhat heavier burdens, and wrestle or box somewhat better than common men; but his advancement in all these particulars is cut short by very narrow boundaries. He cannot pass beyond these any more than the ancient Greek. No corporeal dexterity is acquired in our day beyond that of the ancient jugglers and gymnasts. When we pass to the faculties of man's spirit, we find all different.

These can be improved indefinitely and without any limitation whatever. The more the mind learns the more it can learn. When an Aristotle or a Cuvier has extended his knowledge beyond that of the peasant a thousand fold, he is better able than ever before to make further acquisitions. The same fact is true of the race. Each generation, may, if it chooses, preserve all the acquisitions both of faculty and knowledge made by parent generations, and may add to them. When we compare the powers of civilized man with those of savages, the former appears almost as a demigod to the latter; but civilized society is now prepared by virtue of these acquisitions to advance from its present position with accelerating speed. Recent events prove this; for the last forty years have witnessed an advancement in knowledge and power equal to the previous hundred years.

Why does an all-wise Creator endow our mental faculties with capacity for endless advancement unless he designs us for an endless life? Observation teaches us that wherever God placed a power in the human *essentia*, he has appointed some legitimate scope for its exercise. It is incredible that he should have given this most splendid power to man had he intended to make it futile by cutting short man's existence. When we visit a nursery farm, where the little scions of apple trees and the great shade trees are cultivated for sale, we see that the nurseryman has planted them one foot apart in rows not more distant than corn-rows; but we see by experience that it is the nature of these trees to grow continually until each one occupies an area of forty feet in diameter. How is this? This nurseryman is surely cultivating these scions with express view to their transplantation into another and wider field of growth, otherwise he is a fool.

Seventh, The argument is crowned and made unanswerable by considering man's moral faculties. These centre in the following intuitive and necessary rational judgments, which are universal among right-minded men, and more indisputable if possible than the axioms of logic and geometry. We have an intuitive notion of moral good and evil, of the distinction between virtue and vice, right and wrong, which cannot be explained by or reduced into any other notion. Every man, not insane or idiotic, knows self-evidently that he is under obliga-

tion to do the right and avoid the wrong. Every man knows that there is good-desert in doing the right and ill-desert in doing the wrong. Every man feels the satisfaction of a good conscience when he does the right disinterestedly, and the sting of remorse when he does evil. Take this set of judgments and sentiments out of a man's spirit and he ceases to be a man.

The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, gives us this ingenious argument for immortality from this moral principle, "We know that it is our duty to practice all virtue and avoid all vice, as well as we know it is our duty to practice any virtue." That is to say, our judgment of obligation commands us to be morally perfect. Every sincerely good man is sincerely striving to be better and better, and no enlightened conscience will ever be satisfied short of moral perfection. This is then the voice of God, our maker, in our reasonable souls; and it is a voice of divine command. But experience teaches us that nobody has ever attained moral perfection in this mortal life.

Then surely there must be a future life in which progress in virtue may be made unto perfection. If God has not provided such a future state for us, he would never have laid this high command upon our souls. What should we think of his justice and equity if, after limiting our bodily growth to twenty-five years and fixing our bodily decay at three-score and ten, he had then commanded us every one to grow to be twenty feet tall? Nobody grows to much more than six feet in seventy years. How can we be commanded to grow to twenty feet if seventy years are the limit of our existence?

In the next place, our necessary judgment of demerit for sin and our sentiment of remorse make us all know that punishment ought to follow sin. Everybody expects that punishment will follow sin. We know that God is the fountain-head of moral obligation and the supreme moral ruler. We know that he wields a providential government over us. This is a truth so obvious as to force itself upon the dark mind of the pagan emperor Nebuchadnezzar, that God doeth his will among the armies of heaven and the inhabitants of this earth; and that there is none that can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou? On the one hand it is entirely agreeable to reason and conscience to regard the miseries of this life as the punish-

ments, or at least the chastisements, of sin; but on the other hand, if there is no future life reason and conscience ought to pronounce these earthly punishments the whole punishments of sin.

Our intuitions ought to make us believe that, as this mortal life terminates, our penal debt is fully paid off, the ill-desert of sin satisfied and extinguished, and the creature, lately a transgressor, cleansed of its ill-desert and guilt. As the mortal approaches death, remorse ought to decline, and relax its pangs, so that in the moment of death the soul should be absolutely freed from death and fear and self-rebuke, and quit existence in a state of perfect moral peace.

But such is never the case with dying men, unless their intellects are oppressed by delirium or coma, or their consciences seared as with a hot iron. The soul of the dying man, if in a rational state, knows that its debt of punishment for sin is not fully paid. It knows that earthly sufferings are only the beginning of that payment. Conscience is not satisfied, but denounces the ill-desert of the soul more clearly and awfully than ever before. Fear and remorse are not assuaged, but increase their torments, and culminate in the last dreadful period of exit from this world. Such is the experience of every rational soul in dying, who has not drugged himself with some deadly delusion, unless he is calmed by the hope of pardoning mercy in the Divine Judge whom he knows he is to meet beyond the grave. These moral convictions of dying men are dictated by the most universal, the most necessary, the most fundamental judgments of human reason. Were there no such fact of a future existence to ground them, reason itself would be a lie, and man incapable of moral conclusions.

It is very well known how materialists endeavor to break this testimony of nature itself to immortality, by crying that this fear and remorse are merely the results of superstitious fictions working upon the ignorant imagination. This explanation is as silly as it is false to rational consciousness. It is but the same which is advanced by the pagan atheist Ovid: *Timor fecit deos*. Mr. Edmund Burke sufficiently exploded the miserable sophism by the scornful question, *Quis fecit timorem?* No one is afraid, unless he believes there is an object to be afraid of.

The belief in the reality of the object must be present beforehand, in order to generate the fear. Every man who is not trying to cheat himself knows that these moral judgments, which are so solemnly reinforced by death, are functions of the reason and not of the fancy. The imaginings of superstition with its morbid terrors are the abuse and travesty of these moral sentiments, and not their source.

There is another broad moral fact which completes the demonstration, both of a future life and of future rewards and punishments. When we compare our fellow-men together we see that they do not all receive their equal deserts in this life. Here wickedness often triumphs and innocence suffers. The wicked "spread themselves like the green bay tree," their strength is firm and there are no bands even in their death; but the righteous are afflicted every morning and chastened every evening. Not seldom the purest human lives are darkened during their larger part by unkindness, calamity, or bereavement, and are terminated by a painful disease culminating in yet more painful death. No compensation comes to them, but the existence which was continued under the twilight of suffering ends in darkness. When we set these afflicted lives over against the prosperity of the wicked there remains a moral mal-adjustment abhorrent and frightful to every moral sentiment, unless there is to be a more equitable settlement beyond. These facts are impregnable. Righteousness deserves reward, and sin deserves punishment. There is a righteous God who rules this world by his providence. His benevolence and equity make it impossible that he should visit earthly miseries upon any moral agent except as the just punishment of his sins. Since all of us suffer more or less, all of us are more or less sinners, as our own consciences fully testify; but men are not punished in this life in due proportion to their relative guilt. Therefore it must be that God completes the distribution of penalties in a future life. To deny this then is to impugn the existence or the holiness and justice of God; it is a burning insult to him, near akin to blasphemy.

Such is a moderate statement of the rational arguments which prove the immortality of our spirits and our accountability beyond death for our conduct. The course of the proof also shows that the denial of our conclusion would make mankind

practically brutes; for when we have proved that there exists in the human person a rational and spiritual substance, the spirit, we have virtually proved man's immortality. Prove successfully that man does not possess this distinct spiritual substance and *he is made a mere beast*. He may be a more refined beast than an elephant, a pointer dog, or a monkey, but still he is only a beast. That which alone differentiates him from brutes is gone.

It is known that there is a vain philosophy, which avows itself materialistic and which yet pretends to find something in this evolved and improved animal to which to attach a temporary moral personality, moral sentiments, and moral accountability. We assure such vain thinkers that their attempt is futile. When we try it at the bar of common sense and sound philosophy, it meets these crushing refutations. Our mind is nothing but a refined function of a material organism, and its highest sentiments are nothing but animal instincts grounded only in organic sensibilities, evolved into some advanced forms; then it is impossible there can be any valid concept of the moral good higher than that of mere animal good. It is also impossible that there can be any moral motive directing and restraining actions. Where there are no moral motives there can be no just responsibility. Again, if all man's high sentiments are but advanced evolutions from animal instincts there can be no rational free-agency. Has the hen, for instance, any rational free-agency when impelled by her instinct to incubate her eggs? But where there is no rational free-agency there can be no just moral responsibility.

An all perfect God is the only adequate standard of righteousness, as his preceptive will is the only sufficient practical source of obligation. Without an omniscient administrator and a future life no adequate administration of justice is possible. Thus the logic of philosophy proves that when God, spirit, and immortality are expunged morality becomes impossible.

The great sensuous masses of mankind will reach the same result by a simpler and shorter path. "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." We may be assured this will be the logic of the average man when taught materialism: "The scientists teach me that I am only a refined beast. Then if I choose, I

may act as a beast; there is no hereafter for me. Then I shall be a fool to deny myself anything I desire out of a regard for a hereafter. Experience teaches me that what they call wicked men may live very prosperously in their wickedness provided they are a little politic in observing a few cautions. Then there is no penalty for that sort of wickedness in this life, and as there is no future life, there is no penalty for it anywhere. Why should I not indulge myself in it? There is no such thing as an omniscient God, consequently I am free to do anything and everything I desire, provided these short-sighted men do not 'catch me at it.' Indeed, why should your materialists stop short of this unanswerable logic? "The scientists tell me that I am only a refined beast, and that my fellow-men are the same. A beast cannot be guilty of crime, and it is no crime to kill beasts; why then may I not kill any human beings whom I find it convenient to murder? Why may I not kill any of these scientists who have taught me this instructive lesson, provided I gain anything by it?" Practically, the result of this materialism always has been, and always will be, to disorganize human society, to let loose the flood-gates of crime, and to destroy civilization. In imperial Rome skepticism and materialism became the prevalent doctrines. With what result? History answers: The butcheries of Nero and his successors, the death of public virtue, and the utter putrescence of the once glorious Roman republic, which left it like a rotting behemoth to be torn to pieces by the Goths and Huns. Again, materialism became the dominant creed of the ruling faction in France in 1790. With what result? The fruit was the "Reign of Terror," which in five years annihilated fifty-two billions of francs of French wealth, made the streets of her cities run with the blood of judicial murders, perpetrated in the name of liberty more outrages and crimes against human rights than the autocratic Bourbons had wrought in five hundred years, and plunged Europe in two decades of causeless wars. Again in 1871 the International Communists, a faction of materialists, gained temporary possession of Paris. The consequence was a carnival of plunder and murder, until President Thiers crushed them out by force. Surely it is time then to learn that the tendency of this doctrine always has been, and always must be, by turning men into brutes, to

turn earth into a hell. There is no adequate restraint upon the wicked tendencies of man's fallen nature short of the authority of an omniscient, almighty God, and the fear of the righteous awards of immortality.

Shall all these stern lessons of history and of common sense be rebutted by the assertion that quite a number of our scientific evolutionists and materialists are quite nice, decent gentlemen? No doubt. But what makes them such? The traditional influences and habits of action resulting from that very Christianity which they are seeking to destroy. Their good citizenship is a temporary impulse communicated to them from God-fearing ancestors. Let them succeed in obliterating the belief in God and immortality, society will find too late that the whole source of the restraining impulse has been lost. The intellectual progeny will tend to become monsters, with the irresponsible ferocity of beasts energized by the powers of perverted rationality. Does a George Eliot, for instance, tell us that she still leaves an adequate object for the moral homage of her materialists in the noble concept of the "aggregate humanity," the worthy object of the humanitarian virtues? What is aggregate humanity? Where is it? According to her doctrine that huge part of the idol, which is composed of the past generations, is nowhere, is rotting in annihilation. According to her, the part of the idol which is to come in future generations is only an aggregate of beasts, a suitable object truly for moral homage! And worse still, this part is as yet a non-entity; and when it shall have become an actuality her votaries, whom she invites to worship it, will have become non-entities. Bah! Can the insolence of folly go further than this? Or are we told that these most decent scientists are doing nothing but following the lights of inductive science and bowing loyally to the truths of nature, wherever they meet them? We know that, so far as they array their zoölogy and histology as proofs of materialism, they are not paying loyal homage to the truths of natural science, but misconstruing and perverting them. We know that their attempt to disprove the existence of our rational spirits by means of the very exercise of the rational faculties can only turn out a logical suicide. It is as though one said to us, we have now proved experimentally that there are no eye-balls in human

heads. We ask, gentlemen, by what species of experiments do you prove that assertion? They answer, By a series of nice experiments made with our visual faculty. But if there are no eye-balls there is no visual faculty. Such experiments would be impossible. The analogy is exact. If these scientists did not possess a mind, endowed with supersensuous rational faculties, impossible to be the functions of mere material organism, faculties which are the indisputable signatures of distinct spiritual substance, the experiment of his biology would mean nothing to him. He thinks he is sacrificing at the altar of pure scientific truth. He deceives himself. He is sacrificing to an intellectual idol. Solomon tells us of men, who, while "scattering fire-brands, arrows and death," said, "Are we not in sport?" Ghastly sport it is! By what title can these mistaken interpreters of nature flatter themselves, that they are not scattering the fire-brands, arrows and death which their doctrine has always hitherto strewn among the nations?

CIVIC ETHICS.

PASSING now from the social morals of the family to the general ethics of social duties, we meet the fact that the civil government is the appointed regulator and guardian of all these. Hence these duties take the form of civic morals, and our rights and duties as citizens meet us at the front. The discussion naturally begins with the question, What is the moral ground of my obligation to obey the magistrate, whom yesterday, before he was inducted into office, I would have scorned to recognize as my master, to whom to-day I must bow in obedience? Three opposing theories have been advanced in our day in answer to this question. The first answer is that I am bound to obey him solely because I have consented to do so. This is the theory which founds government in a "social contract," which, first stated by Thomas Hobbes, of Malmesbury, was made popular among English Liberals by John Locke, and, introduced to the French by Rousseau's famous book, *Le Contrat Social*, became the ruling philosophy of the French Jacobins. This apprehends men as at first insulated individuals, human integers, all naturally equal and absolutely free, having a natural liberty to indulge, each one, his whole practical will as a "lord of creation." But the experience of the inconveniences of the mutual violences of so many hostile wills, with the loss of so many advantages, led them, in time, to consent voluntarily to the surrender of a part of their wills, natural rights, and independence, to gain a more secure enjoyment of the remainder. To effect this they are supposed to have conferred, and to have entered into a compact with each other, covenanting to submit to certain restraints upon their natural liberty, and to submit to certain of their equals elected to rule, in order to get their remaining rights protected. Subsequent citizens entering the society by birth or immigration are supposed to have given their sovereign assent to this compact, expressly, as in having them-

selves naturalized, or else impliedly, by remaining in the land. The terms of compact form the organic law, or constitution of the commonwealth; and the reason why men are bound to obey their equal, or possible inferior, as magistrate, is simply that they have bargained, and are getting their *quid pro quo*.

Many writers, as Burlemarquí and Blackstone, are too intelligent to suppose or claim that any human persons ever rightfully existed, in fact, in the independent state described, or that any commonwealth actually originated in such an optional bargain; but they teach that such a non-existent compact must be assumed as implied, and as virtually accounting for the origin of civic obligation. Thus Blackstone, II. Intro., § 2, p. 47. But to us it appears that this species of legal fiction is a poor basis for a moral theory, and is no source of natural right and obligations.

The second theory may be called theistic, tracing civic obligation to the will and ordinance of God our Creator. It answers that we are bound to obey the civil magistrate, because God, who has the right as creator and sovereign, commands it. This command is read by all Christian citizens in sacred Scripture, which says, "The powers that be are ordained of God," and "Whosoever resisteth, resisteth the ordinance of God." It is read again in the light of natural facts and reason. These facts are mainly two, that God created man a social being, which is so true that without social relations man would utterly fail of reaching his designed development and happiness, and indeed would perish, and that man's personal appetencies ever tend to engross to himself the rights of others. Selfishness is ever inclining to infringe the boundaries of equity and philanthropy. Hence it is the ordinance of nature that man shall live in society; and that man in society must be restrained from injuring his fellows. And there are no other hands than human ones to wield this power of restraint. We are thus taught as clearly as by Scripture itself, that the Creator ordained civil government and wills all men to submit to it. The same argument may be placed in this light: Men are rational, moral, and responsible creatures. Righteousness is their proper law. But personal selfishness tends perpetually to transgress that law, hence arises the necessity of restraint. Thus, the only alternatives are, submission to civil government, which is such restraint, or an ulti-

mate prevalence of aggression, which would destroy the very ends of social existence. Witness the wretched and savage state of all human beings who are wholly without any form of government. Here we are met by a cavil which is expressed by some, and which has evidently embarrassed many other moral writers. This is, that God ought not to be introduced into this discussion, because God and his will are theological facts; but since this inquiry is concerning natural right and secular relations, it ought to be decided exclusively upon natural data, without importing into it other premises from the alien field of theology. To this I answer, that in reality there is no fact among the data of moral science so purely natural as God. As soon as the mind begins to reason on the phenomena of nature and experience, it is led in one direction to God, at least as immediately and necessarily as it is led in other directions to gravity, causation, conscience, free agency or any other natural fact. God is not only one proper factor, but the prior one, in the philosophy of our moral nature, seeing he created it, and his nature is the concrete standard of moral perfection; and his preceptive will, the expression of that nature, is the practical source and rule of all our obligations. He is, therefore, not only the first, but the essential and most natural of all the factors in every question of natural right. To attempt to discuss those questions, omitting him and his will, is just as unreasonable as it would have been in Newton to discuss planetary astronomy, and the orbital motion of the planets, leaving out all reference to the sun. And this is justified, last, by the remark, that in constructing our theory of civic obligations, we introduce God, not in his theologic relations as Redeemer, but in his natural relation as creator and moral ruler. I am happy to find my position thus sustained by the great German statesman and philosopher, Dr. Julius Stahl, (quoted by Dr. Chas. Hodge *Theol.* Vol. III. p. 260): "Every philosophical science must begin with the first principle of all things, that is, with the Absolute. It must, therefore, decide between Theism and Pantheism, between the doctrine that the first principle is the personal, extra mundane, self-revealing God, and the doctrine that the first principle is an impersonal power immanent in the world." It is the Christian doctrine of God and of his relation to the world that he makes the founda-

tion of legal and political science. He controverts the doctrine of Grotius that there would be a *jus naturale* if there were no God, which is really equivalent to saying that there would be an obligation to goodness if there were no such thing as goodness. Moral excellence is of the very essence of God. He is concrete goodness, infinite reason, excellence, knowledge, and power, in a personal form; so that there can be no obligation to virtue which does not involve obligation to God.

The theistic scheme, then, traces civil government and the civic obligation to the will and act of God, our sovereign, moral ruler and proprietor, in that he from the first made social principles a constitutive part of our souls, and placed us under social relations that are as original and natural as our own persons. These relations were: first of the family, then of the clan, and, as men multiplied, of the commonwealth. It follows thence that social government in some form is as natural as man. If asked, whence my obligation to obey my equal, or possible inferior, as civil magistrate? it answers, because God wills me to do it. He has an infinite right. The advantages and conveniences of such an arrangement may illustrate and even reinforce the obligation; they do not originate it. Civil government is an ordinance of the Maker; magistrates receive place and power under his providence. They are his ministers to man.

This theory, pushed to a most vicious extreme by the party known as Legitimists, is the third which has had some currency. These advocates of the divine right of royalty teach, that while government is the ordinance of God, its first form was the family, in which the father was the sovereign, and this is the type of all larger commonwealths. Every chief magistrate should therefore be a king, holding the same sovereign relation to their subjects which fathers hold to their children. As in the patriarchal clans of Scripture, the birth-right descended to the eldest son and carried with it the headship of the clan, so the right to reign is hereditary in the king's eldest son. To deprive him of it is to rob him of his rightful inheritance. Subjects, if discontented with their king, have no more right to replace him by another chief magistrate elected by themselves, than minor children have to vote in a new father. If the hereditary monarch becomes oppressive, the only remedy for the subject is humble petition and

passive obedience. There is no right of revolution. Oppressed subjects must wait for a release by divine providence. And in support of this slavish theory they quote the precepts of the apostles. (Rom. xiii.; 1 Peter ii. 13-17.)

This servile theory I thus refute. Men in society do not bear to their rulers the proportion minor children bear to their parents, in weakness, inexperience, or folly, but are generally the natural equal of their rulers. Nor are the citizens the objects of an instinctive natural love in the breasts of kings, similar to that of parents for their children, powerfully prompting a disinterested and humane government of them. The pretended analogy is utterly false. Second, whereas divine authority is claimed for royalty, God did not give a regal government to his chosen people Israel; but his preference was to make them a federal republic of eleven cantons. When he granted a king at their request, it was not an hereditary one. The monarchy was elective. David was not the son of Saul, but was elected by the elders of Israel. It is true that the prestige of his heroism enabled him to nominate his immediate successor, Solomon, who yet was not his eldest son. After Solomon, the elders of Israel were willing to elect his son Rehoboam; but upon ascertaining his tyrannical purposes they elected Jeroboam. And the reader must note that they are nowhere in Scripture blamed for this election, nor for their secession; and Rehoboam, who had been elected by two tribes, when proposing coercion is strictly forbidden by God. So Jehu, elected by divine direction, was not a successor of the house of Ahab. Third, the New Testament does not command us especially to obey kings, but "the powers that be." Scripture thus makes the *de facto* government, whatever may be its character, the object of our allegiance within the limits of conscience. And it is fatal to these advocates of the divine right of royalty, that the actual government which St. Paul and St. Peter enjoined Christians to obey was neither regal nor hereditary. It was a recent usurpation in the bosom of a vast republican commonwealth still retaining the nominal forms of republicanism. Julius Cæsar and his nephew Octavius carefully rejected the title of king. The latter selected that of emperor, the constitutional title of the commander-in-chief of the active armies of the republic. He held his executive power by

annual, nominal reëlection of the offices of pontifex maximus and consul, both republican offices. He was, in a word, what the Greeks expressed by the name—*τυραννος*. Octavius Cæsar was not the son of Julius, Tiberius was not the son of Octavius, Caius Caligula was not the son of Tiberius, Nero was not the son of Caius. So that the fact is, that the very government to which the early Christians were commanded to submit was a revolutionary one, and not regal. So unfortunate have the Legitimists been in claiming the authority of Scripture against the right of revolution, and in favor of royalty. In a word, their theory has not a particle of support in reason or God's word. Yet the obtruding of it by so many divines as the theistic theory doubtless did much to prejudice the right view.

On the contrary, the power of magistrates as between them and the citizens is only a delegated power, and is from the commonwealth, which is the aggregate of citizens, to them. God has indeed, by the law of nature and revelation, imposed on all the citizens and on the magistrates the duty of obedience, and ordained that men shall live in regular civil society under laws. But he has not given to magistrates, as such, any inherent rights other than those belonging to other citizens. As persons, they are equal to the citizens and of them; as magistrates they exist for the people and not the people for them. "They are the ministers of God to thee for good." They personally have only the common and equal title which their fellow citizens have to good as being of one race, the common children of God, subject to the golden rule, the moral charter of republicanism.

Having refuted the theory of legitimacy, or divine right of kings, we now return to complete our evidence for the right theory, by refuting the claim of a social contract.

First, it is notoriously false to the facts. Civil government is a great fact. It must find its foundation in a fact, not in a legal fiction. And the fact is, men never existed rightfully for one moment in the independency this theory imagines. God, their maker and original ruler, never gave them such independence. Their civic responsibility, as ordained by him, is as native as they are. They do not elect between civic subordination and license any more than a child elects his father, but they are *born* under government. The simple practical proof is, that were any

man to claim that natural liberty, and the option of accepting or declining allegiance, every government on earth would claim the right to destroy him as an outlaw.

Second, the theory is atheistic and unchristian. Such were Hobbes and the Jacobins. It is true that Locke tried to hold it in a Christian sense, but it is none the less obstinately atheistic in that it wholly discards God, man's relation to him, his right to determine our condition of moral existence, and the great fact of moral philosophy, that God has formed and ordained us to live under civil government. So, in the insane pride of its perfectionism, it overlooks the fact that man's will is ever disordered and unrighteous, and so cannot be the just rule of his actions.

Third, it also virtually discards original moral distinctions. So did Hobbes, its author, teaching that the *enactments of government* make right and wrong. It infers this consistently, for if man's wish made his natural right, and he has only come under any constraint of civil law by his optional compact, of course whatever he wished was right by nature. Moreover, government being a restraint on natural right, is essentially of the nature of an evil, to which I only submit for expediency's sake to avoid a greater evil. Civil society is herself a grand robber of my natural rights, which I only tolerate to save myself from other more numerous robbers. How then can any of the rules of civil government be an expression of essential morality? And is this scheme likely to be very promotive of content and loyalty?

Fourth, the social contract lacks all basis of facts, and is therefore wholly illogical. It has no claim *in foro scientiæ* to be entertained even for discussion. For the science of natural rights should be inductive. But this theory has no basis of facts. Commonwealths have not historically begun in such an optional compact of lordly savages. Such absolute savages, could we find any considerable number of them, would not usually possess the good sense and the self-control which would be sufficient for any permanent good. The only real historical instances of such compacts have been the agreements of outlaws forming companies of banditti, or crews of pirate ships. These combinations realize precisely the ideals pictured by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Did ever one of them result in the creation of a permanent and well-ordered commonwealth? The

well-known answer to this question hopelessly refutes the scheme. Commonwealths have usually arisen, in fact, from the expansion of clans, which were at first but larger families. True historical research shows that the primitive government of these clans was usually presbyterial, a government by elders who had succeeded to the natural and inherent authority of the first parents.

Fifth, certain inconvenient and preposterous consequences must logically follow from the theory of the social contract. The righteous "swear to their own hurt, and change not." No matter, then, how the lapse of time may have rendered the old contract unsuitable or mischievous, no majority could righteously change it so long as any minority claimed their pledges. Again, unless the commonwealth has a formal constitution, who can decide what are the terms of the social contract? England has no written constitution. Again, if the ruler violated the essence of the contract in one act, this would release all the citizens from allegiance. The contract broken on one side is broken on both. But so sweeping a release of all the individual citizens of the commonwealth from their allegiance, whenever any essential article of the social contract had been violated, either by a ruler or a greedy majority, would lead to intolerable anarchy. There is a noted government which historically and actually originated in a social compact, that of the United States of America. It was a republic of republics, a government of special powers, created by a federal covenant between sovereign states, or little contiguous independent nations. The contracting integers were not citizens, but states. The logical result was that the infringement of any essential principle of the constitution, which was the compact, released each contracting party from the bond. This result inhered inevitably in the nature of the federal government, as was admitted by jurisconsults of all parties, by Josiah Quincy, President Fillmore, and Daniel Webster as fully as by Jefferson, Madison, and Calhoun. A government formed by a social compact is, *ipso facto*, dissolved by the breach of that compact into the integers which composed it. In the case of the United States those integers were sovereign commonwealths. Hence the exercise of their constitutional right of secession could not result in anarchy, for the

original commonwealths survived, exercising all the authority necessary to that civic order enjoined by natural obligation.

Last, law properly arms the magistrate with some powers which could not have been derived from a social contract of individuals, because the individuals never possessed those powers. Life, for instance, is God's. No man can bargain away what does not belong to him. Nor can they plead that the commonwealth's existence justifies her in assuming a power of life and death. But the commonwealth, on their view, has no existence to persons as yet until the social contract is completed. Again, how does the commonwealth get power to take the life or property of aliens who never contracted with it? The theory represents independent men as surrendering certain natural rights to society in order to secure the enjoyment of the rest. But I deny that any right can be mentioned, morally belonging to any man, of which he is stripped when entering a just government. The one most frequently named is the right of self-defence. But what is meant by it? The privilege of making one's self accuser, judge, jury and executioner, at once to avenge any supposed wrong in any manner suggested by one's own resentment? I deny that this was ever a right of any creature of God's in any state of existence. It is always a natural unrighteousness. It is the right of an innocent man, when the arm of the law is not present, to protect himself by his own personal force, even to the destruction of the assailant, if necessary. Then I deny that just government strips any citizen of this right. The law fully recognizes it.

This infidel theory sets out, like an atheist as it is, without reference to the fact that man's existence, nature and rights sprang out of the personal will of a creator. It sets out without reference to original moral distinctions, or original responsibilities to God, or to his moral essence. It quietly overlooks the fact that man's will, if he is the creature of a personal and moral creator, never could be in any circumstance his rule of action. It hides away the stubborn fact that the human will is depraved, and, for that second reason, cannot righteously be his rule. It falsely assumes a state of nature in which the individual's will is independent, and makes his right. Whereas, no being except the eternal and self-existent God has a right to that state for

one instant. But all these are facts of nature, involved in this case of civic obligation, and discoverable by reason and experience. All then must be included in our construction, if we would have a correct, or even a rational view. The state of facts is simply this: Man, being a creature, enters on existence the subject of God. This he does not only by force, but by moral right. Moral distinctions are essential and eternal, having been eternally impersonated in God's subjective moral principles, and authoritatively legislated for creatures in all the precepts, to utter which God is prompted by those immanent principles. Moral obligations on the creature are therefore as native as he is. They are binding, not by the assent of the creature's will, but by God's enactment; so that man enters existence under social obligations, as is indicated by his being, in so many constitutive traits, a social creature. Civil government is nothing more than the organization of one segment of those social rights and duties. Thus civil government is God's natural ordinance. Once more, the rule of action enforced by just governments is the moral rule. This is approximately true, even of the government which we deem relatively bad. So that a thoroughly just civil government, if such could be realized, would enjoin on each order of citizens only the acts which were morally right for them to do, and forbid only those which would be wrong.

What then would be a man's civil liberty? I reply, under a perfectly equitable government, could such be realized, the same as his natural liberty. No existing government is perfectly equitable, because executed by man's imperfect hands. None are wholly unrighteous. Some withhold more, some fewer of the citizen's moral (and natural) rights. Hence, under the most despotic government, some natural rights remain. Could a government be perfectly equitable, each citizen's civic liberty would be exactly equal to his natural.

Some few citizens may shrink from the theory of government in God's absolute authority over man, and denying to man any absolute natural independence, from the apprehension that it may lead to arbitrary civil government. To such, I reply: Is it not far more likely that tyrannical consequences will be drawn from the other theory which discards God, the eternal standard and pattern of pure equity and benevolence, which postulates

the sinful creature's licentious and unjust wishes, as the ultimate measure of his rights, which represents the natural rights of the ruler and the ruled as a very different quantity from his civic rights, and which discards the essential distinction between justice and injustice *a priori* to legislation? Is not this the freer and safer theory, which founds man's inalienable rights, as his duties, on eternal and holy moral distinctions, and holds rulers and ruled responsible to the judgment of an equitable heavenly Father with whom is "no respect of persons?"

"By their fruits ye shall know them." I require the student to look at Hobbes, deducing with his iron logic from this theory of the social contract his conclusion, that government must be leviathan, the irresistible giant among all the weaker animals. He proves that on his theory government ought to be absolute. For the theory recognizes neither responsibility nor allegiance to a common heavenly Father, perfectly impartial, equitable and benevolent, the ruler of rulers, the protector of all his children, who will call all their oppressors to a strict account. To the Jacobin, the commonwealth is the only God, beyond which there is no umpire, no judge, no avenger. Again, upon this theory, the supreme rule of commonwealths' action has no standard whatever of intrinsic righteousness, equitable and immutable, embodied first in the moral perfections of the heavenly Father, and then in the universal and indestructible judgment of the right human conscience; but the ultimate standard of right is the mere will of each greedy and unrighteous creature. For this system there is no morality to enforce duties or guarantee rights except the human laws; and these are merely the expression of the cravings of this aggregate of licentious, ruthless, selfish wills.

This reasoning of course makes the will of the majority supreme, and says *vox Populi, vox Dei*. But it must be remembered that this majority is only the accidental major mob, in which the wicked will of each citizen is the supreme law; so that the god of Jacobinism, whose voice receives this sovereign expression, may at any time reveal himself as a fiend instead of a benignant heavenly Father. The practical government which results from this theory is simple absolutism, differing from the personal despotism of a Sultan or a Czar only in this one partic-

ular, that its victims have that "many headed monster," the mob, for their master, always liable to be more remorseless and greedy in its oppressions than a single tyrant.

To this deduction history gives the fullest confirmation. The democracies infected by this theory have ever turned out the worst despotisms. Such was the government of the Jacobin party in France ninety years ago, expressly deduced from the social contract, and yet, a government guilty of more oppressions, stained with more political crimes and murders of the innocent, more destructive of public and private wealth than all the despotisms of Europe together, annihilating in one decade forty-eight billions of francs of the possessions of the French people, and drenching Europe in a universal, causeless war, and rendering itself so loathesome to the nation that it was glad to escape from it into the military despotism of Napoleon. The favorite motto of this democracy is, "*Liberté, égalité, fraternité*," of which the practical rendering by the actions of the Jacobins was this, "*Liberté*," license to trample on other people as they chose; "*Egalité*," similar license for the Outs when they could become the Ins; "*Fraternité*," all brother rogues. So all the worst oppressions and outrages experienced by the people of the United States have been inflicted by the same Jacobinism, masquerading in the garb of Republicanism.

The Declaration of Independence teaches as self-evident that "all men are by nature equal." The proposition is highly ambiguous. We need not be surprised to find the Jacobin party claiming it in their sense, that every sane human being has a moral right to a mechanical equality with every other in every specific privilege and franchise, except when deprived of them by conviction of crime under the laws; so that, if any one man or class in society is endowed with any power or franchise whatsoever that is not extended to every other person in the commonwealth, this is a violation of natural justice. This famous document is no part of the constitution or laws of the United States. With all its nervous pomp of diction and political philosophy, it involves not a few ambiguities and confusions, and the enlightened friends of freedom have no concern to assert its infallibility. But this often quoted statement bears another sense. There is a natural moral equality between all men, in

that all are generically men. All have a rational, responsible and immortal destiny, and are inalienably entitled to pursue it. All are morally related alike to God, the common Father; and all have equitable title to the protection of the laws under which divine providence places them. In this sense, as the British constitution declares, all men, peer and peasant, "are equal before the law." The particular franchises of Earl Derby differ much from those of the peasant: the lord sits in the upper house, as the peasant does not; inherits an entailed estate; and if indicted for felony, is tried by peers. But the same laws protect the persons and rights of both. Both, so far as human and as subjects of human society, have the same generic, moral right to be protected in their several (different) just franchises. Here are two meanings of the proposition, which are historically perfectly distinct. If there are those who profess to see no difference, it is because they are either inconsiderate and heedless, or uncandid. The difference was perfectly palpable to the English liberals who dethroned the first Charles Stuart; for that great Parliament on the one hand waged a civil war in the support of the moral equality of all Englishmen, and at the same time rejected with abhorrence the other, the Jacobin equality, when they condemned the leveller Lilburn, and caused his books, which contained precisely that doctrine, to be burned by the common hangman. I assert that it is incredible the American Congress of 1776 could have meant their proposition to be taken in the Jacobin sense; for they were British Whigs. Their perpetual claim was to the principles and franchises of the British Constitution, and no other. Their politics were formed by the teachings of John Hampden, Lord Fairfax, Algernon Sidney, Lord Somers, and the revolutionists of 1688. I should be loath to suppose those great men so stupid and ignorant of the history of their own country as not to understand the British rights, which they expressly say they are claiming. Second, their English common sense showed them that the statement is false. In the Jacobin sense men are not by nature equal. One half of them differ by nature from the other half, in the essential qualities of sex. There are countless natural differences of bodily organs, health, and stature, of natural faculties and moral dispositions. Naturally, no two men are equal in that sense.

Third, it is impossible the Congress could have intended that sense, seeing that every one of the thirteen states then legalized African slavery, and not a single one granted universal white suffrage even. No application was made by any of those states of this supposed Jacobin principle at that time to remove these inequalities of franchise. Were these men so nearly idiotic as to propound an assertion in which they were so glaringly refuted by their own actions at home?

The extreme claim of equality is false and iniquitous. For out of the wide natural diversities of sex, of powers, and of character, must arise a wide difference of natural relations between individuals and the state. To attempt to bestow identical franchise upon all thus appears to be unjust, and indeed impossible. It is but a mockery to say that we have bestowed a given franchise upon a person whom nature has disqualified from using it. It is equally futile to boast that we lift all men to the same identical relations, when their natural differences have inexorably imposed on them other relations. Of what avail would it be to declare that all women have the same natural right with myself to wear a beard and to sing bass, when nature has decided that they shall not? What is the use of legislating that all lazy fools shall acquire and preserve the same wealth with the diligent, wise men? The law of the universe ordains that they shall not. I urge further, that the attempt to confer upon all the same franchises, to which the wise and virtuous are competent, upon the foolish and morally incompetent, is not only foolish and impossible, but is a positive and flagrant injustice to all the worthier citizens; for when these unsuitable powers are abused by the unworthy all suffer together. The little children of my family have not an equal right with their parents to handle loaded revolvers and lucifer matches. If we were so foolish as to concede it, the sure result would be, that they would kill each other, and burn down the dwelling over their own and their parents' heads. So it is not equal justice to clothe the unfitted members of society with powers which they will be sure to misuse to the ruin of themselves and their better fellows under the pretense of equal rights. Such pretended equality is in fact the most outrageous.

I argue again, that the Jacobin doctrine leads by logical con-

sequence to female suffrage and "woman's rights." The woman is an adult, not disfranchised by conviction of crime. Then by what argument can these theorists deny to her the right of suffrage, or any other civic right enjoyed by males? By what argument can they require her to submit for life to the domestic authority of a male, her absolute equal, in order to enter marriage? Especially have American Jacobins armed this logic with resistless force against themselves by bestowing universal suffrage on negroes. By what plea can the right of suffrage be withheld from the millions of white American women, intelligent, educated, virtuous and patriotic, after it has been granted as an inalienable natural right to all these illiterate semi-savage aliens? In the point of this argument there lies a fiery heat which must sooner or later burn its way through all sophistries and plausibilities, unless the American people can be made to unlearn the fatal premise. But the concession of all equal rights to women means simply the destruction of the family, which is the cornerstone of the commonwealth and civilization. Will permanent marriage continue after it becomes always possible that every man's political "enemies may be those of his own household?" Further, the moral discipline of children becomes impossible when there are two equal heads claiming all the same prerogatives, unless those heads are morally perfect and infallible. What will be the character of those children reared under a government where, when a father says I shall punish, the mother has an equal right to say, you shall not? Once more, I have shown at a previous place, that if marriage is reduced to a secular co-partnership of equals, the principles of equity will compel this result, that it shall be terminable upon the plea of either party. This theory thus destroys the family and reduces the relations of the sexes to concubinage, when carried to its logical results. Facts confirm these reasonings. Such were its fruits in Jacobin France, and in those Swiss, Italian and German cities which adopted the revolutionary philosophy.

But among the inalienable natural rights of all are these: privilege to pursue and attain one's rational and equitable end, virtue, and that grade of well-being appropriate to the social position of each for time and eternity; and for adults, liberty of thought, inquiry and belief, so far as human compulsion goes.

The former is an inalienable right, because it attaches to the boon of existence, which is God's gift. Hence all restraints or institutions of civil society which causelessly prevent this are unrighteous. But even the title to existence must give place to the commonwealth's right of self-preservation; as when she calls upon even her innocent citizens to die in her defence from invasion; or when she restrains capital crimes by inflicting the death penalty. "The greater includes the less." Hence the same principle justifies the commonwealth in restricting the lesser rights when the safety of the whole requires it. The right of free thought is inalienable, because belief is the legitimate, and ought to be the unavoidable result of sufficient evidence; whence I infer that it cannot be obstructed by violence without traversing the rights of nature. Second, responsibility to God (as we shall prove in the proper place) is unavoidable, and cannot be evaded. Hence the iniquity of intruding another authority over thought between the individual and God, when the intruder is unable to take his penalty for wrong belief off his shoulders. Third, no human government, either in church or state, is infallible. Rome professes to meet this objection by claiming that she is infallible. She is consistent; more so than a persecuting Protestant. Hence the conclusion, that civil government has no right to interfere with thought, however erroneous, until it intrudes itself in acts violative of proper statutes. For instance, the state refrains from meddling with the Mormon's polygamous opinion, not because he has a right to such opinions; he commits an error and a sin in entertaining them; but this sin is against another jurisdiction than the state's, that of God. If he puts it into practice, he is righteously prosecuted for bigamy, a felony. But suppose the statute is immoral, requiring of the citizen an act or an omission properly sin? How shall a free conscience act? I answer, it asserts its higher law by refusing to be accessory to the sin. If the conscientious citizen holds a salaried office, one of whose functions is to assist in executing such sinful laws, he must resign his office and its emoluments. To retain its powers and emoluments while still refusing to perform its tasks on plea of conscience, is hypocrisy and dishonesty. Having thus resigned his executive office and its salary, the citizen is clear of the sin involved in the evil law;

except that he, like all other private citizens, has the right to argue and vote for its amendment. But if this sinful act is exacted by the state from its citizens, not as its executive officers but as its private subjects, he must refuse to obey, and then submit, without violent resistance, to whatever penalty the state inflicts for his disobedience, resorting only to moral remonstrance against it. The latter part of my precept may appear at first glance inconsistent with my doctrine of freedom of conscience. Ardent minds may exclaim, if it is righteous in us to refuse complicity in the acts which the state wickedly commands, then it is wicked in the state to punish us for that righteous refusal, whence we infer that the same sacred liberty which authorized us to refuse compliance should equally authorize us to resist the second wrong, the unjust penalty. I reply, that if civil government had no better basis than the pretended social contract, this heady argument would be perfectly good. It is equally obvious that it would lead directly to anarchy; for the right of resisting penalties which the private citizen judged iniquitous must, on these premises, rest exclusively upon his sovereign opinion. The state could not go behind the professed verdict of his conscience; for upon this theory the disobedient citizen's private judgment must be final, else his liberty of thought would be gone. But now, I remind these overweening reasoners that anarchy is more expressly forbidden to them by the will of God than unjust punishment of individuals is forbidden to magistrates; that anarchy is a far greater evil than the unjust punishment of individuals, because this universal disorder strips away all defence against similar unjust wrongs, both from themselves and their fellow-citizens. Or my argument may be put thus: My right to refuse obedience to a civil law only extends to the cases where compliance is positive sin *per se*. But my submission, for a conscientious reason, to a penalty which I judge undeserved, is not my sin *per se*: my sufferings under it are the sin of the erroneous rulers. Hence, while I must refuse to make myself an accomplice in a positive sin, I submit peaceably to the penalty attached to such refusal. Thus, when "the noble army of martyrs" were required by the pagan magistrates to worship idols, they utterly refused. The act was sin *per se*. But when they were required to lose goods, liberty or life, as the penalty

of their refusal, they submitted; because these losses, voluntarily incurred in a good cause, were not sin *per se* in them, however evil on the part of the exactors. Even Socrates, though a pagan, saw this argument so clearly that when means of escape to Maegara from an unjust death sentence were provided for him, he refused to avail himself of the escape, and remained to drink the hemlock. (*See Plato's Phædo*). Thus judged the holy apostles and the Christian martyrs of all ages.

It may be asked now, if the individual righteous citizen may not forcibly resist the injustice of the state, how can that aggregate of citizens, which is only made up of individuals, resist it? Does not this refute the right of revolution against even the most usurping and tyrannical government? That right is correctly argued against Legitimatisms from these premises: First, that the will of God, as revealed by nature and Sacred Scripture, does not make a particular form of government obligatory, but some form; the rule for the individual being that the *de facto* government is authoritative, be it of one kind or another. Hence the sin of rebellion does not consist in changing the form, but in resisting the government as government. Second, that as between rulers and ruled, the power is delegated from the latter to the former. Rulers exist for the behoof of the ruled, not the reverse. Whence it follows that to make a crime of the ruled (the masters) changing their rulers involves the same absurdity as making the parent rebel against his own child. Third, that hence there must be in the ruled the right to revolutionize, if the government has become so perverted, on the whole, as to destroy the ends for which government is instituted. This right must exist in the ruled, if anywhere, because providence does not work relief without means, and the righteous means cannot be found in external force, according to the law of nations. The divine right of kings is no more sacred than that of constables.

But the difficulty recurs, if it is the duty of each individual citizen to submit to the government's wrongs on him, how can the injured body of citizens ever start the resistance without sin? Since the existing offices of the state are in the hands of the oppressors, of course the initial action of resistance must be private and unofficial. Even grant that when once a "commit-

tee of public safety" has been organized that may be fairly considered as clothed with delegated and official power, the getting it arranged must be unofficial, private action. All this is true, and it gives us the clue to find the dividing path between unwarrantable individual resistance and righteous revolution. If the outraged citizen is moved to resist merely by his own private wrong, he is sinful. If his resistance is disinterested, and the expression of the common breast outraged by general oppressions, it is patriotic and righteous. There is the dividing line. It is common to say with Paley, that, to justify forcible revolution, the evils the body of the citizens are suffering under the usurpations of the existing government must be manifestly greater, on the whole, than the evils which unavoidably accompany the revolution. This seems correct. And that there must be, second, a reasonably good and hopeful prospect of success. This I dissent from. Some of the most righteous and noble revolutions would never have begun on such a calculation of chance of success. They were rather the generous outburst of despair. Such was the resistance of the Maccabees against the Syrian domination. Such was the rising of the Swiss against the house of Hapsburg. But these were two of the most beneficial revolutions in history.

An all important corollary of the liberty of thought is, that neither church nor state has a right to persecute for opinion's sake. A part of the argument may be seen above. It may be supposed that this is too universally held to need any argument. I answer, it is held, but very much on unintelligent and sophistical grounds; so that its advocates, however confident and passionate, would be easily "dum-founded" by a perspicacious opponent. The history of human rights is, that their intelligent assertors usually learn the true grounds of them "in the furnace of affliction"; that the posterity who inherit these rights hold them for a while in pride and ignorant prescription; when the true logic of the rights has been forgotten, and when some plausible temptation presses so to do, the next generation discards the precious rights bodily and goes back to the practice of the old tyranny. Such has been the history, precisely, of confederated rights in the United States. The present popular theory of the United States' Constitution is exactly that theory of consolidated

imperialism which that constitution was created to oppose; and which our wise forefathers fought the Revolutionary War to throw off. You may deem it a strange prophecy, but I predict that the time will come in this once free America, when the battle for religious liberty will have to be fought over again, and will probably be lost, because the people are already ignorant of its true basis and condition. As to the latter, for instance, the whole drift of the legislation and judicial decisions touching the property of ecclesiastical corporations, is tending like a broad and mighty stream to that result which destroyed the spiritual liberty of Europe in the middle ages, and which "the men of 1776" knew perfectly well would prove destructive of it again. But the statesman who now should propose to stay this legislation would be overwhelmed by a howl from nearly all the Protestant Christians of America.

In arguing men's responsibility for their moral opinions, we saw and refuted the erroneous grounds on which many advocates of freedom claim it. I showed you that upon their ground our right of freedom was betrayed to the advocates of persecution. For these succeed in proving beyond reply that men are responsible for their beliefs, and then add the inference that, since erroneous beliefs are mischievous, the errorist should be responsible to the penalties of the civil magistrate. When we object by pointing to the horror of mediæval persecutions, they reply, that these admitted excesses no more disprove the right of magistrates to punish error wisely and moderately than the Draconian Code of Britain, which punished sheep-stealing with death, proves that theft should not be punished at all. The only way to refute these adroit statements is to resort to a truth which Radicals and Liberals are most prone to forget, that the state is not *τὸ πᾶν* of social organization, but is limited by God and nature to the regulation of one segment of social rights and duties; while the others are reserved to the family, the church and to God. It is well again to repeat, that while the citizen is responsible for erroneous beliefs, his penal responsibility therefor is to God alone. The wickedness of human intrusion here is further shown by the following considerations: No human organization can justly usurp the individual's responsibility to God, for his powers of thought and will, because

no human organization can substitute itself under the individual's guilt and penalty if he is made to think or feel criminally. Now, this is more especially true of the state than even of the organized church. Because the state in its nature is not even ecclesiastical, much less a spiritual institute; being ordained of nature simply to realize secular (yet moral) order. Orthodoxy or spirituality are not qualifications requisite for its magistrates, according to the law of nature, but only secular virtue and intelligence. Witness the fact, that the rule of Mohammedan magistrates is morally valid in Turkey, and of pagan in China. And the magistrates to whom Romans *xiii.* enjoined allegiance were pagan and anti-christian. Now, how absurd that I should be required to devolve my spiritual personal functions and responsibility on an institute utterly non-spiritual in its nature and functions, or even anti-spiritual! And how practically absurd, that institutes which are disagreeing (as to religion) and contrary to each other and the truth, throughout most of the world, should be selected as defenders of that truth which not one of them may hold.

Again, if the fallibility and incompetency of the state for this task be waived, persecution for misbelief, by either church or state, is wicked, because it is not only a means utterly irrelevant to produce the professed good in view, right belief, but has a violent and mischievous tendency to defeat it, and hence is criminally impolitic. Thus, first, a right belief must be spontaneous; force is a compulsory measure. It is as though one should whip a sad child to make him glad. His sadness may be sinful, but a punishment which he feels unjust will certainly not help matters. Second, it is so natural as to be unavoidable, that a creed must be more or less associated in men's minds with apprehension of its supporters. True, a cruel man may by chance be the professed advocate of a right creed. None the less do I associate creed and its advocate and infer that if the advocates are wicked, the creed is wicked. What, then, is the insanity of trying to make me love the creed from which I had dissented, by giving me most pungent motives to hate its advocates? So history teaches that persecution for mere opinion's sake, unless annihilating, as of the Lutherans in Spain, only makes the persecuting creed odious, and the persecuted one popular. Thus the perse-

cuting of the Scotch Covenanters by the prelatist made prelacy odious to the Scotch nations for two centuries. The brief persecution practiced against the Immersionists by the colonial government of Virginia, has made that creed popular ever since in the old counties of the state. Third, persecuting helps the error persecuted by arraying on its side the noblest sympathies of human nature, sympathy with weakness and suffering, and moral indignation at injustice. Fourth, persecution, if practiced at all extensively, is frightfully demoralizing; first, by confounding faults, which, if faults at all, are lesser ones, with the most enormous in the criminal code. A sincere mistake about a mysterious doctrine is punished more severely than rape and murder. Secondly, by always using and rewarding, as it must, the vilest and foulest of the community as its delators and tools, thus putting the rascality of the community in place of honor. It breeds hypocrisy wholesale; professing to punish a mistake in theologizing severely in the person, perhaps, of a very pure and benevolent woman or old man, while the current sins of cursing, drinking, lust and others, go rampant. Eras of persecution have always been eras of foul and flagrant moral laxity. Last, persecuting, if not annihilating, always inflames religious dissensions and multiplies sects. If annihilating, it produces, as in Italy, France, and Spain of the eighteenth century, a dead stagnation of infidelity under the mask of orthodox uniformity.

The American constitutions now all deny to the states the right to establish or endow any form of religion, true or false. That right, almost universally believed in out of America, until our generation, by all statesmen of all creeds, was argued from two different points of view. One, which I may call the high prelatist (as in Gladstone's *Church and State*), makes the state the *τὸ πᾶν* of human aggregation, charged with all associated functions whereby man is advantaged for time and eternity; teaches that this omnibus organ, state, is moral and spiritual; has a conscience; is, as an organism, responsible to God for propagating his true religion, as well as Christian morals, just as much as the two other institutes of God and nature, the family and the church. Hence it is obligatory that the state shall herself profess a religion, and that a true one, through her chief magistrates; shall apply a religious test-oath to all her officers, judges and legis-

lators; and shall actively support and propagate the true religion through the ministry, through the orthodox church. This extreme theory is refuted thus: If it is to do all this, why not persecute also? Let the student consider the question. The state is not by its nature either a spiritual or ecclesiastical institution, but a secular one. The same argument would prove that every gas company or telephone company was bound to profess a company religion, have a test-oath, evangelize its employees and patrons. The second, more modern, theory, advocated by Bishop Warburton, Dr. Chalmers, Macaulay, Patrick Henry and such men, argues thus: They repudiate the (absurd) prelatial theory of the state, and hold that it is only a secular organization, appointed by God and nature to realize secular order. 1. But, by the reason that it is entitled to exist, it is entitled to use all means essential to its existence and fulfilment of its natural ends. This is granted. 2. They proceed to say that popular morality is essential to its existence and fulfilment of its natural ends. 3. There is no adequate basis for popular morality, except the prevalence of some form or forms of reasonably orthodox, evangelical Christianity. 4. But experience shows that no voluntary denomination of Christians can succeed in sufficiently evangelizing the masses without state aid. Hence the conclusion that it is the state's right and duty to select some one or more denominations of Christians reasonably orthodox, evangelical, and pure, and endow and aid them to evangelize every district and the whole population.

This theory is much more plausible and decent. No experienced man contests either of the first three propositions. We contest the fourth, and also argue crushing difficulties in the way of the state's reaching the desired end in the way of church establishment. Experience shows that free and voluntary effort of the denominations, all wisely and equitably protected by the government, but left independent, will come nearer evangelizing the whole society than any other plan. The United States is the best example. For when we consider the rapid growth of its population, we see that the voluntary efforts of the denominations have done relatively more than any churches enjoying state aid in other lands.

The following arguments are to be added against the more

moderate theory we are discussing; they apply *a fortiori* against the higher prelatie theory. That the state's patronage will be benumbing. For, since the state is and must be a secular institute, its individual magistrates are likely to be anti-evangelical. "The natural man receiveth not the things of God, for they are spiritually discerned." "The carnal mind is enmity against God." These earthly rulers must therefore be expected to patronize the least evangelical ministers and denominations; and the office-seeking temper will debauch the ministry, just as it does the other office-seekers. Again, since the state pays the salaries of the preachers, the duty to the tax-payers will not only justify, but demand its supervision of the functions paid for, either by claiming the appointing power over pastors, or in some other appropriate way that shall be efficient. Then how shall the endowed church maintain its spiritual independence or its allegiance to King Christ? This was strikingly illustrated in Scotland in the collisions of the Free Church with the government in 1843. The British government claimed for secular patrons the "right of advowson," (or right to nominate a minister to a parish). Dr. Chalmers claimed that the ordination, installation, and discipline of ministers were spiritual functions of the church, over which she could recognize no control whatever except that of her divine Head. But the government rejoined that this secular control over the religious teachers was the just corollary from the support which the secular government furnished to them. Dr. Chalmers' party attempted to evade this argument by a distinction. They admitted that secular aid must justify a certain secular control over religious functionaries, *quoad temporalia*, but not *quoad sacra*; as to these the authority of the church under Christ must be exclusive and supreme. The government replied in substance that the distinction was impracticable; when the *temporale*, for instance, was a manse, endowment or a monied salary furnished by the commonwealth as her compensation for a certain religious teaching, it was impossible for her to exercise the control over her money, without also exercising a virtual control over the function for which the money was paid. Dr. Chalmers' distinction appeared as vain as though a plaintiff in a civil court, who had sold a horse, the health of which he warranted, and who was now sued for the

purchase-money, should raise this plea: that while he admitted the jurisdiction of the court over the money, he should deny its competency to decide upon the health of the horse, on the ground that it was a court of law, and not a veterinary surgeon. The court would answer that its jurisdiction over the purchase-money must inevitably involve its right to judge the horse's health; jurisdiction over the *quid* must carry jurisdiction over the *pro quo*. I conceive that, against Dr. Chalmers, who still asserted the duty of the state to endow the church, this reply was conclusive. The wildest form of state establishment must logically result in some partition between the state and church of that spiritual government which Dr. Chalmers rightly taught belongs exclusively to the church under the laws of the Lord Jesus Christ. And this suggests, finally, that any state establishment of religion must tend to evolve Erastian influences as to church discipline of private members also; see this powerfully confirmed by the difficulties of Calvin in Geneva. For, will not the unchristian citizen say that this pastor is a public servant? How, then, can he convict his own master for acts not prohibited by the state, his employer? The consequence is logical, that since the religious functionaries are but a part of the state's administration, magistrates alone should have the censorship of manners and morals, unless they are to surrender that whole function to the clergy. But the latter would be absurd and impossible. If the magistrates are not entitled to correct the crimes and misdemeanors of the people, there is nothing to which they are reasonably entitled. If, now, another censorship of manners and morals is allowed the clergy, the citizens are subjected to an *imperium in imperio*, to double and competing authorities. Where, then, will be their rights or liberty?

The Protestant Reformers did not at first evolve the doctrine of religious liberty or separation of church and state. The former was taught by Milton and John Owen, and the latter by Jefferson and Madison. Virginia was the first commonwealth in the world which, having sovereign power to do otherwise, established full religious liberty instead of toleration, with independence of church and state, and which placed the stamp of crime upon the African slave trade. The latter law she enacted

in October, 1778, in the midst of the throes of a defensive war, thirty years before it was done by the Government of the United States, and forty years before the overpraised and tardy action of Great Britain.

From the view we have given of the basis of the commonwealth and of rights under it, it is obvious, that the right of suffrage and eligibility to office is not an inalienable natural franchise, but a function of responsibility entrusted to suitable classes of citizens as a trust. The opposite theory, which claims suffrage as an inalienable right, is inconsistent, in that it does not extend the claim to women, and either extend it to aliens also, or else refrain from all jurisdiction over them and their property. That claim is founded on the social contract theory, by implication, and so falls when it is refuted. That theory represents man as absolutely free from all obligation to government, save as he comes under it by his optional assent to the social contract. It is supposed that this assent is only given by suffrage. Hence, it is argued, no man owes any allegiance except he be clothed with the right of suffrage. But we have seen that God and nature bring men under the moral obligation of allegiance, and not their own optional assent. Hence the duty of allegiance does not imply the right of suffrage. The extreme Jacobins do not deem it right to extend suffrage to minors. Why not? The answer must be, because they lack the knowledge and experience to exercise it safely. They are human beings; it would be absurd to disfranchise them merely because they are of a certain age. The argument must be, that this immature age is the sign of their disqualification for the function. Now, if a class of persons, over twenty-one years of age, are marked by a similar incompetency, why should not the same exclusion be applied to them? To give the incompetent a power which they will abuse to their own injury, and the injury of their fellow-citizens, is not an act of right, but of injustice. That claim leads to unreasonable and self-destructive results; for should it be that a class of citizens in the commonwealth are of such a low grade of intelligence and virtue (yet not in the class of condemned felons) as to use their suffrage to destroy their fellow-citizens' right and their own, reason, says the commonwealth, is entitled to self-preservation by disfran-

chising them of that power. One of the maxims of the Whigs of 1776 was: "That all just taxation should be accompanied with representation." They meant that a commonwealth or *populus* must be somehow fairly represented in the parliament which taxes them, or else there is injustice. Modern democracy claims that it is true of individuals. Certainly those great men did not mean it thus. The historical proofs are, that in that sense the maxim is preposterous. For, first, then no females, however rich, could pay a cent of taxes unless they voted; nor wealthy minors; nor, second, aliens holding much property protected by the commonwealth. And, last, since even Jacobinism does not propose to have babies, idiots and lunatics vote, all their property must remain untaxed. As the moral duty of allegiance does not spring out of the individual consent, but is original and natural, so the duty of paying taxes, which is one branch of allegiance, does not arise thence. This, of course, does not imply that a government has a moral right to tax an unprotected class of citizens unequitably. And for equitable protection of the taxed against their own rulers clothed with the taxing power, it is enough that the taxed be represented in the law-making department by enough of the classes who pay taxes, to make their just will potentially heard. And experience proves that to clothe all, including those who have no property, with suffrage, leaves property practically unprotected.

GEOLOGY AND THE BIBLE.¹

THE subject to which we invoke our readers' attention has been much debated. But our purpose is not to weary them with a repetition of those discussions concerning a pre-Adamite earth, the length of the creative days, or the best way to reconcile geology with Moses, which have often been conducted within a few years past, with deficient knowledge and temper in some cases, and often with slight utility. In the progress of natural science, relations between it and theology become apparent from time to time, and frequently in very unexpected ways. Both parties are usually at fault in defining those relations in the beginning; and thus there occurs a season of somewhat confused contest, arising from the oversight of the proper "metes and bounds" of the two sciences. As the discussion proceeds, the facts are at length set forth, which enable all reasonable men to adjust the relations satisfactorily, and to appropriate to each its legitimate field of authority. All will agree that it is time such an adjustment were, if possible, begun between the geologist and the divine. Our humble attempt will be to make such a beginning. We have no geologic theory to advance or to impugn, and no particular facts to advance, either new or old. But, looking back over the general course of the discussion on the structure of our globe, only as those may profess to do who keep up with general literature, without assuming to be professional geologists, we would endeavor to fix some principles of discussion by which the application of natural science and its inferences may be defined and limited to their proper territory, and the claims of theology established along the points of contact. It would, perhaps, have been better for the divines if they had confined their efforts to these defensive views, instead of entering, without being always adequately prepared, into the technical discussions of geology.

¹ Appeared in the *Southern Presbyterian Review*, for July, 1861.

1. But, while making this admission at the outset, we would firmly protest against the arrogant and offensive spirit in which geologists have often, we may almost say usually, met clerical criticisms of their reasonings. To the objections advanced by theologians, the answer has usually been a contemptuous assertion that they were incompetent to sit in judgment, or to object, when geology was in question, because they were not professional masters of the science. Their reasonings have been pronounced foolish, ignorant, mistaken, and slightly dismissed or rejected without fair examination, because they came from "parsons." Now, we freely grant that it is a very naughty thing for a parson, or a geologist, to profess to know what he does not know, as well as a very foolish; that some of the "*genus irritabile vatum*" have doubtless been betrayed into this folly by their zeal against infidel science, as they supposed it, and that geologists have not been at all behind them—as some instances will show before we have done—in the mortifying displays of ignorance and sophistry they have made, in their attempts to use the weapons of the theologian and expositor. But, we would remark, while the specialties on which inductions are founded, in any particular branch of natural science, are, of course, better known to the professor of the specialty, the man of general intelligence may judge the deductions made from the general facts just as well as the other. Any inductive logic is the same in principle with all other inductive logic, and all deductive logic also is similar. Yea, conclusions from facts may sometimes be drawn more correctly by the man of general science than by the plodding collector of them; because the former applies to them the appropriate logic with a more correct and expansive view, and, perhaps, with less of the prejudice of hypothesis. The man who defined the inductive logic was not a naturalist by special profession—was not practically skilled in any one department of natural history—but was a great philosopher and logician.

If, then, after geologists have described and generalized their facts, and have explained their conclusions therefrom, a class so well educated as the clergy must be pronounced unfitted to form an opinion upon them, the fault must be in the geologist or his science. If demonstration is there, it ought surely to be visible

to the intelligent eye. How absurd is it for the advocates of the science to recalcitrate against the opinions of an educated class of *men*, when they virtually offer their systems to the comprehension of *boys*, by making them a subject of collegiate instruction, and one who has, perhaps, more scornfully than any other, derided the criticisms of clerical opponents to popular assemblages of clerks and mechanics! Surely, if Mr. Hugh Miller thought that he could convince a crowd of London mechanics intelligently, in one night's lecture, of his theory of the seven geologic ages, it is absurd to claim that the science is too recondite for the unholy inspection of a parson's eyes.

There must always be a peculiar reason for the meddling of theologians in this subject. It is, that it is virtually a theory of cosmogony; and cosmogony is intimately connected with the doctrine of creation, which is one of the modes by which God reveals himself to man, and one of the prime articles of every theology. The inevitable connection of the two might be inferred from this fact, that all the cosmogonies of the ancients were natural theologies; there is no philosopher of whom we know anything, among the Greeks and Romans, who has treated the one without treating the other. It must, therefore, be always expected that theologians will claim an interest in geologic speculations, and will require them to be conformed to sound principles of logic and exposition.

2. On the other hand, the attitude and temper of many of the eager defenders of inspiration towards the new science have been most unwise. By many, a jealousy and uneasiness have been displayed which were really derogatory to the dignity of our cause. The Bible is so firmly established upon its impregnable evidences, it has passed safely through so many assaults, has witnessed the saucy advance of so many pretended demonstrations of its errors, which were afterwards covered with ridicule by the learned, that its friends can well afford to be calm, patient, and dignified. They should be neither too eager to repel and denounce, nor too ready to recede from established expositions of the text at the supposed demand of scientific discoveries. They should assume the calm assurance, which regards all true science, and every genuine discovery, as destined inevitably to become the handmaids, instead of the assailants,

of revelation. Especially to be deprecated is that shallow and fickle policy, which has been so often seen among the professed defenders of the Bible, in hastily adopting some newly-coined exposition of its word, made to suit some supposed exigency of a new scientific discovery, and as hastily abandoning it for some still newer meaning. They have not even waited to ascertain whether the supposed necessity for relinquishing the old exposition has been really created by a well-established discovery; but, as prurient and shallow in science as in theology, they have adopted on half-evidence some new-fangled hypothesis of scientific facts, and then invented, on grounds equally insecure, some new-fangled explanations to twist God's word into seeming agreement with the hypothesis. It would be well for us to ascertain whether our position is really stormed before we retreat to search for another. But, several times within a generation, the world has seen a certain class of theologians saying that the old popular understanding of the Bible upon a given subject must be relinquished; that science had proved it untenable, but that they had at last found the true and undoubted one. And this they proceeded to sustain with marvellous ingenuity and zeal. But, after a few years, the natural philosophers relinquish, of their own accord, the hypothesis which had put these expositors to so much trouble, and introduce with great confidence a different one. And now, the divines tell us, they were mistaken a second time as to what the Bible intended to teach about it; but they are certain they have it right at last. So a third exposition is advanced. It has been this shortsighted folly, more than any real collision between the Bible and science, which has caused thinking men to doubt the authority of inspiration, and to despise its professed expounders. If they are to be believed, then the word of God is but a sort of clay which may be moulded into any shape required by the purposes of priestcraft. Clergymen ought to know enough of the history of human knowledge to be aware that true science advances slowly and cautiously; that great and revolutionizing discoveries in physical laws are not established every day; that a multitude of hypotheses have been mistaken, before our times, for demonstrations, and afterwards relinquished; and that even true inductions are always, to a certain extent, tentative, and

require to be partially corrected after the science has been pushed to farther advances, from which fuller light is reflected back upon them. It will be time enough, therefore, for us, as professional expositors of the Mosaic history, to settle and proclaim a plan for expounding it in harmony with geology when geology has settled itself. Our wisdom would be to commit the credit and authority of God's Word to no theory except such as is absolutely established by the laws of sound exegesis; and when we have thus taken a well-considered position, to maintain it firmly against all mere appearances.

3. It should, in the third place, be clearly decided what is the degree of authority which we are to claim for the Bible upon those questions of physics which lie along the path of its topics. Many claim for geology a license here, which comes very near to the deceitful distinction of the schoolmen, between the philosophical and theological truth. When their daring speculations clearly contravened the teachings of Scripture, they said that these opinions were true in philosophy, though false in theology. In a somewhat similar spirit it is now pleaded for geology, that it has its domain in a different field of investigation and evidence from that of the Bible. Each kind of evidence is valid in its own sphere, it is said; and, therefore, the teachings of each science are to be held true, independently of each other. But all truths are harmonious *inter se*. If one proposition contradicts another, no matter from what field of human knowledge it may be brought, manifestly, both cannot be true. If, then, the Bible, properly understood, affirms what geology denies, the difference is irreconcilable; it cannot be evaded by any easy expedient like that described above; it can only be composed by the overthrow of the authority of one or the other of the parties.

To determine how the Bible should be understood in its allusions to physical facts, we must bear in mind the object of God in giving it. His purpose was not to teach us philosophical knowledge, but theological. Nothing seems plainer than that God acts on the scheme of leaving men to find out, by their own researches, all those facts and laws of nature, the knowledge of which may minister to curiosity or to material well-being; while

he limits himself to giving us those divine facts and laws which man's research could not discover, or could not adequately establish, necessary for our attaining our proper theological end. Philosophy is our teacher for the body and for time; revelation, for the soul and for eternity. When revelation says anything concerning material nature, it is only what is made necessary to the comprehension of some theological fact or doctrine. And in its observance of this distinction the Bible is eminently a practical book, saying nothing whatever for mere curiosity, and stopping at just what is essential to religious truth. Hence, we ought to understand that when the Scriptures use popular language to describe physical occurrences or facts, all they mean is to state the apparent phenomena as they would seem to the popular eye to occur. They never intended to give us the non-apparent, scientific mechanism of those facts or occurrences; for this is not essential to their practical object, and is left to the philosopher. Hence, when natural science comes, and teaches us that the true *rationale* of apparent phenomena is different from that which seems to be suggested by the terms of the Scripture and of popular language, there is no real contradiction between science and the Bible, or between science and the popular phraseology. For instance, the exposition of such passages, which led the doctors of Salamanca to condemn Columbus' geography as unscriptural, and the Inquisition and Turretin to argue against the astronomy of Galileo, as infidel, was mistaken. The former argued against Columbus, that the Psalms speak of the heavens as spread out like a canopy, and the earth as immovable and extended. Turretin argues most methodically that the Copernican scheme of the heavens cannot be true, because the Scriptures speak of the earth as "established that it cannot be moved;" of the sun as "going forth to his circuit in the heavens;" and of sun and moon as "setting," "rising," "standing still" at Joshua's command. We now clearly see that all this was an exegetical folly. And, now that we know it is the earth that moves, and not the sun, we no more dream of charging the Bible with error of language than we do the astronomer himself, when he says, perhaps on the very pages of his almanac, "sun rises," "sun sets," "sun enters Capricorn," etc; for such really are the apparent motions of those bodies,

and had the Bible departed from the established popular phraseology in mentioning them, to use terms of scientific accuracy, it would have been gratuitous pedantry, aggravated by the fact that it would have been unintelligible and absurd to all nations which had not yet developed the Copernican astronomy.

Now, so far as the demands of modern geology upon our understanding of the Mosaic record are analogous to the concessions made above, we cheerfully yield them. It was with a view to the illustration of this new application that the familiar principle was again stated by us. And we find this principle, which we thus concede, claimed by the Christian geologist, as Hugh Miller, to cover all possible liberties which they find it convenient to take with the sacred text. This, then, is another point which requires careful adjustment. When Moses seems to say that God brought our world out of nothing into an organized state, about six thousand years ago, and in the space of six days, are his words to be classed along with those passages which denote physical occurrences according to their popular appearance, and which are to be interpreted, as we do the popular language about them, in obedience to the discoveries of natural science? Or, does this class of passages belong to a different category? We are compelled to take the latter answer as the proper affirmative. In the first place, the reference to physical facts in the record of creation is not merely subsidiary to the narrative or statement of some theological truth, but it is introduced for its own sake. For, creation is not only a physical fact; it is a theological doctrine. The statement of it is fundamental to the unfolding of the whole doctrine of the creature's relation to his creator. It is not one of those things which revelation treats as being intrinsically outside its scope, and which it, therefore, only introduces allusively. It is the first of those "things of God," which it is the proper and direct object of revelation to teach authoritatively. Second: the fact of creation had no apparent phase different from its true scientific one, like the seeming dome of the skies, the rising sun, the stable earth; for the simple reason that it had no human spectators. Hence, there could be no popular mode of representation different from the true scientific *rationale*, as there was no people to observe the apparent phenomena and describe them. But

we have seen that the popular language of the Bible about the rising sun, and such like apparent phenomena, receives its explanation purely from the fact that it is conformed to the apparent and obvious occurrences, and to the established popular language founded thereon. Instead, therefore, of requiring these passages to stand waiting until they receive their proper construction from the hand of natural science, they are to be construed, like the remainder of the doctrinal teachings of the Scriptures, according to their own independent laws of exegesis, honestly applied.

Farther: when the proper rights of revelation, as related to natural science, are defined, it is most important that we assert their independence of it. Most geologists speak as though, on any subject which the researches of human science may happen to touch, the Bible must say only what their deductions permit it to say.¹ The position to which they consign God's word is that of a handmaid, dependent, for the validity of the construction to be put upon its words, upon their permission. Now this, we boldly assert, is intrinsic rationalism; it is the very same principle of baptized infidelity which reappears from so many different points of view, from Socinianism, Neologism, Abolitionism, exalting the conclusions of the human understanding over the sure word of prophecy. Let us fully concede that the Bible has been often misinterpreted, and that thus its infallibility has been cited to sustain what God never meant it to sustain; that its correct exposition may, especially in certain parts of it, require great patience, caution, and modesty; and that it is wrong to claim its teachings as authoritative on any point, unless we have ascertained the true meaning of the text, beyond a peradventure, by the just application of its own laws of exposition. But still, the Bible must be held to have its own ascertainable and valid laws of exposition; and its teachings, when duly ascertained, must be absolutely authoritative in all their parts, without waiting on or deferring to any conclusions of human science whatsoever; otherwise, it is practically no Bible; it is no "rule of faith" for a human soul. For, to say nothing of the uncertainties and fallibility of human reasonings, of the numerous mistakes of science once held to be demonstrated, how

¹ *Testimony of the Rocks*, page 157-8.

preposterous is the idea that our Bible held out to all the generations of men before Cuvier what professed to be an infallible cosmogony, while they had no possible means (the science which was to interpret it being undeveloped) to attain the true meaning, or to discover, by the laws of exposition of the language itself, their misunderstanding of it? Such a revelation would be a mere trap. But, worse than this; just as all our forefathers, when reading the first chapter of Genesis, supposed they were reading a plain story, which they were invited and permitted to comprehend, but were, all the while, deceived; so we may now be unconsciously accepting a number of Bible propositions as authoritative, and staking our souls upon them, which are destined to receive, several hundred years hence, a totally different interpretation—an interpretation impossible for us to attain—from the light of some science as yet undeveloped, either geological, or astronomical, or ethical, or ethnological. And who can guess in what part of the Bible these quicksands are? All seems like solid ground to us now; but so did Genesis seem to our honest forefathers. We repeat, if they sinned against the Bible's own independent laws of exegesis in venturing to put a sense on the first of Genesis, if there was anything in those laws of exegesis themselves which, properly observed, would have sufficed to warn them off from their unwarranted interpretations, they were wholly to blame for their mistake. But if not, if the Bible was dependent for a fair understanding on a science as yet wholly undeveloped, then in those places it really means nothing in itself; and in seeming to mean something it is a mere trap for honest people. And so, we repeat, until human science shall have made its last advance in every circle of knowledge which can ever inosculate with theology, we must remain in suspense, whether there are not other hollow places in this Bible which are betraying us. Obviously, such a book is not authoritative to a rational soul. And obviously, he who holds the authority of the Bible only in the sense described, is but a rationalist in spirit, whatever may be his Christian or his clerical profession. But, it may be objected, "does not every enlightened Christian hold that it is the glory of the Bible to receive illustrations from every light of human science?" We reply: it is its glory to have all human science ancillary to it, not dominant

over it; to have its meaning illustrated, *but not created*, by all the discoveries of true science.

4. An equally important adjustment is to be made as to the party which is bound to assume the burden of proof in this discussion between the Mosaic and the geologic records. We consider that the theologian, who asserts the infallibility of the Bible and the independency and sufficiency of its own laws of interpretation, is entitled to the preliminary presumption; and, therefore, the burden of proof rests upon the geologist, who asserts a hostile hypothesis. The authority of the Bible, as our rule of faith, is demonstrated by its own separate and independent evidences, literary, historical, moral, internal, prophetic. It is found by the geologist in possession of the field, and he must assume the aggressive, and positively dislodge it from its position. The defender of the Bible need only stand on the defensive. That is, the geologist may not content himself with saying that his hypothesis, which is opposed to Bible teachings, is plausible, that it cannot be scientifically refuted, that it may adequately satisfy the requirements of all the physical phenomena to be accounted for. All this is naught, as a successful assault on us. We are not bound to retreat until he has constructed an absolutely exclusive demonstration of his hypothesis; until he has shown, by strict scientific proofs, not only that his hypothesis *may be* the true one, but that *it alone can be* the true one; that it is impossible any other can exclude it. And we, in order to retain our position, are not at all bound to construct any physical argument to demonstrate geologically that Moses' statement of the case is the true one; for, if the Bible is true, what it teaches on this subject is proved true by the biblical evidences, in the absence of all geologic proof. Nor are we under any forensic obligation to refute the opposing hypothesis of the geologist by geologic arguments farther than this: that we shall show geologically that his argument is not a perfect and exclusive demonstration. If we merely show, by any flaw in his conclusion, by the citation of any phenomenon irreducible to the terms of his hypothesis, that his demonstration is incomplete, we have successfully maintained the defensive; we hold the victory.

Now, have geologists always remembered this? Nay, is it

not notoriously otherwise? It would seem as though this interesting young science had a sort of fatality for infecting its votaries with a forgetfulness of these logical responsibilities. Perhaps this would be found equally true of every other physical science of wide extent, of complex phenomena and of fascinating character, while in its forming state. But every acute reader of the deductions of geologists perceives numerous instances where they quietly substitute the "may be" for the "must be," and step unconsciously from the undisputed probability of an hypothesis to its undisputed certainty. And one's observation of nature need proceed but a small way to light upon instances in which phenomena exist which would receive a given solution just as plausibly as certain others; while the geologists imagine a reason for withholding that solution in the cases which would thus spoil their hypothesis. That they can not yet claim that exclusive and perfect demonstration of their hypothesis which is required of their position, as holding the aggressive, seems very plain from familiar facts. One is the radical differences of hypothesis to which leading geologists are committed up to this very day. Sir Charles Lyell makes it almost the key-note of his system, that all geologic changes were produced by such causes as are now at work, and operating, in the main, with no greater speed than they now exhibit. Hugh Miller, and others, are equally sure that those changes were produced by successive convulsions and earth-tempests, revolutionizing in a short time the state of ages. Some reconcile the "stony record" with that of Moses, upon the scheme advocated by Dr. Chalmers, which pushes back all the mighty changes to that interval ending, in Genesis i. 2, when "the earth was without form, and void." Others, with Miller and Professor Tayler Lewis, adopt the very different theory of the six creative days extending to vast periods of time. Mr. Miller is certain that the fossil *flora* and *fauna* indicate just the order, in the main, as to the succession which their chief developments had in the geologic ages, which is set down in Genesis as the work of the several days. Many others, equally great, declare just the opposite.

A reasonable mistrust of the perfectness of geological demonstrations is excited again by instances of obvious haste and

inconclusiveness in their inferences from supposed facts. Of this one or two illustrations must suffice. Few of their writers rank higher than Sir Charles Lyell. In the London edition of his *Principles of Geology*, 1850, page 205, we have an attempt to make an estimate of the age of the earth's present crust from the character of the deep gorge, or great rocky gully, in which the Niagara river flows from the falls towards Lake Ontario. The deep part of this channel is said to be about seven miles long. The author first satisfies himself, on grounds which might perhaps amount to probability, that this whole gorge may have been excavated by the torrent itself. This is the first element of the calculation. Through the rest of the argument this probability is tacitly turned into a certainty. The next element to be ascertained is, the rate at which the river now digs out its channel, and the edge of the cataract recedes. A previous intelligent inquirer concluded, upon the best testimony he could collect upon the spot, that the falls receded a yard each year; but Sir Charles assumes an average of a foot per year as the more correct rate, on grounds which he does not state. This second source of uncertainty is also quietly ignored. Then it is calculated that the Niagara has been flowing thirty-five thousand years. While the author does not venture to vouch for this positively, he concludes by indicating to his reader that his private opinion is, the time was more likely longer than shorter. Now, even the unscientific visitor of Niagara cannot fail to observe, what Sir Charles himself correctly states, that the perpendicular face of the gorge of the cataract and of the lower edge of Goat Island reveals this structure: on the top there is a vast layer or stratum of hard gray limestone, nearly horizontal, and, at the falls, nearly ninety feet thick, while all below it, to the bottom of the precipice, is a soft shale. The real obstruction to the very rapid cutting away of the precipice by the tremendous torrent, is the solidity of the limestone layer whose surface forms the bottom of the river above the falls. When that once gives way the rest is speedily removed. Any person can easily understand that the permanency with which this limestone layer withstands the water depends chiefly on its thickness, and also on its dip, or inclination, and on the frequent occurrence or absence of fissures or seams, destroying the cohesion of

its masses to each other. Now, will not the reader be surprised to learn that, even in the two miles which extend from the cataract down to the Suspension Bridge, this all-important stratum of limestone is diminished more than half in its thickness, the soft and yielding shale forming the remainder of the cliffs? So that, to say nothing of the high probability of the occurrence of the two other causes within the seven miles, we have here a cause for the recession of the cataract greatly more rapid than that which now obtains. Sir Charles Lyell concludes with these words: "At some points it may have receded much faster than at present, but its general progress was probably slower, because the cataract, when it began to recede, must have had nearly twice its present height." Did not the waters then have more than twice their present momentum? So that common sense would say that, if there was more earth to be worn and dug away, there was far more power to do it. Surely, such reasoning as the above does not make an exclusive and perfect demonstration!

Another instance shall be taken from the same author. On page 219 he presents us with an argument for the great age of the world, from the length of time the Mississippi has been employed in forming its alluvial delta. The elements of the calculation are, of course, the area and depth of the alluvial deposit, giving the whole number of cubic yards composing it, the quantity of water passed down the stream in one year, and the percentage of solid matter contained in the water in its average state of muddiness. The *data* upon which the depth of the alluvium is fixed are only two, the average depth of the Gulf of Mexico, and a well or shaft sunk near Lake Ponchartrain. Are either of these sufficient? Is it not customary for strata to dip towards seas and oceans? If the spot at which the well was dug happened to be one of those sunk far below the usual level by earthquake agencies—and Sir Charles himself saw that such agencies had produced just such results in the region of the same river, near New Madrid—would it not come, in the course of a few hundred years, to receive far more than the average thickness of alluvial deposit? But let us come to the other element, the percentage of sediment in the water. From the observations of Dr. Riddell he learns that it is one three-

thousandth part, in bulk, of the water. Two other observers, Messrs. Brown and Dickeson, make it one five hundred and twenty-eighth part, and they make the volume of water one-third more! Sir Charles concedes that "so great a discrepancy shows the need of a new series of experiments." Did either of the observers take pains to ascertain whether the larger part of the sediment does not gravitate towards the bottom of the water while flowing, and to go down any part of the one hundred and sixty-eight feet, which measures the depth of the river at New Orleans, to procure the water which they examined? We are not informed. The observations on the annual volume of water were made at New Orleans. Was any allowance made for the waters which flow off in such vast quantities through the delta, by the *bayous*, and during the gigantic freshets, leaving the main channel above New Orleans? We are not informed. Again, the total volume of the water passing New Orleans in a year depends on its velocity. Now, experienced pilots and boatmen of the Mississippi are generally of opinion that the lower strata of water in its channel run with far more velocity than the surface. Hence the calculators, in gauging the surface velocity, were probably entirely at fault as to the real volume of water. Last, it is universally known that the Mississippi is nearly twice as muddy, on the average, at the head of the delta as at New Orleans! How much is this notable calculation worth after all these deductions? But, for all that, he *chooses* to assume Dr. Riddell's estimate for his basis, and thus proves (!) that the Mississippi has been running one hundred thousand years.

Now, let the reader note, that we do not advance the inconclusiveness of these two calculations as sufficient proof, by itself, that the world *is not* thirty-five thousand, or one hundred thousand years old. But we advance it upon the principle expressed in the adage, "*Ex pede Herculem.*" The detection of such hasty and shallow reasoning gives sufficient ground of mistrust as to their general conclusions.

Another specimen shall be drawn from Hugh Miller, ludicrous enough to relieve the tedium of this discussion. In the *Testimony of the Rocks* (Boston: 1857, p. 259), he is arguing that the fossil animals were produced by natural law, vast ages ago, because they exhibit marks of creative design similar to

those we now find in the living works of nature. One of his evidences is a little coral, the "*Smithia Pengellyi*," which constructed its bony cells such that the fracture of them presented a surface remarkably similar to a certain calico pattern which had proved extremely popular among the ladies. The conclusion is, that as this calico must have been very pretty—as though the better part of creation had never been known to exhibit their sweet caprices by admiring things for their very ugliness—the creator undoubtedly caused these coral insects to construct their cells in this way for their prettiness! To us duller mortals it is not apparent that the "final cause" of coral insects was to be ready to have their stony buildings cracked open by geologists' hammers; we thought they had been made for an existence where, in the main, no human eye could see them, especially as the species was pre-Adamite by myriads of years. Mr. Miller's notion of the design of creation seems to be very much akin to that of the old Scotch crone, who, whenever she beheld a beautiful young girl, had no other appreciation of her graces than to conceive "what a lovely corpse she would make."

Once more: while the currently received theory of the cosmogony is ingenious, it is at least doubtful whether the adjustment of all the phenomena of so complex a case to the hypothesis, has been, or can be, accurately carried out. But, until this is done, it is not demonstrated. If that scheme is true, then all the material substances which make up the chemist's list of simple substances must have been derived from the elements of the atmosphere, of water, and of the primitive rocks. For, if we go back to the beginning, we find, according to the current hypothesis of the geologists, nothing in existence, except a heated atmosphere, watery vapor, and a fluid globe of melted granite, basalt, etc. All the rest, secondary, tertiary, alluvial, is the result of cooling, crusting, depressions and upheavals of this crust, disintegration, and sedimentary deposits. But, is it certain that air, pure water, and primitive rocks contain all the chemical substances? And a still harder question is this: has it ever been ascertained whether the chemical conditions and combinations, in which the elements exist in the primitive rocks, and then in those called secondary and tertiary,

are such as are consistent with this hypothesis? Has it been ascertained that the small percentage of silicate of lime found in some of the granites—only some—and other primitive rocks, within such a distance from their surface as could, by any possibility, be subjected to disintegration, can account for all the vast masses of *carbonate* of lime—no longer silicate—in all the limestone, marbles, chalks, coral, and calcareous clays of the newer strata? But the world is entitled to have these questions answered before the geologists claim a demonstration of their hypothesis.

Recent events furnish us with another doubt. One of the main arguments by which the fossil animals of all but the most recent species are shown to be pre-Adamite, as it is claimed, is, that no fossil human remains, or marks of human handiwork, have been found among them. And geologists have admitted—as they must—that the well-attested discovery of such remains among the earlier strata would demand a surrender and reconstruction of their theory. But lately the scientific world has been agitated by the report that, near *Amiens*, in France, arrow heads of flint, and other works of human industry, have been found unquestionably in a *stratum*, and along with fossils, uniformly assigned by geologists to a pre-Adamite period. And now, it is stated that a scholar of high qualifications, Rawlinson, has visited the spot, and is satisfied of the correctness of the assertion.

For these and many other reasons, we consider the geological hypothesis as not yet a demonstration; and, hence, we claim the right to stand upon the defensive, upon the impregnable bulwarks of Scripture evidences, until we are positively dislodged. We deny that any logical obligation rests upon us to present any scientific argument, or to establish any hypothesis, on the subject. We are not bound to show, by natural science, what is the true *rationale* of the earth's creation. Our defence is thoroughly accomplished when we show that any adverse theory is not yet exclusively demonstrated.

5. The most vital point in the relations between theology and geology we have reserved for the last. It is one which has been summarily disposed of by geologists, without condescending to weigh its vast import. How far must the logical value of

the inferences of natural science from natural appearances be modified by the admitted fact of *a creation*! The character of these inferences is the following: "We see a given natural law produce a given structure; we find the remains of a similar structure which has been somehow produced in the past; we infer that it must have been produced by a similar natural law." The just application of this kind of reasoning, within its proper limits, is fully admitted; it has been the main lever in the discoveries of natural science. But now, we ask, how far should its application be limited by the knowledge of the truth, that *somewhere* in the past some omnipotent creative act must have intervened? This is the question.

Unless geologists are willing candidly to take an atheistic view of cosmogony, the fact of an absolute act of creation must be admitted somewhere in the past. We will not insult the intelligence and piety of our readers by supposing it necessary to recite the arguments which disprove an atheistic origin of the present order of things, or the emphatic admissions of all the greatest teachers of natural science, that nature obviously discloses her own origin in the creative will of an eternal Intelligence. The short-lived theory of *development* has been already crushed beneath the combined arguments and ridicule of scientific geologists themselves. There is, however, one fact, peculiarly germane to this point, that the Christian geologists of Great Britain and America claim it as the peculiar glory of their science, that it presents an invincible and original argument for a creation. It is this: the stony records of successive *genera* of fossil plants and animals show that prior *genera* perished wholly, and *genera* entirely new appear on the stage of life. Now, as the development theory is repudiated, the entrance of each new *genus* evinces, beyond a doubt, a new and separate creative act. Let us grant this for argument's sake. It is agreed, then, that terrestrial structures began, somewhere in the past, in God's creative act.

But now, it is most obvious, that if a scientific observer had been present, just after that creative act, to observe the structures produced by it, any observations or inferences he might have drawn from the *seeming* marks of the working of natural laws upon them, would have been worthless to prove that those

specimens originated in natural laws. We repeat, once admit that a creative act has intervened *anywhere* in the past, and we should have had there, if we had been present, one case in which all deductions and inferences of the natural origin of things from their natural appearances would have been worthless. Such analogical arguments would have been cut across and superseded utterly by the creative act. This is indisputable. We may illustrate it by the instances usually presented by the sound old writers of the class of Dick—instances which have far more significance than has usually been admitted. Suppose, for illustration's sake, that the popular apprehension of the Bible account of the creation of Adam's body and of the trees of Paradise is true. But now a naturalist of our modern school investigates affairs. He finds towering oaks with acorns on them! Acorns do not form by nature in a day—some species of oaks require two summers to mature them. But worse than this. He has ascertained by natural history that one summer's growth forms only one of the concentric rings in the grain of the tree's stock. He cuts down one of the spreading monarchs of the garden, and discovers that it has a hundred rings. So he coolly rejects the story that this garden began last week, and insists on it that Adam has told a monstrous fib in saying so; that it is not less than a hundred years old. Yet Adam was right; for the creative act explained all. But let us suppose another naturalist returning after some nine or ten centuries. He visits the venerable tomb of the father of all the living, and learns from his heir, Seth, how that his father sprang, at the bidding of God, out of the dust, a full-formed, adult man. The naturalist takes up a leg-bone of Adam's skeleton; he remarks: "The person to whom this bone belonged at death was evidently an adult; for its length, size, solidity and density show this." He saws off a section, polishes it down to a translucent film of bone, and subjects it to his microscope and his chemical solvents. He remarks: "Here is the cellular structure of gelatinous matter, which once formed the incipient bone of the *fœtus*; and these cells I now find filled with the deposit of *proto-phosphate of lime*, giving it its stony strength and hardness. But I know that the introduction of this earth into the cells of the soft bone of the infant is just the process by which

nature now forms the bones of adults, by gradual growth. Whence I learn that this individual, like his children, grew, during the space of twenty-one years, from a *fœtus* to an adult; and the myth of his son Seth, concerning his instantaneous creation, is an attempt to impose on my credulity. This attempt I, as a philosopher, shall repudiate with contempt." Yet Seth was right, and the philosopher wrong; for, not to rely on the inspired testimony alone, this natural argument would prove that Adam was once an infant, and, therefore, had a father. The same argument, applied to the body of Adam's father, would equally prove that he also was once an infant, and had a father. And it would prove equally well an infinite series of finite human fathers, extending back to all eternity. But such a series, philosophy herself shows, is impossible!

But, second—and the remark is of prime importance—any creative act of God, producing a structure which was intended to subsist under the working of natural laws, must produce one presenting some of the *seeming* traces of the operation of such laws. We confidently challenge geologists who admit that there has ever been any creation at all to imagine a product of it which could be different. For, note, all these theistic geologists repudiate the theory of development of *genera* from different and lower *genera*. Whence it follows, that the first specimen of God's immediate handiwork, the very first moment it left his hand, must have stood forth *as truly natural* as any of its progeny which were destined to proceed from it by natural law. And the same thing must have been true, to some extent, of all inorganic structures. If they had no traits of the natural, as they came from God's hand, then they were incapable of becoming, thenceforth, the subjects of natural law.¹

Hence, third, it follows that, if once a creative act is admitted to have occurred somewhere in the past, it may have occurred anywhere in the past, so far as the deductions of natural science from the marks of natural law upon its products go. In other words, the value of all these analogical inferences as to the date at which, and the mode by which, these objects of nature came

¹ But the fossils! especially animal? Ans. If the invalidity of the arguments for the sequence and age of unorganized strata be admitted, then the proof that fossils are pre-Adamite is gone.

into being, are worthless just so soon as they attempt to pass back of the earliest historical testimony. For the creative act, wherever it has intervened (and who can tell, when historical testimony fails, where it may not have intervened?) has utterly superseded and cut across all such inferences. Nor can these natural analogies prove that the creative act has not thus intervened at a given place in the past, because the whole validity of the analogies depends on the supposed absence of the creative act. Hence, all the reasonings of geologists seem to us utterly vitiated in their very source, when they attempt to fix, from natural analogies, the age and mode of production of the earth's structure.

This objection is usually dismissed by geologists with a sort of summary contempt, or with a grand outcry of opposition. It does, indeed, cut deep into the pride and pretence of their science; at one blow it sweeps off that whole domain of its pretended discoveries—the region of the infinite past prior to all history—in which the pride, conceit, and curiosity of man's fallen intellect most crave to expatiate. But let us see whether it is possible to impugn the simple premises on which our conclusion rests, or the inevitable result from them. Is there a single answer which can be presented that is even of any scientific weight?

It is urged, in substance, by Hitchcock, that if the validity of their analogical reasonings from natural laws is denied in this case, the very foundations of all natural science are overthrown. But what is this, more than an appeal to our fears and prejudices? It is as though one said, when we refuse to accept a given species of evidence outside its proper range, that we thereby invalidate the force of all evidence. The question is: what is the proper domain of these inferences from the analogies of natural law? Within their own domain, true science accepts them as valid; outside of it, true science herself will concur with theology in arresting them. Let these premises be granted, viz., given the sufficient evidence that supernatural causes are all absent in a certain class of effects; and given the fact that just such effects have usually resulted from a certain natural law: then the inference may be very valid that these effects did result from the operation of this law. But this infer-

ence cannot help us to determine the first premise, whether all supernatural causes were truly absent, for the very reason that it depends on that premise in part. This would be to reason in a circle, with a vengeance. The application of these inferences, upon which Hitchcock and the other geologists insist, is, in fact, precisely a case of that induction from mere uniformity of antecedent and consequent, as far as observed, which Bacon condemned under the term "*Inductio per enumerationem simplicem*," and which it was one of his chief tasks to explode as utterly worthless. He proves that it can never raise more than a meagre probability of the correctness of its conclusions where it is not supported by some better canon of induction. To explain, the shallow observer says: "I find that, so far as my observation has been enabled to test the matter, a given consequent phenomenon, named B, has always been preceded by a given antecedent, named A. Hence, I conclude that, in every other case where B appears A was its cause." The obvious vice of this is, that it is wholly unproved that some other cause capable of producing B was not present, besides A, in the last cases. The induction is worthless until that is proved beyond a peradventure. To apply this: our modern geologists argue, for instance, that wherever they have been able to examine the actual process by which the formation of *stratified rocks* takes place, the cause is *sedimentary action*. Therefore, wherever any other stratified rocks are seen, their producing cause must have been sedimentary action. Here we have precisely the worthless induction *per enumerationem simplicem*, for the possible presence of some other cause capable of producing stratified rocks has not been excluded. And every one but the atheist admits that another such cause may have been present in the shape of *creative power*. Until the presence of that cause is excluded by some other evidence, the conclusion is not proved. The vice of the argument is just like that in the famous sophism of Hume against miracles—it is not worthy of a Humeist. And we conceive that there is no uncharitableness in declaring that the covert tendencies of all such philosophizings are to *Hume's atheism*. Such reasonings cannot be complete for such a result in all cases, unless the supernatural be wholly excluded and the secret tendency to do so, which is

virtual atheism. is the true spring of all such reasonings in science. But it may be retorted: are we, then, to surrender all dependence on inferences from natural law, as certain evidence, throughout the whole extent of the natural sciences? We reply, no; wherever the inquirer into nature is certain that the facts he investigates are truly under the dominion of natural law, so far such reasonings are valid. As to the origin and history of nature in the past, they are valid no farther back than we can be assured of the absence of the supernatural; and we know not how such assurance can be gained by us, save by the testimony of human experience and history, or of inspiration. This conclusion does, indeed, curb the arrogance of human science, but it does not affect in the least any part of its legitimate dominions, or of its practical value to mankind. It does, indeed, disable us from determining the age, date, and origin of the structures nature presents us, but it does not prevent our discovering the laws of those structures; and the latter is the discovery to which the whole utility of science belongs.

Again, why should the theistic philosopher desire to push back the creative act of God to the remotest possible age, and to reduce his agency to the smallest possible *minimum*, as is continually done by these speculations? What is gained by it? Instead of granting that God created a *world*, a *κοσμος*, they continually strive to show that he only created the rude germs of a world, attributing the actual origin of the fewest possible elements to God's almighty act, and supposing the most possible to be the result of subsequent development under natural law. We repeat the question: what is truly gained by this, if once the lingerings of covert atheism be expelled? Admit in good faith the facts of an actual Creator, an almighty and omniscient agent, and of an actual creation, anywhere in the past, and it will appear just as reasonable that God should have created the whole finished result, as a part. To his infinite faculties there is nothing hard, as opposed to easy; nothing intricate, as opposed to simple; nothing great, as contrasted with the small. It was just as easy for him to speak into existence a finished universe, with all its beautiful order, "by the word of his power," as to produce the incipient elements out of which "laws of nature" were slowly and laboriously to evolve the result.

For, what are those laws of nature, and what their source? Do they not originate, after all, in the mere will and immediate power of God? None but the atheist disputes this. And, although we cordially grant that the properties of bodies, by which they are constituted *forces* in the great system of causation under natural law, are actual properties, and not mere seeming blinds or *simulacra* of properties; though we grant that they are truly intrinsic in bodies, as constituted by God's creative will; yet who, except the atheist, denies that their operation is sustained and regulated by the ever-present, special providence of God? Hence, if we say *natural law* does this or that, as opposed to supernatural creation, we have not in the least simplified, or relieved, the perpetual miracle of God's working. There is still a manifold and countless operation of infinite power and wisdom.

But, if the natural philosophers still persist in claiming the universal application of their principle, that wherever there is an analogy to the results of natural law, there we must conclude natural law alone has wrought, we can clearly evince that their position is utterly untenable and inconsistent, save for the thorough atheist. For, as already intimated, push back the supernatural creative intervention as far as we may, it is impossible for us to conceive how it could produce any structure adapted to the subsequent dominion of natural law, without giving it the properties which such law gives to its similar products. To give the most complete proof of the justice of this remark, let us take that theory of the solar system which the unbelieving La Place is said to have doubtfully suggested as a possible one, and which our nominally Christian philosophers have so incontinently adopted, without demonstration, as demonstratively the true one. Suppose that the natural historian, coming from some older system, had begun his investigation of ours on the principles of these philosophers at that stage when nothing existed but a *nebula* of incandescent compound vapor, rotating from west to east around an axis of motion. This is the stage, we understand, at which it is now most popular to suppose cooling, liquefying, and solidifying processes began, resulting in a sun and planets; when the only shadow of truly scientific evidence on which La Place grounded his doubtful

surmise, has been dissipated by Lord Rosse, resolving the *nebulae* into clusters of well-defined stars. How would this scientific observer have speculated on what was presented at that primitive stage? Had he used the confident logic of our geologists, he must have said to himself: "motion in matter is always the result of impact; therefore, this rotary motion which I now behold must be the result of some mechanical force, developed by natural action, either mechanical or chemical. And, again, *vapor* implies *evaporation*, and sensible heat suggests latent heat rendered sensible by chemical action. There must, therefore, have been a previous and different condition of this matter, now volatilized, heated, and moving. These conditions are the results of the working of natural laws; and that implies a previous material, in a different condition, to be the subject of that working." Now, this reasoning would be precisely as good as that of geologists. But what would it prove? It would make matter and the organism thereof eternal; for, after ascending by such reasonings one stage higher, we should be equally impelled to ascend still another, and another. Thus it would exclude a creator totally from creation. Hence, it appears that the principles we have criticised are unsound and inconsistent, in any hands except those of the atheist. Once admit a creator and a creation, and the validity of all inferences from the seeming analogies of nature, as to origin of things, is vitiated the moment we pass back of the authentic light of historical testimony. Once admit a creator and a creation, and nothing is gained, in logic, by attempting to push back the creative act.

In fine, if that account which theology gives of the origin of the universe is to be accepted at all, it appears to us that the most philosophical conception of a creation would be the following: that God, in producing a world which his purposes required, should pass immediately under the dominion of natural laws, would produce it with just the properties which those laws were to develop. Thus God, intending to have trees perpetuated by a law of germination and growth, would most naturally create the first tree of the *genus* just such as germination and growth would produce. And so the whole structure of his world would be made, at first, with an adaptation to the laws which were intended subsequently to regulate and modify it. And

just here theology inosculates with cosmogony, and gives us a consideration which will strike every just mind with no little force, while it is one of that kind which the man of narrow specialities is almost incompetent to estimate. What was God's true end in the creation of a material world? Reason and Scripture answer: it was to furnish a stage for the existence and action of reasonable moral beings. The world was made for MAN to inhabit. Without the presence of this its rational occupant and earthly master, all the manifestations of intelligent design and moral attributes, given in the order of nature, would be an aimless and senseless work. For, as light would be no light were there no *eye* in the universe, so God's declarative glory in the wisdom and goodness of his works is no glory till there is a *mind* to comprehend it. Now, such being God's end, it seems far more rational to suppose that God would produce at once the world which was needed for his purpose, rather than spend hundreds of thousands of years in growing it.

But, bearing in mind the object for which God created a world, we shall see that it becomes the most reasonable supposition that he should have made it, from the first, with some of those traits which geologists suppose have all resulted from the working of natural laws. For instance, God's purposes, as at present revealed, prompted him to subject the surface of our globe to that class of agencies which are continually adding to its sedimentary *strata* of rocks and earths. Well, it is the most reasonable, the most philosophic supposition, that the same purposes prompted him to create a globe which had, from the first, some *strata* of the same sort. That the surface of the globe should be from the first stratified was necessary, for instance, to produce springs and veins of water, and that whole economy of irrigation which makes it a tenable home for sentient creatures.

If, therefore, there is any authentic testimony that God did, from the first, create such an earth, no sound inference drawn from natural analogies is of any force to rebut that testimony.

A CAUTION AGAINST ANTI-CHRISTIAN SCIENCE.¹

"Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ."—*COLossIANS*, ii. 8.

EVERY Christian should be familiar with the fact that the human mind, as well as heart, has been impaired by the fall. Men "so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body." From the nature of the case, the misguided intellect is unconscious of its own vice; for consciousness of it would expel it. Its nature is to cause him who is deceived to think that error is truth, and its power is in masking itself under that honest guise. Why, then, need we wonder that every age must needs have its vain and deceitful philosophy, and "oppositions of science, falsely so called?" And how can the Christian expect that uninspired science will ever be purged of uncertainty and error, by any *organon* of investigation invented by man? Even if the *organon* were absolute, pure truth, its application by fallen minds must always ensure in the results more or less of error, except in those exact sciences of magnitudes where the definiteness of the predications and fewness of the premises leave no room for serious mistake.

Even when a body of honest and sincere men, like this Synod, attempts to apply certain common principles to questions of moral and ecclesiastical detail, their differences betray the fact that the operation of their reasons is imperfect. Yet these are the men to whom the church looks to teach the way of salvation. Now we demonstrate in our very church courts the fallibility of our minds when we are left to ourselves. How then can any man be willing to entrust to us the guidance of a soul, which is

¹ A sermon preached in the Synod of Virginia, October 20, 1871, and published by request of Lieutenant-Governor John L. Marye, Major T. J. Kirkpatrick, George D. Gray, J. N. Gordon, F. Johnston, and others, elders of the Presbyterian Church.

worth more than the whole world, and whose loss is irreparable? No thinking man will commit himself without reserve, in this thing, to any human direction. We must feel our need of an unerring guide; and hence the superiority of that religion which gives us as prophet and teacher that Christ who is "the image of the invisible God, born before all creation" (ch. i. 15), "in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge," (ii. 3); and "in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," (ii. 9). How blessed is the man who is "complete in him!" He has an infallible guidance, and no other is sufficient for an immortal soul.

The Colossian Christians were enticed to leave this prophet for a shadowy philosophic theory of their day. This was a mixture of Oriental, Rabbinical and Greek mysticism, which peopled heaven with a visionary hierarchy of semi-divine beings, referred the Messiah to their class, and taught men to expect their salvation from their intercession, combined with Jewish asceticisms and will-worship. Thus we are taught, both by uninspired, but authentic history, and by intimations of the holy apostle in the Epistle itself. This fanciful scheme was supported by the "traditions of men"; that is to say, by the inculcation of favorite masters of this vain philosophy; and by "the rudiments of the world," by this world's first principles, instead of Christ's declarations. But the apostle solemnly reminded them that this philosophy was vain and deceitful; and moreover, that the price of preferring it to the Christian system was the loss of the soul. Thus, the real aim of the seducer was to despoil the soul of its salvation, and to make it a captive to falsehood and corruption.

The prevalent vain, deceitful philosophy of our day is not mystical, but physical and sensuous. It affects what it calls "positivism." It even makes the impossible attempt to give the mind's philosophy a sensualistic explanation. Its chief study is to ascertain the laws of material nature and of animal life. It refers everything to their power and dominion; and from them pretends to contradict the Scriptural account of the origin of the earth and man. Does it profess not to interfere with the region of spiritual truth, because concerned about matter? We find, on the contrary, that physical science always

has some tendency to become anti-theological. This tendency is to be accounted for by two facts: one is, that man is a depraved creature, whose natural disposition is enmity against God. Hence this leaning away from Him, in many worldly minds, perhaps semi-conscious, which does "not like to retain God in its knowledge." The other explanation is, that these physical sciences continually tend to exalt naturalism; their pride of success in tracing natural causes, tempts them to refer everything to them, and thus to substitute them for a spiritual, personal God. Again, then, is it time for the watchman on the walls of Zion to utter the apostle's "beware." Again are incautious souls in danger of being despoiled of their redemption by "vain deceitful philosophy." To enforce this caution, I urge:

I. The attitude of many physicists at this time towards revelation is threatening. I perceive this in the continual encroachments which they make upon Scripture teachings. Many of you, my brethren, can remember the time when this modern impulse did not seek to push us any farther from the old and current understanding of the Bible cosmogony than to assert the existence of a pre-Adamite earth, with its own distinct *fauna* and *flora*, now all entombed in the fossiliferous *strata* of rocks. To meet this discovery no harder re-adjustment was required than that of Drs. Pye Smith and Chalmers, who proposed to amend the expositions of Moses by supposing that between "the beginning" and that epoch of void and formless chaos immediately before the six days' work, there was a lapse of myriads of years; of which Moses tells us nothing, because the creatures and revolutions which filled these ages had nothing to do with the history of man's redemption.

But now we are currently required by physicists to admit that the six days' work of God was not done in six days, but in six vast tracts of time.

That the deluge did not cover "all the high hills which were under the whole heaven," but only a portion of Central Asia.

That man has been living upon the globe, in its present dispensation, for more than twenty thousand years, to say the least, as appears by some fossil remains of him and his handiwork; and that the existence of the species is not limited to the five

thousand nine hundred years assigned it by the Mosaic chronology.

That the "nations were not divided in the earth after the flood by the families of the sons of Noah;" and that God did not "make of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth;" but that anatomy and ethnology show there are several distinct species, having separate origins.

That God did not create a finished world of sea and land, but only a fire-mist, or incandescent, rotating, nebulous mass, which condensed itself into a world.

And last, that man is a development from the lowest type of animal life.

Can the Scriptures, my brethren, be shown plastic enough to be remoulded, without total fracture of their authority, into agreement with all these views?

Again, the whole posture and tone of this class of physicists towards revelation is hostile and depreciatory; their postulates, with their manner of making them, imply a claim of far more authority for human science than is allowed to inspiration. Thus, the attempt to restrain any corollaries, however sweeping, which they may draw by the teachings of Scripture is usually resented. But in any other field of reasoning, if two lines of seeming argument lead to contradictory conclusions, men always admit the rule that truths must be consistent among themselves, and, in obedience to it, they surrender the weaker line to the stronger, thus removing the collision. But these physicists never dream of surrendering a deduction simply to the Bible contradiction of it. Thus they betray very plainly whether they think human science more certain than revelation. The very attempt to bring the truth of their scientific conclusions to the test of the Bible is resisted as an "infringement of the rights of science," an unjust restraint upon the freedom of their intellects. Now these men will scarcely claim for a man a right to argue himself into the belief of demonstrated falsehoods. The implication is, that the Scriptures really settle nothing by their own testimony; that is, that they have no true authority with these scholars. The public mind has become so habituated to this imperious attitude of physical science, that it is hard for you to take in its full significance. To enable you to measure it, I will ask you to represent

to yourselves that some of us theologians should raise the corresponding outcry against the physicists: that we should be heard exclaiming, "We resent the intrusions of physical science upon our divine science, as an infringement of the rights of theology; and we resist them wherever they contradict our inferences, as an unjust restraint upon the freedom of man's intellect, when expatiating in this noblest of all its domains!" Realize to yourselves the astonishment with which scientific worldly men would listen to our outcry. They would deem it the extravagance of lunacy in us! And, indeed, we should be rather fortunate if you also did not sympathize a good deal with the charge! It is, in this matter, just as it is in all other cases where Christians and the world meet on common, social grounds. Everybody thinks it obviously reasonable that where a collision would arise, the Christian people must concede, in order to avoid giving offence to the worldly. But should the Christians in any case require the world to concede anything in order to avoid giving offence to the church, in the common social *arena*, although the Christians pay just as good money as the world does for their share, their claim would appear excessively queer, indeed foolish, and wholly out of the question! Why, what are Christians for, if not to make sacrifices and be imposed on? But, if two coördinate sciences impinge against each other, the equality of their authority gives the advocates of the one just as much right of complaint as the advocate of the other, until special inquiry has settled where the fault of the contradiction lies. The feeling which I have above described shows that, in this case, the sciences of nature and of redemption are not thought coördinate, and that the latter is regarded as of inferior authority.

We hear the physicists, again, very condescendingly, lamenting the imprudence of the theologians in thrusting the Scriptures into collision with their sciences. They regret, they tell us, the damage which is thus inevitably done to the credit of religion. They are, indeed, quite willing to patronize the Christian religion as a useful affair, provided it is sufficiently submissive in its behaviour. But their conception about the collision between it and physical science is just that of the engine-driver upon the collision between a child and his mighty locomotive: it was a catastrophe much to be lamented, but only on the child's

account! Sometimes we are told that theology has nothing to do with science; that our imprudence is like that of Hophni and Phineas, in risking the ark of God in their war with the pagans. But what if the Philistines invade the very sanctuary? Shall the ark of God, at their bidding, be expelled from its home on earth? And if the price of its quiet is to be, that it shall have no Shekinah of glory to dwell upon its mercy-seat, and no tables of testimony within it, written by the finger of God, we may as well let the enemy take the empty casket. Now, all these assumptions betray too obviously the belief of their authors that the Bible is fallible, but science infallible.

Again: While I do not charge infidelity upon all physicists, the tendency of much of so-called modern science is skeptical. The advocates of these new conclusions may plead that they only postulate a new exposition of Scripture, adjusted to the results of the "advanced modern thought." But I ask, can any exegesis make our Bible speak all the propositions which I enumerated above, and all the rest which it may please the adventurous innovators to announce, without damaging its authority as a sure rule of faith? The common sense of most men will conclude that such a book is only a lump of clay in the hand of priestcraft, to be moulded into such shape as may suit its impostures. We freely grant all that can be said in favor of caution and exhaustive study, in placing a meaning upon the words of Scripture; but a Bible which does not assert its own independent meaning, as fairly interpreted by itself; a Bible which shall wait for distinct and changing human sciences to tell us what it shall be permitted to signify, is no sufficient rule of faith for an immortal soul. Those who know the current tendencies of the physical sciences well know that we utter no slander in saying that they are towards disbelief of revelation. We have the explicit testimony of an eye-witness in the scientific association of the year, held at Indianapolis, that the great majority of the members from the Northern States openly or tacitly disclaimed inspiration; and this, while many of them are pew-holders, elders—yea, even ministers—in the Christian churches. When asked why they continued to profess a religion which they did not believe, some answered that the exposure and discussion attending a recantation would be inconvenient; some, that it would be pain-

ful to their friends; some, that Christianity was a good thing for their sons and daughters, because of its moral restraints.

Both in the British Isles and in this country, the very worst and most reckless of these physical speculations now receive the most mischievous diffusion. They are inserted in popular textbooks, and taught to youth, as though they were well-established scientific truths and veritable organs of mental discipline; and that, even, in some colleges professedly Christian. They are hawked about at second-hand, by popular lecturers, as though they were the commonplaces of science. We find them strained, in feeble but malignant solution, into the magazines which intrude themselves into our families as suitable reading for the Christian household. So that college lads can cultivate, under their father's own roof, by this aid, a nascent contempt for their fathers' Bibles, along with their sprouting mustaches; and misses can be taught to pass judgment at once on the blunders of Moses and the triumphs of Parisian millinery. Worse than all, we sometimes hear of their utterance from the pulpit by ministers, who treat of "Man in Genesis and Geology," intimating, in no doubtful way, that the former record of man's origin is to be corrected by the latter.

Beware, then, my brethren, lest any man spoil you through this vain, deceitful philosophy. Bethink yourselves what is to be done. Are you ready to surrender the infallibility of your Bibles? The advocates of these new opinions may plead that we are not to assume in advance the inspiration of the whole Scriptures, when, as they say, the very question in debate is, whether their sciences do not prove them fallible in part. Even if we granted this, it is still time that we knew where we stand. It is high time that the true quality of this antagonism were unmasked. Let us no longer say, "Peace, peace, if there is no peace." Consider how disastrous it may be to have these new opinions asserted without contradiction. It may be that your son, or daughter, or young pupil, is just now experiencing the bitter struggle of the carnal mind against the calls of the sanctifying Spirit, or that inflamed appetite is panting to overleap the odious but wholesome restraints of the revealed law. How dangerous, at this critical hour, to have them taught that philosophers have found, amidst the stony *strata* and musty fossils

which they explore, undoubted evidence of mistakes in Moses, Paul, and Christ! I tell you that this has become a case under that general truth of which the apostle so faithfully warns us, that "the friendship of the world is enmity to God." You must resist, or you must practically surrender your Bibles. You will have to "take sides" for or against your God. You will find yourselves under a necessity of forbidding the inculcation of this intrusive error to your children, and its entrance into your families, as though it were established truth; no matter what *odium* you may incur, or what institutions or men, styled Christian, may follow the fashion of the times; else, if things go as they now do, the church will have a generation of infidel sons.

II. And this is the position on which the Christian pastor should stand. Unless our Bible—when cautiously and candidly interpreted by its own light—is inspired and infallible, it is no sufficient rule of faith for an immortal soul. Such the Bible is, notwithstanding all the pretended discoveries of vain philosophy. Modern events have not loosened a single foundation stone of its authority, nor can any such discoveries, from their very nature, affect it. But in asserting this confidence, it is not necessary for the theologian to leave his own department, and launch into the details of these extensive, fluctuating, and fascinating physical inquiries; nor shall I, at this time, depart from my vocation as the expounder of God's word, to introduce into this pulpit the curiosities of secular science. We have no occasion, as defenders of that word, to compare or contest any geologic or biologic theories. We may be possessed neither of the knowledge nor ability for entering that field, as I freely confess concerning myself. We have no inclination to deny that these physicists have displayed a surprising industry in their researches; that they have accumulated a multitude of observations; that they have speculated upon them with amazing ingenuity, or that they have actually deduced many useful conclusions. My business is in another field; that of moral evidence. My effort shall be to set forth the nature and conditions of that evidence, as bearing upon the question of the Bible's inspiration and authority; and I shall endeavor to show you that the kind of physical speculations under review, whether they be more or less ingenious or probable, can never reach the level of that higher question.

First, then : Modern physical science is not to be allowed to boast entire immunity from error, or certainty of results, any more than the physical science of the scholastic ages. I am well aware of the proud claim which its votaries now make. While they join in exposing and ridiculing the pretended physics of the middle ages, and even glory in the vast mutations which the natural sciences have undergone, our present physicists always assume that the Baconian *Organon* has given them an immunity from mistake. Henceforth, they boast, the progress of science is firm, yea, infallible, and destined to no reverses or contradictions, but only to continual accretions, upon the impregnable basis laid by the inductive logic. We are living, say they, not in the age of hypotheses, but of experimental demonstration. Those who come after us will never have any such rubbish to remove from our systems, as the calxes, and phlogiston, the Ptolemaic astronomy, and the baseless maxims, such as that "Nature abhors a *vacuum*," which we have cast out of the old philosophy.

Now, while rejoicing in the belief that physical science has made many solid advances, we are skeptical as to the realization of this boast. It is overweening and unreasonable. Man is a fallen and weak creature, impaired in all his faculties. As I argued at the outset, so I insist here : that this finite, fallen, imperfect reason is incompetent to invent an infallible method of investigation, or to apply it with unfailing correctness, if it were given to us. Partial error has marked all the results of our forefathers' speculations ; and if we should arrogate to ourselves an entire exemption from similar mistakes, this vain conceit of ourselves would be the strongest ground for prognosticating our failure. "That which hath been, is that which shall be." Physical science will remain, in part, uncertain and changeable, for the simple reason that it will still be the work of men—men like the predecessors whose science we have convicted of uncertainty. It is true that Lord Bacon called his method a *Novum Organum* ; but he who supposes that the publication of this new method is to make modern science infallible shows himself a sciolist indeed. Did Bacon invent a logical faculty, or only describe a use of it ? He who supposes that any more than the latter was done is as absurd as though

one should say that the drill-master invents legs. Nature makes legs, and also teaches their use by instinct; men managed to walk before ever a drill-master existed, by the impulse of nature's teaching. All that the drill-master does is to teach men to walk better, and oftentimes he cannot even do that. So, our creator gave us the faculty of reasoning, and men syllogized before ever Aristotle described the syllogistic process, and made inductions before Bacon analyzed their canons. If you suppose that the experimental method was never known or valued in physics until Bacon's day, you are much mistaken. In truth, Aristotle, who is called the "Father of Logic," analyzed its laws as really as he did those of the syllogism. But had he not, Nature, man's kindly teacher, would have taught him to appreciate the experimental method; and all men who have reasoned have appealed to it, because it is one of the methods of common sense. Again, if you suppose that all the speculations of the modern sciences are conformed to Bacon's method, you are much mistaken. Sins against its rigor and simplicity are by no means limited to the days of old. Men still forget that hypothesis is not proof; and the same motives, so natural to a fallen soul, which caused mediæval physicists to depart from the safe and rigid processes of experimental logic—haste, love of hypothesis, vain-glory, prejudice, disgust of a proud and overweening heart against the humble, modest, and cautious rules of that method, still mislead men's minds. The assumption that henceforth physical science is to be trusted, and to be free from all uncertainty and change, is therefore simply foolish.

This verdict is more solidly confirmed by facts. Indeed, how can one doubt its general justice when he beholds the sciences of the day in a state of flux before his eyes? Geologic theories change in some particulars with every decade. New facts come to light, such as the supposed discovery of human fossils near Amiens, in France; and of skulls in California, in older *strata* than had been supposed to contain any such remains; or as the deep sea soundings which have lately shown that formations determined, as was asserted, to be older and newer, lie beside each other in the ocean cotemporaneously. These discoveries, inconsistent with previous hypotheses, impose to-day a labor of modification upon geologists, and we must be excused

for our lack of confidence in their new structures of theory, with so recent an example of error before us, and with so manifest a pride of opinion influencing the reception reluctantly given to the new facts. Again: we are told that the chemistry taught to-day is different from that which was taught us in the colleges and university thirty years ago—so different as to require a new nomenclature. What reflecting man would deny that unproved hypothesis enters largely into the current physical sciences? Let us mention, for instance, one of the most beautiful, and one which, in parts, has received almost a mathematical accuracy, the science of optics. Is light, itself, a distinct, imponderable substance, as was suggested by Newton to be possibly true? Or is it a molecular function only, of other transparent substances? The latter supposition, we are informed, is now the fashionable one, but has it ever received an exact and exclusive demonstration? Does any one claim for it more than this, that it is a supposition which *may satisfy* all the observed facts about light, so far as we yet know? This is all, we presume, which any careful physicist will assert. Yet how often do we find writers on optics proceeding on this supposition, as though it were demonstrated, to other conclusions and assertions? We are told that the atheistic astronomer, La Place, suggested the “nebular hypothesis” for the origin of our globe, as a possible solution; resting its plausibility on the appearance of nebulous clouds of light among the fixed stars. But since the chief ground of plausibility has been removed by Lord Rosse’s gigantic telescope, resolving some of these *nebulae* into clusters of fixed stars, do we hear our clerical cosmogonists who have adopted this supposition prate any the less glibly about it? Not a whit. And last, as though to convince every sober mind that much of the current physical speculation is but a romantic dreaming, engendered of the surfeit of an over-prurient age, comes Darwinism, and engages a considerable number of the most admired names of physicists for this monstrous idea, that the wondrous creature, man, “so noble in reason, so infinite in faculties, in form and moving so express and admirable, in action so like an angel, in apprehension so like a God,” is but the descendant, at long removes, of a mollusc or a tadpole. No prophet is needed to predict that some, at least, of the current science of our day

will be swept away by the innovations of future physical science itself, as we have discredited much that preceded us.

The supposed conclusions, which seem adverse to the Scriptures as understood by common Christians, are parts of an unstable, because an incomplete system. And I will venture the assertion, without other faculty or acquirement than the light of common sense, that these conclusions are far short of that perfect, exclusive demonstration which would be necessary to unseat the Bible from its throne of authority. A faithful scrutiny would detect sundry yawning chasms between facts and inferences; sundry places where the proposition which, when introduced first, can be called no more than a "may-be," is afterwards tacitly transmuted into a "must-be." Nor is this surprising when we remember the novel and fascinating quality of the observations, and the multiplicity of the premises given by the fruitful variety of nature. Here is a trying labyrinth indeed, to be threaded by the most patient, modest, humble, cautious, finite reason. But are humility, modesty, and caution the characteristics of modern advanced thought? When, for instance, some ethnologists argue that the roots of the different families of languages indicate separate sources for the original tribes of men; when Sir J. Lubbock argues, from presumed social laws, that our civilization has raised man out of a primeval savage state; when Bunsen reasons that man has been more than twenty thousand years upon our globe, from the supposed coincidence of some human fossils with older deposits: do you suppose that their proofs are of that character which, in a court of justice, would stand the test of adverse counsel at law in every link, and remain so conclusive beyond all doubt as to justify an honest jury in taking a fellow creature's life? The inventors themselves would doubtless recoil with a shock from such a responsibility!

But the Bible, by reason of its demonstrative evidences from the independent fields of history, criticism, miracles, fulfilled prophecy, internal moral character, and divine effects on human souls, is in prior possession of the ground of authority. We hold the defensive. The burden of proof against us rests with the physicists. Nothing is done to oust the Bible, until they construct a complete, exhaustive demonstration; not only that

created things *may have* arisen, as modern science surmises, but that they *must have* arisen thus, and not otherwise. Let us suppose that we saw a group of ingenious and well-informed mechanics around a steam engine which bore no maker's label or mark. The question is: where and by whom was it made? They are certain that it might have been made in Philadelphia; they tell us that they know the skilled labor, the appliances, the metals are there for the production of just such a machine; and adding certain marks which are like those communicated to such work by the builders of that city, they are about to conclude that this engine came thence. But now there steps forth a sturdy, respectable Englishman, whose word no man has any right to doubt, and says: "Yes, it might have been made in Philadelphia; yet it was not, for I brought it from London." Is not mighty London confessedly equal to the production of just such a work? Then here is a case in which the Englishman is undeniably competent to testify, and if he is also found credible, the hypothetical reasons of the ingenious mechanics are *wholly out of place* if advanced to rebut his testimony, because the truth of what he testifies does not in the least clash with the grounds of their surmise. He can say to them, with perfect truth: "Gentlemen, I do not impugn your knowledge or skill; I do not dispute a word which you testify of the resources of your city; your surmise, hypothetically, is perfectly reasonable; as far as at first appeared from the machine itself, it *might have been made* in Philadelphia; and yet, in point of fact, it was made in London, as I know." Thus: if there is an all-wise, Almighty God, it must be allowed that he is fully equal to the production of this earth and its organisms. However fair, hypothetically, the surmise may be, that they were produced by other agencies, if there is a credible, independent witness that, in fact, they were made by God, the testimony is relevant, and the supposititious inferences wholly irrelevant to rebut it.

Finally, no naturalistic arguments from observed effects to their natural causes, however good the induction, have any force to prove a natural origin for any structure older than authentic human history, except upon atheistic premises. The argument usually runs thus: we examine, for instance, the disposition which natural forces now make of the sediment of rivers. We

observe that when it is finally extruded by the fluvial current into the lake or sea where it is to rest, it is spread out horizontally upon the bottom by the action of gravity, tidal waves, and such like forces. The successive deposits of annual freshets we find spread in *strata*, one upon another. Time, pressure, and chemical reactions gradually harden the sediment into rock, enclosing such remains of plants, trees, and living creatures as may have fallen into it in its plastic state. The result is a bed of stratified stones. Hence, infers the geologist, *all stratified and fossil bearing beds of stone have a sedimentary origin*, or other such like natural origin. Hence winds and waters must have been moving on this earth long enough to account for all the beds of such stone on the globe. Such is the argument in all other cases.

Grant now that an infinite, all-wise, all-powerful Creator has intervened anywhere in the past eternity, and then this argument for a natural origin of any structure, as against a supernatural, creative origin, becomes utterly invalid the moment it is pressed back of authentic human history. The reason is, that the possible presence of a different cause makes it inconclusive. Now, I well know that this conclusion, simple and obvious as it is, awakens a grand outcry of resistance from physicists. "What," they exclaim, "do not like causes always produce like effects? This principle is the very *fulcrum* of the lever of induction; unsettle it, and you shake all science; remove it, and all her exploits are at an end." Very true; all these illegitimate exploits in this region of a past eternity, whose solemn romance so piques the curiosity and inflames the enthusiasm of the human mind, in which science vainly seeks to measure strength in the dark with an inscrutable omnipotence; all these delusive exploits are ended. But within the proper sphere of science, we leave her the full use of her foundation principle, and bid her good speed in its beneficial use. And that is the sphere of practical inquiry, within the historical past, the present, and the finite, terrestrial future, where we can ascertain the absence of the supernatural.

But to show how utterly out of place the principle is in the past eternity, in which it must meet an Almighty First Cause, and meet him we know not where, let me add two very simple

thoughts: "Like causes always produce like effects?" Yes, provided the conditions of action remain the same. But is it forgotten that *a proposition does not prove its converse*? The admission, that like causes always produce like effects, is not enough to demonstrate that all similar effects have come from the same causes. Suppose we are compelled to grant the presence of another, independent, unlike, yea, omnipotent cause; and suppose we are compelled to admit that it may have intervened at any time prior to actual human history, as all except atheists do admit? Now, in the presence of this vast, *unlike cause*, where is your valid inference, from like effects to the like causes? It is wholly superseded. It may be asked: "Must we then believe, of all the pre-Adamite fossils, that they are not, as they obviously appear, organized matter; that they never were alive; that they were created directly by God as they lie? The answer is, that we have no occasion to deny their organic character, but that the proof of their pre-Adamite date is wholly invalid, when once the possibility of creative intervention is properly admitted, with its consequences. For the assumed antiquity of all the rocks called sedimentary is an essential member of the argument by which geologists endeavor to prove the antiquity of these fossils. But if many of these rocks may have been created, then the pre-Adamite date of fossils falls also. Moreover, when we are confronted with an infinite Creator, honesty must constrain us to admit, that amidst the objects embraced in his vast counsels, there may have been considerations, we know not what, prompting him to create organisms, in numbers, and under conditions, very different from those which we now term natural. After the admission of that possibility, it is obviously of no force for us to argue, "These organisms must have been so many ages old, supposing they were produced, and lived, and died under the ordinary conditions known to us." This is the very thing we are no longer entitled to suppose.

But hear the other thought. Grant me any creative intervention of a God, in any form whatsoever, and at any time whatsoever, then it is inevitable that any individual thing, produced by that intervention, must have presented, from its origin, every trait of naturalness; for it was produced by a rational Creator for the purpose of being—if inorganic—a part of a natural

system, to be providentially governed through the laws of nature; or—if organic—to be, moreover, the parent of a species or race of organisms like itself. The inference is as sure as geometry; for if the first, the parent organism, had not all the properties natural to the species, how could it generate that species? What is the definition which science itself gives of identity of species? It is the aggregate of those properties, precisely, which are regularly transmitted through natural generations. Then, the first organism, made by the Almighty to be the parent of the species, must have been endued with all the properties natural to the species, or to its subsequent members. Now, then, if the argument of our physicists to a natural origin is universally valid—that the like effects must be from the like natural causes—it is valid to prove that this first supernatural organism was also natural. But, according to our case as agreed on, it was not natural. And from this reasoning there is no possible escape, save in absolute atheism.

As this is a conclusion of fundamental importance, let us make it still clearer by applying it in a fair instance. We will suppose that within the lifetime of Seth an antediluvian physicist appeared, investigating the origin of the human species precisely upon the modern principles. He exhumed the remains of Abel and of Adam, and submitted them to a critical examination. He also enquired of Seth what was his belief concerning the origin of the race. That patriarch answered, that the testimony of God, delivered by the venerable Father of Man, Adam, perfectly cleared up the matter; that he, his murdered brother Abel, the unnatural murderer Cain, were all the natural progeny of a first pair, who were themselves the supernatural, adult productions of the Creator, without human parents. But to this simple account of the matter the man of science necessarily demurred; for he had examined Adam's bones, and found them exhibiting every mark of growth from a natural infancy. He had, for instance, possessed himself of that very arm-bone with which, as the unphilosophic myth of Seth would fain teach, Adam had cultivated the primeval garden. Our naturalist had sawed out a transverse section of this bone; he had polished it down to a translucent film; he had poured a pencil of microscopic light through it; and lo, there appeared plainly, as in any other bone,

the cellular tissue filled with that earthy salt, phosphate of lime, which gives to all natural bones their rigidity. And then our naturalist exclaimed, "Why, Seth, the very microscope contradicts you. We have learned from human physiology that all bony matter is thus formed by nature: first, the cellular tissue grows, and then the infant's little frail, flexible bones acquire a gradual solidity by the deposition of phosphate of lime in the cells, until, as the child becomes a mature adult, the full charge of this earthy substance gives the density and firmness of the bone of the sturdy man. Now, you observe that this bone of Adam has that density. By the unfailing maxim, that 'like causes produce like effects,' I know that this bone must have been thus produced; that it was once the flexible, gelatinous structure of the *fœtus*, then the soft bone of the babe, and at length, by gradual growth and deposition of the earthy salt, the mature adult bone which we see. Hence, science must pronounce your story untrue, when you say that this person's body had no natural parentage, but was produced in a mature state by a Creator." To this beautiful induction the common sense of Seth doubtless objected; that God told Adam, for all that, he had made him without natural parents, the first of his kind; a testimony which Adam's own recollection confirmed, in that, from his earliest consciousness he had been a grown man, and there had been no older human being with him at all. Seth doubtless protested, that this testimony he should believe in spite of seeming science. And we may imagine that our naturalist grew quite impatient with his stupid obstinacy, and, as he thrust the microscope under his nose, exclaimed, "Why, man, look here; seeing is believing; your own eyes will tell you that this is natural bone, and so must have grown naturally."

Yet, still the naturalist was wrong, and Seth was right. He could have proved it even without claiming Adam's testimony; he could have reminded this naturalist that, if his reasoning necessarily proved that Adam had a parent, then the same reasoning, applied to a bone of Adam's father, would prove with equal certainty that *he* had a father in his turn, and then that there must have been a grandfather, a great-grandfather, and so backwards forever. But now it is a conclusion of science itself, that an infinite series backward, without original cause outside of itself, is an impos-

sible self-contradiction. This conclusion is of geometrical rigidity, and is recognized by all modern philosophers, even the most anti-Christian. The denial of it is, moreover, blank atheism. Now, then, if the antediluvian naturalist cannot hold this absurd and atheistic history of an infinite series of human generations literally, without beginning from past eternity, he must admit that somewhere in the past there was the *first man*. But his arguments from the natural properties of that first man's remains must inevitably be false in that case. Well, then, he might just as well admit that the argument from Adam's bone was worthless in his case. Seth's testimony is found, after all, strictly competent to the question; and, if his character is seen to be trustworthy, perfectly decisive of it. Seth could, moreover, have supported his own credibility by most weighty experimental facts: such as the exceeding fewness, in his day, of those very bones and other remains of dead human generations; the scantiness of the members of the human family, compared with their evidently prolific powers, and the obvious marks of recency attaching to the whole condition of the race.

Now I claim that my instance is fair; the parallel defect will appear in every attempt of modern science to push the Creator's intervention back of the earliest human history by such inductive reasoning. And I ask, with emphasis, if men are not in fact reaching after *atheism*; if their real design is not to push God clean out of past eternity, why this craving to show his last intervention as Creator so remote? Why are they so eager to shove God back six millions of years from their own time rather than six thousand? Is it that "they do not like to retain God in their knowledge"? It is not for me to make that charge. But have I not demonstrated that the validity of their scientific logic, in reality, gains nothing by this *regressus*?

Once more: let men explicitly relinquish the horrible position of atheism; and they must admit, somewhere in the past, the working of a Being of "eternal power and Godhead." And that admission contains another: that this eternal, sovereign Maker was, of course, *prompted by some rational design* in making what he then chose to make. That is, in the language of natural theology, God must have some *final causes* for what he does, of some sort or other. While we may not audaciously

speculate as to what they were, yet so much is obvious, that in this vast and inscrutable counsel of the Maker's purpose, amidst all the wide designs of the Infinite Reason, the material is intended to subserve the spiritual. As the body is for the mind, and not the mind for the body, so the whole world discloses thus much of its Maker's purpose, that the irrational creation is for the sake of the rational. Shall philosophers be the men to impugn this? They cannot. All nature would cry shame on them for doing so. For what is their preferred glory over the rest of us common men? It is the superior use of their reason.

Now God is manifestly so infinite in wisdom and power, that any creative exploit to which his own final causes might prompt him is as easy to him as any smaller one. Suppose that he may have had rational ends to gain from the production of a world already organized and equipped for the home of a reasonable race of his servants. Then it was no more fatiguing or inconvenient to him to produce such a world six thousand years ago, in all its completeness, than to produce, six millions of years ago, simply a nebulous, incandescent mass of vapor, out of which to grow a world. But, it will be said, is not that statement purely hypothetical? I reply, yes; in advance of revealed testimony, it is. But its legitimate use is *to show that there is a competent and relevant case here for just such testimony*. Now, then, if such a witness appears, and his credibility has sufficient moral supports, his testimony is good. And this view of the matter is as really the most scientific as it is the most Christian.

Hence, brethren, I hold that there is, and there can be, no proper collision between the most explicit and authoritative theistic testimony and sound natural science. They cannot clash, because wherever, in travelling backwards, the domain of creative Omnipotence is met, there true natural science stops. Let us hold this ground, and we have no need to debate any particular hypothesis as to the origin of organism, or to choose this rather than that. We have no call to leave the sphere of morals and theology to plunge into the secular disputes of anatomists or mineralogists. Neither have we any need to force a strained exegesis upon God's record of his own omnipotence in order to conciliate uncertain and fluctuating human sciences.

The best antidote, my hearers, for all this naturalistic unbe-

lief is to remember your own stake in the truth of redemption ; and the best remedy for the soul infected is conviction of sin. "Beware lest any man despoil you through a vain, deceitful philosophy." Of what will they despoil you ? Of a divine redemption, and a Saviour in whom dwell the divine wisdom, power, love, and truth, in all their fulness ; of deliverance from sin and guilt ; of immortality ; of hope. Let naturalism prove all that unbelief claims, and what have you ? This blessed Bible, the only book which ever told perishing man of an adequate salvation, is discredited ; God, with his providence and grace, is banished out of your existence. But is consciousness discredited, which assures you that you are a spiritual and responsible being ? Is sin proved a fancy and death a myth ? Alas, no. These imperative needs of the soul still remain, and crush you as before ; but there is no deliverer. In place of a personal God in Christ, Father, Friend, Redeemer, to whom you can cry in prayer, on whom you may lean in your anguish, who is able and willing to heal depravity and wash you from guilt, who is suited to be your portion in a blessed immortality, you are left face to face with this eternal nature, impersonal, reasonless, heartless. Her evolutions are but the movements of an infinite machine, revolving by the law of a mechanical necessity, and between her upper and nether millstones the corn is this multitude of human hearts, instinct with life, and hope, and fear, and sensibility, palpitating, writhing, and bleeding forever under the remorseless grind. Yes, for aught you know, forever ! for this dreary philosophy cannot even give you the poor assurance of annihilation. Even though it should banish God from your creed, it cannot banish the anticipations of immortality from your spirit. Naturalism is a virtual atheism, and *atheism is despair*. Thus saith the apostle : "They who are "without God in the world " are "without hope." (Eph. ii. 12.) Young man, does it seem to you an alluring thought, when appetite entices or pride inflates, that this false science may release you from the stern restraints of God's revealed law ? Oh ! beware, lest it despoil you thus of hope and immortality. Remember those immovable realities, sin, guilt, accountability, which no vain, deceitful philosophy will be able to hide in the hour of your extremity. Look at these great facts in that light

in which, as you well know, death, "that most wise, eloquent, and mighty teacher," will place them. How poor and mean will all these pretentious sophisms appear in that hour?

Hence, I am not afraid to predict an assured final triumph for the Bible in this warfare. In the end, the spiritual forces of man's nature must always conquer, as they always have conquered. Look back, proud Naturalist, upon history; your form, and all other forms of skepticism, have been unable to hold their ground, even against the poor fragments and shreds of divine truth which met you in Polytheism, in Mohammedanism, in Popery. Man, however blinded, will believe in his spiritual destiny in spite of you. Let proud Naturalism advance, then, and seek its vain weapons groping amidst pre-Adamite *strata* and rotten fossils. The humble heralds of our Lord Christ will lay their hands upon the heartstrings of living, immortal man, and find there always the forces to overwhelm unbelief with defeat. Do men say their propositions are only of things spiritual? Aye, but spiritual truths are more stable than all their primitive granite. These imperishable truths rest on the testimony of consciousness, a faculty more valid than sense and experience: because, only by admitting its certainty can any perception or experience of the senses claim validity.

Centuries hence, if man shall continue in his present state so long, when these current theories of unbelief shall have been consigned, by a truer secular science, to that *limbus* where the Ptolemaic astronomy, alchemy and judicial astrology, lie condemned, the servants of the cross will be winning larger, and yet larger, victories for Christ, with the same old doctrines preached by Isaiah, by St. Paul, by Augustine by Knox by Davies.

THE CAUTION AGAINST ANTI-CHRISTIAN SCIENCE CRITICISED BY DR. WOODROW.¹

IN May, 1869, I addressed a memorial on theological education, not to the General Assembly, but to the Committee on Theological Seminaries. Called by the church and Assembly to this work almost from my youth, I had devoted sixteen of my best years to their service, as a teacher in one of the Assembly's schools of divinity. I was conscious that I had studied this great interest, and engaged in this labor, with all the zeal and attention of which my feeble powers were capable. It was obvious that our system of seminary instruction was still, notwithstanding its valuable fruits, in several respects experimental. It had been borrowed, by Drs. A. Alexander and J. H. Rice, mainly from Andover, then the only institution of this precise nature in America, for Princeton and Union Seminaries. But Andover was Congregational—we are Presbyterians. I saw that there was danger lest features borrowed by these beloved fathers provisionally should, by unquestioned usage, harden into fixed precedents, which they never desired, when, perhaps, time might show that these features were unsuited, or not best suited, to our policy and principles. As our church was then, in God's providence, passing anew through a formative state, it seemed the right time to discuss these points of seminary management. Who should evoke that discussion, if not the men to whom the church has entrusted the business? I, though not an old man, was very nearly the oldest teacher in divinity in the service of the church. Now, I might have sought moral support for my views by manœuvring to get some faculty, or colleague, or my Presbytery, or my Synod, or a majority thereof, to "father"

¹Appeared in the *Southern Presbyterian Review*, for October, 1873, in answer to a criticism by Rev. James Woodrow, D. D., on the preceding article.

them, in the form of an "overture" to the Assembly. But, as I desired to speak out my whole mind respectfully, yet honestly, I preferred to have my views go before the Assembly unsupported by factitious props, and let them receive only that assent to which their intrinsic merit might entitle them.

The memorial was not read in the Assembly of 1869, but was referred to the faculties and directors of Columbia and Union Seminaries, going first to the former. The authorities at Columbia disapproved all my views. The papers were then mislaid for a time among the officers and committeemen of the Assembly; I know not how. Finally, another committee of the Assembly reported, without ever having met as a committee, or having seen my memorial, advising that the subject be finally dropped, on the single ground that so decided a dissent of one seminary would make it improper to attempt any improvements, whether valuable or not. Thus the paper was consigned to "the tomb of all the Capulets;" and I was refused a hearing, when neither church nor any of the Assemblies knew anything whatever of my recommendations, save from the version of my opponents. Had I demanded the privilege of dictating my views, this reception would have been just. But the humblest servant expects a *hearing*, when he comes to the most imperious master, in the spirit of humble zeal and fidelity, to inform that master of the interests of *his* property entrusted to the servant's care. That mere hearing was what I asked for; and only for my master's good, not my own; for the only result to me, of the adoption of my views, would have been increase of toil and responsibility; but even a hearing has been refused me.

This, however, is a digression. One of the points made in this forgotten memorial was an objection to the introduction of chairs of natural science into our seminaries. These sciences, and especially geology, have been so largely perverted to the interests of unbelief, that sundry friends of the Bible, in their uneasiness, came to think that our seminaries should be provided with chairs to teach these sciences, in their relation to inspiration, to all the pastors of the church. I recognized the danger, but dissented from this mode of meeting it, on three grounds, which still seem to me perfectly conclusive. One was, that the amount of instruction which could be thus given on these intri-

cate and extensive branches of knowledge in connection with the arduous studies of a three years' course in divinity, would usually prove inadequate to the end proposed; whence I conclude that the defence of inspiration against the perversions of these sciences would be better left to learned Christian laymen, and to those pastors and teachers whose exceptional talents and opportunities fitted them for going thoroughly into such studies. My second point was, that the study of modern geology, especially, is shown by experience to be seductive, and to have a tendency towards naturalistic and anti-Christian opinions. Some, of course, must master these matters, notwithstanding any dangerous tendencies; but it would be more discreet not to place the Christian men especially devoted to these seductive pursuits in the very schools where our pastors are all taught, and not to arm them with the church's own power and authority for teaching an uninspired and fallible branch of knowledge *ex cathedra* to all our pastors; because, should that happen among us, at some distant day, which has often happened to others, it would be far more detrimental to have the defection in a citadel of the church than in an outpost. To show that I was not insinuating any doubt of any living man, I added: "*The undoubted soundness of all our present teachers and clergy, and their unfeigned reverence for inspiration, now blind us to the ulterior tendency of such attempts. It may be two or three generations before the evil comes to a climax.*" My third argument was the most conclusive of all. It was grounded in the fact that our church and all its ecclesiastical powers are founded upon a doctrinal covenant—our Confession and Catechisms. Hence, I argued, the church cannot, by ecclesiastical power, teach her presbyters *ex cathedra* in her seminaries—which, if they have any right to exist at all, are ecclesiastical institutions—a set of opinions which are clear outside of our doctrinal covenants. And this was the more conclusive because it was morally certain that any theory of adjustment between geology and Moses, which would be taught by any modern geologist, would contradict the express terms of our doctrinal covenants as they now stand. For each of these schemes of adjustment postulates the existence of a pre-Adamite earth and living creatures; but our Confession, Chap. IV. Sec. 1, expressly asserts the contrary. Now, this being the case,

and some of our ministers holding one, and others holding a contrary scheme of adjustment, and others, again, being, like myself, committed to none, it must follow that, sooner or later, the attempt to inculcate one of these schemes by ecclesiastical authority must lead to strife among ourselves. How soon has this been verified! Dr. Woodrow's groundless apprehension that I was seeking to inculcate a different scheme from his, has already verified it! Now, we do not regard our Confession as infallible; but it is our doctrinal covenant, and we are surely right, therefore, in expecting, at least, thus much, that those who believe they have detected positive error in it, ought candidly to move the church to agree together upon the correction of that error; and they are the proper persons to show how to correct it, if they can.

But meantime, Judge Perkins had endowed a chair of "Natural Science in connection with Revealed Religion" in Columbia Seminary, and Dr. Woodrow was its incumbent. Is this critique his retaliation for my presuming to exercise my right of dissent? I carefully remove all provocation, by making, as I have recited, a most express and honorable exception in favor of him and all his colleagues and pupils. It will appear in the sequel as though he were bent upon excepting himself from the benefit of my exception, and verifying in his own case the caution which I was too courteous to apply to him.

The first criticism which I notice is, the charge that I disallow and reject all physical science whatever; and that I do it upon the implied ground that revelation can only be defended by disallowing it all; thus virtually betraying the cause of the Bible with all intelligent men. This misconception of my aim will be so astonishing to all impartial readers, that perhaps they will be slow to believe Dr. Woodrow has really fallen into it. Hence I quote a few of his own words. *Review*, p. 328: "Dr. Dabney has been keeping up for a number of years an unremitting warfare against physical science." There must be a good many remissions when Dr. W.'s zeal can find but three blows in seven years. Page 333: "Dr. D. endeavors to excite hostility against physical science," etc. Page 335: "Having taught . . . that physical science is vain and deceitful philosophy," etc. Page 337: "If he had confined himself to saying that

the tendency of much of so-called modern science is skeptical, he might easily have substantiated this assertion. But . . . he maintains no such partial proposition," etc.

But this is precisely the proposition which I do maintain; having stated and defined it precisely thus in my own words. I presume that Dr. Woodrow is the only reader who has so misconceived me. My last and chief publication, the sermon in Lynchburg, is entitled, "A Caution against *Anti-Christian Science*." Why may I not be credited as understanding and meaning what I said? Dr. Woodrow exclaims, as he cites from my own words my respectful appeal to the physical science of Drs. Bachman and Cabell, or to the refutation of the evolution hypothesis of Darwin, etc., by Agassiz and Lyell, or to the proof of actual, new creations of *genera* by fossil-geology: "Is Saul among the prophets?" Why may it not be supposed that I was not an ignoramus, and so was consistent with myself, and knew what I was saying? The anti-Christian science which I disallow was here expressly separated from this sound physical science. But again: In the introduction of the sermon I hasten to separate and define the thing I attack. On the second page I tell my readers that it is the "prevalent, vain," physical philosophy. Now every one knows that it is the materialistic philosophy of Lamarck, Chambers (*Vestiges*), Darwin, Hooker, Huxley, Tyndall, Herbert Spencer, Büchner, which is now the "prevalent" one. That is, these and their followers, like the frogs in the fable, who made more fuss in the meadow than the whole herd of good bullocks, are notoriously "prevalent" upon the surface of the current literature. It is these whom people called "intelligent" now usually read in the journals of the day. They hear of Darwin and his friends a thousand times, and do not hear of Dr. Woodrow's sound and safe science at all. I presume that there was not a gentleman in my audience in Lynchburg who did not see that I opposed these materialistic physicists, and them alone. I further defined the thing I opposed as that which affects "positivism;" which attempts to construct a "sensualistic" psychology; which refers everything, as effects, to the laws of material nature and of animal life. One would think that the materialistic school of Darwin, Huxley, *et al.*, was in these words defined beyond possibility of mistake to the well-

informed hearer. All such would, moreover, clearly understand me as meaning these, because they knew that I knew it was precisely this school of physicists which was making nearly all the noise and trouble in the popular literature of the day, described by me in subsequent passages of the sermon.

But Dr. Woodrow, rather than give me the benefit of my own definition of my own object, on page 335 of his *Review*, launches out into the most amazing misunderstanding and contradictions. Indeed, the passage is to me unintelligible, except that his astounding denial of the attempt made by the followers of Hume, and of Auguste Comte, to give a "sensualistic" explanation of the "mind's philosophy," betrays the fact that he has wholly failed to apprehend what I was speaking of. Had I learned manners in the school of Dr. Woodrow, I should here be warranted in retorting some of his very polite language on pages 368 to 370, and "prove that *he* is acquainted neither with the method nor the ends of" *mental* "science;" that he "has refused to learn" about the history of psychology "what boys in college can understand," or that he "is ignorant of the difference between true science" of mind "and the errors uttered in its name," etc., etc. But instead of doing so, I shall simply beg Dr. Woodrow's attention to some very familiar facts in the history of philosophy, which I trust will enable him to see my meaning. Be it known then, that especially since the days of Hartley in England, and Condillac in France, there have been in those countries, schools of philosophers, whose main characteristic is that they ascribe to the human mind no *original* functions save those of sensibility and sense-perception. They deny all *à priori* powers to the reason, and disbelieve the existence, in our thinking, of any really primitive judgments of reason. They teach that all logical principles are empirical. They hold in its sweeping and absolute sense the old scholastic maxim, "*Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu.*" The consistent result of so false an analysis was foreseen to be materialism; and so it resulted. Now, the term employed to denote this school of psychology, from the days of the great and happy reaction under Royer Collard and others in Paris, and Emmanuel Kant in Königsburg, was *sensualistic*, sometimes spelled by the English philosophers, as Morell, *sensationalistic*; and the name

is appropriate, because the school sought to find all the sources of cognition in the *senses*. This common error characterized the deadly philosophy of Hume, the scheme of Auguste Comte, termed by himself *positivism*, and the somewhat diverse systems of Buckle, John Stuart Mill, and of Darwin and Huxley; who, while disclaiming *positivism* in that they do not adopt some of Comte's crotchets, yet hold this main error, and consequently reach, more or less fully, the result, blank materialism. One of the worst characteristics of the type of physical science now so current through the writings of these men, is the union of this "sensualistic" psychology with their physical speculations, whence there results almost inevitably a practical atheism, or at least a rank infidelity. I hope that Dr. Woodrow is now relieved, and begins to see what was the "anti-Christian science" which I opposed in my sermon and other writings.

I will now add, that at the end of last April, two months before the publication of Dr. Woodrow, he did me the honor to write me very courteously, at the prompting of a good man, a friend of peace, notifying me of his intended critique. I wrote him, the first of May, a polite and candid reply, in which occurred the following sentences:

"REV. AND DEAR SIR: Your courtesy in advertising me of your article deserves a thankful acknowledgment. I beg leave to tax your kindness with a few remarks before you finally commit your MS. to the press. The few words which passed between us in Richmond showed me that I had not been so fortunate as to convey the real extent and meaning of my views to you. This misconception I will make one more effort to remove, in order to save you and the public from discussions aside from the real point. . . .

"I conceive that there is but one single point between you and me, which is either worthy or capable of being made a subject of scientific discussion. It is this: I hold that to those *who honestly admit a Creator anywhere in the past, the a posteriori argument from naturalness of properties to a natural—as opposed to a creative or supernatural—origin of the structures examined, can no longer be universally valid*. That is, really, the only point I care for. Now let me appeal to your candor to disencumber it of misapprehensions and supposed monstrous corollaries, and where is the mighty mischief?

"But, you may say, Dr. Dabney is understood as holding the above in such a sense as to involve the assumption that all save the '*pleistocene*' fossils are shams; that is, that the older fossil remains of animal life never were alive, but that God, in creating the world, created them just as they are, probably for the purpose of 'humbugging' the geologists. Now I have never said nor implied any such thing, and do not believe it. *Search and see*. You may return to the charge with this inferential argument; that the doctrine means this, or else it has no point to it. *It*

does not mean it in my hands, and I will show you what point I think it has. Let that ugly bugaboo, I pray you, be laid.

"Again, you will find, if you will search my notes and sermon, that I have not committed myself for or against any hypothesis held by truly devout, Christian geologists. I have not said that I rejected, or that I adopted, the older scheme of a pre-Adamite earth, as held by Drs. Chalmers, Hodge, Hitchcock, etc. I have not committed myself for or against the hypotheses of Cardinal Wiseman, and Dr. Gerald Molloy of Maynooth. No man can quote me as for or against the 'uniformitarian' scheme of Sir Charles Lyell as compared with the opposite scheme of Hugh Miller. As to the other propositions advanced in my notes and sermon, I presume they can hardly be made the subjects of scientific debate between us, even if of difference. We shall hardly dispute whether shant-science, disparaging Moses, is, or is not, wholesome reading for the children of the church. We shall hardly differ about the propriety of carrying that solemn conscience into physical speculation which sinners usually feel when they come to die. It can hardly be made a point for scientific inquiry, whether your larger or my smaller admiration for the fascinating art of the mineralogist is the more just.

"The only real point which remains, then, is my humble attempt to fix the 'metes and bounds' of physical *a posteriori* reasonings when they inosculate with the divine science. Obviously, atheistic physicists wholly neglect these metes and bounds. Obviously again, many theistic physicists—as Hitchcock, *Religion of Geology*—dazzled by the fascination of facts and speculations, are overlooking these metes and bounds. Now, that inquiry may proceed in a healthy way, and the ground be prepared for safe hypothesis, it is all-important that a first principle be settled here. I offer my humble mite, by proving that, to the theistic reasoner—I have no debate here with atheists—the proposition cannot hold universally true that an analogous naturalness of properties in a structure proves an analogous natural origin. I do not care to put it in any stronger form than the above.

"But when cleared of misconceptions, this proposition, to the theist, becomes irresistible. 'Geologists'—meaning of course the ones defined in the previous paragraph—refuse all limitations of analogical, *a posteriori* arguments, claiming that 'like causes always produce like effects,' which, say they, is the very corner-stone of all inductive science. But the real proposition they employ is the converse of this, viz.: 'Like effects always indicate like causes.' Now, first, must I repeat the trite rule of logic, That the converse of a true proposition is not necessarily true? Secondly, The theist has expressly admitted another cause, namely, an infinite, personal Creator, confessedly competent to any effect he may choose to create. Hence, the theist is compelled to allow that this converse will not hold universally here. Thirdly, A wise creator, creating a structure to be the subject of natural laws, will of course create it with traits of naturalness. Hence, whenever the mineralogist meets with one of these created structures, he must be prepared to find in it every trait of naturalness, like other structures of the class which are originated naturally. Fourthly, To the theist this argument is perfect, when applied to all vital organisms. The first of the species *must* have received from the supernatural, creative hand every trait of naturalness, else it could not have fulfilled the end for which it was made, viz., to be the parent of a species, to transmit to subsequent generations of organisms the specific nature. And, fifthly and lastly, To deny this would compel us still to assign a natural parent, *before the first created parent*, of each species of generated organism: which would involve us in a multitude of infinite series, without causes outside of themselves. But this notion science herself repudiates as a self-contradictory absurdity. . . . etc.

"What use is to be made of this conclusion, if admitted? First, to save us from being betrayed into some theory of cosmogony virtually atheistic. Secondly, to make you and me, those who love geology and those who are jealous of it, modest in constructing hypotheses; to remind us, when examining the things which disclose 'eternal power and Godhead,' how possibly we may have gotten into contact with the immediate *Hand* who 'giveth no account to any man of his matters.'

Very faithfully yours,

R. L. DABNEY."

As to my argument in this letter, on the main point we shall see anon. Now, of course it was impossible for me to foresee the amazing misapprehensions into which Dr. Woodrow had fallen. But had I been prophet enough to foresee them, I could hardly have chosen terms more exactly adapted to remove them, and to demonstrate that I did not attack all physical science; that I did not recommend universal skepticism of all but mathematics and the Bible; that I did not teach God had created a lie in putting fossils into the rocks, etc. But probably it did not avail to change one word; Dr. Woodrow was not to be thus balked of the pleasure of printing a slashing criticism of one who had given no provocation to him. Leaving it to the reader to characterize this proceeding, I would only ask if I was not entitled to the benefit of my own exposition with the public? May I not claim the poor right, never denied even to the indicted felon, of speaking my own speech and defining my own defence? Had Dr. Woodrow deemed my statements in my letter inconsistent with those in my sermon, he might at least have given me the benefit of a change towards what he considers the better mind.

I shall be reminded that the misconception of my scope was justified by such language from me as this: "The tendencies of geologists are atheistic." "These sciences are arrayed in all their phases on the side of skepticism," etc. These statements are all true, and consistent with my high respect for all true physical sciences. All of them are arrayed by some of their professed teachers, on the side of skepticism. Or, as I defined my meaning in the sermon, these sciences of geology, natural history, and ethnology, now exciting so much popular attention, "always have some tendency to become anti-theological." I believe this to be true. They always have this tendency, but not always this effect. A tendency is a partial *drift* towards a certain result. It may exist, and yet in a multitude

of cases it may have no effect, because countervailed by opposing tendencies ; or better still, opposing causes. Thus it appears clearly to be the doctrine of Scripture, that the possession of wealth always has, with frail man, a *tendency* towards carnality ; yet all rich Christians are not carnal. Witness Abraham, the father of the faithful, yet a mighty man of riches ; and the prince of Uz, Job. Hence a good man may, for valid reasons, own riches, and may even seek riches ; yet, until he is perfectly sanctified, their pursuit is doubtless attended with a certain element of spiritual danger. If he does his duty in prayer and watchfulness, this danger will be counterpoised and he will remain safe. Now it is precisely in this sense that I hold these studies always to have some tendency to become anti-theological. Yet it may be even a duty to pursue them, prayerfully and watchfully ; and many good men, like Dr. Woodrow, may thus escape their drift towards rationalism, though, like Abraham, acquiring great store of these scientific riches.

I assigned, as I thought very perspicuously, the reasons of this tendency. First : it is both the business and the boast of physical science to resolve as many effects as possible into their second causes. Repeated and fascinating successes in these solutions gradually amount to a temptation to the mind to look less to the great First Cause. The experience of thousands, who were not watchful and prayerful, has proved this. Again ; geology and its kindred pursuits have this peculiarity, that they lead inquiry full towards the great question of the *Αρχη*, the fountain head of beings. Now let a mind already intoxicated by its success in finding the second causes for a multitude of phenomena which are to meaner minds inexplicable, and in addition, secretly swayed by that native hostility which the Scripture declares lurks in all unconverted men, "not liking to retain God in their knowledge," let such a mind push its inquiries up to this question of the beginning of beings, there will be very surely some anti-theological tendency developed in him. Is it asked why all other human sciences, as law, chemistry, agriculture, are not chargeable with the same tendency ? The answer is : because they do not come so much into competition with the theistic solution of the question of the origin of things. Is it denied that geology does this ; and are we told that Dr.

Dabney has betrayed his scientific ignorance by supposing that geology claims to be a cosmogony? Well, we know very well that Sir Charles Lyell, in the very outset of his *Principles of Geology*, (London, 1850), has denied that geology interferes with questions of cosmogony. And we know equally well, that if this be true of his geology, it is not true of geology generally, as currently obtruded on the reading public in our day. I thought that "cosmogony" meant the genesis of the cosmos; that cosmos is distinguished from chaos. So, when modern geology, in anti-theological hands—which are the hands which rather monopolize geology now in our periodicals, viz., Huxley, Hooker, Tyndall, Büchner, *et al.*—undertakes to account for the *origin of existing structures*, it is at least virtually undertaking to teach a *cosmogony*. In this judgment I presume all men of common sense concur with me. "Geology *ought* not to assume to be a cosmogony?" Very true; and I presume Dr. Woodrow's does not. But unfortunately, in this case the frogs out-sound the good, strong bullocks. It is the assuming, anti-theistic, cosmogonic geology of which the Christian world chiefly hears; and *hence my protest*.

On page 352 Dr. Woodrow says: "All speculations as to the origin of forces and agents operating in nature are incompetent to natural science. It examines how these operate, what effects they produce; but in answer to the questions, is there a personal, spiritual God, who created these forces? or did they originate in blind necessity? or are they eternal? *natural science is silent*."

That is to say, Dr. Woodrow's natural science is silent. But is Drs. Darwin's and Huxley's natural science silent about them? Notoriously, it is not. When these men endeavor to account for existing beings by "natural selection," a physical law as the "original force" and "operating agent;" when *many* recent writers endeavor to use the modern doctrine of the "correlation of forces" for the purpose of identifying God's power with force, *their* natural science does not behave at all as Dr. Woodrow's behaves. And *this is our quarrel with them*. Nor can we assent fully to Dr. Woodrow's view, that true natural science "is silent" about all these questions. She ought not to be silent. Her duty is to evolve as the crown and glory of all her

conclusions, the natural, theological argument for the being, wisdom and goodness of a personal God. Such was the natural science of Lord Bacon, of Sir Isaac Newton, of Commodore Matthew Maury.

It is urged, I should not have said these physical sciences have an anti-theistic tendency, because, where men have perverted them to unbelief, the evil "tendency was in the student, and not in the study." This, I reply, is a half truth. The evil tendency is in the student *and* the study; I have shown that the study itself has its elements of danger. But I might grant that it is in the student, rather than in the study; and still assert the generality of this lurking tendency. For, the quality in the student, which constitutes the tendency, is, alas! inborn, and universal among the unrenowned, namely, alienation from God—a "not liking to retain him in their knowledge"—a secret desire to have him afar off.

And now, when we turn to current facts, do they not sorrowfully substantiate my charge against these perverted sciences? Every Christian journal teems with lamentations over the wide and rapid spread of unbelief flowing from this source. Such men as Dr. McCosh fly to arms against it. Such men as Dr. Woodrow have so profound an impression of the power and audacity of the enemy as to be impelled to wage the warfare continuously, even in an inappropriate *arena*. It is notorious that these physical speculations have become, in our day, the common, yea, almost the sole resources of skepticism. We have infidel lawyers and physicians; but they are infidels, not because of their studies in jurisprudence, therapeutics or anatomy; but because they have turned aside to dabble in geology and its connections.

But we see stronger, though less multiplied, instances of this tendency, in the cases where it sways devout believers to positions inconsistent with their own faith. Thus, Hugh Miller was a good Presbyterian, the representative and organ of the Scotch Free Church, yet he was misled by geology to adopt a theory of exposition for the first chapter of Genesis which Dr. Woodrow strongly disapproves. And Dr. Woodrow, though "believing firmly in every word of the Bible as inspired by the Holy Ghost," is betrayed in this critique, by the same seductive "ten-

dency," into two positions inconsistent with his sound faith. This will appear in the sequel. In this connection a remark should also be made upon the attempt to veil the prevalence of unbelief in America, by condemning my reference to the reported sentiments of many members of the Indianapolis meeting of 1870. He thinks it quite slanderous in me to allude to the published testimony of an eye-witness, without having required that person to put these slandered members through a very full and heart-searching catechism as to all their thoughts and doings, and the motives of them. Somehow, I find my conscience very obtuse upon this point. Obviously, I only gave the published testimony of this reporter for what it was worth. That I was clearly entitled to do so seems very plain from this fact: that he, and I know not how many other prints, had already *given it to the public*. He had made it the public's; he had made it mine, as an humble member of the public, to use it for what it might be worth. The currency given to the statement, by its mention in my poor little sermon, was but as a bucket to that ocean of publicity into which it had already flowed through the mighty Northern press.

The second point requiring correction in Dr. Woodrow's critique is the equally surprising statement, that I inculcate universal skepticism in every branch except the Bible and mathematics. Here, again, his mistake is so surprising that it is necessary to state it in his own words. Page 330, of *Review*: "He" (Dr. D.) "*recommends skepticism* as to the results of the application of our God-given reason to the works of God's hands." Page 331, I am represented as teaching that "we must regard ourselves as *incapable of arriving at a knowledge of truth*," and, farther on, "*that we can never become certain of anything* in geology or other branches of natural science." I am represented, on page 332, as claiming "*that our reason could not form one correct judgment* on any subject without divine guidance." On page 338, I am represented as attempting to show that "*physical science never can reach* undoubted truth." On page 337, I am made to teach "*that the systematic study of God's works always tends to make us disbelieve his Word*," whereas the very point of my caution is, that the sort of pretended study of God's works which makes so many people dis-

believe his Word *is not systematic*. That is, it is not conducted on a just system.

There is, then, no mistake in my charging this misrepresentation, that the reviewer really does impute to me a sweeping disbelief of *all* that physical science teaches, except in the "exact sciences." And neither is there, with the attentive reader, any mistake in the verdict that this charge is a sheer blunder. The very passage quoted to prove the charge from my sermon disproves it in express words. I state that "the human *mind*, as well as heart, is *impaired* by the fall," not destroyed. I do not go any farther, certainly, than our Confession. Why did not Dr. Woodrow assail and ridicule that? Again: "The Christian need never expect that uninspired science will be *purged of uncertainty and error*," etc. The metaphor is taken from therapeutics, in which a "purge" is given with the aim of bringing away certain morbid elements bearing a very small ratio to the body purged. And still more definitely, I say: "Even if the *organon* were absolute, pure truth, its application by fallen minds must always insure in the results *more or less of error*," etc. On page 8 of *Sermon*, I add, speaking of the industry and ingenuity of the infidel physicists themselves, that even "*they* have deduced *many* useful conclusions." Dr. Woodrow remarks, very simply, p. 331: "It is singular that Dr. Dabney should have fallen into this error," etc. Yes; so very singular as to be incredible. And I presume that he is the only attentive reader of my words in America who has "fallen into the error" of imputing this error to me. As Dr. Woodrow says, I condemn it in my Lectures. I repudiate it by honoring certain learned votaries of physical science. I repudiate it by appealing to certain well-established conclusions of physical science. I expressly limit my charge of fallibility in physical science to the presence of "*more or less of error*" mingled with its many truths.

But as Dr. Woodrow's misconception evinces that it was possible for one man to fail to understand my position, I will state it again with a plainness which shall defy a similar result.

The perverted physical science which I oppose contradicts revelation. We believe that the Bible is infallible. Now, my object is to claim the advantage for the Bible of infallibility as

against something that is not infallible, in any actual or possible collision between science—falsely so called—and the Scriptures. This is plain. Now, as Dr. Woodrow and all the good people for whom I spoke believe, with me, that the Bible is infallible, all that remains to be done, to give us this advantage, is to show that physical science, and especially anti-Christian physical science, is not infallible. Where now is the murder? Does Dr. Woodrow wish to assert that these human speculations are infallible? I presume not. Then he has no controversy with me here. That obvious and easy thesis I supported, by noting, first, that while the fall left man a reasonable creature, the intellect of his sinful soul was no longer a perfect instrument for reasoning; and we may expect it to be specially imperfect on those truths against which the prejudices of a heart naturally alienated from God are interested. Then, alluding to the fact that these infidel physicists usually assume the arrogant air of treating their science as certain, and the Bible as uncertain; and alluding to the claim that, however fallible the ancient and the mediæval physics, the adoption of the inductive method has now made the conclusions of modern physics certain, I proceeded to contest that claim in part, asserting that we must expect some error still in modern physics. This I proved (*a*), by the principle, that ancient and modern men are of the same species, and so should be expected to have the same natures and infirmities; but modern physicists convict their predecessors of a number of errors, whence it is arrogant in the former to assume that posterity will not convict them of any. I showed (*b*), that it was not true the inductive method was first invented and used in science from Lord Bacon's day, because Aristotle is said to have described the method; and whether *any* logician described and analyzed it or not, nature had taught men of common sense, in all ages, to make some use of it. I asserted (*c*), that even the inductive method had not saved modern physics from all error, perfect as that method might be, because in fact modern physicists do not always stick to it faithfully; they sometimes, at least, yield to the same temptations which seduced the mediæval physicists. I showed (*d*), that modern physics had not yet reached infallibility, because *it is still correcting itself*. And I remarked (*e*), that infallibility could be approximated in

the exact sciences only, in pursuing which, the fewness of premises and exactness of predications may, by the help of care, bring entire certainty within the reach even of fallible intellects. Now, a great many scholars have concurred with me in applying this name, "exact sciences," to the knowledge of magnitudes and number. They must have thought that the others were in some sense "inexact sciences." Yet they never dreamed they were guilty of recommending *universal skepticism of everything save the Bible and mathematics*. I presume they thought thus: that these "inexact sciences," true sciences to a certain extent, notwithstanding their inexactness, should be valued and should be used as far as was safe, but should be pressed with caution, and especially that they should be modest when they came in competition with exact science or infallible revelation.

Now, Dr. Woodrow would reply, at this showing of the matter, that I must be clear before I require the "inexact science" to succumb to the theological proposition, that the latter was indeed God's infallible meaning, and not merely my human supposition about it. I grant it fully. And I take him to witness that I did not require my hearers to commit themselves to the interpretation of the Westminster Assembly, nor to that of Dr. Pye Smith, Chalmers, *et al.*, nor to that of Mr. Tayler Lewis, *et al.*, nor to my own interpretation of what Moses really meant to teach about the date and mode of creation. I did not even intimate whether I had any interpretation of my own. Indeed, I behaved with a reserve and moderation which, for so rash a person, was extremely commendable. But I must claim another position: I must assume that Moses did mean *something*, and when we are all honestly and certainly convinced by a sufficiently careful and mature exposition what that something is, then we have the infallible testimony of the Maker himself, and fallible human science must bow to it.

But from Dr. Woodrow's next step I must solemnly dissent. It is that in which he degrades our knowledge of God and redemption through revelation to the level of our fallible, human knowledge of the inexact physical sciences. He is attempting, page 331, to refute my inference from the fall of man, which he misrepresents as a commendation of absolute skepticism, to the imperfection of his speculations. To do this he claims "that

theology is as much a human science as geology, or any other branch of natural science." "The facts which form the basis of the science of theology are found in God's Word; those which form the science of geology are found in his works; but the *science* in both cases is the work of the human mind." To ensure us that he is deliberate in propounding this startling doctrine, he repeats: "Still, the science of theology as a science is equally *human* and *uninspired* with the science of geology; the facts in both cases are divine, the sciences based upon them human." He then proceeds expressly to extend this *human* and *uninspired* quality to *our knowledge of the great central truths of theology!*

The grave error of this is unmasked by a single question: is then the work of the geologist, in constructing hypotheses, inductions, inferences, merely hermeneutical? All that the student of the divine science properly does is to interpret God's Word, and compare and arrange his teachings. Is this all that geology undertakes? The world had to wait many centuries for a Kepler and a Newton to expound the laws of the stars; God tells us himself that his Word is for his people, and so plain that all may understand, and the wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err therein. Again, this degrading view of theology misrepresents the reality. The "facts of geology" are simply phenomenal, material substances. The facts of theology, which Dr. Woodrow admits to be divine, are *didactic propositions*, introducing us into the very heart of divine verities. "God is a spirit." "The word was God." "The wages of sin is death." Here are the matured and profoundest truths of the divine science set down for us in God's own clear words. Does he teach the laws of geology thus? This difference is too clear to need elaboration. Once more: the critic's view, whether right or wrong, is unquestionably condemned by his Confession of Faith and his Bible. The former, Chap. I., § 5, says: "Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts." And Chap. XIV., § 2: "By this faith a Christian believeth to be true whatsoever is revealed in the Word, *for the authority of God himself* speaking therein," etc. The Scripture says: an apostle's preaching

"was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power; that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God." (1 Cor. ii. 4, 5.) The apostle John promises to Christians (1 John ii. 20, 27): "But ye have an unction from the holy one; and ye know all things." "The *same anointing* teacheth you *all things*, and is truth, *and is no lie*."

Dr. Woodrow, perceiving how obnoxious his position might be shown to be to these divine principles, seeks an evasion in the claim, that the children of God are as much entitled to ask and enjoy spiritual guidance when they study God's works as when they study his word. He reminds us that the heavens declare the glory of God, etc., and asks whether Christians forfeit his guidance when they seek a fuller knowledge of that glory in the heavens and the firmament. Unfortunately for this evasion, we have to remind him of a subsequent page of his essay, where he heaps scorn upon the idea that physical science has any theological tendency, and declares that it is only ignorance which ascribes to it either a pro-Christian, or an anti-Christian character. The physicist, then, is not seeking God's glory in his study of *strata* and fossils; if he does, he has become, like Dr. Dabney, unscientific; he is seeking only "the observable sequences" of second causes and effects. Farther, the physicists whom I had in view never seek God anywhere, never pray, and do not believe there is any spiritual guidance, being infidel and even atheistic men.

If, then, the "science of theology" is as human and uninspired as the science of geology; and if, as Richard Cecil has so tersely expressed it, the meaning of the Bible is practically the Bible; the ground upon which we are invited in the gospel to repose our immortal, irreparable interests, is as fallible as geology. How fallible this is, we may learn from its perpetual retractions and amendments of its own positions, and from the differences of its professors. Is the basis of a Christian's faith no better? Is this the creed taught to the future pastors of the church by Dr. Woodrow? As was remarked at the outset, when we predicted such results in the distant future, from the attempt to teach fallible human science in a theological chair, we still courteously excepted Dr. Woodrow from all applications

of this caution. The reader can judge whether my critic has not deprived himself, in this point, of the benefit of this exception, and verified my prophecy two generations earlier than I myself claimed.

The third general topic requiring my notice in this critique is the outspoken charge of culpable ignorance. It is said, page 368, that I am "acquainted with neither the methods nor the ends of physical science, with neither its facts nor its principles," etc.; and of this assertion many supposed specimens are given, served up to the reader with the abundant sauce of disdain and sarcasm. On this I have, first, two general remarks to make. If it was only intended to prove that I am not a technical geologist, like Dr. Woodrow, which is not necessary to infidel physics, this end might have been quickly reached without fifty-two dreary pages of criticism, by quoting my own words, *Sermon*, page 8: "We may be possessed neither of the knowledge nor ability for entering that field, as I freely confess concerning myself." The other remark is, that all these specimens of imputed ignorance would have been passed over by me in absolute silence, did they not involve instances and illustrations of important principles; for I presume the Presbyterian public is very little interested in the negative of that question, "Is Dr. Dabney an ignoramus," the affirmative of which Dr. Woodrow finds so much interest in arguing.

But it is asserted that I understand "neither the methods nor the ends" of physical science, because I speak of some such professed science as "anti-Christian," and suspect it of atheistic tendencies. Page 353: "Natural science is itself incapable of inquiring into the origin of forces . . . and it is impossible for it to be either religious or anti-religious." Page 354, it is claimed as a "fact," that the "results reached are not in the slightest degree affected by the religious character of its students." Page 351, I am criticised for asking whether the theological professor of "natural science in connection with revealed religion" traces geologic forces up to a creator, and it is charged as a "grievous mistake to suppose that natural science has anything whatever to do with the doctrine of creation." Well, I reply, if even a mere physicist had not, we presume that a Christian divine, put into a theological school to teach the church's

pastors the "connection of natural science with revealed religion," ought to have something to do with that "connection." This, as the attentive reader will perceive, was the question in that passage of my writing. Hence it is a sheer error to cite this place as proof of an "utter failure to recognize the province of natural science."

But in truth, physics, simply as natural science, have a theological relation. These studies deal with the very forces, from whose ordering natural theology draws the *a posteriori* argument for the existence of a creator. It is not a "fact," that these studies are unrelated to the religious views of their students. Were this so, it would not have happened that a Newton always travelled by astronomical science to the recognition of a God; and a La Place declared, as the result of his *Mecanique Celeste*, that a theory of the heavens could be constructed without a creator. It would not have happened, that while Dr. Woodrow always traces natural laws up to the great First Cause, Dr. Thomas Huxley should see in Darwin's physical theory of evolution by natural selection a perfect annihilation of the whole teleological argument for the being of a God. Dr. Woodrow says in one place, that because the business of natural science is with second causes, it has no business with first causes. Because the fisherman is at one end of the pole, he has no business with the hook and the fish that are at the opposite end of the line! Fortunately, on pages 343 and 344, Dr. Woodrow himself contradicts this error. There he defends his view of a creation by evolution, by claiming that the structure produced by second causes is as truly God's creation as a first supernatural structure could be. If that is so, then the study of the second cause is surely a study of a creation, and so of a creator. So also Dr. Woodrow's friend, Lord Bacon, contradicts him, and justifies me in the very place quoted (*Review*, page 374): "It is an assured truth and a conclusion of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of philosophy may incline the mind of man to atheism; but a farther *proceeding* THEREIN doth bring the mind back again to religion; for in the entrance of philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer themselves unto the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause,"

—just the “tendency” towards unbelief described by me; “but when a man passeth on farther, and seeth the dependence of causes, and the works of providence, then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of nature’s chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter’s chair.” Thus, according to Bacon, natural science has a religious relationship. What is it indeed but hypercriticism to object to the phrase, “anti-Christian science,” and the like, that natural science is properly neither Christian nor anti-Christian, when everybody but the critic understood that the terms were used in the sense of “natural science perverted against religion?” So fully are such phrases justified by use, and so well understood, that Dr. Duns actually entitles his gigantic volumes on physical science, “*Biblical Natural Science*.” What a target, in that title, for such objections!

On page 372, the reviewer finds an evidence of ignorance in the passing allusion which I made to the new questions touching the relative order of *strata* raised by the results of recent deep-sea soundings; “all of which,” declares Dr. Woodrow, “evinces an utter misapprehension of the real import of the discoveries in question.” That is to say, Dr. Woodrow happens not to be pleased with that view of the import of these recent discoveries which I advanced, derived from competent scientific sources. Therefore the apprehension which happens not to suit him is all “misapprehension.” We shall see, before we are done, that it is rather a permanent illusion with the reviewer to account that his opinion is true science, and true science his opinion. But we beg his pardon; we do not purpose to be dogmatized out of our common sense, nor to allow the reader to be dogmatized out of his. Let these facts be reviewed, then, in the light of common sense. It is the current theory of Dr. Woodrow’s friends, the geologists, that the stratified and fossil-bearing rocks are the result of the action of water, formed of sediment at the bottom of seas and oceans, and then lifted out of the water by upheavals. Now geologists have assigned a regular succession of lower, and upper, and uppermost, to these *strata*, determined, as Lyell remarks, by three guides: the composition of the *strata*, the species of fossil life enclosed in them, and the observation of actual position, where two or more of the *strata* co-exist.

Now then, should some new upheaval lift up the bottom of the North Atlantic, for instance, what is now the surface of the sea bottom would, immediately after the upheaval, be the top *stratum* of the land upheaved. But the deep-sea plummet and the self-registering thermometer have proved that species of animal life hitherto determined by the rules of stratigraphy to be *successive*, are in fact *cotemporaneous* now on the sea bottoms, and considerable difference of temperature—determining different species of aquatic life—are found, unaccountably, in neighboring tracts of the same ocean at depths not dissimilar. Is it not evident that, in case of such an upheaval, we might have, side by side, formations of equal recency? But geologists would have decided, by previous lights, that they were not equally recent; that one was much older than the other. The prevailing stratigraphy may, consequently, be very probably wrong. Let the reader take an instance: microscopists have been telling us, with great pride, that English chalk is composed in large part of the minute shells of an animalcule, which they name *Globogerina*. They say that the cretaceous deposits rank as *mesozoic*, below the *pleiocene*, *eocone*, and *miocene* in order, and consequently older in origin. That is, Sir Chas. Lyell says so, in his most recent work, if he is any authority with Dr. Woodrow. But the microscopists also tell us, that the slime brought up from the depths of the North Atlantic by the plummet, of a whitey-grey color when dried, is also composed chiefly of the broken shells of the tiny *Globogerinae*, many of them so lately dead that the cells still contain the jelly-like remains of their organic parts. If this is true, then chalk formations *are now making*, and should an upheaval occur, there would be a chalk bed as really new, as post tertiary, as the bed of alluvial mud on the banks of Newfoundland. May it not be, then, that some other chalk beds on or near the top of the ground, may be less ancient than the established stratigraphy had claimed? Such was our point touching these deep-sea soundings; and we rather think that sensible men will not agree with Dr. Woodrow that it can be pooh-poohed away. But as we are nobodies in science, we will refer him to a testimony of Dr. Carpenter, of London, late president of the British Association, who is recognized as perhaps the first physicist in Great Britain. He says:

"While astronomy is of all sciences that which may be considered as most nearly representing nature as she really is, geology is that which most completely represents her as she is seen through the *medium* of the interpreting mind; the meaning of the phenomena that constitutes its data being, in almost every instance, open to question, and the judgments passed upon the same facts being often different, according to the qualifications of the several judges. No one who has even a general acquaintance with the history of this department of science can fail to see that the geology of each epoch has been the reflection of the minds by which its study was then directed." . . . "The whole tendency of the ever-widening range of modern geological inquiry has been to show how little reliance can be placed on the so-called 'laws' of stratigraphical and paleontological successions."

Abating the euphemism, Dr. Carpenter seems as bad as Dr. Dabney. He will soon require the chastisement due to the heresy, that the Woodrow opinion is not precisely the authoritative science of the case. His testimony is peculiarly significant as to the worthlessness of "the so-called 'laws' of stratigraphy," because he had himself been especially concerned in the examination of this chalk-mud from the deep-sea soundings.

Dr. Woodrow sees proof of ignorance of even the nomenclature of natural science, in my use of the word *naturalism* to describe—what he obviously apprehends I designed to describe—that school which attempts to substitute nature for God as the ultimate goal of their research. The very passage quoted from my printed notes by him defined my meaning. "This, therefore,"—meaning obviously the unwillingness of this school to recognize any supernatural cause back of the earliest natural cause—"is the eternity of naturalism; it is atheism." Dr. Woodrow thinks this an antiquated, and therefore an improper use of the word. On both points I beg leave to dissent. If I need an expressive term, why may I not revive an ancient one, if I define its sense? Is not this better than coining a new one, and being obliged to define that? But my term is not antiquated. *Naturalismus* holds its place to-day in German lexicons; and Webster—surely he is "new-fangled" enough—gives the word in my sense. But the concrete noun, "*naturalist*," ought to be used in the sense of a *student of nature*; not in my meaning of an *advocate of naturalism*—in my evil sense. So it is usually employed. But in the only place where I use it in the bad sense, I distinguish it sufficiently by the epithet, "proud naturalist," whose theory of nature is a "form of skepticism."

Here again I am comforted by the belief that Dr. Woodrow is the only man in America embarrassed by my nomenclature.

On page 339 of the *Review*, supposed evidence is found that I believed, in my ignorance, that the idea of a pre-Adamite earth was first suggested within the memory of the older members of the Synod of Virginia; and a great deal of rather poor wit is perpetrated as to the age of these members. Having read, for instance, the introductory chapters of Lyell's *Principles of Geology*, twenty years ago, in which quite a full sketch of all the speculations about this matter is given from ancient times, I was in no danger of falling into that mistake; nor did I give expression to it. My brethren doubtless understood the words, "this modern impulse," in the sense I designed, namely, as a "popular impulse," given by the comparatively recent diffusion of geological knowledge, and felt in the minds of the people. And it is substantially true, that just one generation ago, it had not generally gone farther in the speculations then prevalent among Americans, than the claim of a pre-Adamite earth in such a sense as might be reconciled with the Mosaic cosmogony upon the well-known scheme of Dr. Pye Smith. Since that day many other and more aggressive postulates, standing in evil contrast with the first and comparatively scriptural and tolerable one, have been diffused among our people by irreligious men of science. Some of the latter I also enumerated; intimating that, while we might, if necessary, accept the first, along with such sound Christians as Dr. Pye Smith, Dr. Chalmers, and Dr. Woodrow, *all of the latter* we certainly could not accept consistently with the integrity of the Bible. So that my charge of anti-Christian character was, at least to a certain extent, just, against this set of physicists.

Another evidence of my ignorance, upon which Dr. Woodrow is exceedingly funny, upon pages 367 and 368, is my classification of the rocks, as lowest and earliest, the *primary* rocks all *azoic*; next above them, the *secondary* rocks, containing remains of life *palæozoic* and *meiocene*; third, the *tertiary* rocks and clays containing the *pleiocene* fossils; and fourth, the *alluvia*. Dr. Woodrow then presents a classification, which he says is "REAL GEOLOGY," differing from the brief outline I gave chiefly—not only—by using more subdivisions. The meaning of the as-

sertion that this is the "Real Geology," it must be presumed, is, that this is Dr. Woodrow's geology; for his classification is not identical with Dana's, or Lyell's, any more than mine is. But it is not true that Dr. Dabney "comes forward as a teacher of this science." In that very lecture I state expressly that I "do not presume to teach technical geology." My avowed, as my obvious, purpose was only to cite the theory of the geologists in its briefest outline, unencumbered with details and minor disputes of its teachers among themselves, sufficiently to make my argument intelligible to ordinary students of theology. For this object details and differences were not necessary, and I properly omitted them. Dr. Gerald Molloy, of Maynooth,—a writer of almost unequalled perspicuity and intelligence,—with precisely the same end in view, goes no farther in the way of classification than to name as his three divisions, *igneous*, *metamorphic*, and *aqueous* rocks. Here is a still greater suppression of details. Dr. Woodrow may now set this exceedingly rudimentary division over against his detailed "Real Geology," and represent Dr. Molloy also as ignorant of what he speaks of.

But, it is presumed, Dr. Woodrow would add that my rudiments of a classification were partly wrong, namely: that I call the igneous rocks (granite, trap, etc.) *primary*, and that I apply the term *azoic* to all rocks devoid of fossils; whereas it has seemed good in the eyes of the Woodrow geology—the only "real geology"—not to call the igneous rocks *primary*, and to restrict the term *azoic* technically to a very small segment of the azoic rocks, viz., to the sedimentary rocks, which have no fossils.

Well, the Woodrow geology is entitled to choose its own nomenclature, we presume; and *so are the majority of geologists who differ from it entitled to choose theirs*; and I have a right to follow that majority. Dr. Woodrow, as he intimates, chooses to follow Sir Chas. Lyell in his crotchet of refusing to call the "igneous" rocks "*primary*." The latter uses the word "*primary*" as synonymous with the palæozoic group. But Dr. Woodrow also knows that this freak of Lyell's is prompted by a particular feature of his "uniformitarian" scheme, and *is a departure* from the ordinary nomenclature of the earlier geologists. He knows also that many geologists apply the term *azoic* to all the crystalline rocks, and not to the non-fossiliferous *strata* of

sedimentary rocks only. Thus, Duns, "following competent men of science," divides thus, first, Azoic; second, Primary, equivalent to the palæozoic; then, secondary, equivalent to the mesozoic; and fourth, tertiary, or cainozoic. So Dana states his division thus, "I. Azoic time. II. Palæozoic time. III. Mesozoic time. IV. Cainozoic time. V. The age of mind." And what can be more true than that the igneous rocks, ordinarily styled primary, may be also termed *azoic*; when *the absence of fossil remains of life in them* is at least as uniform and prominent a trait in them as any other? But the reader will feel that this is an exceedingly small business.

The specimen of ignorance which amuses Dr. Woodrow perhaps most of all, is my notice of some geologists' "nebular hypothesis," criticised on pages 344 and 345 of the *Review*. This idea,—that our solar system was first a vast mass of rotating, incandescent vapor, and then a sun and a set of planets, of which the latter, at least, had been cooled first to a molten liquid, and then to a solid substance on their surfaces—is said to have been suggested first by La Place as a mere hypothesis; and the only seeming fact giving it even a show of solid support was the existence of those faint, nebulous spots of light among the stars which no telescope had as yet made anything of. Now every one who reads infidel books of science observes how glibly they prate of this supposition, as though there were some certainty that it gave the true origin of our earth. Meantime Sir William Herschel first, and then Lord Rosse, applied more powerful magnifiers to them. The effect of Herschel's telescope was to resolve some of the *nebulae* into distinct clusters of stars. He then divided them into the three classes of the *resolved*, the *resolvable*, and the *unresolved*, suggesting that a still more powerful instrument would probably resolve the second class. Lord Rosse, in our own day, constructed a still larger reflector, and the result is, that more of the *nebulae*, when sufficiently magnified, are now seen to be clusters of stars. Now, must not every sober mind admit with me that "the chief ground of plausibility is thus removed" from the atheistic supposition? The probability is, that the other *nebulae* are what all are shown to be, which have been resolved. Then the evidence of fact is lacking that the heavens ever contained planetary matter in that form. For

the only other luminous and nebulous bodies known to astronomy are the comets, and they evidently are not cosmic or planetary matter, *i. e.*, not matter which can be cooled into a solid as large as a world, because, however vast their discs and trains, their quantity of matter is so amazingly small that they produce no appreciable perturbations in the orbits of the planets near them. But Dr. Woodrow exclaims that the newly discovered *spectroscope* has taught us the chemistry of the heavens, and has shown that some *nebulae* are incandescent gases. Well, let us see about this *spectroscope*, of which we have heard a great deal these latter years. One thing which we have heard is the following sensible caution from Dr. Carpenter. Speaking of the assumption founded on the *spectroscope*, that the sun's chromosphere is incandescent hydrogen, he says, "Yet this confidence is based entirely on the assumption that a certain line which is seen in the *spectrum* of a hydrogen flame, means hydrogen also when seen in the *spectrum* of the sun's chromosphere. . . . It is by no means inconceivable that the same line might be produced by some other substance at present unknown." Dr. Carpenter then proceeds to administer a similar caution to Dr. Huggins, one of the professed authorities with the *spectroscope*. Such is the skepticism of England's greatest physicist about its revelations. But to be more particular: its friends tell us that the *spectra* of luminous rays passing from incandescent solids through a gaseous *medium* have certain dark lines in them; whereas, when the incandescent gases are themselves the sources of the rays, the *spectra* have the cross-lines in different places. Now hear how Dr. Roscoe tells this story of Dr. Huggins, about the *nebulae* in the spectroscope, in the great work of the former on *spectrum analysis*. "He," (Dr. Huggins) "instead of having a band of light intersected by dark lines, indicating the physical constitution of the body to be that corresponding to the stars, found the light from these *nebulae* consisted simply of *three insulated bright lines*," etc. The sober reader will be apt to think with me, and with Dr. Carpenter, that so minute a result, and so unlike the other results of more distinct *spectrum analyses*, gives no basis for any conclusion whatever. And this will be confirmed when he hears Mr. Lockyer, another friend of the *spectroscope*, say, "The light of some of those *nebulae* visible in a moderately large

instrument has been estimated to vary from one 1,500th to one 20,000th of the light of a single sperm candle consuming 158 grains of material per hour, viewed at a distance of a quarter of a mile. That is, *such a candle a quarter of a mile off, is twenty thousand times more brilliant than the nebula!*" Let the reader now consider what likelihood there is, that any art can ever separate all the stray beams of other light diffused through our atmosphere, from this almost infinitely slender beam, so as to be sure that it is dealing with the rays of the *nebula* alone. But a *microscopic shadow* of this almost invisible ray is the "conical ball of the chassépot gun" on which Dr. Woodrow relies, to pierce the solid steel of common sense! This is, to our view, shooting with rays of "moonshine," in the thinnest of its metaphorical senses.

The last of these specimens is that noted on page 366 of the *Review*. I had shown that the first structures made by God, though supernaturally produced, had every trait of naturalness. This was then illustrated by me, by reference to one of the trees of paradise. To this Dr. Woodrow makes the very singular objection, that I ought not to found scientific arguments upon surmises! He overlooks the simple fact that this surmise about the tree of paradise with annual rings, *was not my argument at all*, but only my illustration of it! Had he read the previous paragraph of my "Notes," or pages 13 and 14 of my sermon, with attention, he would have found *there* my argument, founded, not on *suppositions* about a possible tree or bone, but on impregnable principles of natural science itself. Does not Dr. Woodrow know that every parable is, in its nature, a supposition? Yet parables are excellent illustrations. When Jotham, the son of Gideon, in the sixth chapter of Judges, answered the men of Shechem with his parable of the trees, Dr. Woodrow would have put this reply in the mouths of Abimelech's faction: "That Jotham was exceedingly illogical, for the reason that the actual utterance of words by olive and fig trees, vines and brambles, was a phenomenon not known to exist."

On page 335 of his *Review*, Dr. Woodrow prepares the way for his charges of ignorance and inconsistency against me, by the following illustration: "Just as leading Presbyterian theologians, *personally known to Dr. Dabney*, have taught that 'every

obstacle to salvation, arising from the character and government of God, is actually removed, and was intended to be removed, that thus every one of Adam's race might be saved,' and that 'the Father covenants to give to the Son, as a reward for the travail of his soul, a *part* of those for whom he dies.'" To many readers it has doubtless appeared unaccountable that so "far-fetched" an illustration was sought. The clerical readers of the *Southern Presbyterian Review* and the *Southern Presbyterian*, can easily recall the clue of association which suggested it. They will remember that nine and a half years ago, these two periodicals, which have now been made the vehicles of the charge of scientific heresy against me, contained articles which insinuated against me the very charge of theological heresy, viz., an indefinite design in Christ's atonement, which is here introduced by Dr. Woodrow as an illustration. The occasion of that charge was my action, in obedience to the General Assembly, as chairman of a committee for conference and union with the United Synod of the South. That committee proposed to the Presbyteries a declaration of doctrinal agreement, of which I happened to be the penman. The conductors of the two presses in Columbia, opposing the union, sought to prevent it, in part, by criticising the orthodoxy of the doctrinal propositions, and intimating the doctrinal unsoundness of them and their writer in no indistinct terms. True, this intimation remained without effect, as might have been supposed, when aimed equally against the orthodoxy of my obscure self, and of such well-known and learned Old School theologians as Dr. Wm. Brown, Col. J. T. L. Preston, Dr. J. B. Ramsey, and Dr. McGuffey—the last two conferring as informal members of the committee. We see, when reminded of this history, how natural it was that Dr. Woodrow, seeking for a biting illustration, should recall this one. And the clerical readers of the *Review* have doubtless almost as naturally understood him as insinuating that "the leading Presbyterian theologian, personally known to Dr. Dabney," was no other than Dr. Dabney himself. If the words bear that construction, all I have to say is, that I never wrote or uttered the statements enclosed in the quotation marks.

But I find these very words ascribed by Dr. B. M. Palmer, in a controversial piece against the United Synod, to Dr. H. H.

Boyd, a distinguished minister of that body. Doubtless, Dr. Palmer quoted them correctly. Grant, now, that the insinuation against me, which seemed to lie so obviously in Dr. Woodrow's reference, was not intended by him, and that he also meant to designate Dr. Boyd; the question recurs, why was so peculiar and remote an illustration selected? The only answer is this: that an intimation of Dr. Dabney's unworthiness might be given from his intimate association with a theological comrade so erroneous as Dr. Boyd was esteemed at Columbia. To this again I have to say that Dr. Boyd was not "personally known" to me; that I never spoke to him save once, on the steps of a hotel, as I was passing to the cars; and that I never heard him preach, nor read one line of his theological writings, save the few quoted by Dr. Palmer, and thus had no personal knowledge of his unsoundness or orthodoxy. My whole knowledge on this point was a statement received through acquaintances, which I believed to be authentic, coming from Dr. Boyd himself; and that statement was, that when our Lynchburg declaration appeared, Dr. Boyd, counseling with his own brethren in his Presbytery, earnestly advised them to accept the union on those terms, although, as he declared, that joint declaration was, in his view, purely an Old School document, and distinctly condemnatory of whatever was peculiar in his own theological views. For, he said, the best interests of the churches demanded union; and inasmuch as his brethren were doctrinally already upon this Old School platform, he did not desire selfishly to gratify his own peculiar doctrinal preferences, at the cost of obstructing their comfort and usefulness; his points of difference from the platform not being, in his view, vital.

The fourth, and far most important vindication which remains, is of the fundamental position of my sermon on anti-Christian science. That position has been seen by the reader in the extracts given in this reply (pages 143-'5 above) from my letter of May 1st last to Dr. Woodrow. That position may be thus restated: the structures of nature around us cannot present, by their traits of naturalness, a universally demonstrative proof of a natural, as against a supernatural origin, upon any sound, theistic theory. Because, supposing a creator, originating any struc-

tures and organisms supernaturally, he also must have conferred on his first things equal traits of naturalness. Hence, should it be found that this creator has uttered *his testimony* to the supernatural origin of any of them, that testimony fairly supersedes all natural arguments *a posteriori* from natural analogies to a natural origin. My arguments for this position are briefly stated in those extracts inserted above (pages 143-'45.) The reasoning, though brief, will be sufficient for the candid reader, and I shall not weary him by repeating it.

But Dr. Woodrow, *Review*, pages 365 and 366, impugns one of my points. He will not admit it as proven that a wise creator, producing a first organism to come under natural law, and to be the parent of a species of like organisms, must have made it natural. He says, "he does not know, and he thinks it likely that Dr. Dabney does not know either." And he proceeds very facetiously to speak of my imagination about the rings in the tree of paradise as the sole basis of my argument. The tree was only an illustration. That basis I will state again. If theism is right, as Dr. Woodrow believes, then the creator is doubtless voluntary, knowing, and wise. While it is often very unsafe philosophy to surmise that the creative mind must have been prompted by this or that *final cause*, it is always very safe to say that he was prompted by *some* final cause, and that a consistent and intelligent one. For this is but saying that he is wise, and what he has effected is a disclosure of what he designed to effect, so far as it is completed. Now, God, in producing his first organisms by creation, must have designed them to exist under the reign of natural law; because we see that he uniformly *places them under that law*. That is to say, what he does is what he intends to do. But natural law could not govern that which remained contra-natural in qualities as well as origin; therefore God must have created his first organisms, while supernatural in origin, yet natural in traits. This argument is, if possible, still more demonstrative when applied to the first living organisms, vegetable and animal, because these were made by God to be the *parents of species* propagated by the first, and thenceforward in successive generations. Now, not only does revelation say that these supernatural first organisms "*yielded seed after their kind*," but natural science also tells us

most clearly, that the true notion of propagation, perpetuating a given species, is the parents' conveying unto the progeny all their own essential, specific qualities. So true is this notion, that the most scientific definition of *species* is now stated substantially thus by the greatest living natural historians. A given species *denotes just that aggregate of properties which every individual thereof derives by its natural propagation*. Hence it is certain that the first organism, supernaturally produced, possessed every essential quality natural to its species; otherwise it could not have been a parent of species.

Suppose then, that by any possibility, a physicist should examine the very remains of one of those first organisms, he would find in it the usual traits of naturalness; yet he could not infer thence a natural origin for it, because it was a *first thing*. Hence it is concluded, with a mathematical rigidity, that, granted a creator anywhere in the past, the argument from naturalness of structure to naturalness of origin *cannot be universally conclusive*. And supposing the structure under examination to be one of which revelation asserts a divine origin, then, in that case, this testimony of the almighty maker absolutely cuts across and supersedes the opposing inference from natural analogies. Such was the doctrine of my notes and sermon. Dr. Woodrow seems to conclude that, in such a case, God's workmanship would teach a lie, by seeming to be natural in origin when it was not. The solution of his embarrassment is simple. It is not God who teaches the lie, but perverted science going out of her sphere; and that this question of *αρχη* is out of her sphere, Dr. Woodrow has himself taught with a fortunate inconsistency, on page 352 of his *Review*.

But as I know nothing about science, I beg leave to fortify my position by three scientific testimonies. The first shall be that of Dr. Büchner, the German materialist and atheist. He declares, in a recent work, that the ideas of *God* and of *science* are incompatibles, in this sense, that just to the degree a divine action is postulated, the conclusions of science are to that extent estopped. Now, what is this but confessing that the only evasion from my argument is atheism? The second testimony shall be from a more friendly source. Dr. Carpenter, in the inaugural speech referred to above, uses the following closing

words. When we make allowance for a certain *euphemism*, prompted by his attitude as president of a body purely scientific, many of whose members are avowed infidels, and by the occasion of his speech, which was wholly non-religious, we shall see that his testimony is very decided. After showing that every physical law, correctly interpreted, tells us of one single, almighty, intelligent Cause, the supreme, spiritual God, he says: "The science of modern times, however, has taken a more special direction. Fixing its attention exclusively on the *order* of nature, it has separated itself wholly from theology, whose function it is to seek after its cause. In this science is fully justified." . . . "But when science, passing beyond its own limits, assumes to take the place of theology, and sets up its conception of the order of nature as a sufficient account of its *cause*, it is invading a province of thought to which it has no claim; and *not unreasonably provokes the hostility* of those who ought to be its best friends."

The third witness is Prof. F. H. Smith, who fills the chair of Natural Science in the University of Virginia. His long experience, vast learning, subtle and profound genius, and well known integrity and caution of mind, entitle his scientific opinions to a weight second to none on this side of the Atlantic. He makes, in two letters to me, the following statements:

"The transcendent importance of the subject of the letter with which you lately honored me forbade any response which was not deliberate.

"The 'naturalness' of the new-created world is, in my judgment, conclusively established in your recent letter to me. You wholly demolish the argument of the infidel, who deduces from such continued and uninterrupted naturalness the eternity and self-existence of nature. To me it is simply inconceivable, that the physical world should ever have borne marks of recent creation, or that it shall ever present signs of impending annihilation. Nay, granting the existence of such inconceivable signs, I do not see how we could interpret them. If they were possible, they must be unintelligible.

"The beginning of a universe regulated by mechanical laws must have been some 'configuration,' to which it *might* have been brought by the operation of the same mechanical laws from an antecedent configuration, mathematically assignable. I undertook to illustrate this truth to my class last session, by this simple example: The undisturbed orbit of a planet is an ellipse, described with a velocity periodically varying by a definite law. The planet passes any given point of its orbit with the same velocity, and in the same direction, in each recurring round. If it were arrested there, and then projected with that velocity in that direction, it would resume identically the same orbit. The actual motion at each point of the orbit is, therefore, the necessary projectile motion of the new-created planet at that point.

Hence, wherever created and projected, its initial motion *might* have been the result of centrifugal action. Thus the elliptical circulation presents no marks of a beginning or of an end. As regards the terms of its existence, the phenomenon is dumb. The lesson it teaches is not the shallow sophism that it has no beginning or end; but that whatever information we derive on these points, we must seek from a source other than nature.

"When this first great truth was first apprehended by me, it filled me with a glow of a new discovery. You may smile at the confession; for to one well acquainted with the history of philosophy, the statement may appear to be one of venerable antiquity. Indeed, I found it myself, subsequently, ably set forth in an article¹ on geology, which appeared in the *Southern Quarterly Review* (Columbia, S. C.), in 1861. I believe that Mr. P. H. Gosse, a British naturalist, advanced substantially the same idea in a book quaintly called, *Omphalos*; the name and keynote of which were suggested by the probable fact that Adam had a navel, though he was never united to a mother by an umbilical cord.

"Be the history of the doctrine what it may, none the less acceptable and timely is the irresistible logic by which you have established it. Most heartily do I agree with you in affirming that the formula, 'Like effects imply like causes,' fails for the initial state of the world, and cannot, therefore, logically be used to disprove a beginning," etc. . . .

"All the astronomer's statements" (calculating possible past or future eclipses), "as to the past or the future, are limited by the qualification, either overt or covert, *nisi Deus interit*."

We claim, that a case of what lawyers call "circumstantial evidence," in a court of justice, is a fair illustration of the logical rules which ought to govern in all these hypothetical geological arguments to a natural origin for given structures. The science of law has exactly defined the proper rules for such evidence. These rules require the prosecution to show that their hypothesis, viz., the guilt of the man indicted, not only may possibly, or may very probably, satisfy all the *circumstantiæ* which have been proved to attend the crime, but that it is the *only possible hypothesis* which does satisfy them all. And the defence may test this in the following manner: if they can suggest *any other hypothesis*, invented, surmised, or imagined, even, which is naturally possible, and which also satisfies all the circumstances, then the judge will instruct the jury that the hypothesis of guilt is not proven, and the accused is acquitted. Such is the rule of evidence to which logical science has been brought by a suitable sense of the sacredness and value of a human life. Now, the conditions of scientific *hypotheses* are, logically parallel; *they are cases of "circumstantial evidence."*

¹ An article which appeared anonymously, but was written by R. L. Dabney.

Suppose, then, for argument's sake, that some such hypothesis, in the hand of an infidel physicist, should put our Bible upon its trial for veracity. It is the time-honored belief of the Christian world that the truth of that Bible is the only hope of immortal souls. Surely the issue should be tried under at least as solemn a sense of responsibility, and as strict logical requirements, as an indictment against a single life.

But I carry this parallel further. Grant the existence of a Creator God, "of eternal power and Godhead," then we of the defence *have always the alternative hypothesis*, which is always naturally possible, viz., that any original structure, older than all human observations, which is brought by anti-Christian science into one of her "circumstantial" arguments, may possibly have been of direct divine origin. Hence it follows, that should, perchance, the Bible contradict any scientific hypothesis of the origin of things, science is incapable, from the very conditions of the case, of convicting the Bible of falsehood upon such an issue. The thoughtful reader can now comprehend the polemic prejudice which prompts Büchner to say that the very idea of God is an intrusion into the rights of science; and Huxley to argue that the evidence from design for the existence of a God is annihilated by the evolution scheme of Darwin. These infidels have perspicacity enough to see that the theistic position vacates their pretended scientific deductions as to the origin of structures and organisms. Let us explain. A murder has been committed in secret; there is no parole testimony, apparently, to unfold the mystery. The prosecutors therefore proceed, with exceeding industry, care, patience, and ingenuity, to collect the materials for a circumstantial argument, to fix the guilt upon Mr. X. Y. Z., against whom a vague suspicion has arisen. These lawyers note even the most trivial matters, the direction of the shot, the smell of gunpowder upon the garments of the corpse, the scrap of blackened paper which formed a part of the wadding of the gun, and a thousand other circumstances. They weave them into their hypothesis of X. Y. Z.'s guilt, with a skill which is apparently demonstrative. But there now steps forth a new witness, named L. M., and testifies that *he saw* the murder committed by another man, named A. B., who had not been hitherto connected with the event. Now, there is, natu-

rally, no antecedent impossibility that A. B. might commit a murder, or this murder. Let us suppose that such was the case. Every lawyer knows that the issue would now turn *solely upon the competency and credibility* of L. M. as a witness. If the prosecution desire still to sustain the proposition that X. Y. Z. is the murderer, they now have but one course open to them: they must successfully impugn the competency or credibility of L. M. If they admit these fully, their case against X. Y. Z. is naught; their circumstantial hypothesis falls to the ground, without a farther blow. That hypothesis was exceedingly plausible; the antecedent probabilities of its truth were great, or even almost conclusive? Yes. Still, if L. M. is true, they now conclude nothing. They show that X. Y. Z. *might have killed* the murdered man. L. M. shows that *actually he did not*. The conditions of the argument of infidel science against the Bible and the creative agency of God are exactly parallel. Their hypothesis may be, naturally speaking, every way probable; but the Bible comes in as a parole-witness, and testifies that God, and not nature, was the agent of this given work. Now, we believe that the Bible is a competent and credible witness. Hence its voice supersedes the "circumstantial evidence" here.

It is complained, that when we thus refuse to allow the maxim, "like effects imply like causes," to thrust itself into competition with the testimony of revelation upon these questions of the first origin of the world, we deprive mankind of its use in every scientific induction, and in all the experimental conclusions of practical life. Dr. Woodrow is not satisfied with the reply, that within the sphere of natural induction, where we are entitled to assume the absence of the supernatural, his canon is valid. He attempts to quote me against myself, as saying, on page 15 of my notes: "*It is not experience which teaches us that every effect has its cause; but the a priori reason. Very true, intuition, not mere experience, teaches us that every effect has its cause. That intuition is: had there been no cause, there would have been no effect.*" Had my doctrine been attended to, as developed in my sixth lecture, these words would have been found on page 49: "The doctrine of common sense here is, that when the mind sees an effect, it intuitively refers it to *some cause.*" For instance, when we come upon a stratified

rock, intuition necessarily refers its existence to *some cause*, either to God, or to watery action, or some other adequate natural agency. But the question is: *which cause?* If we are practically assured of the absence of the supernatural cause, then of course we must assign the effect to one or another natural cause. But *if we have good reason to think that the supernatural cause may possibly have been present*, then the attempt to confine that effect to a natural cause, upon the premise that "similar effects imply the same causes," obviously becomes an invalid induction. Now, should it appear that revelation testifies to the presence of the supernatural cause at a given juncture, that would be good reason to think, at least, its possible presence; and then the naturalistic induction becomes invalid. It obviously comes then into that class which Bacon stigmatizes as worthless for the purpose of complete demonstration, under the term, "*Inductio simplicis enumerationis.*" *Novum Organum*, Lib. I. § 105: "*Inductio enim, quæ procedit per enumerationem simplicem, res puerilis est, et precario, concludit, et periculo exponitur ab instantia contradictoria,*" etc. Yes; in the case in hand, the *instantia contradictoria* would be the instance of a supernatural origin, competently testified by revelation. Hear even the sensualistic philosopher, Mill, (*Logic*, p. 187): "But although we have always a propensity to generalize from unvarying experience, we are not always warranted in doing so. Before we can be at liberty to conclude that something is universally true because we have never known an instance to the contrary, it must be proved to us, that if there were in nature any instances to the contrary, we should have known of them," etc. This is, so far, sound logic. But now, should it be that the Bible testifies to structures supernaturally originated in a pre-Adamite time, it is obvious that we should *not* have known of them, for the simple reason that no human witness was extant. The universal reference of all structures to natural causes would be, according to Mill himself, in that case, the very induction we "were not warranted" in making. What can be plainer?

Dr. Woodrow cites as an instance the wine made of water by Christ, at Cana. He says, page 359, "Had one of the guests been questioned as to its origin, he would unhesitatingly have

said that it was the expressed juice of the grape. But, by unexceptionable testimony, it could have been proved that it had been water a few minutes before, and had never formed part of the grape at all. Now, in view of this fact, according to Dr. Dabney's reasoning, we are forever debarred from concluding that wine is the juice of the grape, unless we shall have first *proved the absence* of God's intervening power," etc. I reply: Not so. My position is, that we would be "debarred from concluding" that a given vessel of wine "was the juice of the grape," in the particular cases where "unexceptionable testimony" had "first proved the PRESENCE of God's intervening power." This one word removes all the confusions and misconceptions of the subsequent pages of his critique. Indeed, I desire no better instance than Dr. Woodrow's admission touching this wine of Cana to exemplify my view. Any sensible man, drinking good wine under ordinary circumstances, would of course suppose that it came from grapes. But if competent testimony showed that, in this case, a miracle-worker had been present, who had infinite power, and a benevolent motive, to make *this wine* without grapes, his good sense would not lead him, admitting the testimony, to argue that this must also have come from grapes, because all natural wine uniformly comes from that source. And my position is precisely parallel. We examine numerous structures, whose beginning we did not ourselves see, and they all wear, seemingly, the appearance of full and equal naturalness. We were about to ascribe them all, very naturally, to a natural source. But should "unexceptionable testimony" come in, asserting that some among them had a supernatural origin, we should then conclude, precisely as the man of "common sense" at Cana had to conclude, that *in this particular case, the inference from naturalness of qualities to a natural origin did not hold*. This is all I have ever asked. Dr. Woodrow concedes it.

But he argues that if I hold on this ground, that there never was any pre-Adamite earth—as he understands me to hold—then I must also hold that the fossils, in all deposits older than the Adamic, are a species of shams; that they never were alive; and that the existence of these portions of matter would be absolutely unaccountable. Indeed, he thinks I should be driven

to the belief, that the visible works of God are a lie; which is as disastrous as believing his Word a lie. But if, on the other hand, I do admit an earth existing one fortnight before Adam, the Scriptures are, upon my view of them, as fatally impugned as though an earth had existed a million of years before Adam. Hence, he thinks my main position would be useless, were it not false. Let us inspect the two horns of this cruel dilemma. As to the first: he will not allow me to say of the fossils, "We have no occasion to deny their organic character." He thinks my "whole argument rests upon the supposition that the fossils may have been created as we find them." He cannot see what else I mean by saying that if many of "these rocks" may have been created, then the pre-Adamite date of fossils falls also. He can only understand it in this way, either that the fossils never were anything but rock, or that God thrust them into the rocks after they had died, and after the rocks were made, which would be very preposterous.

Had Dr. Woodrow attended to my meaning, when I spoke of many of "these rocks" as possibly created, he would have understood me. He seems to suppose that I meant the fossiliferous rocks. In fact, I was speaking of the stratified but *non-fossiliferous* rocks—the *azoic* of his nomenclature. That geologists recognize quite a large mass of these, is plain from the fact that they have a separate division and name for them. Now they teach us that these *azoic*, but truly stratified rocks, were the work of the same sedimentary action which has through long ages produced the fossiliferous stratified rocks. I trust my meaning will now be seen. It is this: suppose it should be found that revelation testified these *azoic* sedimentary rocks, so-called, were not growing through long ages by deposition from water, but, along with some other things, were made by the almighty word of God. If that were granted, then the "laws, so-called, of stratigraphic succession," as established by geology, are without adequate proof; and it again becomes an open question—to which Scripture may possibly testify—when and how the living creatures which are now fossils did live, and when and how the deposits containing their remains were formed. I say, in that case, the geologists' present arrangement of stratigraphical succession is unproved. As I have stated, the *data*

from which they claim to have settled this order—proving, as they suppose, that some fossils are such ages upon ages older than some others—are of three kinds: the observed order of *strata* where they are actually in juxtaposition; the kinds of organic life they contain; and the material and structure of the *stratum* itself. Now, in the case supposed, this last *datum* has become inconclusive. One stone is lost from their arch of evidence, and the whole arrangement of the stratigraphic succession becomes unsettled. For the reasoning in support of it now involves a vicious circle. For instance, the geologist has concluded that the non-fossiliferous clay-slate is a very old stratified rock, because without fossils. Again, he has concluded that a certain species of fossil life is old, because formed in some *stratum* very near that very old slate. Then he concludes that some other *stratum* is also old, because that old species of fossils is found in it. But the basis of all these inferences is lacking in the case I have supposed, and the reasoning proceeds in a circle.

The other horn of the dilemma made for me is equally unstable. It was urged that, if I had to admit the existence of an earth one fortnight older than Adam, the interpretation placed on the Scriptures by the Westminster Assembly is as violently outraged as though that pre-Adamite earth were millions of years older than Adam; whence Dr. Woodrow supposes it to follow that my main position, if it were not false, would be useless. I have shown that it is not false; I will now show that, as with Prof. F. H. Smith, and so many other learned men, judges, it is of vital use, after we admit a pre-Adamite earth. Its use is, that it alone can save Dr. Woodrow and us from an endless *regressus* into a naturalistic atheism. Let us review that naturalistic argument, as the evolutionists and the atheist Büchner insist on using it, and as Dr. Woodrow claims it ought to be used, untrammelled by my position. The maxim, "Like effects imply like causes," must be pushed, say they, universally; if restricted by my rule, the very basis of experimental science is gone. But now, theism says that there were first things, somewhere in the past, created, and not evolved naturally. There was a first man, not naturally born of a mother, but created, the father of subsequent men. Yet this first man must also have been *natural* in

all his organization, in order to be the father of men. But had these physicists subjected his frame to their experimental investigation, they would have concluded that, because his organization was natural, his origin must have been natural. He, therefore, by their logic, was not the first man, but had a natural father. Who does not see that the same process of reasoning applies equally well to that supposed earlier man, and then to his father? Who does not see that the same logic, consistently followed, runs us back into an infinite natural series, without any first term, or first cause? Dr. Woodrow, then, must cease to oppose my doctrine, in order to save himself from the infidel evolution theory. And the evolutionist must accept my doctrine, in order to save himself from that absolute "eternity of naturalism, which is atheism." But if my doctrine is squarely accepted, then, on every question of the *αρχή* of things, of the *when* and the *how* of the origin of nature, the testimony of revelation properly and reasonably supersedes all natural inferences contradictory thereto, when once the testimony is clearly understood.

But *how* should that testimony of the Bible be understood? It would appear that I have been much misapprehended here, in spite of the caution with which I refrained from dogmatizing on this point. It has been supposed that my whole argument involves the assumption of that sense placed upon the Mosaic record by the Westminster Assembly, totally denying a pre-Adamite earth. I will therefore attempt to place my meaning beyond possible misconception. I say then, first, that I *have not postulated* the interpretation of the Westminster Assembly as the true one, and that I have not asked any one to commit himself to a denial of a pre-Adamite world in all forms. It may very well be that the science of Bible-exegesis is not yet dispassionate and mature enough on this point to authorize us to commit ourselves finally to *any* exposition of it, as I am very sure that such a final decision is not at all essential to our defence of the integrity and supreme authority of revelation. And it may also be true, that the inquiries and conclusions of geology are not yet mature enough for it to venture on the construction of a scientific theory on that point. I say, secondly, that if the supposition be made for argument's sake, that the interpretation of

the Westminster divines turned out some day to be the only scriptural one—the only one faithful to the inspired text—then my principles would still enable me to uphold the full authority of my Bible, reasonably, consistently, and philosophically, notwithstanding the seeming, natural analogies for an older date of the world. Note, dear reader, that I do not make that supposition, and I have no craving to do so. But let us, for argument's sake, look at it, as one may surmise it to return upon us. Suppose, I say, that after all the *pros* and *cons*, friends and enemies of Moses' inspiration should settle down to this conclusion that his language can in fairness mean only what the Westminster divines supposed, viz., that there was no pre-Adamite earth at all. Let us suppose that, while honest reverence led believers, like Dr. Woodrow and me, to this conclusion, that *all* the "scientists" had also settled down to the same, so far as to say, disdainfully, "Your Moses obviously can mean nothing but that, if he means anything; and it is, therefore, *we* reject him totally." Let us also represent to ourselves by what plausibilities a person who, like Mr. David N. Lord, holds this view, would support his assertion, that to this issue the universal opinion must come at last. He would remind us that the great body of Christians certainly understood Moses so, while unbiassed by the *stress* of this geological view; that while a few of the fathers and the Reformers understood Moses differently, yet the new interpretation, as he would call it, was, in fact, suggested and dictated by that geological stress, which was a little suspicious; that the Christian geologists, when driven by that stress, are vacillating and contradictory in their exegesis, which is again suspicious; that the Westminster divines, while probably very poor geologists, were exceedingly able and faithful expositors; and especially that *Moses' enemies are coming more and more openly to the position, that no such new interpretation can save his credit for inspiration.* Our imaginary expositor certainly has the facts with him on this last point. The tone of the scientific infidels is changing in this direction manifestly. Formerly they studied decency, and professed to be quite obliged to the Pye Smiths and Chalmers, who saved the consistency of the venerable Book with their science by means of the new interpretation. But now their *animus* is very different. They disdain to trouble them-

selves about these old literary remains of "Hebrew barbarians" and ignoramuses. No sense placed on them is of any importance to the scientific mind. Let the Westminster sense be the true one—which they think is most probably the only consistent one—for the man who is a fool enough to believe in the documents, these "scientists" easily disencumber themselves by kicking the whole aside as rubbish. Such is Huxley's mode, for instance.

Suppose now, for argument's sake, that we should at last be all compelled to settle down upon the Westminster construction. Then I, from my position, could still save my Bible, and do it consistently. Dr. Woodrow could not. I could say, this Bible is established by its own impregnable, independent evidences, moral, prophetic, historical, miraculous, to be a competent and credible witness to the supernatural agency of an Almighty Creator. I could say this omnipotent agency is competent to any result whatsoever. I could bring in my position, that in such a case the divine testimony logically supersedes the circumstantial evidence for a natural hypothesis, no matter how plausible; and my conclusion would not be superstition, but true logic and true science. If the unbelieving geologist thrust at me his difficulty about the seemingly ancient fossils, I could say, first, that the Divine Witness does not stand in need of an explanatory hypothesis from man to entitle him to be believed. I should say, secondly, that it was always credible that Infinite Wisdom might find a motive, and Infinite Power a means, to effectuate results very unaccountable to my mind. It might be, for instance, that this Omnipotent and Infinite Wisdom, working during the six days, and during the long antediluvian years, during the flood, and during the years succeeding, in times and places where there was no human witness, saw fit to construct these *strata*, and to sow them with vegetable and animal life with a prodigal profusion now unknown; and to hurry the maturing of *strata*, and the early death and entombment of these thronging creatures, with a speed very different from the speculations of geology; and all for profound motives good to his infinite wisdom, but beyond my weak surmises. I might also add that possibly this is what revelation meant, when it said (Gen. i. 20): "God said, let the waters bring forth *abundantly*," etc. I might point to the fact, that such

a divine working would not be wholly unwonted; that, for instance, he causes thousands of embryos of animal life to be produced and to perish without their proper development, for one that grows; that he sows the earth prodigally with vegetable germs which, if they ever sprout, sprout only to perish; that he sheds millions of rain-drops, such as are adapted by nature to water the herbs upon the barren wastes of ocean; that he gives to millions upon millions of flowers in the wilderness, destined only to be cropped by the irrational brute, the same æsthetic arrangement of color, shape and perfume which he has conferred on the flowers of our gardens, for the purpose of giving to rational, observing man the thrilling pleasures of taste. Why this seeming prodigal waste? It is no duty of mine to account for it. But God acts so! So, if he had told me that he had done a similar thing at the world's creation, I should be ready to believe it. But *I should believe it on the authority of God's express testimony, not on the strength of a mere hypothesis and a set of analogies which I have just described.*

I repeat again, I have no mission at this time to assert this Westminster construction of Moses as the only true one. It may be asked, why, then, do I argue its possibility? Why did I, in my former arguments, seem to imply that this might be the issue between the Bible and science? I answer: because I wished to illustrate the full value of this saving principle, by showing how, even in that aspect of the debate, it would defend us against infidelity.

And now I close. I beg the reader's pardon for detaining him so long, excusing myself by the honest plea, that my chief object is, not the vindication of any poor credit I may personally have, but the exposition of vital principles, which will, sooner or later, be found precious to all Christians. As against my rigid critic my purpose has been solely defensive; and if my haste or carelessness has let slip one word which, to the impartial reader, savors of aggression or retaliation, I desire that word to be blotted from memory. None can accord to Dr. Woodrow more fully than I do the honor of sincere devotion of purpose to the truth; or can join more cordially than I do in the wish that he may soon return home with recruited energies and prosperous health, to the work of defending truth.

MORALITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION.

THE prominent influence which lawyers exert in the community makes it a question of vital interest what are the ethical principles upon which the profession habitually regulate the performance of their professional duties. Their social standing is usually that of leaders in every society. As a class, they are almost uniformly men of education, and their studies of the science of the law, which is a great moral science, with their converse with all conditions of men, and all sorts of secular transactions, give them an intelligence and knowledge of the human heart which cannot but make them leaders of opinion. It is from this class that the most of our legislators and rulers, and all our judicial officers, must be taken. They are the agents by whose hands are managed nearly all the complicated transactions which involve secular rights, and interest the thoughts and moral judgments of men most warmly. But more; they are the stated and official expounders of those rights, and not the mere protectors of the possessions or material values about which our rights are concerned. In every district, town or county of our land, we may say with virtual accuracy, monthly, or yet more frequent, schools are held in which the ethical doctrines governing man's conduct to his fellow man are publicly and orally taught to the whole body of the citizens, with accessory circumstances, giving the liveliest possible interest, vividness and pungency to the exposition. Of these schools the lawyers are the teachers. Their lessons are presented, not in the abstract, like so many heard from the pulpit, but in the concrete, exemplified in cases which arouse the whole community to a living interest. Their lessons are endlessly varied, touching every human right and duty summed up in the second table of the law. They are usually intensely practical, and thus admit of an immediate and easy application. They are always delivered with animation, and often with an impressive eloquence. It is, therefore, obvious

that this profession must have fearful influence in forming the moral opinions of the community. The concern which the country has in their professional integrity, and in their righteous and truthful exercise of these vast powers, is analogous to that which the church has in the orthodoxy of her ministers. Nor are these influences of the legal profession limited to things secular; for the domains of morals and religion so intermingle that the moral condition of a people, as to the duties of righteousness between man and man, greatly influences their state towards God. It may well be doubted whether an acute and unprincipled bar does not do more to corrupt and ruin many communities than the pulpit does to sanctify and save them. These things at once justify the introduction of the topic into these discussions, and challenge the attention of Christian lawyers and readers to its great importance.

In describing what is believed to be the prevalent, though not universal, theory and usage of the bar, we would by no means compose our description out of those base arts which are despised and repudiated as much by honorable lawyers as by all other honest men. There is no need to debate the morality or immorality of the various tricks; the subornation of witnesses; the bribing of jurymen; the falsification of evidence in its recital; the misquotation or garbling of authorities; the bullying of truthful and modest persons placed in the witness' stand by no choice of their own; the shaving of the claims of clients in advance of a verdict by their own counsel, by which some lawyers disgrace their fraternity. This class are beyond the reach of moral considerations; and, concerning their vile iniquity, all honest men are already agreed. Nor, on the other hand, can we take the principles of that honorable but small minority as a fair exemplar of the theory of the profession, who defend in the bar no act or doctrine which their consciences would not justify in the sight of God, and who say and do nothing officially which they would not maintain as private gentlemen. This class, we fear, are regarded by their own fraternity rather as the puritans of the profession. It is believed that the theory of the great mass of reputable lawyers is about this: "that the advocate, in representing his client's interest, acts officially, and not personally, and, therefore, has no business to entertain, even as an advocate,

any opinion of the true merits of the case, for this is the function of the judge and jury; that the advocate's office, to perform which faithfully he is even sworn, is to present his client's cause in the most favorable light which his skill and knowledge of law will enable him to throw around it; and that if this should be more favorable than truth and justice approve, this is no concern of his, but of the advocate of the opposite party, who has equal obligation and opportunity to correct the picture; that not the advocate himself, but the judge and jury who sit as umpires, are responsible for the righteousness of the final verdict; that, according to the conception of the English law, a court is but a debating society, in which the advocates of plaintiffs and defendants are but the counterpoises, whose only function is the almost mechanical, or, at least, the merely intellectual one of pressing down each one his own scale, while an impartial judge holds the balance; that this artificial scheme is found by a sound experience to be—not, indeed, perfect—but, on the whole, the most accurate way to secure just verdicts in the main, and that this fact is the sufficient moral defence of the system.”

Now, it is not our intention, in impugning the morality of this theory, to charge the profession with immorality and dishonor, as compared with other professions. While the bar exhibits, like all other classes, evidences of man's sinful nature, it deserves, and should receive, the credit of ranking among the foremost of secular classes in honorable and generous traits. Lawyers may urge with much justice, that other professions habitually practice means of emolument strictly analogous to their official advocacy of a bad cause. The merchant, for instance, says all that he can say, truthfully, in commendation of his wares, and is silent concerning the *per-contras* of their defects. “To find out these,” he says, “is the buyer's business.” The farmer praises all the good points of the horse or the bullock he sells, and leaves the purchaser to detect the defects, if he can. It is not intended, then, to assert, that the practice of this theory of the advocate's duty is more immoral than other things commonly supposed reputable in other callings. The question to be gravely considered is: whether the greater importance of the advocate's profession, as affecting not only pecuniary and personal rights, but the moral sentiments and virtues of the

commonwealth, does not give a graver aspect to the errors of their theory of action. It is not that the bar is more immoral than commerce or agriculture; but that, if the bar acts on an immoral theory, it is so much more mischievous. Nor, again, is it asserted that the individual advocate is necessarily a vicious man, because the professional idea into which he is betrayed is a vicious one. It is not doubted that many men of social honor act out the idea of their office above described, who, if they were convinced of its error, would repudiate it conscientiously. It is not questioned that the professional intercourse of lawyers with each other is usually courteous, generous and fraternal, above most of the secular professions; that many magnanimous cases exist where peaceful counsels are given by them to angry litigants, so as to prevent controversies which would be extremely profitable to the advocates, if prosecuted; that there is no class of worldly men who usually respond more nobly to the claims of beneficence than lawyers; and that they deserve usually their social position in the front rank of the respectable classes. But, to recur to the truth already suggested, it should be remembered that their profession is not merely commercial or pecuniary in its concerns; it is intellectual and moral; it affects not only the interests but the virtues of the people: lawyers are their leaders and moral teachers. Therefore, they act under higher responsibilities than the mere man of dollars, and should be satisfied only by a higher and better standard. The merchant may, perhaps, lawfully determine his place of residence by regard to his profits: the preacher of the gospel may not; and should he do so, he would be held as recreant to his obligations. Why this difference? In like manner we may argue that should the lawyer act on a moral standard no higher than that of the mere reputable man of traffic, he would violate the obligations of his more responsible profession. But if this were not so, the obvious remark remains, that, if all other secular professions act unscrupulously, this is no standard, and no justification for the bar: to "measure ourselves by ourselves, and compare ourselves among ourselves is not wise." The only question with the answer to which true integrity will satisfy itself, is this: *whether the above theory of an advocate's functions is morally right.*

We shall begin a diffident and respectful attempt to prove that it is not, by questioning the accuracy of the plea of beneficial policy, in which it is asserted, that the administration of justice is, on the whole, better secured by this artificial structure of courts, than by any other means. We point to the present state of the administration of justice in our country; to the "glorious uncertainties of the law;" to the endless diversities and contradictions, not only of hired advocates of parties, but of dignified judges; to the impotence of penal law, and especially to the shameful and fearful license allowed among us to crimes of bloodshed; and ask, can this be a wholesome, a politic system, which bears such fruits? Is this the best judicial administration for which civilized, Christian, free nations may hope? Then, alas, for our future prospects! But it is notorious among enlightened men, that there are States, as for instance Denmark, Wurtemberg, Belgium, and even France, where the general purposes of order, security and equal rights—not, indeed, as towards the sovereign, but between citizen and citizen—are far better obtained in practice than they are among us, and that, in some cases, without our boasted trial by jury. Our system, judged by its fruits, is not even politic: it is a practical nuisance to the State. It may be well doubted whether, in spite of all our boasted equal rights, the practical protection this day given to life, limb and estate, by the unmitigated military despotism of the Governor-General of Cuba, not to say by the tyrannical government of Louis Napoleon, is not, on the whole, more secure and prompt and equitable, than that now enjoyed in many of the United States. And the worst feature is, that as the legal profession has increased with the growth of the country, and gotten more and more control over legal transactions, these defects of judicial administration have increased. It is urged in favor of this system of professional advocacy, that great practical injustice would frequently result from the inequality of knowledge, tact, fluency and talent in parties, if they did not enjoy the opportunity of employing counsel trained to the law and exercising their office in the spirit we have described. It would often happen, it is said, that a rich, educated, skilful man, might contend with a poor, ignorant and foolish one; but, by resorting to counsel, all these differences are equalized. It may

be justly asked, whether there are not inequalities in the skill and diligence of advocates, and whether the wealth which would give to the rich suitor so unjust an advantage over his poor adversary, if they pleaded their causes in person, does not, in fact, give an equally unjust advantage, in the numbers and ability of the counsel it enables him to secure, when those counsel are permitted to urge his cause beyond their own private convictions of its merits. We do not, of course, dream of any state of things in which professional advocates can be dispensed with wholly; minors, females, persons of feeble intellects, must have them in some form. But it is very doubtful whether as equitable results would not be reached in the main, were all other suitors, except the classes we have mentioned, obliged to appear *per se*, extreme as such a usage would be, as those reached under our present system. Cases are continually occurring, in which verdicts are obtained contrary to right, in virtue of inequalities in the members, reputation, talents, or zeal of opposing counsel, or of the untoward prejudices under which one party has to struggle. Especially is this assertion true of a multitude of cases in which the commonwealth is a party; for when this unscrupulous theory of an advocate's functions is adopted, it is universally found that the personal client on the one side is served with a different kind of zeal and perseverance from that exerted on the other side in behalf of that distant, imaginary, and vague personality, the State. This theory, therefore, probably does as much to create unfair inequalities as to correct them. And it usually happens that the advocate derives his warmth, his strongest arguments, and most telling points, from his conversations with the eager client, whom self-interest has impelled to view the controversy with all the force of a thoroughly aroused mind; that, in a word, the client does more to make the speech effective than his counsel.

But we are disposed to attach comparatively little importance to these considerations. Policy is not the test of right, on which side soever the advantage may lie; and we have too much faith in the immutable laws of rectitude, and in the providence of a holy God over human affairs, to believe that a true expediency is ever to be found in that which is immoral. In the final issue, that which is right will always be found most expedient. If,

therefore, the theory we oppose can be shown to be immoral, there will be no need to reply to the assertion of its expediency.

We remark, then, in the second place, that it is a presumptive reason against this theory of the lawyer's functions, that so constant a tendency is exhibited by individuals of the profession to descend to a still lower grade of expedients and usages in the pursuit of success. While the honorable men of the profession stop at the species of advocacy we have defined, there is another part, a minority we would fain hope, who show a constant pressure towards practices less defensible. To that pressure some are ever yielding, by gradations almost insensible, until the worst men of the body reach those vile and shameless arts which are the *opprobrium* of the bar. It is greatly to be feared that this tendency downwards is manifesting itself more and more forcibly in our country as the numbers of the profession increase, and competition for subsistence becomes keener. Now, our argument is not so much in the fact that the profession is found to have dishonest members; for then the existence of quacks and patent medicines might prove the art of the physicians to be immoral; but in the fact that the honorable part of the bar are utterly unable to draw any distinct and decisive line, compatibly with their principles, to separate themselves from the dishonorable. The fact to which we point is, then, that men who practice in their clients' behalf almost every conceivable grade of art and argument unsustained by their own secret conscience, short of actual lying and bribery, consider themselves as acting legitimately under the theory of the profession; and their more scrupulous brethren, who hold the same theory, cannot consistently deny their claim. If the advocate may go farther in the support of his client's case than his own honest judgment of its merits would bear him out; we ask, at what grade of sophistry must he stop? Where shall the line be drawn? If he may with propriety blink one principle of equity or law, in his behalf, may he not for a similar reason blink two? If he may adroitly and tacitly, but most effectively, insinuate a sophistry in his favor, might he not just as well speak it boldly out? The *suppressio veri* not seldom amounts to a *suggestio falsi*. And if the duty to the client, with the constitution of the court, justify the insinuation or assertion of a sophistry, by what reason can it be

shown that they will not justify the insinuation of a falsehood? A sophistry is a logical falsehood; and if he who offers it comprehends its unsoundness, we cannot see how he is less truly guilty of falsehood than he who tells a lie. To speak falsehood is knowingly to frame and utter a proposition which is not true. He who knowingly urges a sophistical argument does in substance the same thing; he propagates, if he does not utter, a false proposition, namely, the conclusion of his false argument. But we may fairly press this reasoning yet further. No one will deny that when the advocate, as an advocate, suppresses truth, or insinuates a claim more than just to his client, or less than just to his adversary, any such act would be *iusincere*, and therefore immoral, if it were done as an individual and private act. The circumstances which are supposed to justify it are, that he is not acting for himself, but for another, not individually, but officially; that there is an antagonist whose professional business it is to see that he gets no undue advantage for his client, and that the lawyer is not bound to form any private opinion whatever about the question, whether the advantages he is procuring for his client are righteous or not, that being the business of the judge and jury. These circumstances, it is claimed, make that professionally innocent which would otherwise be a positive sin. Why, then, may they not justify the commission of any other sin which would be profitable to the client; and what limit would there be to the iniquities which professional fidelity might demand, provided only the client's case were bad enough to need them? If it is right, for his sake, "to make the worst appear the better cause," why not also falsify testimony, or garble authorities, or bribe jurors, or suborn perjurers, if necessary to victory? It would be hard to affix a consistent limit, for the greater urgency of the client's case would justify the greater sin. It is no answer to this to say that the latter expedients would be wrong, because the opposite party is entitled to expect that the controversy will be conducted with professional fairness, and that no advantage will be sought, which professional skill and knowledge may not be supposed able to detect and rebut if the party seeking it is not fairly entitled to it. For, according to the theory under discussion, this professional fairness is itself a conventional thing, and not the same with absolute righteousness; and

any conduct which was conventionally recognized for the time being would come up to the definition. So that the party secretly contemplating the employment of some of these vile expedients, would only have to notify his antagonist in general terms, to be on the lookout for any imaginable trick, in order to render his particular trick professionally justifiable. And it is wholly delusive to urge that the advantage sought by one party is legitimate, because it is only such a one as the opposing party may be expected to detect and counteract by his skill, if competent for his professional duties as he professes ; for the reason why the given artifice called legitimate is used in any case is just this, that it is supposed the opposing party will not have skill enough to detect and counteract it. Its concealment from him is the sole ground for the hope of success in using it ; and it is a mere evasion to say that it is such a legal artifice as the opponent's legal skill may reasonably be supposed competent to meet ; when, in that particular case, it is used for the very reason that it is believed his skill will not be competent to meet it. It is used because it is hoped that it will remain as much undetected and unanswered as would the illegitimate tricks of falsification and bribery. We believe, therefore, that if the advocate may transgress the line of absolute truth and righteousness at all in his client's behalf, there is no consistent stopping place. No limit can be consistently drawn, and the constant tendencies of a part of the profession with the various grades of license which different advocates, called reputable, allow themselves, indicate the justice of this objection.

We may properly add just here that, even if the theory we oppose were in itself moral, it might yet be a grave question whether it is moral to subject one's self to a temptation so subtle and urgent as that which allures the advocate to transgress the legitimate limit. Tho limit is confessedly a conventional one at any rate, and not absolutely coincident with what would be strict righteousness, if the person were acting individually and privately ; it is separated from immoral artifices by no broad, permanent, consistent line ; the gradation which leads down from the practices called reputable, to those allowedly base, is one composed of steps so slight as to be almost invisible ; and the desire to conquer, so vehemently

stimulated by the forensic competition, will almost surely seduce even the scrupulous conscience to transgress. No sinner has a right to subject his infirm and imperfect virtue to so deadly a trial.

In the third place, we respectfully object to the lawfulness of the attitudes in which this theory of the profession places the advocate. It claims that the court is but the debating society, in which the function of the two parties of lawyers is, not to decide the justice of the cause, that being the function of judge and jury, but to urge, each side, all that can be professionally urged in favor of its own client; and that out of this *ex parte* struggle, impartially presided over by the listening umpire, there will usually proceed the most intelligent and equitable decision. But the fatal objection is: that even if the latter claim were true, we might "not do evil that good might come." And truth and right are sacred things, which carry an immediate, universal, inexorable obligation to every soul in every circumstance, if he deals with them at all, to deal with them according to their reality. Man is morally responsible for every act he performs which has moral character or consequences; and no circumstance or subterfuge authorizes him to evade this bond. His maker will allow him to interpose no conventionality, no artificial plea of official position between him and his duty. Every act which has moral character man performs personally, and under an immediate personal responsibility. The mere statement of this moral truth is sufficient to evince its justness; the conscience sees it by its own light; and it is obvious that unless God maintained his moral government over individuals in this immediate, personal way, he could not maintain it practically at all. Some form of organization might be devised to place men in a conventional, official position, in which everything might be done which a sinful desire might crave, and thus every law of God might be evaded. In a word, whatever else a man may delegate by an artificial convention of law, he cannot delegate his responsibility; that is as inalienable as his identity. And it is equally impossible for man voluntarily and intelligently to assume the doing of a vicarious act, and leave the whole guilt of that act cleaving to his principal. His deed, in consenting to act vicariously, is his personal, indi-

vidual deed, lying immediately between him and his God; and if the deed has moral quality at all, it is his own personal morality or immorality.

Now, truth and right are concerned in every legal controversy. But these are things to which moral character essentially belongs. If a man speaks, he ought to speak truth; if he handles a right, he ought to handle it righteously. Lawyers seem to feel as though this conventional theory of the courts of law had no more moral quality attaching to it than the apparatus by which the centre of gravity of a ship is restored to the middle, as she leans to one side or the other. The honest sailor seizes the lever by which he moves his ponderous chest of cannon balls or chain cable, and when the sliding of some heavy part of the cargo in the hold, or the impulse of wind or wave causes the ship to lurch to the larboard, he shoves his counterpoise to the starboard side. He tells you that his object is, not to throw the ship on her beam ends, but to maintain a fair equilibrium, by going as much too far on the one side as the disturbing force had gone on the other. And this is all right enough. The forces which he moves or counterbalances are dead, senseless, soulless, without responsibility. But it is altogether otherwise when we come to handle truth and right. For they are sacred things. They can in no sense be touched without immediate moral obligation; and to pervert a truth or right on the one hand, in order that a similar perversion on the other hand may be counterbalanced, is sin, always and necessarily sin; it is the sin of meeting one wicked act by another wicked act, or, at best, of "doing evil that good may come." An attempt may be made at this point to evade this clear principle of morals by means of the confusion of thought produced by an appeal to a false analogy. Perhaps some such illustration as this may be presented: the soldier obeys his officer; he honestly, fairly and mercifully performs the tasks assigned him in his lawful profession, and yet sometimes takes life in battle. Now, suppose the war to which his commander leads him is an unrighteous war? All must admit that every death perpetrated by the unrighteous aggressor, in that war, is a murder in God's sight. But we justly conclude that this dreadful guilt all belongs to the wicked sovereign and legislature who declare the war, and not to the pas-

sive soldier who merely does his duty in obeying his commander. Hence, it is asserted, "the principle appears false; and there may be cases in which it is lawful for a man to do vicariously, or officially, what it would be wrong to do individually."

We reply that the general proposition thus deduced is one essentially different from the one which our principle denies. To say that a man may lawfully do some things vicariously or officially, which he may not do privately and individually, is a totally different thing from saying that if an act would be immediately and necessarily wrong in itself, whenever and however done, the agent who does that act for another may still be innocent in doing it, because he acts for another. But the latter is the proposition which must be proved, in order to rebut our principles. We remark further upon the illustration above stated, that there are several fundamental differences between the case of the soldier and that of the advocate who professionally defends his client's wrong-doing. One is, that the soldier, in the case supposed, has not volunteered of his own free choice to fight in this particular war which is unrighteous. If he has, then we can by no means exculpate him from a share in the guilt of all the murders which the wicked sovereign perpetrates in battle by his hand. It is only when the soldier is draughted into this service without his option, and compelled by the laws of his country, that we can exculpate him. But the advocate has chosen his own profession freely in the first instance, and he chooses each particular case which he advocates, with whatever justice it may involve. For, whatever fidelity he may suppose his professional oath, perhaps thoughtlessly taken, compels him to exercise in behalf of his unrighteous client, after he has made him his client, certainly he is not compelled to undertake his case at all unless he chooses.

Another minor difference of the two cases is, that the soldier, not being a civilian by profession and habit, is competent to have very few thoughts or judgments about the abstract righteousness of the war to which his sovereign has sent him; whereas, it is the very trade and profession of the lawyer to investigate the righteousness or wrongfulness of transactions; so that if, indeed, he is aiding his client to perpetrate an injustice, he is the very man of all others who should be most distinctly aware

of the wrong about to be done. But the chief and all-sufficient difference of the two cases is, that all killing is not murder ; but all utterance of that which is known to be not true is lying. The work of slaying may or may not be rightful ; the case where the lawful soldier, obeying his commander in slaying in battle, commits murder, is the exceptional case, not indeed in frequency of occurrence perhaps, but in reference to the professed theory of legitimate government. But to the rule of truth and right there is no exception ; all known assertion of untruth is sin. How comes it that the profession of slaying as an agent for the temporal sovereign, as a soldier or sheriff, for instance, is in any case a righteous one ? Only because there are cases in which the sovereign may himself righteously slay. And in those cases, it may be that this right to slay, which the sovereign himself possesses, may be held properly by another person by delegation. But no man can delegate what he does not possess. The client cannot therefore delegate, in any case, to his lawyer, the function of making his wrong-doing appear right, because it would be in every case wrong for him to do it himself. And here we are brought to a point where we may see the utter absurdity of all the class of illustrations we are combating. For lawyers will themselves admit that if they acted individually and privately when they present pleas which they are aware are unjust, it would be sin. Their defence is that they do it officially. Well, then, if the client did it for himself, it would be sin ; how can the lawyer, his agent, derive from him the right to do what he has himself no right to do ? Or, will it be said that the official right of the advocate to act for a given client is not delegated to him from that client, but from the State which licensed him as an advocate ? We think this is a doctrine which clients would be rather slow to admit. And again, the State is as utterly devoid as the client of all right to misrepresent truth and right. God has given to the civil magistrate the right to slay murderers and invaders, but he has given to no person nor commonwealth under heaven the right to depart from the inexorable lines of truth and right.

This great truth brings us back to the doctrine of each man's direct and unavoidable responsibility to God, for all his acts possessing moral character or moral consequences. Now, in per-

forming our duty, God requires us always to employ the best lights of reason and conscience he has given us, to find out for ourselves what is right. It is man's bounden duty to have an opinion of his own concerning the lawfulness of every act he performs, which possesses any moral quality. God does not permit us to employ any man or body of men on earth as our conscience-keepers. How futile, then, is the evasion presented at this point by the advocates of the erroneous theory, "that the lawyer is not to be supposed to know the unrighteousness of his client's cause; that it is not his business to have any opinion about it, but, on the contrary, the peculiar business of the judge and jury; nay, that he is not entitled to have any opinion about it, and would be wrong if he had, for the law presumes every man innocent till after he is proved wicked; and when the advocate performs his functions, no verdict has yet been pronounced by the only party authorized to pronounce one." The fatal weakness of this feeble sophistry is in this, that these assertions concerning the exclusive right of the judge and jury to decide the merits of the case are only true as to one particular relation of the client. The judge and jury are the only party authorized to pronounce the client wrong or guilty, as concerns the privations of his life, liberty or property. It would, indeed, be most illegal and unjust for lawyer or private citizen to conclude his guilt in advance of judicial investigation, in the sense of proceeding thereupon to inflict that punishment which the magistrate alone is authorized to inflict. But this is all. If any private, personal right or duty of the private citizen, or of any one, is found to be dependent on the innocence or wickedness of that party before the court, it is a right and duty to proceed to form an opinion of his character, as correct as may be, by the light of our own consciences, in advance of judicial opinion, or even in opposition to it. Yea, we cannot help doing so, if we try.

Now, the question which the advocate has to ask himself as to an unrighteous client is: "shall I professionally defend his unrighteousness, or shall I not?" And that question involves an unavoidable duty, and constitutes a matter personal, private and immediate, between him and his God. In deciding that he will not lend his professional assistance to that man's unrighteous-

ness, he decides a personal duty; he does not touch the bad man's franchises, nor anticipate his judicial sentence. Let us illustrate. Many years ago, an advocate, distinguished for his eloquence and high social character, successfully defended a vile assassin, and, by his tact, boldness and pathos, secured a verdict of acquittal. When the accused was released, he descended into the crowd of the court house, to receive the congratulations of his degraded companions, and, almost wild with elation, advanced to his advocate, offering his hand, with profuse expressions of admiration and gratitude. The dignified lawyer sternly joined his own hands behind his back and turned away, saying: "I touch no man's hand that is foul with murder." But in what light did this advocate learn that this criminal was too base to be recognized as a fellow man? The court had pronounced him innocent! It was only by the light of his private judgment—a private judgment formed not only in advance of, but in the teeth of, the authorized verdict. Where, now, were all the quibbles by which this honorable gentleman had persuaded himself to lend his professional skill to protect from a righteous doom a wretch too vile to touch his hand? as that "the lawyer is not the judge; that he is not authorized to decide the merits of the case?" Doubtless, this lawyer's understanding spoke now, clear enough, in some such terms as these: "my hand is my own; it is purely a personal question to myself whether I shall give it to this murderer; and, in deciding that personal question, I have a right to be guided by my own personal opinion of him. In claiming this, I infringe no legal right to life, liberty or possessions, which the constituted authorities have restored to him." But *was not his tongue his own*, in the same sense with his hand? Was not the question, whether he could answer it to his God for having used his tongue to prevent the punishment of crime, as much a private, personal, individual matter, to be decided by his own private judgment, as the question whether he should shake hands with a felon? Let us suppose another case: a prominent advocate defends a man of doubtful character from the charge of fraud, and rescues him, by his skill, from his well-deserved punishment. But now this scurvy fellow comes forward and claims familiar access to the society of the honorable lawyer's house, and aspires to the hand of his daughter in marriage. He imme-

diately receives a significant hint that he is not considered worthy of either honor. But he replies: "You, Mr. Counsellor, told your conscience that it was altogether legitimate to defend my questionable transactions professionally, because the law did not constitute you the judge of the merits of the case, because the law says every man is to be presumed to be innocent till convicted of guilt by the constituted tribunal, and because you were not to be supposed to have any opinion about my guilt or innocence. Now the constituted authorities have honorably acquitted me—at your advice! I claim, therefore, that you shall act out your own theory, and practically treat me as an honorable man." We opine the honorable counsellor would soon see through his own sophistry, and reply that those principles only applied to his civic treatment of him as a citizen; that his house and his daughter were his own; and that he was entitled, yea, solemnly bound, in disposing of them, to exercise the best lights of his private judgment. So say we, and nothing can be so intimately personal and private, so exclusively between a man and his God, as his concern in the morality of his own acts. Since God holds every man immediately responsible for the way in which he deals with truth and right, whenever and in whatever capacity he deals with them, there can be no concern in which he is so much entitled and bound to decide for himself in the light of his own honest conscience. The advocate is bound, therefore, to form his own independent opinion, in God's fear, whether in assisting each applicant he will be assisting wrong, or asserting falsehood. This preliminary question he ought to consider, not professionally, but personally and ethically. Let every man rest assured that God's claims over his moral creatures are absolutely inevitable. He will not be cheated of satisfaction to his outraged law by the plea that the wrong was done professionally; and when the *lawyer* is suffering the righteous doom of his professional misdeeds, how will it fare with the *man*?

Our fourth consideration is but an extension and application of the great principle of personal responsibility which we have attempted to illustrate above. We would group together the practical wrongs which evolve in the operation of this artificial and immoral theory; we would invite our readers to look at their enormity, and to ask themselves whether it can be that

these things are innocently done. Let the conscience speak; for its warm and immediate intuitions have a logic of their own, less likely to be misled by glaring sophistry than the speculations of the head. And here we would paint not so much the judicial wrongs directly inflicted by suitors unrighteously successful; for here the lawyer might seem not so directly responsible. We might, indeed, point to the case in which plausible fraud succeeds in stripping the deserving, the widow, the orphan, of their substance, inflicting thus the ills of penury; or to that in which slander or violence is enabled to stab the peace of innocent hearts, undeterred by fear of righteous retribution; and ask the honest, unsophisticated mind, can he be innocent who, though not advising, nor perpetrating such wrongs in his individual capacity, has yet prostituted skill, experience, and perhaps eloquence, to aid the perpetrator? Can it be right? But we would speak rather of those evils which proceed directly from the advocate himself in his own professional doings. Here is a client who has insidiously won subtle advantages over his neighbor in business, until he has gorged himself with ill-gotten gain. He applies to the reputable lawyer to protect him against the righteous demand of restitution. The lawyer undertakes his case, and thenceforth he thinks it his duty, not indeed to falsify evidence, or misquote law, or positively to assert the innocence of injustice, but to put the best face on questionable transactions which they will wear—to become the apologist of that which every honorable man repudiates. Now, we speak not of the wrongs of the despoiled neighbor; of these it may be said the client is the immediate agent. But there stands a crowd of eager, avaricious, grasping listeners, each one hungry for gain, and each one learning from this professional expounder of law how to look a little more leniently on indirection and fraud; how to listen a little more complacently to the temptations before which his own feeble rectitude was tottering already; how to practice on his own conscience the deceit which “divides a hair between north and northwest side;” until the business morality of the country is widely corrupted. Can this be right? Can he be innocent who produces such results, for the selfish motive of a fee? But worse still; a multitude of crimes of violence are committed, and when their bloody perpetrators are

brought before their country's bar, professional counsel fly to the rescue, and try their most potent arts. See them rise up before ignorant and bewildered juries, making appeals to weak compassion, till the high sentiment of retributive justice is almost ignored by one-half of the community. Hear them advocate before eager crowds of heady young men, already far too prone to rash revenge, the attractive but devilish theory of "the code of honor;" or assert, in the teeth of God's law and man's, that the bitterness of the provocation may almost justify deliberate assassination; or paint, in graphic touches, which make the cheek of the young man tingle with the hot blood, the foul scorn and despite of an unavenged insult, until the mind of the youth in this land has forgotten that voice pronounced by law both human and divine, "vengeance is mine, I will repay," and is infected with a dreadful code of retaliation and murder; until the course of justice has come to be regarded as so impotently uncertain, that the instincts of natural indignation against crime disdain to wait longer on its interposition, and introduce the terrific *regime* of private vengeance, or mob-law; and until the land is polluted with blood which cries to heaven from the earth. Can it be right that any set of men, in any function or attitude, should knowingly contribute to produce such a fatal disorganization of public sentiment; and that, too, for the sake of a fee, or of rescuing a guilty wretch from a righteous doom which he had plucked down on his own head? Can it be right? And now, will any man argue that God hath no principle of responsibility by which he can bring all the agents of such mischiefs as these into judgment? That such things as these can be wrought in the land, and yet the class of men who have in part produced them can, by a set of professional conventionalities, juggle themselves out of their responsibility for the dire result? Nay, verily, there is yet a God that judgeth in the earth. But if such a theory as the one we have discussed were right, while bearing such fruits, his government would be practically abdicated.

The fifth and last consideration is drawn from man's duty to himself. The highest duty which man owes to himself is to preserve and improve his own virtue. Our race is fallen, and the reason and conscience which are appointed for our inward

guides are weakened and dimmed. But yet God places in our power a process of moral education by which they may be improved. The habit of acting rightly confirms their uncertain decisions, and a thorough rectitude of intention and candor act as the "euphrasy and rue" which clarify our mental vision. How clear, then, the obligation to employ those high faculties in such a way that they shall not be perverted and sophisticated? There is no lesson of experience clearer than this, that the habit of advocating what is not thoroughly believed to be right, perverts the judgment and obfuscates the conscience, until they become unreliable. No prudent instructor would approve of the advocacy of what was supposed to be error by the pupils in a debating society. Such an association was formed by a circle of pious young men in the country; and once upon a time it was determined to debate the morality of the manufacture of ardent spirits. But it was found that all were of one mind in condemning it. So, to create some show of interest, one respectable young man consented to assume the defence of the calling, "for argument's sake." The result was, that he unsettled his own convictions, and ultimately spent his life as a distiller, in spite of the grief and urgent expostulations of his friends, the censures of his church, and the uneasiness of a restless conscience. Nothing is better known by sensible men than the fact that experienced lawyers, while they may be acute and plausible arguers, are unsafe judges concerning the practical affairs of life. They are listened to with interest, but without confidence. Their ingenious orations pass for almost nothing, while the stammering and brief remarks of some unsophisticated farmer carry all the votes. The very plea by which advocates usually justify their zeal in behalf of clients seemingly unworthy of it, confesses the justice of these remarks. They say that they are not insincere in their advocacy, that they speak as they believe; because it almost always occurs that after becoming interested in a case, they become thoroughly convinced of the righteousness of their own client's cause. Indeed, not a few have said that no man is a good advocate who does not acquire the power of thus convincing himself. But there are two parties to each case. Are the counsel on both sides thus convinced of the justice of their own causes, when of course, at least, one

must be wrong? Fatal power : to bring the imperial principles of reason and conscience so under the dominion of self-interest and a fictitious zeal, that in one-half the instances they go astray, and are unconscious of their error! It has been remarked of some men famous as politicians, who had spent their earlier years as advocates, that they were as capable of speaking well on the wrong side as on the right of public questions, and as likely to be found on the wrong side as on the right.

Now, it is a fearful thing to tamper thus with the faculties which are to regulate our moral existence, and decide our immortal state. It may not be done with impunity. Truth has her sanctities ; and if she sees them dishonored, she will hide her vital beams from the eyes which delighted to see error dressed in her holy attributes, until the reprobate mind is given over to delusions, to believe lies. Were there no force in any thing which has preceded, duty to one's self would constitute a sufficient reason against the common theory of the advocate's office.

We conclude, therefore, that the only moral theory of the legal profession is that which makes conscience preside over every official word and act in precisely the same mode as over the private, individual life. It does not appear how the virtuous man can consistently go one inch farther, in the advocacy of a client's cause, than his own honest private judgment decides the judge and jury ought to go ; or justify in the bar anything which he would not candidly justify in his own private circle ; or seek for any client anything more than he in his soul believes righteousness demands. "Whatsoever is more than these, cometh of evil." It may be very true, that if all lawyers practiced this higher theory, the numbers and business of the profession would be vastly abridged. If the fraudulent exactor could find no one to become the professional tool of unjust designs ; if the guilty man, seeking to evade justice, were told by his advocate that his defence of him should consist of nothing but a watchful care that he had *no more than justice* meted out to him ; it is possible clients would be few, and litigation rare. But is it certain that any good man would regret such a result? It might follow, also, that he who undertook to practice the law on this Christian

theory would find that he had a narrow and arduous road along which to walk. We, at least, should not lament, should Christian young men conclude so. Then, perhaps, the holy claims of the gospel ministry might command the hearts of some who are now seduced by the attractions of this attractive but dangerous profession.

THE STATE FREE SCHOOL SYSTEM IMPOSED UPON VIRGINIA BY THE UNDERWOOD CONSTITUTION.

DR. DABNEY,

He Has A Few Words to Say in Reply to Dr. Ruffner.

Repelling the Charge of Inconsistency—An Advocate of Universal Education, Provided it is True Education—The Old Virginia Plan—School Houses and Jails—Educated Criminals—A Few Comparative Figures—Drenching and Drinking—Home Education.

I.

Hampden Sidney, Va., April 18, 1876.

To W. H. Ruffner, Esq., Superintendent of State Schools:

Dear Sir:—You have undesignedly done the cause of truth a service by so assailing the Virginia doctrines as advanced by me in the *Southern Planter* as to awaken the public curiosity to their defence. That defence I propose to continue in a brief reply to you by facts and arguments alone. I do not propose to follow you into any personalities. I am perfectly aware that my person is, to the people of Virginia, too unimportant for them to feel interested in a squabble over its consistency or credit. I presume that their feeling for your private person also is not very different. For an important principle they may care. While my humble sphere as a minister and teacher may render the great public indifferent to me personally, my employers and neighbors, who know me, need no defence of my personal credit from any disparagement from what quarter soever. They know that my position is thoroughly consistent and independent; that in my own education I never received from Church or State one dollar of eleemosynary aid; and that I have neither neglected nor abused any official trust committed to me.

You think it inconsistent in me to disapprove any free school because, you say, I am a professor in a "free school"—a theological seminary. This seminary is indeed truly "a free school." "I thank the Jew for that word." Founded and sustained by the *spontaneous, unforced gifts* of good men, it gives free tuition in divinity to young men *of all denominations*—even the most opposed to the donors—seeking the ministry. It is honestly and really a "free school"—supported by free gifts, attended by free, voluntary pupils. No penny of the salary of its teachers is exacted by the tax-gatherer from unwilling hands to pay for a project or an inculcation which they disapprove. Your "free schools," like not a few of the other pretensions of Radicalism, are in fact exactly opposite to the name falsely assumed. The great bulk of those who pay the money for them do it, not "freely," but by compulsion. They are virtually thrust down our throats by the bayonet. And the exemplars you most boast and imitate not only make the payment compulsory, but the attendance also, as your consistency will doubtless cause you to do in Virginia also in a few years. The only freedom of your system is *your freedom* to compel other people's money.

Your attacks on me breathe a great glorying in the strength of your party. Their tone seems to cry: "Oh, vain man; seest thou not that thou resistest the inevitable? With us are all Kaisers, and all demagogues, and all their minions, and all tax-gatherers, and all tax-consumers. Who art thou against so many?" Well, perhaps, nobody. But it is precisely in this that every prudent, reflecting Virginian sees the conclusive argument against your plan. Our true statesmen always taught us that government should not be allowed to go into any project aside from its direct, legitimate ends, especially if that project would subsidize many persons and create for them a motive of personal advantage to uphold it. Because whenever that project might be wrested to mischief, these interested motives might prevent a wholesome and necessary repeal. Such is precisely the case with your project. It has become mischievous and tyrannical, in that it forces on us the useless, impracticable, and dishonest attempt to teach literary arts to all negroes, when the State is unable to pay its debts and provide for its welfare, and has just been despoiled of its pos-

sessions by violence. And just so soon as a feeble voice is raised against this wrong, you flaunt before us this fact, that the vicious system has corrupted and subsidized so many minds that the friends of right are powerless! Why, this is the very demonstration that I am right. This is the crowning condemnation of your system.

You seem also to think I wrote with great severity. I did write with great severity in one sense. How came you to overlook the fact, which every dispassionate reader saw, that my severity was all aimed, not at Virginia, but at her conquerors and oppressors? Was it because you found yourself in fuller sympathy with those conquerors than with your oppressed fellow-citizens? Take heed, lest some, less your friends than I, should conclude so.

Notwithstanding your glorying, then, I mean once more to assert the unfashionable truth. Truth is never out of date. It has sometimes happened that a tentative experience has thrown so much light upon a bad system as to re-open the discussion with better guidance than the previous. If the American people, after enjoying this bepraised system, are so deficient in candor and intelligence that they cannot review and amend wrong action, this is sufficiently convictive of the worthlessness of the plan.

Let me also, at the outset, arrest all invidious outcry by saying that I am an advocate of the most universal education possible, provided it be true education. I heartily recognize all the teachings of the golden rule, of philanthropy, and of equality (so far as equality is righteous), which prompt us to desire for all our fellow-creatures, so far as possible, all the advantages of culture we value for ourselves—and that without distinguishing against classes. Let me say, once for all, *I am an advocate for the State's providing, if necessary, all the aid for poor children's schooling which is really desirable and will be really utilized by them—that is,* UPON THE OLD VIRGINIA PLAN. I wish to satisfy the most overweening by the express admission that universal education would be a good thing, were it practicable. The argument is that under that providential order which God has imposed upon society, the effectual literary education of all is impossible, and therefore the promise of it is delusive and mischevius, and that when the State is an American demo-

cracy, especially, it is no safe or suitable agent for doing the work.

We begin by reasserting the familiar objection, so often contemptuously dismissed, that the principle upon which the State intrudes into the parental obligation and function of educating all children, is dangerous and agrarian. It is the teaching of the Bible and of sound political ethics that the education of children belongs to the sphere of the family and is the duty of the parents. The theory that the children of the Commonwealth are the charge of the Commonwealth is a pagan one, derived from heathen Sparta and Plato's heathen republic, and connected by regular, logical sequence with legalized prostitution and the dissolution of the conjugal tie. The dispensation of Divine Providence determines the social grade and the culture of children on their reaching adult age by the diligence and faithfulness of their parents, just as the pecuniary condition of children at that epoch is determined. The desire of procuring for their children a desirable condition in all these respects is the grand *stimulus* which Providence has provided for the efforts of parents. It is His ordination that youth shall inherit the *status* provided for them by their parents, and *improved it by their own exertions* as aided by the Christian philanthropy of their fellow-men. Now, by what apology does the State (not an evangelical, nor an eleemosynary institute by its nature) justify itself in stepping in to revolutionize that order? By the plea that it (the State) is so vitally interested in the intelligence of the citizens that this entitles her to take effectual means for preventing their ignorance. See, now, whither this assumption leads. The morality of the citizens is far more essential to the welfare of the State; and the only effectual basis for morals is the Christian religion. Therefore the State would be yet more bound to take order that all youth be taught Christianity. And this is just the argument by which Dr. Chalmers and Mr. Gladstone (before his political somersaults began) strenuously defended church establishments. Again, physical destitution of the citizens is as dangerous to the State as ignorance; therefore the State would be entitled to interfere for her own protection and repair that calamitous condition of destitution which their own and their parents' vices and laziness have entailed on a part of the people, by confiscating, for their relief, the honestly-

earned property of the virtuous and thrifty and their children. The last two inferences are precisely as fair as the first. Principles always bear their fruits; and the friends of this principle will in due time become consistent, and claim at least the last inference, along with the first. They are not likely to adopt the second, because the culture and ethics of the "common school" will leave them, after a time, too corrupt and atheistic to recognize the value of morality or its source—the Christian religion.

We often hear this apology for the State's wholesale intrusion into education advanced with the exactness of a commercial transaction. They say: "It costs less money to build school-houses than jails." But what if it turns out that the State's expenditure in school-house is one of the things which necessitates the expenditure in jails? The fruits of the system show that such is the result, and hence the plea for the State's intrusion is utterly delusive. The regular result of the kind of education which alone it can give is to propagate crime. Allison's History of Europe states that forty years ago two-thirds of the inhabitants of France could neither read nor write. In Prussia, at the same time, the government had made secular education almost universal, by compelling parents to send their children to school from seven to fourteen years of age. Statistics of the two countries show that serious crime was at that time *fourteen times as prevalent* in intelligent Prussia as in ignorant France—volume V., page 15. Again it has been found from the official records of the 86 departments of France that the amount of crime has, without a single exception, been in proportion to the amount of scholastic instruction given in each. Again, we are told that much the largest number of the lewd women of Paris come from those departments where there is most instruction. In Scotland the educated criminals are to the uneducated as four and a half to one. M. De Toqueville remarked of the United States that crime increased most rapidly where there was most instruction. The ancients testify that the moral condition of the "Barbarians" was comparatively pure beside that of the Greeks and Romans, and that the most refined cities were the most corrupt. But let us bring the comparison nearer home. The Northern States of the Union had previously to the war all adopted the system of universal State schools,

and the Southern States had not. In 1850 the former had thirteen and a half millions of people, and twenty-three thousand six hundred and sixty-four criminal convictions. The South (without State schools) had nine and a half millions, and two thousand nine hundred and twenty-one criminal convictions—that is to say, after allowing for the difference of population, the “educated” masses were something more than six times as criminal as the “uneducated.” The same year the North was supporting 114,700 paupers, and the South 20,500. The “unintelligent” South was something more than four times as well qualified to provide for its own subsistence as the “intelligent” North! But Massachusetts is the native home of the public school in America. In Boston and its adjacent county the persons in jails, houses of correction or refuge, and in alms-houses bore among the whites the ratio of one to every thirty-four. (Among the wretched, free blacks it was one to every sixteen.) In Richmond, the capital of “benighted” Virginia, the same unhappy classes bore the ratio of one to every one hundred and twelve. Such are the lessons of fact. Indeed, it requires only the simplest ocular inspection to convince any observer that the economical plea for State schools is illusory. In the South State school-houses were unknown, and consequently jails and penitentiaries were on the most confined and humble scale. The North is studded over with grand and costly public school-houses, and her jails are even more “palatial” in extent and more numerous than they.

All such promiscuous efforts to educate the whole masses by any secular authority must disappoint our hopes, and result in mischief, for a second reason. It finds its illustration in the homely proverb, that “while one man may lead a horse to water a hundred cannot make him drink.” True education, taken in any extent of its meaning, broad or narrow, is so greatly a moral process that a certain amount of aspiration and desire in its subject is an absolute prerequisite. The horse may be drenched, but that is not drinking; and the drench is not nourishment to be assimilated, but medicine. So, a knowledge of letters may be “exhibited” (as the medical men phrase it) to the resisting or apathetic mind; but there is no assimilation of the mental *pabulum* and no recruitment of spiritual strength. Something else must be first done, then, besides building and equipping a school

for souls which are in this State; and that is something which the State can never do—at least not by its schools. The moral aspiration and virtuous aims must be present, which alone will utilize a knowledge of letters. This is very plain. Now, it will be found generally true that in this country it is precisely the children of those who are presumed to need State education, and for whom the provision is chiefly designed, who are in this unprepared condition. If the State contained no children save those of parents who had the intelligence, the virtue, the aspiration, and also the property, or else the industry, which would make them resolved and able to educate their own, then, of course, it would be wholly superfluous for the Government to interfere. But these are the only children to whom letters are, in the general a real means of culture or elevation. Separate those who, in our fruitful land have neither aspiration, nor industry, nor property enough to insure that they will educate their own children, and in those children we usually find precisely that apathetic and hopeless condition, which renders this means nugatory, or worse. The parents are the real architects of their children's destiny, and the State cannot help it. There are, of course, exceptions. There are meritorious parents reduced by exceptional calamities to destitution, and there are a few "rough diamonds" unearthed in the unlikely mines of grovelling families. Such exceptions should be provided for; but wise legislators do not make universal systems to reach exceptional cases.

The law which we assert is accounted for by several practical causes. Parents who remain too poor and callous to educate their own children are so because they are ignorant, indolent, unaspiring, and vicious. The children's characters are usually as much the progeny of the parents as their bodies. Again: The aspiration, virtuous desire, and energy of the parents are absolutely essential to supply that impulse, which the child's mind requires to overrule its youthful heedlessness, and to impel it to employ and assimilate its otherwise useless acquisitions. And once more: The home education is so much more potential than that of the school, that the little modicum of training which a "common-school" system can give to the average masses is utterly trivial and impotent as a means of reversing the child's tendency. That which costs nothing is never valued. Old Judge

Buell, of Albany, placed a sack of a new variety of beautiful wheat upon the counter of the pavilion at a great agricultural fair, with a label inviting every farmer to take one quart as a gratuity, for seed. At night the sack was almost untouched. The old gentleman fretted at this result, took it the second day to the booth of a seeds man, and directed him to sell it at two dollars per quart. It was at once bought up greedily. One of the best teachers we ever knew determined to devote his latter years to the philanthropic work of teaching a gratuitous school for his neighbors. In a few months it had dwindled to five pupils, and died a natural death within a year. There is a natural humiliation also in being compelled to accept the provision of charity, or of the State, for that which conscience tells parents is obligatory on them. These reasons account for the fact, which the advocates of public schools so desire to hide, that the children do not attend, and the parents do not care to make them attend. He who goes "behind the scenes" in the Northern States knows how extensively this is true. *The rising movement for a "compulsory education" is a confession of this fact.* The unwilling disclosure of the failure of the system is the only thing this new movement will effect; for its folly is clear from this simple thought, that it contravenes, worse than all, the axiom: "One man can lead the horse to water," etc. Hence it results, that the class which is low enough to need this State aid, is one which usually cannot be elevated by it. But the abortive effort will awaken other influences, as we shall see, which are likely to make the children more miserable and less innocent than their ignorant parents.

Must the philanthropist, then, submit to the conclusion that ignorance and its consequences must needs be hereditary, and that knowledge, culture, and virtue are not to be extended beyond the fortunate youth for whom their parents secure them? We reply: this sad law does hold, and must hold to a far wider extent than our over-weening zeal is willing to acknowledge. Yet its rigor may be relaxed but not by the meddling of the civil magistrate or the arm of legislation. The agency must be social and Christian. The work must be done by laying hold of the sentiments, hearts, and consciences of parents and children together—not through their grammatical and arithmetical faculties. The agents for this blessed work are *the neighbor and*

the church. Christian charity and zeal, with the potent social influences descending from superiors to inferiors, in a society which is practically a kindly and liberal aristocracy; these may break the reign of ignorance and unaspiring apathy. The State cannot; the work is above its sphere.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. L. DABNEY.

DR. DABNEY AGAIN.

Universal Education as Involving the Idea of the Leveller—All cannot Aspire to the Highest Stations—Manual Labor or Savagery the Destiny of the Major Part—Fancy Philanthropists—The Common School Alumni—Theological Quacks—A Little Learning a Dangerous Thing.

II.

Hampden Sidney, Va., April 22, 1876.

To W. H. Ruffner, Esq., Superintendent of State Schools:

Dear Sir.—In the third place this theory of universal education in letters by the State involves the absurd and impossible idea of the Leveller, as though it were possible for all men to have equal destinies in human society. It is a favorite proposition with the asserters of these so-called American ideas, that "every American boy should improve himself as though he might some day be President of the United States." That is to say, the system supposes and fosters a universal discontent with the allotments of Providence, and the inevitable gradations of rank, possessions and privilege. It is too obvious to need many words, that this temper is anti-Christian; the Bible, in its whole tone, inculcates the opposite spirit of modest contentment with our sphere, and directs the honorable aspiration of the good man to the faithful performance of its duties, rather than to the ambitious purpose to get out of it and above it. It may be asked, does not the Bible recognize that fact, so pleasing to every generous mind, that the lower ranks now and then produce a youth worthy of the highest? Yes, David was taken from the sheep-folds to be Israel's most glorious king. But the Bible-idea is (and David's was a case precisely in point) that the humble boy is to exhibit this fitness for a nobler destiny, not by discontent and greedy cravings, but by his exemplary performances in his lower lot; and that Providence and his fellow-citizens are

to call him to "come up higher." For these instances of native merit, which are usually few, the State has no need to legislate. They will rise of themselves. They cannot be kept down, provided only we do not legislate against them, but leave them the *carriere ouverte aux talents*; or, if they will be the better for any provision, it should be exceptional, as they are exceptional cases.

With this exception, it is utterly false that every American boy may aspire to the higher stations of life. In the lottery of life these prizes must be relatively few—only a few can reach them. Nor is it right or practicable to give to all boys an "even start" in the race for them. The State, of course, should not legislate to the disadvantage of any in this race; but we mean that Providence, social laws, and parental virtues and efforts, do inevitably legislate in favor of some classes of boys in their start in that race, and if the State undertakes to countervail that legislation of nature by levelling action, the attempt is wicked, mischievous, and futile. The larger part of every civilized people is, and ever will be, addicted to regular, manual labor. The idea that the diffusion of intelligence and improvement of the arts are so to lighten the doom of labor, that two or three hours' work daily will provide for the wants of all, and leave the lowest laborer the larger part of his day for intellectual pursuits, is a preposterous dream. Let experience decide. Does the progress of modern civilization tend to exact "shorter hours" of its laborers than the barbarous state? Human desires always outrun human means. If this Utopian era is ever to come, when two or three hours of the artisan's time will be worth a day's work, the artificial wants of him and his family will have outrun him, in demanding the expenditure of five or six days' wages in one. The laborer will still find a motive for working all day as now—unless he turn loafer! And the last words remind us, that the inexorable law of nature we have just pointed out is, on the whole, a beneficent one; for it is necessary to prevent mankind from abusing their leisure. The leisure conferred by wealth is now often abused. So would that secured for the poor, by this fancied wealth of intelligence, be yet more abused; and the six or eight hours redeemed from manual toil would be devoted, not to intellectual pursuits, but to wasteful and degrading vices. And these vices would soon rivet again the yoke of constant labor upon their necks, or the fetters of the jail or

house of correction. We repeat: The destiny of the major part of the human family is the alternative of manual labor or savagery.

Now, no people will ever connect a real pursuit of mental culture with the lot of constant manual labor. The two are incompatible. Neither time, nor taste, nor strength, nor energy of brain will be found for both. Have not all manual-labor schools been failures? The man that works all day (usually) does not study. The nerve-force has been expended in the muscles, and none is left for mental effort. Hence, we care not how universally the State may force the arts of penmanship and reading on the children of laborers, when these become laboring men they will cease to read and write; they will practically disuse the arts as cumbersome and superfluous. This is a fact at which your enthusiast for common schools is very loath to look; *but it is a stubborn one.* The laboring classes in States which profess to give a universal education do not make any more beneficial use of letters, than those elsewhere. Prussia has for more than a generation compelled all her peasantry to go to school; but she is full of middle-aged peasants who have forgotten how to read, and who, in fact, never read. In boasted Massachusetts herself the very superintendents of the free schools lament that the State has more than ever of laboring poor, especially among the agricultural laborers, who neither know nor care anything concerning letters, for themselves or their children. The deniers of these stubborn facts are only the flatterers, not the friends, of the laborers.

Again our fancy-philanthropist will raise his out-cry, that if these views are admitted they condemn more than half of our fellow-creatures to a Boeotian stupidity and mental darkness. We might answer, first, that his expedients are futile to reverse that doom. The only difference between him and us is, that he is too quixotic, or uncandid, or interested, to admit the fact. God has made a social sub-soil to the top-soil, a social foundation in the dust, for the superstructure—the utopian cannot unmake it, least of all by his patchwork. But there is a second answer; he forgets that the use of letters is not education, but only one means of education, and not the only means. The laboring classes find their appropriate mental and moral cultivation in their tasks themselves, and in the example and in-

fluence of the superiors for whom they labor. The plough-man or artisan cultivates his mental faculties most appropriately in acquiring skill and resource for his work. He trains the moral virtues by the fidelity and endurance with which he performs that work. He ennobles his taste and sentiments by looking up to the superior who employs him. If to these influences you add the awakening, elevating, expanding force of Christian principles, you have given that laborer a true education—a hundred fold more true, more suitable, more useful, than the communication of certain literary arts, which he will almost necessarily disuse. Let the reader recall that brilliant passage of Macaulay, as just as brilliant, in which he shows, against Dr. Johnson, that the Athenian populace, without books, was a highly-cultivated people. Let him remember how entirely the greatness of the feudal barons in the middle ages, was dissociated from all “clerkly arts;” yet they were warriors, statesmen, poets, and gentlemen. So, our own country presents an humbler instance in the more respectable of the African freedmen. Tens of thousands of these, ignorant of letters, but trained to practical skill, thought, and resource, by intelligent masters, and imitating their superior breeding and sentiments, present, in every aspect, a far “higher style of man” than your Yankee laborer from his common school, with his shallow snattering and purblind conceit, and his wretched newspaper stuffed with moral garbage from the police-courts, and with false and poisonous heresies in politics and religion. Put such a man in the same arena with the Southern slave from a respectable plantation, and in one week’s time the ascendancy of the Negro, in self-respect, courage, breeding, prowess and practical intelligence, will assert itself palpably to the Yankee and to all spectators. The slave was, in fact, the educated man.

Let it be granted, as we have just implied, that there is a certain use which this *alumnus* of the common school may continue to make of his knowledge of letters. This gives us our strongest argument. Then the common schools will have created a numerous “public” of readers one-quarter or one-tenth cultivated; and the sure result will be the production for their use of a false, shallow, sciolist literature, science, and theology, infinitely worse than blank ignorance. “Wheresoever the carcass is, thither will the eagles be gathered together.” This will

be the sure result of the law of supply and demand inspired by a mercenary spirit. Formerly literature was for the educated; it was their occupation, and they formed the constituency for whom the producers of literature labored; consequently the literature of the civilized nations was characterized by all that was most decent in manner, elevated in sentiment, and thorough and just in argument, of which their society could boast. The uneducated or quarter-educated formed no direct constituency for authors and publishers; they did not bid for them, or cater to them. These unlettered classes received their ideas of literary, political, philosophical, and theological subjects (the most ignorant virtually have their politics, philosophy, and theology), from their social superiors, through social channels. And this was a source much safer than the present "literature for the millions," because much higher, purer, and more disinterested. The consequence was, that the unlettered classes reflected the opinions, sentiments, and elevated tone of the uppermost *stratum*; now it is those of a class lower and more sordid than themselves. Thus the Southern overseer, who read little but his Bible, had a judgment infinitely better trained, a moral tone far higher, and a social, political, and religious creed far sounder than the modern *alumnus* of your "common school," with his Leveller's arrogance and envy, and his armful of cheap newspapers. The overseer had the landed gentry who employed him as his instructors and models, and through them drew his speculative opinions from the noblest minds of the South; the Crawfords, Cheves, Madisons, Barbours, Randolphs, Calhouns. The common-school *alumnus* has the wretched sciolists and theological quacks, who drive their sordid trade in cheap periodical literature. The advocates of the Yankee system boast in it, and revile the old one in that the latter made letters the prerogative of the few; theirs of the many. But letters of what sort? Here we have "given them a Roland for their Oliver."

We appeal to facts. Has not the creation of this large reading (but not truly educated) public occasioned a flood of mischievous, heretical, sciolistic, corrupting literature? The result is that the book and newspaper-making trade has, for sordid purposes, brought down to the lower classes a multitude of speculations on the most dangerous subjects, with which no mind is prepared to deal for itself and independently, until it is

very thoroughly trained and informed. That thorough mental discipline and full learning the common schools can never give to these masses. They may as well promise that every agrarian among them shall be an Astor or a Rothschild in wealth. The state of European and Yankee society under this new impulse illustrates the facts we assert. The smattering which State education has given the masses has but been to them the opening of Pandora's box. It has only launched them in an ocean which they are incompetent to navigate. Every manufactory is converted into a debating club, where the operatives intoxicate their minds with the most licentious vagaries of opinions upon every fundamental subject of politics and religion; and they have only knowledge enough to run into danger, without having a tenth part of the knowledge necessary to teach them their danger and incompetency. It was this system which prepared the way for the "International Society," and the horrors of the Paris *Commune*. So far are these nations from being healthily illuminated, they are an easy prey to the most destructive heresies, social and religious; and their condition is far more unwholesome and volcanic, with a more terrifying prospect of social dissolution, anarchy, and bloodshed, than was ever presented by the ignorance of the "middle ages." So obvious was this tendency to thoughtful minds thirty-five years ago that the great historian Heerea, with his intimate acquaintance with all the defects of mediaeval society, announced the deliberate opinion that the art of printing was destined to be more a curse than a blessing to Europe. It is not necessary for us to espouse that opinion; here is, at least, a fair instance for the application of the maxim of Pope, now so universally and disdainfully ignored:

“A little learning is a dangerous thing,
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring;
For shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
But drinking deeply sobers us again.”

The amount of this grave objection is that when the State interferes in the work of common school education, it inevitably does not enough, or too much. To give that large learning and thorough discipline necessary for setting the mind to deal inde-

pendently with the corrupt labyrinth of modern current opinion is beyond the State's power. What she does give usually prepares the victims for the literary seducers.

It is one of the most important and best established maxims of social science that *influence descends*. Hence, if you would permeate the whole popular mass with any wholesale influence, the wisest plan is to place the element of good at the top, that it may percolate downwards. The engineer, when he wishes to supply the humblest, lowliest lane or alley of a city with pure water, establishes his reservoir upon the topmost hill; and thence it descends, without any other force than its own gravity, to every door and every lip. So the most effectual, the most truly philanthropic mode for elevating the lower classes of society is to provide for the rise of the superior class. This is nature's process; she elevates the whole mass by lifting it from above so that all the parts rise together, preserving that relation of places on whose preservation the whole organism depends. The fashionable plan is to place the lever under the bottom stones and prize them to the level of the cap-stones of which the result is that the whole structure tumbles into rubbish. The establishment of the University of Virginia for giving the most thorough training to advanced scholars has been the most truly liberal measure for the cultivation of the masses ever adopted in the State. It teaches only a few hundred of young men, and those only in the highest studies? True, but in giving them a higher standard of acquirement it has elevated as well as multiplied all the teachers of every grade; making the instruction better, down to the primary schools where the children of the poor learn the rudiments of reading. And what is better still, it has made thorough culture respectable, and diffused honest aspirations to the lowest ranks. Your very obedient servant,

R. L. DABNEY.

ANOTHER DABNEY BOLT FOR DR. RUFFNER'S BENE- FIT.

Overweening Philanthropists—Decent and Vile Children—The Danger of Disease—What Dr. Dabney Thinks of Southern Negroes as Compared with Northern Poor Whites—Demagogues and Politicians and Their Relation to the Free School System—The Testimony of Webster, Not the Dictionary Man—An Alternative Horrible to Contemplate.

III.

Hampden Sidney, Va., April 25, 1876.

To W. H. Ruffner Esq., Superintendent of State Schools:

Dear Sir.—In the objections thus far set forth there are premises which, however true and impregnable, are now so unfashionable that with many they will meet no response but an angry outcry. The application of them would demolish so many vain idols, now much cherished, that the writer cannot hope for a hearing even, from many minds. Time must be the only teacher for these overweening philanthropists. When they are taught by him that this system of State education has utterly failed to produce the benefits they designed, and has fixed on us the mischiefs above described, they will learn that these are the words of truth and soberness. But we purpose to present three other points of objection not involving the principles expounded in the previous part of this discussion, more practical and indisputable; and either one of these is sufficient for the utter condemnation of the system.

The first is, that if a system of universal common schools is to be carried out in good faith, there must be a mixture of the children of the decent and the children of the vile in the same society during the most plastic age. The boast is: that the ed-

ucation is to be for all, and most prominently for the lowest and most ignorant, because they need it most. Then, if this boast is to be faithfully realized, all the moral lepers among the children of a given district must be thrust into the society of our children at school. In order to receive the shallow *modicum* of letters there dispensed, they must be daily brought into personal contact with the cutaneous and other diseases, the vermin—(Yes, dear reader, it is disgusting! We would spare you if faithfulness permitted; but the foulness belongs to the plan, not to us)—the obscenity, the profanity, the groveling sentiments, the violence of the *gamins*, with which our boasted material civilization teems in its more populous places. This must be done, too, at the tender and imitative age of childhood. The high, sacred prerogative of the virtuous parent to choose the moral influences for his own beloved offspring must be sacrificed to this ruthless, levelling idol. Every experienced teacher knows that pupils educate each other more than he educates them. The thousand nameless influences—literary, social, moral—not only of the play-ground but of the school-room, the whispered conversation, the clandestine note, the sly grimace, the sly pinch, the good or bad recitation, mould the plastic character of children far more than the most faithful teacher's hand.

Now, there are some quarters of our towns and cities, and some rural neighborhoods, where this difficulty is little felt; either because the limited population is nearly homogeneous, or because the poor are decent and virtuous. Especially has the latter case been realized in many country communities of the South, where such was the cleanliness, propriety, good breeding, and moral elevation of the poorer families, imbibed from their kindly dependence on cultivated superiors, that a neighborhood school could be made to include all the white children, without serious injury to the morals of any. But the levelling policy, of which State common schools are a constituent member, now claims to make the blacks equal, socially and politically, to the most reputable whites. Against the collection of white children into the same public schools with Negroes, the very principle which we are illustrating, has made a protest so indignant and determined that, although the protest of the conquered, it has been heard in all the Southern States, except Louisiana. The refusal to hear it there resulted in the absolute

banishment of the children of the white citizens from the schools supported by their money. And this protest has not been, as the enemy and conqueror deems it, the mere expression of caste-prejudice, but the conscientious demand of the natural right to our children from moral contamination. Here, then, we have a broad, a recognized application of this potent objection to the State system. The whole Southern people make the objection; nearly all the friends of State education admit its force in this case. But on this conceded case there are two remarks to be made. First, the concession is inconsistent with the whole theory of State schools and of the levelling system to which they belong. This is so clearly felt, that even now the determined advocates of State education are candid enough to foreshadow the withdrawal of the concession, speaking of it as an arrangement "necessary for the time being." Is it your opinion that this concession should be yielded to us temporarily or permanently? Do you think that it should be withdrawn after a little, when all the staunch old Confederates like me have died out; or that the Negroes should never be admitted to the same schools as the whites? Yankeedom and Negroedom are listening for your consistent answer. Second. The Southern Negroes are a less degraded and vicious race than many large elements of the white poor, who, in parts of the North, have free entrance into the common schools there. Indeed, the force of the social objection is felt and acted on by numbers of the Northern people. Many are the blatant advocates of the system among the people of property, who yet dream not of sending their own children to the common schools. They consult their popularity by pretending to advocate the system; and yet, for their own offspring, they will not so much as touch it with a tip of their fingers. And many are the Phariasaic negrophobists who berate and revile the Southern people for resisting this abhorrent amalgamation of their children with blacks; who would flout with foul scorn the proposal to send their own pampered brats to the common school near them along with the children of their poor white neighbors.

Sometimes it is asked, "How are the degraded classes to be elevated if they are thus to be denied all association with those better than themselves?" We reply that while we fully recognize the Christian duty of seeking the degraded and of drawing

them up to purer associations, we beg leave to demur against employing our innocent and inexperienced children as the missionaries. The braving of this moral contagion is the proper work of mature men and women of virtue; and these are to elevate their beneficiaries by holding to them the relation of benevolent superiors, not of comrades and equals in school-room and play-ground. It is claimed that it is the teacher's part to prevent those "evil communications which corrupt good manners." We reply that it is impossible; he would need more than the hundred hands of Briareus and the hundred eyes of Argus, with more moral fidelity than falls to the share of any save apostles and martyrs. Is the pittance paid to a common-school teacher likely to purchase all these splendid endowments? It is said that if a fastidious parent does not like the social atmosphere of the common school he may pay for a more select private one. But he is taxed compulsorily to support this school which parental duty forbids him to use; so that the system in this case amounts to an iniquitous penalty upon him for his faithfulness to his conscience. What clearer instance of persecution could arise? Once more it is sneeringly asked: "Have children's morals never been corrupted in private schools?" They have, alas, often been. But this only shows our argument stronger instead of weaker; for it proves that parental vigilance as to the moral atmosphere of the children's comrades needs to be greatly increased; while this system insists upon extinguishing all such conscientious watchfulness, and provides the punishment of a mulct for its exercise.

The second objection is yet more damning as against the system of State schools in this country. They are, and will inevitably be, wielded by the demagogues, who are in power for the time, in the interests of their faction. Here is a danger and a curse which must not be estimated by the results of the system in any other country, such as Scotland or Prussia. In the former kingdom the Presbyterian system of parochial schools gave what was virtually a national primary education. But it was not obnoxious to this perversion to factious uses. Scotland is a little country, and was then almost absolutely homogeneous in religion and politics; the government was a stable, hereditary monarchy, of the change of which there was neither possibility nor desire; the schools were controlled by the parish clergy and

kirk sessions, parties whose attitude was at once independent, and dissociated from political objects and managers. In Prussia, also, we see a permanent military monarchy ruling the people with a uniformity and resistless power which has hitherto left no hope to the demagogue. It is very true that this monarchy does manipulate the State schools in the interest of its own perpetuity, and in doing so inflicts on the minds of the people no little injury. But the wrong thus done is as white as snow compared with pitch, when set against the foul perversions wrought by our demagogues in power. For an old, stable monarchy is always infinitely more decent and moderate than a democratic faction in America rioting on the spoils of party success. The teachings of the monarchy, if self-interested, are at least conservative and consistent; and they include a respectable knowledge of the Christian religion. It will be utterly delusive, therefore, to argue for the value of State common schools from Scotland or Prussia. Our demagogues will take effectual care that our schools shall not yield us even the mixed fruits which those nations have reaped from theirs.

For what is it on which American politicians do not lay their harpy hands to get or to keep the spoils of office? On the offices themselves, which the law has instituted for the public service; on finance; on commerce; on the railroads; on the productive industries of the citizens; on taxation; on our holy religion itself! And, like the harpies, whatever they touch they contaminate! That the school system of the States is perverted to factions and sordid ends is so notorious that we shall not insult the intelligence of our readers by many testimonies. Has not the supreme official of the school system in the State of Indiana, for instance, been seen to publish to the world his unblushing boast that he had successfully arrested the whole machinery to inculcate upon all the children of that State the malignant and lying creed of Radicalism? And this man, after satisfying his masters, the Radical Legislature, of his success in placing this gospel of hate and murder, and these utter falsifications of history and fact and constitutional law, in the tender hand of every child in Indiana, only intimates, in the most gingerly and apologetic way, a faint inclination to give them the Word of God: which yet, he hastens to assure them, he had not presumed to attempt! Again, these omnipotent school

boards, under the plausible pretext of uniformity of text-books, enter into alliances with capitalists who are publishers of books (for what solid consideration, who can tell?), giving them the monopoly of manufacturing American history, ethics and politics for the children of a whole State, without leaving any option to the parent. This single feature, presented by the alliance of the "Book-Trade" with the Education Boards, is sufficient to condemn the whole in the judgment of every independent mind. If it is not corrected the liberty of the citizens is gone. In some of those Southern States where the Conservatives have been so fortunate as to retain control of the State governments the advocates of State education are openly heard attempting, in their new-born zeal, to reconcile the people to the measure forced upon them by promising that it shall be so manipulated as to train the next generation of negroes to vote with the Conservatives. Now the temptation of the oppressed to foil their oppressors may be very strong; and they may be inclined to be rather unscrupulous in the means of defense against enemies so unscrupulous and abhorred as the carpet-bag horde. It may be very alluring to us to employ this tyrannical system, which is forced upon us against our will, to the ruin of its inventors, and thus to "hoist the engineer with his own petard." But the foreseeing man cannot but remember that it is a dangerous force which is employed, and that on any change of the faction in power what we hope to make sauce to the (Radical) goose may become sauce to the (Conservative) gander. It is a hazardous game for good people to attempt to "fight the devil with fire."

This perversion of a pretended system of education is as intolerable as it is certain. It is hard enough to have a triumphant faction rule us in a mode which outrages our sense of equity and patriotism—shall they also abuse their power to poison the minds of our own children against the principles which we honor, and to infect them with the errors which we detest? Is it not enough that our industries must all be burdened and our interests blighted by the selfish expedients of demagogues grasping after power and plunder? Must the very souls of our children be made merchandise and trafficked with in the same hateful cause? What freemen can endure it? These practices have already disclosed their destructive fruits in preparing a

whole generation, by a pupilage of lies, for a war of plunder and subjugation against the South. For years before the war the sectional and aggressive party had control of the State education in New England and the Northwest. They used their opportunity diligently; and the result was that when the chance to strike came, they had a whole generation trained to their purpose in hatred of the South and in constitutional heresies. Such was the testimony of Daniel Webster. Two gentlemen from Virginia—old collegemates of mine—were visiting Washington during Mr. Filmore's administration. Webster's return towards an impartial course had then gained him some respect in the South, and my two friends paid their respects to him. While conversing with them he fixed his dark eyes on them, and with great earnestness asked: "Can't you Southern gentlemen consent, upon some sort of inducement or plan, to surrender slavery?" They replied firmly: "Not to the interference or dictation of the Federal Government. And this not on account of mercenary or selfish motives, but because to allow outside interference in this vital matter would forfeit the liberties and other rights of the South." "Are you fixed in that?" asked Webster. "Yes, unalterably." "Well," he said, with an awful solemnity, "I cannot say you are wrong, but if you are fixed in that, go home and get ready your weapons." They asked him what on earth he meant. He replied, that the parsons and common-school teachers and school-marms had diligently educated a whole Northern generation into a passionate hatred of slavery, who would, as certainly as destiny, attack Southern institutions. So that if Southern men were determined not to surrender their institutions they had better prepare for war. Thus, according to Mr. Webster, the crimes, woes, and horrors of the last fifteen years are all partly due to this school system. The only condition in which free government can exist is amidst the wholesome competition of two great constitutional parties, who watch and restrain each other. The result of this system of State schools is that the successful party extinguishes its rival, and thus secures for itself an unchecked career of usurpation. For it aims to extinguish all the diversity and independence which the young would derive from parental inculcation, and to imprint upon the whole body of coming citizens its own monotonous type of political heresies and

passions. This is virtually done in America. For the Northern Democratic party is only a little less radical than the Radicals, and really separated from them chiefly by the craving for party spoils. If the triumphant faction, wielding this power of universal education, happens to be one as able, patriotic, and honest as the party of Knox and Melville, then there may result the marvelous homogeneity and thrift of Presbyterian Scotland. But the ascendant faction may happen to be a ruthless and unprincipled Radicalism, armed with this power of universal corruption of future opinion and morals! And what then? *All is lost*; the remaining alternatives are Chinese civilization, or savagery. Your very obedient servant, R. L. DABNEY.

DR. DABNEY'S BATTERY.¹

HE OPENS FIRE ON DR. RUFFNER FROM ANOTHER QUARTER.

His Fourth Letter—The Bible in the Public Schools—The Difficulty not Limited to America—Is Religious Training Essential?—The Human Spirit a Monad—The Duty of Parents.

IV.

Hampden Sidney, Va., May 4, 1876.

To W. H. Ruffner, Esq., Superintendent of State Schools:

Dear Sir.—The third objection to education by the State is, if possible, more conclusive still. It is one which looms up already in such insuperable dimensions that we freely acknowledge the hope that the whole system may be wrecked by it at an early day. This is the difficulty, especially for American Commonwealths, of the religious question. What religion shall be taught to the children by the State's teachers as the necessary part of the education of reasonable and moral beings? We have only to mention the well-known facts that the citizens of these American States are conscientiously divided among many and rival sects of religion, and that our forms of government tolerate no union of Church and State, and guarantee equal rights to all men irrespective of their religious opinions, to show to any fair mind how impossible it is for the advocates of universal State education to do more than evade the point of the difficulty. It has been made familiar to every reader of the newspapers in America by recent events in this country—in New York, in Cincinnati, and elsewhere. The teaching of King James's version of the Christian Scriptures even has led to violent protest and even to actual riot and combat. The most numerous and determined complainants are, of course, Roman Catholics; but the Jews, now becoming increasingly numerous and influential, and the Unitarians and Deists must

¹—Appeared in *Richmond Enquirer*.

claim similar grounds of protest. Their argument is that this version of the Scriptures is, in their sincere judgment, erroneous; and therefore they cannot conscientiously permit it to be taught to their children. But as they are taxed to support these schools, they cannot be justly perverted to teach their children an obnoxious creed without a virtual establishment of the Protestant religion at public expense; which is an outrage against the fundamental principles and laws of the State. The special advocates of the common schools, who are usually also zealous Protestants, try hard to flout this objection as captious. But while we are very far from being Romanists in religion, we feel that this difficulty cannot be justly disposed of in this way. If the State, through its teachers, taught the children of us Protestants that version of the Bible which makes the Redeemer say: "Except ye do penance ye shall all likewise perish," we should make a determined resistance. No power on earth would force us to acquiesce in such inculcation of what we devoutly believe to be religious error. And we should feel that it was an inexcusable injustice to tax us for the purpose of teaching to our beloved children what we could not, at the peril of our souls, permit them to learn. Now, the common-school advocates of New York and of Ohio would say, our objection is just, because the Latin vulgate is really an erroneous translation; the objection of the Romanists is unjust because King James's is a substantially correct version of God's word. As theologians, and in an ecclesiastical *arena*, we assert that this is true; and are confident that we can establish it. But this is not the point. We have covenanted that in our political relations as citizens of the Commonwealth, all shall have equal rights irrespective of their religion. In that sphere we are bound to be impartial; "our word is out." The very point of the covenant is, that so far as civic rights and privileges go, our Romanist fellow-citizens' opinions (erroneous though we deem them, in our religious judgment) shall be respected precisely as they are required to respect ours. The weight of the Romanist protest, then, cannot be consistently evaded by American republicans.

This difficulty is not limited to our democratic land. In Great Britain and Ireland, where the government is moving for national education, all the denominations of Christians are hopelessly involved in it. For the settlement of this matter,

there are, if the State educates, but three possible alternatives. One is to force the religion of the majority on the children of the minority of the people. The injustice of this has already been proved. A second solution is what the British call the plan of "concurrent endowment." It consists in aiding the citizens of different religions to gather their children in separate schools, in which religious instruction may be given suited to the views of the parents, and all paid for by the State alike. The clamors of the Romanists in New York have been partially appeased by acts falling virtually under this plan. The city government, in view of the fact that Romanists cannot conscientiously send their children to schools which they are taxed to support, make appropriations of public money to some of their schools, which are in every respect managed after their own religious ideas. This "concurrent endowment" is justly as odious to the great Protestant body, both in this country and Great Britain, as any plan could be. It offers its seeming solution only in places populous enough in the several rival religions to furnish materials for a school to each. In all other places it makes no provision for the difficulty. It is a dereliction from principle in a State prevalently Protestant in its population thus to place contradictory systems of belief upon a complete legislative equality, teaching both alike, when the truth of the one inevitably implies the falsehood of the other. It outrages the rights of Protestants by expending a part of the money they pay in propagating opinions which they regard as false and destructive, and it gives to erroneous creeds a pecuniary and moral support beyond that which they draw from the zeal and free gifts of their own votaries. For these reasons the plan of "concurrent endowment" is reprobated by all the stronger denominations on both sides of the Atlantic. The Irish and American Catholics profess to approve it, because they expect to gain something by it, but most inconsistently. Who dreams that if they held the power, and were in the majority in either the British or Yankee empire (as in the French), they would be willing to see "good Catholic money" appropriated by the State to teach "Protestant heresies?"

The third alternative proposed is, to limit the teaching of the State schools in every case to secular learning, leaving the parents to supply such religious instruction as they see fit in

their own way and time, or to neglect it wholly. Of this solution no Christian of any name can be an advocate. We have seen how utterly the Pope and his prelates reprobate it. All other denominations in Europe regard it as monstrous; and indeed no adherent of any religion can be found in any other age or country than America who would not pronounce it wicked and absurd for any agency undertaking the education of youth to leave their religious culture an absolute blank. Testimonies might be cited to weariness; we will satisfy ourselves with a few, two of which are of peculiar relevancy, because drawn from unwilling witnesses, earnest advocates of State schools. In an annual meeting of the Teachers' Association of the State of Maryland a well-considered piece was read by a prominent member, in which the immense difficulty of the religious question in State schools was fairly displayed. The author, on the one hand, admitted that the rights of conscience of parents could not be justly disregarded. He held, on the other, that a schooling devoid of moral and religious teachings ought to be utterly inadmissible. The best solution he could suggest was, that the State should get up a course of moral and theological dogmas for its pupils, embracing only those common truths in which all parties are agreed, and excluding every truth to which any one party took exception. And he admitted that, as we have Protestants, Papists, Unitarians, Jews, Deists, etc., (not to say Mormons and the heathen Chinese), the Bible and all its characteristic doctrines must be excluded! It is too plain that when the State school's creed had been pruned of every proposition to which any one party objected, it would be worthless and odious in the eyes of every party, and would be too emasculated to do any child's soul a particle of good.

In a meeting of the Educational Association of Virginia four years ago a pious and admirable paper was read by one of the most eminent citizens in the State (Dr. J. B. Minor) on this theme: "Bible instruction in schools." After some *exordium* it begins thus: "It must be acknowledged to be one of the most remarkable phenomena of our perverted humanity that among a Christian people, and in a Protestant land, such a discussion should not seem as absurd as to inquire whether school-rooms should be located *under water* or in *darksome caverns*. The Jew, the Mohammedan, the follower of Confucius

and of Brahma, each and all are careful to instruct the youth of their people in the tenets of the religions they profess, and are not content until, by direct and reiterated teaching, they have been made acquainted with at least the outline of the books which contain, as they believe, the revealed will of Deity. Whence comes it that Christians are so indifferent to a duty so obvious, and so universally recognized by Jew and Pagan?" The absolute necessity of Bible instruction in schools is then argued with irresistible force. Yet, with all this, such is the stress of the difficulty which we are pressing, it betrays this able writer into saying: "I do not propose to allude to the agitating question of the introduction of the Scriptures into *public schools* conducted under authority of government." But why not? If other schools so imperatively need this element of Bible instruction, why do not the State schools? Its necessity is argued from principles which are of universal application to beings who have souls. Why shall not the application be made to all schools? Alas! the answer is: the right conclusion *cannot* be applied to State schools. We claim, then, this is a complete demonstration that the State is unfit to assume the educational function. The argument is as plain and perfect as any that can be imagined. Here is one part which is absolutely essential to the very work of right education: the State is effectively disabled from performing that part. Then the State cannot educate, and should not profess it. The argument is parallel to this: In order to be a country physician it is essential that one shall ride in all weathers. A. cannot ride in bad weather. Then A. cannot be a country physician, and if he is an honest man he will not profess to be.

Whether the religious training is essential to all right education, let us hear a few more witnesses. Said Daniel Webster, in the Girard will-case, commenting on the exclusion of clergymen from the proposed orphan college: "In what age, by what sect, where, when, by whom, has religious truth been excluded from the education of youth? Nowhere; never. Everywhere, and at all times, it has been and is regarded as essential. *It is of the essence, the vitality of useful instruction*" Says Sir Henry Bulwer: "I do not place much confidence in the philosopher who pretends that the knowledge which develops the passions is an instrument for their suppression, or that where

there are the most desires there is likely to be the most order and the most abstinence in their gratification." The historian Froude (a witness by no means friendly to orthodoxy), quoting Miss Nightingale, a philanthropist as Christian as wise, emphatically endorses her opinion, that the ordinary and natural effect of the communication of secular knowledge to youths whose destiny is labor is only to suggest the desire for illicit objects of enjoyment. Says Dr. Francis Wayland: "Intellectual cultivation may easily exist without the existence of virtue or love of right. In this case its only effect is to stimulate desire; and this unrestrained by the love of right must eventually overturn the social fabric which is at first erected." Hear John Locke: "It is virtue, then, direct virtue, which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education. * * * If virtue and a well-tempered soul he not got and settled so as to keep out ill and vicious habits, languages, and science, and all the other accomplishments of education, will be to no purpose but to make the worse or more dangerous man."

We propose now to substantiate these views of the wise and experienced, by arguing that tuition in Christianity is essential to all education which is worth the name. And we claim more than the admission that each man should at some stage of his training, and by somebody, be taught Christianity; we mean in the fullest sense that Christianity must be a present element of all the training at all times, or else it is not true and valuable education. Some one may say that this broad proposition is refuted at the outset by frequent instances of persons who received, at least during a part of their youth, a training perfectly non-Christian, and who yet are very useful, and even Christian citizens. The answer is easy: It is the prerogative of a merciful Providence, and the duty of His children, to repair the defects and misfortunes of His creatures and to bring good out of evil. But surely this comes far short of a justification for us if we willingly employ faulty methods which have a regular tendency to work evil. Surely it is not our privilege to make mischief for God and good Christians to repair!

Let the candid reader, then, ponder the weight of these facts. The human spirit is a monad, a single, unit, spiritual substance, having facilities and susceptibilities for different modifications, but no parts. Hence, when it is educated it is

educated as a unit. The moral judgments and acts of the soul all involve an exercise of reason; so that it is impossible to separate the ethical and intellectual functions. The conscience is the supreme, directive faculty of the soul; so that knowledge bears to moral action the relation of means to end. Man fulfills the ends of his existence, not by right cognitions, but by right moral actions. Hence we are obviously correct in holding that the fundamental value of right cognitions is simply as they are the means of right moral acts—that is, the knowledge is really valuable *only as it is in order to right actions*. Again: The nature of responsibility is such that there can be no neutrality, or *tertium quid*, between duty and sin. “He that is not with his God is against him.” He who does not positively comply with the ever-present obligation does *ipso facto* violate it, and contract positive sinfulness. Hence as there cannot be in any soul a *non-Christian* state which is not *anti-Christian*, it follows that any training which attempts to be non-Christian is therefore anti-Christian. God is the rightful, supreme master and owner of all reasonable creatures, and their nearest and highest duties are to him. Hence to train a soul away from him is a robbery of God, which he cannot justify in any person or agency whatsoever. He has not, indeed, committed to the State the duty of leading souls to him as its appropriate task. This is committed to the family and to his church. Yet it does by no means follow that the State may do anything tending to the opposite. The soul is essentially active, and every human being in his active powers of moral desire, volition and habit, is unavoidably exercising himself. Hence, whatever omission or neglect may be practiced as to the formation of a character, every character does inevitably form itself, for evil if not for good! Remember, also, that evil example is omnipresent in the world, and the disposition to respond to it is innate in every child. How obvious, then, that a “let-alone policy” as to the moral development must, to a greater or less degree, amount to a positive development of vicious character? Not to row is, itself, to float down the stream. Once more: the discipline of one set of faculties may leave other faculties inert and undeveloped. This result is, then, more than a negative mischief, because the balance or proportion of the character is then more perverted. Should the branches and

leaves of a tree continue to grow while the roots remained stationary it would result in the destruction of the tree, and this although the roots contracted no positive disease or weakness. The first gale would blow it over in consequence of the disproportion of its parts. In this view the conclusion cited above from Sir H. Bulwer and Mr. Froude is seen to be perfectly just. With the increase of knowledge temptations must increase. Wider circles of imagined enjoyments are opened to the desires, so that if the virtuous habitude is not correspondingly strengthened, criminal wishes and purposes will be the sure result. He who has criminal purposes is, moreover, by his knowledge equipped with more power to execute them. Locke's conclusion is just. In the words of Dr. Griffin, to educate the mind without purifying the heart is but "to place a sharp sword in the hand of a madman." Our last proposition of these premises is that practically the Bible is the source and rule of moral obligation in this land. By this we do not mean to decide that even an atheist, not to say a disbeliever in inspiration, might not be still obliged from his principles to recognize the imperative force of conscience in his own reason, if he would philosophize correctly. But practically few do recognize and obey conscience except those who recognize the authority of the Bible. This book is, in point of fact, the source from which the American people draw their sense of obligation, and of its metes and bounds, so far as they have any. This is especially true of children. Grant the inspiration of the Bible, and we have a basis of moral appeal so simple and strong that practically all other bases are comparatively worthless, especially for the young. Its moral histories have an incompatible adaptation to the popular and the juvenile mind. The Bible alone applies to the heart and conscience with any distinct certainty the great forces of future rewards and punishments and the powers of the world to come. And, above all, it alone provides the purifying influences of redemption.

There can be, therefore, no true education without moral culture, and no true moral culture without Christianity. The very power of the teacher in the school-room is either moral or it is a degrading, brute force. But he can show the child no other moral basis for it than the Bible. Hence my argument is as perfect as clear. The teacher must be Christian. But the

American Commonwealth has promised to have no religious character. Then it cannot be teacher. If it undertakes to be, it must be consistent, and go on and unite Church and State. Are you ready to follow your opinions to this consistent end?

Since religious education is so essential a part, it is obvious that a wise Providence must have allotted the right and duty of giving it to some other of the independent spheres between which he has distributed the social interests of man. *This duty rests with the parent.* Such is the Protestant doctrine—the Bible doctrine. Neither State nor Church are to usurp it; but both are to enlighten, encourage and assist the parent in his inalienable task.

(A feeble attempt has been made to escape this fatal objection by saying: Let the State schools teach secular knowledge, and let the parents, in other places and times, supplement this with such religious knowledge as they please and by the help of such Church as may please them. The fatal answers are: 1st. The secular teacher depends for the very authority to teach upon the Bible. 2d. The exclusion of the Bible would put a stigma on it in the child's mind which the parent cannot afterwards remove. 3d. How can one teach history, ethics, psychology, cosmogony, without implying some religious opinions? 4th, and chiefly: The parents who are too poor, ignorant, and delinquent to secure their children secular schooling will, by the stronger reason, be sure to neglect their religious education. But these are the parents whose deficiencies give the sole pretext for the State's interference, so that the one-sided training which the State leaves merely secular will remain so in all these cases. But these cases give to the State common school its sole *raison d'être*.

I conclude, therefore, that in a country like America, at least, your favorite system is inapplicable, and will work only mischief. Our old Virginia system, besides its economy, has these great logical advantages: that it leaves to parents, without usurpation, their proper function as creators or electors of their children's schools, and that it thus wholly evades the religious question, which is, to you, insoluble. Government is not the creator but the creature of human society. The Government has no mission from God to make the community; on the contrary, the community should make the Government. What

the community shall be is determined by Providence, where it is happily determined by far other causes than the meddling of governments—by historical causes in the distant past—by vital ideas propagated by great individual minds—especially by the Church and its doctrines. The only communities which have had their characters manufactured for them by their governments have had a villainously bad character—like the Chinese and the Yankees. Noble races make their governments; ignoble ones are made by them.

I remain your very obedient servant,

R. L. DABNEY.

SECULARIZED EDUCATION.¹

Who is the agent entitled to control education? What is right education? These questions are interdependent. Two answers have been proposed to the first in history: The State, the Church. In Europe, Liberalism says the State, and insists on secularizing education, by which it means its release from the control of popery. Liberals see clearly that, under that control, there will be no true freedom. But, as they also insist on secularizing the State, their idea of a free education is of one devoid of religion, separating the mental from the spiritual culture. Thus they conclude that education must be Godless, in order to be free. Rome has herself to blame for this error, as for most of European scepticism. She claims that she alone is Christian: independent minds reply, "Then Christianity is evil." So if her education were the only Christian, freemen would have to reject Christian education. If private judgment is sin; if the hierarchy is the Church; if the teacher is a real priest and essential "proxy" between men and salvation; if his teaching is infallible; if the real end of the culture is to enslave the soul to a priesthood with a foreign head; if that head is absolutely superior to the secular sovereignty, such ecclesiastical education will be civil slavery. It is not strange that men seeking civil liberty spurn it.

The mistake is in confounding ecclesiastical with Christian education. Let the Scripture be heard: "The kingdom of God is within you," consisting, not in a greedy hierarchy, but in the rule of Truth; the clergy are not lords over God's heritage, but only "ministers by whom we believe"; it has no penalties but the spiritual, reaching no man's civil rights; its only other function is didactic, and its teaching only binds so far as the layman's own conscience responds; it is the Church's duty to instruct parents how God would have them rear their children,

¹—Appeared in *Libby's Princeton Review*.

and enforce the duty by spiritual sanctions; but there its official power ends. It does not usurp the doing of the important task it inculcates. As a Christian private man the minister lends other parents his knowledge and virtues to co-operate in their work. But all this implies no danger either to spiritual or religious liberty.

But it will be well for the modern Liberal to pause and ask whether he secures anything by this transfer of the educating function from Church to State? Does he point to the results of Jesuit teaching, spurious, shallow scholarship, an enslaved and morbid conscience, which dares not even wish to break its fetters, the insatiable greed of the hierarchy for influence and money, the hateful perversion of the sacred task to inspire falsehood and prejudice for this end? The picture is sufficiently repulsive. But are only ecclesiastics grasping? Is human nature depraved? Is it essentially the same in all men? Then why are they not to be expected to act in similar ways, when subjected to the same temptations? And the modern Liberal is the last man to overlook this truth; since he is sceptical of all professions of spiritual principles in clergymen, and prone to ascribe secular motives. He should, then, expect the demagogue to show a misguided ambition exactly like the priests. What is the hierarchy but a ghostly demagogue? The demagogue is but the hierarchy of Mammon's altar. Does he not, for instance, pervert that other educating agency, the press, just as violently as the Jesuit the school? Now, let him become ruler in the State and the State become educator; and there is just the same risk that the education of youth will be perverted to subserve a faction, and that, by the hateful means of imbuing their minds with error and passion in place of truth and right. The result is despotism of a party instead of a pope. One may be as bad as the other.

But if the State is the educator, in America, at least, education must be secularized totally. In theory our State is *the institute for realizing secular justice*. It has absolutely severed itself from all religions equally; has pledged itself that no man's civil rights shall be modified or equality diminished by any religion or the lack of any; and has forbidden the establishment of any religion by law, and the imposition of any burden for a religious pretext on any. But the State school teacher is her

official, and teaches by her authority. All school-officials derive their authority from State laws, hence all their functions are as truly State actions as those of the sheriff in hanging, or the judge in sentencing a murderer. Especially is the school fund, raised by taxation, the common and equal property of the people.

But as our people are divided among many religions, that money ought no more to be used in schools to teach one religion in preference to the others, than in a church establishment. Once the people of a small State, like Connecticut, were so homogeneous, that any dissentient minority was minute, and the dominant religion was taught "on State account," without any protest loud enough to be inconvenient. But the mixture of our people, and especially the strength and audacity of popery, now makes all this different. Papists make an effective issue, arguing that the State must not use the people's money to teach King James's version, which they, a part of the people, believe heretical. Zealous Protestants, usually zealous State school men, try to flout this plea. But would they assent to the State's teaching their children, with their money, the version which says: "Except ye *do penance* ye shall all likewise perish?" They exclaim: "That is an erroneous version, while King James's is faithful." Theologically that is doubtless true. But the very point of the State's covenant with the people is, that *the State shall not judge, either way, of that proposition*. It has been bargained that, in the State arena, we shall respect papists' religious views, precisely as we require them to respect ours. Suppose them, some day, in as large a majority in some State as Protestants are in New England, would we acquiesce in their forcing the study of the *Douay version* in State schools? So, unless we admit that our might makes our right, we ought not to inflict the parallel wrongs on the Jews, Mohammedans, Atheists, and Buddhists among us, because they are still few.

It is sought to parry this conclusion thus: While all religions are equal, and no one established, the State is not an atheistic institute, but must ground itself in the will of God, which is the standard of all rights. That the State is an ethical institute and for ethical ends. That hence it enjoins the Sabbath, punishes blasphemy, etc. That equally the State, while not establishing one religion to the prejudice of others, ought

to teach the divine truths common to all, by the unsectarian use of the Bible. But, whether this be the just basis of a commonwealth or not, our *States do not avow it*. And second, the question is not of the original Scripture in common schools, but of some one version, among other competing ones, which even Protestants do not claim to be infallible. Hence the question, Which version? raises sectarian issues. Third, we do not believe, any more than these reasoners, that the State can be atheistic, because it is an ethical institute, and the divine will is the only valid ethical rule. But the State finds the theistic basis in natural theology. The proof is, that pagan States, resting only on natural theism, were valid, and rightfully (Rom. 13: 5) possessed the allegiance even of Christians. The evasion therefore is futile.

But be the logic of this question what it may, the actual result is certain. The papists will inevitably carry the point, as they have already done in many places. That they will triumph everywhere else that they care to try, is plain from the growing timidity of the Bible advocates, the poverty of the compromises they offer, and the spreading indifference of the masses to the value of biblical teaching. In fact, on American premises, the Bible advocates have no plea but a pious predilection, and sooner or later logical considerations, when so clear, must assert their force. The difficulty of the problem appears thus: That it agitates other free governments than ours, as the British and Holland, at this day.

For the solution there are, on the theory of State education, four suggestions. The first is the unjust one of forcing the religion of the majority on the minority. The second is what is called in Great Britain the plan of "concurrent endowments." Each denomination may have its own schools endowed by the State, and teach its own religion in it along with secular learning. This is virtually the plan by which New York papists have been partially appeased. It is justly rejected by Protestants everywhere. First, because it offers no solution save where the several denominations are populous enough to sustain a school for each in the same vicinage. Second, because the State has no right thus virtually to assert the co-ordinate and equal value of opposing creeds, the truth of one of which may imply the positive falsehood of another. Third, because the

State has no right to indicate of either of the creeds that it is, or is not, true and valuable. Fourth, because Protestantism is more promotive of thrift and wealth than the erroneous creeds; whence a given number of Protestants will pay more school-tax than the same number of errorists, so that this plan uses a part of their money to foster creeds they conscientiously believe mischievous. Fifth, it gives to error a pecuniary and moral support beyond what it would receive from the spontaneous zeal of its votaries. And last, it disunites the population by training youth in hostile religious camps. Irish and American papists have professed to approve because they gain by the plan. But who dreams that if they were in the majority they would be willing to see "good Catholic money" expended in teaching Protestant heresy?

The third plan proposes to give "unsectarian" religious instruction in the first hour of the day, while parents who dissent from it are allowed to detain their children from school until that hour is passed. This amounts to the State's establishing a religion and using the people's money to teach it, but *permitting dissent* without any other penalty than the taxation for a religious object which the taxpayer condemns. That is to say, it places the matter where England places her established religion, since the "Toleration Act" of William and Mary relieved dissenters of penal pains for absence from the Anglican churches. But the thing Americans claim is *liberty* and not *toleration*. They deny the State's right to select a religion, as the true and useful one, for anybody, willing or unwilling. Those who dissent from the selected religion deny that the State may thus expend the people's money as a bait to careless or erroneous parents to submit their children to the inculcation of error.

The only other alternative is to secularize the State's teaching absolutely, limiting it to matters merely secular, and leaving parents or the Church to supplement it with such religious teaching as they may please, or none. Some Christians, driven by the difficulty which has been disclosed, adopt this conclusion. The largest number, notwithstanding the difficulty, reject it with energy. Let us see whether this plan is either *possible* or *admissible*.

This is really the vital question. It cannot be discussed

until we agree what education is, and disperse deceptive misconceptions of it. It is properly the whole man or person that is educated; but the main subject of the work is the spirit. Education is the nurture and development of the whole man for his proper end. The end must be conceived aright in order to understand the process. Even man's earthly end is predominantly moral. Now, if dexterity in any art, as in the handling of printer's type, a musket, a burin, a power-loom, were education, its secularization might be both possible and proper. Is not a confusion here the source of most of the argument in defense of that theory? For instance, "Why may not the State teach reading and writing without any religious adjuncts, as legitimately as the mechanic thus teaches his apprentices filing, planing, or hammering?" Because dexterity in an art is not education. The latter nurtures a soul, the other only drills a sense-organ or muscle; the one has a mechanical end, the other a moral. And this answer cannot be met by saying, "Let it then be agreed that the State is only teaching an art, a dexterity—that, for instance, of letters." For the State refuses to be understood thus: it claims *to educate*; as is witnessed by the universal argument of the advocates of this State function, that she has the right and duty of providing that the young citizens shall be competent to their responsibility as citizens. But these are ethical. Again, if the State professed to bestow, not an education, but a dexterity, equity would require her bestowing not only the arts of letters, but all other useful arts. For only the minority can ever live by literary arts; the great majority of children have equal rights to be taught the other bread-winning arts. Thus government would become the wildest communism. No, the State cannot adopt this evasion; unless she says that she *educates*, she can say nothing.

It should also be remarked here that the arts of reading and writing are rather means of education than education itself, and not the only nor the most effective means. As Macaulay showed, against Dr. S. Johnson, the unlettered part of the Athenians were, in some respects, highly educated, while we see many minds, with these arts, really undeveloped.

But is a really secularized education either possible or admissible?

First, No people of any age, religion, or civilization, before

ours, has ever thought so. Against the present attempt, right or wrong, stands the whole common sense of mankind. Pagan, Papist, Mohammedan, Greek, Protestant, have all hitherto rejected any other education than one grounded in religion, as absurd and wicked. Let Mr. Webster be heard against the Girard will, which enjoined, in order to exclude Christianity from his college, that no minister should ever enter its walls. The argument against the will here was, that the trust it proposed to create was, in this, so opposed to all civilized jurisprudence, as to make it outside the law, and so void. So formidable did the point seem to lawyers, that Mr. Horace Binney, of the defense, went to England to ransack the British laws of trusts. It was in urging this point that Mr. Webster uttered the memorable words:

"In what age, by what sect, where, when, by whom, has religious truth been excluded from the education of youth? Nowhere. Never! Everywhere, and at all times, it has been regarded as essential. *It is of the essence, the vitality of useful instruction.*" And this was not the assertion of Mr. Webster, the politician, but of the learned lawyer, face to face with able opponents, and making one of the most responsible forensic efforts of his life. He knew that he was uttering the weighty voice of history and jurisprudence.

Let another witness be heard, of equal learning and superior character.* "It must be acknowledged to be one of the most remarkable phenomena of our perverted humanity, that among a Christian people, and in a Protestant land, such a discussion" (whether the education of youth may not be secularized) "should not seem as absurd as to inquire whether school-rooms should be located under water or in darksome caverns! The Jew, the Mohammedan, the follower of Confucius, and of Brahma, each and all are careful to instruct the youth of their people in the tenets of the religions they profess, and are not content until, by direct and reiterated teaching, they have been made acquainted with at least the outline of the books which contain, as they believe, the revealed will of Deity. Whence comes it that Christians are so indifferent to a duty so obvious, and so obviously recognized by Jew and Pagan?"

We are attempting then an absolute novelty. But may not

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the tree be already known by its fruits? State education among Americans tends to be entirely secularized. What is the result? Whence this general revolt from the Christian faith in this country, so full of churches, preachers, and a redundant Christian literature, so boastful of its Sabbaths and its evangelism? What has prepared so many for the dreary absurdities of materialism? Why do the journals which seek a national circulation think it their interest to affect irreligion? Why so many lamentations over public and popular corruptions? He who notes the current of opinion sees that the wisest are full of misgivings as to the fruits of present methods. As a specimen, let these words, from the Governor of Massachusetts, at a recent anniversary, be taken: "He" (Gov. Rice) "lifted up a warning voice, with respect to the inadequacy and perils of our modern system of one-sided education, which supposed it could develop manhood and good citizenship out of mere brain culture."

Second, True education is, in a sense, a spiritual process, the nurture of a soul. By spiritual, the divines mean the acts and states produced by the Holy Ghost, as distinguished from the merely ethical. The nurture of these is not human education, but sanctification. Yet education is the nurture of a spirit which is rational and moral, in which conscience is the regulative and imperative faculty; whose proper end, even in this world, is moral. But God is the only Lord of the conscience; this soul is his miniature likeness; his will is the source of obligation to it; likeness to him is its perfection, and religion is the science of the soul's relations to God. Let these statements be placed together, and the theological and educational processes appear so cognate that they cannot be separated. Hence it is that the common sense of mankind has ever invoked the guidance of the minister of religion for the education of youth; in India the Brahmin, in Turkey the Imam, in Jewry the Rabbi, and in Christian lands the pastor. So, everywhere, the sacred books have always been the prime text-books. The only exception in the world is that which Rome has made for herself by her intolerable abuse of her powers. Does the secularist answer that this sacerdotal education results in a Boeotian character and puerile culture? Yes, where the sacred books are false Scriptures, but not where it is the Bible which is the text-book. So that these instances prove that the common sense of

mankind has been at bottom correct, and has only been abused, in some instances, by imposture.

The soul is a spiritual monad, an indivisible, spiritual unit, without parts, as without extension. Those powers, which we name as separate faculties, are only modes of function with which this unit is qualified, differentiated by the distinctions of the objects on which they operate. The central power is still one. From these truths it would appear that it cannot be successfully cultivated by patches. We cannot have the intellectual workman polish it at one place, and the spiritual at another. A succession of objects may be presented to the soul, to evoke and discipline its several powers; yet the unity of the being would seem to necessitate a unity in its successful culture.

It is the Christian ideas which are most stimulating and ennobling to the soul. He who must needs omit them from his teaching is robbed of the right arm of his strength. Where shall he get such a definition of virtue as is presented in the revealed character of God? Where so ennobling a picture of benevolence as that presented in Christ's sacrifice for his enemies? Can the conception of the inter-stellar spaces so expand the mind as the thought of an infinite God, an eternal existence, and an everlasting destiny?

Every line of true knowledge must find its completeness in its convergency to God, even as every beam of daylight leads the eye to the sun. If religion be excluded from our study, every process of thought will be arrested before it reaches its proper goal. The structure of thought must remain a truncated cone, with its proper apex lacking. Richard Baxter has nervously expressed this truth.*

Third, If secular education is to be made consistently and honestly non-Christian, then all its more important branches must be omitted, or they must submit to a mutilation and falsification, far worse than absolute omission. It is hard to conceive how a teacher is to keep his covenant faithfully with the State so to teach history, cosmogony, psychology, ethics, the laws of nations, as to insinuate nothing favorable or unfavorable touching the preferred beliefs of either the evangelical Christians, Papists, Socinians, Deists, Pantheists, Materialists, or Fetisch worshippers, who claim equal rights under American

*"Reformed Pastor" pp. 94, 96.

institutions. His paedagogics must indeed be "the play of Hamlet, with the part of Hamlet omitted." Shall the secular education leave the young citizen totally ignorant of his own ancestry? But how shall he learn the story of those struggles, through which Englishmen achieved those liberties which the colonies inherited, without understanding the fiery persecutions of the Protestants under "Bloody Mary," over which the Pope's own Legate, Cardinal Pole, was sent to preside? How shall the sons of Huguenot sires in New York, Virginia, or Carolina know for what their fathers forsook beautiful France, to hide themselves in the Northern snows or the malarious woods of the South, and read nothing of the violation of the "Edict of Nantes," the "Dragonnades," and the wholesale assassination of St. Bartholomew's day, in honor of which an "infallible" predecessor of the Pope sang *Te Deums* and struck medals? Or, if the physicist attempt to ascend farther in man's history, can he give the genesis of earth and man, without intimating whether Moses or Huxley is his prophet? Or can the science of moral obligation be established in impartial oversight of God's relation to it, and of the question whether or not his will defines and grounds all human duty? Or can a Grotius or a Vattel settle the rights of nature and nations without either affirming along with the Apostles that "God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation," or else denying it with the infidel ethnologist? How much of the noblest literature must be ostracized, if this plan is to be honestly carried out? The State teacher must not mention to his pupil Shakespeare, nor Bacon, nor Milton, nor Macaulay. The *E xpurgatorius* of free democracy will be far more stringent than that of despotic Rome! But it is not necessary to multiply these instances. They show that Christian truths and facts are so woven into the very warp and woof of the knowledge of Americans, and constitute so beneficial and essential a part of our civilization, that the secular teacher, who impartially avoids either the affirmation or denial of them, must reduce his teaching to the bare giving of those scanty rudiments, which are, as we have seen, not knowledge, but the mere signs of knowledge.

Does some one say that practically this showing is exagger-

ated, for he is teaching some purely secular course, without any such maiming of his subjects or prejudicing of Christianity? If his teaching is more than a temporary dealing with some corner of education, the fact will be found to be that it is tacitly anti-Christian; overt assaults are not made; but there is a studied avoidance which is in effect hostile. There can be no neutral position between two extremes, where there is no middle ground, but "a great gulf fixed."

Fourth, Of all rightful human action the will is the executive and the conscience the directive faculty. Unless these be purified and enlightened, to enhance the vigor of the soul's other actions by training is but superfluous mischief. If in a ship the compass be lost and the pilot blind, it is better that there should not be a great force to move her machinery. The more energetic its motion, the greater is the likelihood the ship will speedily be upon the breakers. Surely this is sufficient to show to the reflecting mind that right moral inculcation cannot be separated at any point or for any time from the intellectual, without mischief.

One very obvious and yet not the weightiest application of this truth is to the discipline of the school itself. No training of any faculty takes place without some government. On what moral basis shall the teacher who wholly suppresses all appeal to religion rest that authority which he must exercise in the school-room? He will find it necessary to say to the pupil, "Be diligent. Be obedient. Lie not. Defraud not," in order that he may learn his secular knowledge. But on whose authority? There is but one ground of moral obligation, the will of God, and among the people of this country he who does not find the disclosure of that will in the Scriptures, most often finds it nowhere. But this teacher must not inculcate this Bible. Then his mere might must make his right, or else the might of the parent, or of the magistrate, to whose delegated authority he points back. Or his appeal may be to mere self-interest!

Will this government be wholesome for a youth's soul?

But from a pupil the youth becomes a citizen. He passes under wider and more complex obligations. The end of the State schooling is to fit him for this. The same question recurs, with transcendent moment. On what basis of right shall

these duties rest? As a man, it is presumable he will act as he was taught while a boy. Of course then the grounds of obligation employed with him in school should be the ones he is to recognize in adult life. In the State school a non-Christian standard alone could be given him. He cannot be expected now to rise to any better; he may sink to a lower, seeing the ground then given him had no foundation under it.

That is to say, young Americans are to assume their responsibilities with pagan morals, for these are just what human reason attains from the non-Christian standard. Will this suffice to sustain American institutions? One may say: Natural theism may deduce quite a high ethical code, as witness the Greek philosophy. So could a man who rightly construed the *data* of his consciousness be an atheist; even the atheist might find in them proof that conscience ought to govern. But he does not, nor does the pagan reason *act* as Epictetus *speculated*. Let us begin to legislate for the people *as they ought to be*, and we shall have a fine card-castle. In fact, Americans, taken as we find them, who do not get their moral restraints from the Bible, have none. If, in our moral training of the young, we let go the "Thus saith the Lord," we shall have no hold left. The training which does not base duty on Christianity is, for us, practically immoral. If testimony to this truth is needed, let the venerable Dr. Griffin, of a former generation, be heard. "To educate the mind of a bad man without correcting his morals is to put a sword into the hands of a maniac." Let John Locke be heard. "It is virtue, then, direct virtue, which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education." * * * * * "If virtue and a well-tempered soul be not got and settled so as to keep out ill and vicious habits, languages and science, and all the other accomplishments of education, will be to no purpose but to make the worse or more dangerous man." Let Dr. Francis Wayland be heard. "Intellectual cultivation may easily exist without the existence of virtue or love of right. In this case its only effect is to stimulate desire; and this, unrestrained by the love of right, must eventually overturn the social fabric which it at first erected." Last, let Washington be heard, in his farewell address, where he teaches that the virtue of the citizens is the only basis for

social safety, and that the Christian religion is the only adequate basis for that virtue.

But, is not mental culture *per se* elevating? It is hard for us to give up this flattery, because hitherto education has been more or less Christian. The minister has been the American school-master. But are not the educated the more elevated? Yes. For the reason just given, and for another; not that their mental culture made them seek higher morals, but their (and their parents') higher morals made them seek mental culture! We are prone to put the cart before the horse. Again I cite evidence. James Anthony Froude, a witness by no means friendly to orthodoxy, quoting Miss Florence Nightingale, emphatically endorses her opinion, that the ordinary, as the natural effect of the mere communication of secular knowledge to youths, is only to suggest the desire for more numerous, and, for the bulk of men whose destiny is inevitably narrow, illicit objects of desire. But they plead: In teaching the youth to know of more objects of desire you also teach him to know more restraining considerations. The fatal answer is that knowledge does not rule the heart, but conscience (if anything does); mere knowledge, without God's fear, makes desire grow faster than discretion. Says Sir Henry Bulwer: "I do not place much confidence in the philosopher who pretends that the knowledge which develops the passions is an instrument for their suppression, or that where there are the most desires there is likely to be the most order, and the most abstinence in their gratification." Again, the soul should grow symmetrically. Let the boughs of a tree grow, while the roots (without actual disease) stand still; the first gale would blow it over, because of the disproportion of its parts.

Fifth, We need the best men to teach our children. The best are true Christians, who carry their religion into everything. Such men neither can nor will bind themselves to hold so influential a relation to precious souls for whom Christ died, and make no effort to save them. So the tendency must be towards throwing State schools into the hands of half-hearted Christians or of contemptuous unbelievers. Can such be even trusted with an important secular task? Railroads persist in breaking the Sabbath; so they must be served on the track exclusively by profane Sabbath-breakers or truckling professors

of religion. The consequence is, they are scourged with negligent officials, drunken engineers, and defaulting cashiers. So the State will fall into the hands of teachers who will not even teach secular learning honestly; money will be wasted, and the schools will become corrupting examples to their own pupils of slighted work and abused trusts.

Sixth, To every Christian citizen, the most conclusive argument against a secularized education is contained in his own creed touching human responsibility. According to this, obligation to God covers all of every man's being and actions. Even if the act be correct in outward form, which is done without any reference to his will, he will judge it a shortcoming. "The ploughing of the wicked is sin." The intentional end to which our action is directed determines its moral complexion supremely. Second, Our Savior has declared that there is no moral neutrality: "He that is not with him is against him, and he that gathereth not with him scattereth abroad." Add now the third fact, that every man is born in a state of alienation from God; that practical enmity and atheism are the natural outgrowth of this disposition; that the only remedy for this natural disease of man's spirit is gospel truth. The comparison of these truths will make it perfectly plain that *a non-Christian training is literally an anti Christian training.*

This is the conclusive argument. The rejoinder is attempted; that Christians hold this theology as church members, and not as citizens; and that we have ourselves urged that the State is not an evangelical agent, and its proper business is not to convert souls from original sin. True, but neither has it a right to become an anti-evangelical agency, and resist the work of the spiritual commonwealth. While the State does not authorize the theological beliefs of the Christian citizens, neither has it a right to war against them. While we have no right to ask the State to propagate our theology, we have a right to demand that it shall not oppose it. But to educate souls thus is to oppose it, because a non-Christian training is an anti-Christian training. It may be urged again, that this result, if evil, will not be lessened by the State's ceasing to teach at all, for then the training of youth will be, so far as she is concerned, equally non-Christian. The answer is, that it is one thing to tolerate a wrong as done by a party over whom we have not law-

ful control, but wholly another to perpetrate that wrong ourselves. For the State thus to do what she ought to condemn in the godless parent, though she be not authorized to interfere would be the sin of "*framing mischief by a law*," the very trait of that "throne of iniquity" with which the Lord cannot have fellowship.

It is objected again, that if the State may govern and punish, which are moral functions, she may also teach. If we are prepared for the theocratic idea of the State, which makes it the universal human association, *To Law* of human organisms, bound to do everything for society from mending a road or draining a marsh up to supporting a religion, then we can conclude thus. But then consistency will add to State schools a State religion, a beneficed clergy, a religious test for office, and State power wielded to suppress theological as well as social error. Again, while secular ruling and punishing are ethical functions, they are sufficiently grounded in the light of natural theism. But teaching is a spiritual function—in the sense defined—and for teaching beings fallen, and in moral ruin, natural theism is wholly inadequate, as witness the state of pagan society. Christian citizens are entitled (not by the State, but by one higher, God) to hold that the only teaching adequate for this fallen soul is *redemption*. But of this the State, as such, knows nothing. As God's institute for realizing secular justice, she does know enough of moral right to be a praise to them that do well and a terror to evil-doers.

The most plausible evasion is this: Since education is so comprehensive a work, why may there not be a "division of labor?" Let the State train the intellect and the Christian parent and the Church train the conscience and heart in the home and the house of worship. With this solution some Christians profess themselves satisfied. Of course such an arrangement would not be so bad as the neglect of the heart by both State and parent.

Points already made contain fatal answers. Since conscience is the regulative faculty of all, he who must not deal with conscience cannot deal well with any. Since the soul is a *monad*, it cannot be equipped as to different parts at different times and places, as a man might get his hat at one shop and his boots at another; it has no parts. Since all truths converge

towards God, he who is not to name God, must have all his teachings fragmentary; he can only construct a truncated figure. In history, ethics, philosophy, jurisprudence, religious facts and propositions are absolutely inseparable. The necessary discipline of a school-room and secular fidelity of teachers call for religion, or we miss of them. And no person nor organism has a right to seem to say to a responsible, immortal soul, "In this large and intelligent and even ethical segment of your doings you are entitled to be godless." For this teaching State must not venture to disclaim that construction of its own proceeding to its own pupil. *That disclaimer would be a religious inculcation!*

But farther: Why do people wish the State to interfere in educating? Because she has the power, the revenues to do it better. Then, unless her intervention is to be a cheat, her secularized teaching must be some very impressive thing. Then its impression, which is to be non-Christian, according to the theory, will be too preponderant in the youth's soul, to be counterpoised by the feebler inculcation of the seventh day. The natural heart is carnal, and leans to the secular and away from the gospel truths. To the ingenuous youth, quickened by animating studies, his teacher is *Magnus Apollo*, and according to this plan he must be to his ardent young votary wholly a heathen deity. The Christian side of the luminary, if there is one, must not be revealed to the worshipper! Then how pale and cold will the infrequent ray of gospel truth appear when it falls on him upon the seventh day! In a word, to the successful pupil under an efficient teacher, *the school is his world*. Make that godless, and his life is made godless.

If it be asked again: Why may not the State save itself trouble by leaving all education to parents? The answer is, Because so many parents are too incapable or careless to be trusted with the task. Evidently, if most parents did the work well enough, the State would have no motive to meddle. Then the very *raison d'être* of the State school is in this large class of negligent parents. But man is a carnal being, alienated from godliness, whence all those who neglect their children's mental, will, *a fortiori*, neglect their spiritual, culture. Hence we must expect that, *as to the very class* which constitutes the pretext for the State's interposition, *the fatally one-sided culture she give*

will remain one-sided. She has no right to presume anything else. But, it may be asked: Is not there the church to take up this part, neglected by both secularized State and godless parent? The answer is, The State, thus secularized, cannot claim to know the Church as an ally. Besides, if the Church be found sufficiently omnipresent, willing, and efficient, through the commonwealth, to be thus relied on, why will she not inspire in parents and individual philanthropists zeal enough to care for the whole education of youth? Thus again, the whole *raison d'être* for the State's intervention would be gone. In fact the Church does not and cannot repair the mischief which her more powerful, rich, and ubiquitous rival, the secularized State, is doing in thus giving, under the guise of a non-Christian, an anti-Christian training.

It is also well known to practical men that State common schools *obstruct* parental and philanthropic effort. Thus, parents who, if not meddled with, would follow the impulse of enlightened Christian neighbors, their natural guides, in creating a private school for their children, to make it both primary and classical, now always stop at the primary. "The school tax must be paid anyhow, which is heavy, and that is all they can do." Next, children of poor parents who showed aspiration for learning found their opportunity for classical tuition near their homes, in the innumerable private schools created by parental interest and public spirit, and kindly neighborhood charity never suffered such deserving youths to be arrested for the mere lack of tuition. Now, in country places not populous enough to sustain "State High Schools," all such youths must stop at the rudiments. Thus the country loses a multitude of the most useful educated men. Next, the best men being the natural leaders of their neighbors, would draw a large part of the children of the class next them upward into the private schools created for their own families, which, for the same reason, were sure to be Christian schools. The result is, that while a larger number of children is brought into primary schools, and while the statistics of the illiterate are somewhat changed, to the great delectation of shallow philanthropists, the number of youths well educated in branches above mere rudiments, and especially of those brought under daily Christian training, is diminished. In cities (where public opinion is chiefly manufactured)

high schools may be sustained, and this evil obviated so far as secular tuition goes. But in the vast country regions, literary culture is lowered just as it is extended. It is chiefly the country which fills the useful professions—town youths go into *trade*.

The actual and consistent secularization of education is inadmissible.

But nearly all public men and divines declare that the State schools are the glory of America, that they are a finality, and in no event to be surrendered. And we have seen that their complete secularization is logically inevitable. Christians must prepare themselves then, for the following results: All prayers, catechisms, and Bibles will ultimately be driven out of the schools. But this will not satisfy Papists, who obstinately—and correctly were their religion correct—insist that education shall be Christian for their children. This power over the hopes and fears of the demagogues will secure, what Protestants cannot consistently ask for, a separate endowment out of the common funds. Rome will enjoy, relatively to Protestantism, a grand advantage in the race of propagandism; for humanity always finds out, sooner or later, that it cannot get on without a religion, and it will take a false one in preference to none. Infidelity and practical ungodliness will become increasingly prevalent among Protestant youth, and our churches will have a more arduous contest for growth if not for existence.

Perhaps American Protestants might be led, not to abandon but to revise their opinions touching education, by recalling the conditions under which the theory of State education came to be first accepted in this country. This came about in the colonies which at the same time held firmly to a union of Church and State. The Massachusetts and Connecticut colonies, for instance, honorable pioneers in State education in this country, were decidedly theoretic in their constitution. The Reformed religion was intimately interwoven. So all the Protestant States of Europe, whose successful example is cited, as Scotland and Prussia, have the Protestant as an established religion. This and State primary education have always been parts of one consistent system in the minds of their rulers in Church and State. A secularized education, such as that which is rapidly becoming the result of our State school system, would have been indig-

nantly reprobated by the Winthrops and Mathers, the Knoxs, Melvilles, and Chalmers, and, it is presumed, by the Tholucks and even Bismarcks of those commonwealths, which are pointed to as precedents and models. It is submitted, whether it is exactly candid to quote the opinions and acts of all these great men, for what is, in fact, another thing from what they advocated? Knox, for instance, urged the primary education of every child in Scotland by the State. But it was because the State he had helped to reconstruct there was clothed with a recognized power of teaching the Reformed religion (through the allied Church), and because it was therefore able, in teaching the child to read, also to teach it the Scriptures and the Assembly's Catechism. Had Knox seen himself compelled to a severance of Church and State (which he would have denounced as wicked and paganish), and therefore to the giving by the State of a secularized education, which trained the intellect without the conscience or heart, his heroic tongue would have given no uncertain sound. Seeing then that wise and good men in adopting and successfully working this system, did so only for communities which united Church and State, and mental and spiritual training, the question for candid consideration is: What modifications the theory should receive, when it is imported into commonwealths whose civil governments have absolutely secularized themselves and made the union of the secular and spiritual powers illegal and impossible?

The answer may, perhaps, be found by going back to a first principle hinted in the outset of this discussion. Is the direction of the education of children either a civic or an ecclesiastical function? Is it not properly a domestic and parental function? First, we read in holy writ that God ordained the family by the union of one woman to one man, in one flesh, for life, for the declared end of "seeking a godly seed." Does not this imply that he looks to parents, in whom the family is founded, as the responsible agents of this result? He has also in the fifth Commandment connected the child proximately, not with either presbyter or magistrate, but with the parents, which, of course, confers on them the adequate and the prior authority. This argument appears again in the very order of the historical genesis of the family and State, as well as of the visible Church. The family was first. Parents at the outset were the only social

heads existing. The right rearing of children by them was in order to the right creation of the other two institutes. It thus appears that naturally the parents' authority over their children could not have come by deputation from either State or visible Church, any more than the water in a fountain by derivation from its reservoir below. Second, the dispensation of Divine Providence in the course of nature shows where the power and duty of educating are deposited. That ordering is that *the parents* decide in what *status* the child shall begin his adult career. The son inherits the fortune, the social position, the responsibility, or the ill-fame of his father. Third, God has provided for the parents social and moral influences so unique, so extensive, that no other earthly power, or all others together, can substitute them in fashioning the child's character. The home example, armed with the venerable authority of the father and the mother, repeated amidst the constant intimacies of the fireside, seconded by filial reverence, ought to have the most potent plastic force over character. And this unique power God has guarded by an affection, the strongest, most deathless, and most unselfish, which remains in the breast of fallen man. Until the magistrate can feel a love, and be nerved by it to a self-denying care and toil, equal to that of a father and a mother, he can show no pretext for assuming any parental function.

But the best argument here is the heart's own instinct. No parent can fail to resent, with a righteous indignation, the intrusion of any authority between his conscience and convictions and the soul of his child. If the father conscientiously believes that his own creed is true and righteous and obligatory before God, then he must intuitively regard the intrusion of any other power between him and his minor child, to cause the rejection of that creed, as a usurpation. The freedom of mind of the child alone, when become an adult, and his father's equal, can justly interpose. If this usurpation is made by the visible church, it is felt to be in the direction of popery, if by the magistrate, in the direction of despotism.

It may be said that this theory makes the parent sovereign, during the child's mental and moral minority, in the moulding of his opinions and character, whereas, seeing the parent is fallible, and may form his child amiss, there ought to be a superior authority to superintend and intervene. But the com-

plete answer is, that inasmuch as the supreme authority *must be placed somewhere*, God has indicated that, on the whole, no place is so safe for it as the hands of the parent, who has the supreme love for the child and the superior opportunity. But many parents nevertheless neglect or pervert the power? Yes, and does the State never neglect and pervert its powers? With the lessons of history to teach us the horrible and almost universal abuses of power in the hands of civil rulers, that question is conclusive. In the case of an unjust or godless State, the evil would be universal and sweeping. Doubtless God has deposited the duty in the safest place.

The competitions of the State and the Church for the educating power have been so engrossing that we have almost forgotten the parent, as the third and the rightful competitor. And now many look at his claim almost contemptuously. Because the civic and the ecclesiastical spheres are so much wider and more populous than his, they are prone to regard it as every way inferior. Have we not seen that the smaller circle is, in fact, the most original and best authorized of the three? Will any thinking man admit that he *derives his right to marry*, to be a father, from the permission of the State? Yet there is an illusion here, because civic constitutions confer on the State certain police functions, so to speak, concerning marriage and families. So there are State laws concerning certain ecclesiastical belongings. But what Protestant concedes therefrom that his religious rights were either conferred, or can be rightfully taken away, by civil authority? The truth is, that God has immediately and authoritatively instituted three organisms for man on earth, the State, the visible Church, and the Family, and these are co-ordinate in rights and mutual independence. The State or Church has no more right to invade the parental sphere than the parent to invade theirs. The right distribution of all duties and power between the three circles would be the complete solution of that problem of good government which has never yet been solved with full success. It is vital to a true theory of human rights, that the real independence of the smallest yet highest realm, that of the parent, be respected. Has it not been proved that the direction of education is one of its prerogatives?

But does not the State's right to exist imply the right to secure all the conditions of its existence? And as parents may

so pervert or neglect education as to rear a generation incompetent to preserve their civil institutions, does not this give the State control over education? I answer, first, it is not even a pretext for the State's invading the parental sphere any farther than the destructive neglect exists, that is, to stimulate, or help, or compel the neglectful parents alone. Second, precisely the same argument may authorize the State to intrude into the spiritual circle and establish and teach a religion. But the sophism is here: It is assumed that a particular form of civil institutions has a prescriptive right to perpetuate itself. It has none. So the American theory teaches, in asserting for the people the inherent right to change their institutions. Did our republican fathers hold that any people have ever the right to subvert the moral order of society ordained by God and nature? Surely not. Here then is disclosed that distinction between the *moral order* and any particular *civil order*, so often overlooked, but so eloquently drawn by *Cousin*. So far is it from being true that the civil authority is entitled to shape a people to suit itself; the opposite is true, the people should shape the civil authority.

It is a maxim in political philosophy, as in mechanics, that when an organism is applied to a function for which it was not designed, it is injured and the function is ill done. Here is a farmer who has a mill designed and well fitted to grind his meal. He resolves that it shall also thresh his sheaves. The consequence is that he has wretched threshing and a crippled mill. I repeat, God designed the State to be the organ for securing secular justice. When it turns to teaching or preaching it repeats the farmers' experience. The Chinese Government and people are an example in point. The Government has been for a thousand years educating the people for its own ends. The result is what we see.

Government powerfully affects national character by the mode in which it performs its proper functions, and if the administration is equitable, pure and free, it exalts the people. But it is by the indirect influence. This is all it can do well. As for the other part of the national elevation (an object which every good man must desire), it must come from other agencies; from the dispensation of Almighty Providence; from fruitful ideas and heroic acts with which he inspires the great men

whom he sovereignly gives to the nations he designs to bless; chiefly from the energy of divine Truth and the Christian virtues, first in individuals, next in families, and last in visible churches.

Let us suppose, then, that both State and Church recognize the parent as the educating power; that they assume towards him an ancillary instead of a dominating attitude; that the State shall encourage individual and voluntary efforts by holding the impartial shield of legal protection over all property which may be devoted to education; that it shall encourage all private efforts; and that in its eleemosynary character it shall aid those whose poverty and misfortunes disable them from properly rearing their own children. Thus the insoluble problems touching religion in State schools would be solved, because the State was not the responsible creator of the schools, but the parents. Our educational system might present less mechanical symmetry, but it would be more flexible, more practical, and more useful.

ROBERT L. DABNEY.

THE LABOR UNION, THE STRIKE AND THE COMMUNE.

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Labor Unions have been very obtrusive phenomena in these latter years of the nineteenth century. In profession they are voluntary societies of working men for protecting the "rights of labor."

Were they only associations for protecting the lawful rights of laborers, no more political objection could lie against them than against Granger societies, social clubs, art unions, or Christian churches themselves. But their real and main design is far other. Their avowed purpose and practice are: First, to control the discipline which employers exercise over individual laborers, members of the union; and second, to coerce the payment of higher wages by employers to the laborers. Their weapon of coercion for both ends is, the strike. The labor union has its council and executive head, elected by the laborers from among themselves, and its union-fund raised by monthly or weekly contributions from their wages. Each member is bound by strict vow to obey this council and chief implicitly. Here is the working of the machine. Among the laborers of a certain mine or factory is A. B. "A union man" whom his employers find unpunctual, insolent, incompetent for his work, or drunken. The employers protect themselves by paying him off and discharging him: the only possible mode of self-protection left them under the hireling system of labor. But now the chiefs of the union interfere. They say A. B. is under the protection of "the union," therefore the employers shall retain him and pay him full wages, although they believe he does not suit them, does not earn half his wages and indeed is doing serious and permanent injury to the credit of the firm

by "scamping" his work. If the employers decline to submit, they are at once punished by a "strike." Under the orders of the union-chiefs every laborer is to leave his employment at the concerted signal; every wheel in the factory is to be stopped; all production is to be arrested, and the employer's whole investment reduced to a dead capital until such time as the union chiefs may see fit for ending the strike.

Meantime the laborers and their families, after eating up prior savings, draw a small pension from the "union fund," which provides them a scanty subsistence until such time as their punishment works submission in the hearts of their employers.

Or, if the issue between the union and the employers is the rate of wages, a similar strike is relied on to coerce the latter into paying such wages as the laborers think they should have. Such is the theory of the strike.

The moral and economic objections are patent and trite. The period of total idleness is often ruinous to the habits of the men. The system establishes the state of chronic social warfare between employers and employed, instead of that condition of kindly co-operation, which is so essential to happiness of feeling and prosperity in the business. The strike entails a fearful destruction of wealth. All profit on the plant of the employers is lost; while the savings of the laborers are eaten up, in unproductive consumption, and their time, which is their money, is wasted for naught. The community as a body is left just so much the poorer.

Upon this loss follows another sure economic result, which deserves to be more fully explicated. The law is this: Whenever any hindrance or constriction from any cause whatsoever, is applied to production, the practical hardships thereof are shifted over and delivered down by the better endowed members of the community, until they press upon that class owning no property except their labor, which forms the bottom *stratum*. If we compare those hardships to a load or weight laid upon the top of a wall, and the several strata of the community to the horizontal lines of stones, we shall have an exact illustration: the pressure of that load is ultimately delivered down upon the bottom stratum. This result is insured by a universal principle of human nature, the preference for one's

own welfare and the welfare of those he loves, over that of strangers. An individual instance will best prove this. We will suppose the head of a family a stockholder in the manufactory which is undergoing a strike. He is not one whit more selfish or less charitable than any other rich man, or laboring man. The dividends on his stock constitute his family revenue. By reason of the strike those dividends will drop this year from \$2,500 to \$1,800. He and his wife hold a council upon the question, What is to be done? They are prudent people, who do not wish to go in debt. What will they do? Just what all other parents in the world would do, viz: They will so change their expenditures as to live on the \$1,800, while imposing upon themselves and the children they love the lightest possible hardships of retrenchment and retaining as many of the solid comforts of life as possible. Their retrenchments will work after this fashion. Mother will say: "Husband, hitherto we have indulged our girls by having their finer raiment made up by a dressmaker. The girls must learn, with my help, to be their own mantua-makers; they have leisure enough." Father adds: "Our eldest, Emily, is now quite proficient in her music. Why can she not give the piano lessons to the younger girls, so as to save the heavy cost of the music teacher?" "Just so," says the mother: "And we can also dispense with one of the maids; for the girls can very well do the sweeping and dusting of the chambers; the exercise will be good for their health." "And," adds the father, "there is our boy, Tom, who is now a great, strapping fellow, passionately fond of horses. Why cannot Tom groom and harness old Baldy before and after his school hours, so we can dispense with a hired groom?"

So this family adjust themselves to the reduced income, without any real loss of comfort, only, they have to be somewhat more busy and have less time for idling and loafing, which is all the better for their health and cheerfulness, but, "How does this retrenchment work? Upon the under *stratum*." This dressmaker, who thus loses the custom of a large family is Miss Bettie Jones, the daughter of a poor and sickly old widow, whom she must support along with herself, by her needle. On her this retrenchment presses as a real and probably a cruel hardship, but who can blame this gentleman and his wife for their prudent and honest measures? Surely, it would be still

more cruel in them to continue employing Betsy Jones' needle and then fail to pay her. So the professional music teacher who loses three pupils (a fifth or fourth part of her income), is Miss Lucy Hill, a poor but refined woman, who has to support herself and a paralytic father by her music fees. The discharged house-maid is Biddy Malony, the daughter of Mike Malony, and one of a family of eleven; and the father is the discharged groom, who had earned one-third of the bread and potatoes for his family by caring for old Baldy and his stable. Biddy's wages are now gone and she comes back upon her father to be fed, while half of his means for buying food are gone. Here are four deserving poor persons who are hit hard as a consequence of this decline in the stockholder's income. But it is the strikers who are really responsible for these cruel blows.

I have given a particular instance which is thoroughly typical. Other cases will vary endlessly in details; but they will all work under the same principle. In every case where injury or constriction is planned against the resources of the property class the injury designed for them will be mainly evaded and handed down, until it alights upon the bottom class beneath them. Here we have a biting illustration of the folly (a folly equal to its dishonesty) of all the hostilities of "labor against capital." Every blow which the working men are instigated to aim at their employers must prove a boomerang.

Next, we find this attempt to coerce employers by strikes, as futile as mischievous. The pretensions of the labor union must appear to the employers unjust, usurping and even insolent: it surely provokes resistance. But in the contest thus begun the employers have every advantage. They have more means saved up upon which to live; the arrest of production means for them only the retrenchments we have described above; while for the laborers it means destitution and hunger. So the employers hold out longest, and the union men have to submit after all this bootless loss.

But a stronger element of defeat appears. The labor union does not include all the poor men of the vicinage. Many of these need employment badly and are only too glad to accept the wages and the employment which the union men have just disdained and rejected. Thus after a few days' suspension the wheels of the factory begin to revolve again with a new body

of laborers, while the union men find themselves left out in the cold permanently.

Thus the strike system has proved an utter futility, and worse, unless the union men proceed to further measures, which pass at once into criminality. These are always violent and illegal attempts to prevent non-union men from accepting employment, by insults, threats, blows, assaults, and even murders. The union resolves that their late employers shall not exercise their reasonable and lawful rights to form such new contracts of labor as they and the new employes see fit to approve; they decree that their fellow citizens, their lawful equals, while not union men, shall not exercise the inalienable right of every free human being to work for a living, and to make such contract concerning employment and wages as is satisfactory to himself. Thus the union men "picket" the gates of the factory. They denounce the new laborers as "scabs," as traitors to the cause of the working-man. They make violent threats. In extreme cases they proceed to violent assaults, to murder, to arson, to assassination. Thus the labor union is transmitted into a criminal conspiracy. Every intelligent and just mind views these ulterior measures as most outrageous wickedness and despotism wrought under the pretense of defending the rights of the working men. Yet without these outrages their system effects nothing but direct injury to themselves, as to all concerned. Obviously, the concession to their demands means the confiscation of the employers' property, overthrow of law, the raising of an aristocracy of rights in the union men as against their non-union equals and fellow citizens, and the enthronement of the union in the room of the lawful commonwealth, as an absolute commune.

The true logic of the strike system is this: It is a forcible attempt to invade and dominate the legitimate influence of the universal economic law of supply and demand. This law instructs us that generally the relation of supply to demand in any commodity must regulate its price. Under this law all production must proceed in civilized society. It is under this law the capitalist must produce and market the goods brought forth by his mine or his factory. It is under this law the farmer and planter must rear and sell their crops. Labor is also a commodity as truly as wheat, or cotton, or cloth. All though citizens

whose circumstances prevent the successful formation of labor unions must also contract to sell their labor under the dominion of this same law of demand. If the supply offered in the market exceeds the demand, the price must go down: the general law is inexorable: the producers of that commodity must submit to receive less for what they have to sell, and so content themselves with smaller profits; or they must find means to produce their commodity more cheaply. Particular circumstances may in some cases suspend the working of this law partially and temporarily. But as a general law it is as prevalent and regular as the law of gravitation in physics. The advocates of labor unions do not pretend to deny—they expressly avow—that the purpose and end of their system is to contravene this law as to the commodity which they have to sell, that is a particular form of labor. They perceive that the labor union and the strike are expedients from which the great majority of their fellow citizens are utterly precluded by the nature of their occupations, and *that is the very reason why the unionists value these expedients*. They know perfectly, that if all the other forms of labor in the commonwealth found it equally feasible to protect their own occupations from the law of supply and demand by their own labor unions and strikes, the whole system would be nugatory. For instance, what the spinners in a factory gained by forcing up their wages, would be neutralized by what they would lose to the farmers when they came to buy their food; if the farmers also could have a labor union which would force up the price of their crops proportionately and equitably.

From this point of view the thoughtful reader sees, that labor unions are rather conspiracies against fellow citizens and fellow laborers, than against oppressive employers. We observe that these societies thrive chiefly among operatives in mines and factories, among classes of artisans in towns, among printers, among the employes of railroad lines, or of wharves or shipping. This is because circumstances peculiar to their occupations render their measures feasible and convenient. Either they live in the same village or they can easily meet; there is a uniformity in each industry; their compensation is immediately in money-wages for labor. But let us observe how numerous and vast classes of meritorious laborers are entirely

prevented from combining successfully to force their wages up by strikes. The maid-servants and cooks of America, the hundreds and thousands of school-ma'ams who teach the children of the country for pauper wages, the millions of hired farm laborers, the more numerous millions of yeoman farmers who till their little farm with their own hands, the still larger millions of toiling mothers and housewives are precluded from forming any effective labor unions by their dispersion over a vast continent, their diversities of condition, their varieties of products, and indirect mode in which they receive their final compensation; modes involved in commercial complications where the law of supply and demand must inevitably rule. Here appear at once the real purpose and the iniquity of our existing system of labor unions. C. D. is a weaver in a cloth factory. Mr. E. F. is an honest farmer who must buy a good deal of this cloth to clothe his family and himself. One element of the cost of the cloth to E. F. is the wage of C. D., the weaver; but C. D. has resolved that E. F., his fellow citizen and equal, shall not buy that element in the value of the cloth at that equitable rate which should be generally dictated by the law of supply and demand: C. D. will force up that price against that farmer by the artificial forces of his monopoly-ring, his threats and his strikes. But C. D. fully expects to buy the bread and meat for his family from the farmer, E. F., under the strict operation of supply and demand. There is equity and democratic equality with a vengeance! But should any law or labor union enable the farmer to enhance the price of his food-products above market rates as determined by supply and demand, C. D. would declare himself much outraged. His labor union is a good rule for him; but it must not "work both ways."

I have now brought the reader to a point of view from which the justice of three practical remarks will be self-evident. When labor unionists denounce the great "trusts" of the capitalists, the oil, or sugar trust, as monopolies, we have a curious instance of inconsistency and insolence. What are their societies but labor-monopolies? In every essential feature they are the iniquities which the trusts are, only upon a smaller scale. And when political demagogues adopt the cause of these labor unions, to cater for their votes, under the pretense of democracy, they are doing the most anti-democratic thing possi-

ble. Their cry is: "For the masses against the classes!" Yet they are assisting a narrow class to plunder the masses of their fellow citizens.

The second thing to be noted is, the groundless and impudent claim of these labor unions that they are contending for the "rights of American labor." This tacitly assumes that the small minority of persons who belong to labor unions are the only people in America who labor. I may digress for a moment to add, that the same insolent falsehood is obtruded whenever the tariff system claims to be protective of American labor: as though, forsooth, the factory hands working upon protected manufactures were the only people who perform deserving labor! Whereas it has been perfectly proved a hundred times that this class of laboring men are but a few hundreds of thousands among the millions who labor in America; that they were already better paid than the average of their brethren; and that this "protection" is but a legalized method to enable them to take something from the unprotected earnings of their fellow citizens without value received, and to add it to their own. To return: there are a few hundreds of thousands of labor unionists in the United States. The census of 1890 shows that at most there may be four millions of persons engaged in occupations whose conditions render a labor union possible, but there are seven and a half millions engaged in the heavier labor of agriculture, under hotter suns and freezing winds, to whom the arts of the labor union are impossible. They must produce and sell their crops under the inexorable operation of the law of supply and demand. And if over supply or partial legislation reduces the price of their products below the cost of production, these millions must simply endure it. Methinks if there could be any honest labor union to "protect the rights of American labor," it should be one which would lift the wages of these tillers of the soil nearer the level enjoyed by the unionists.

The average American yeoman earns about fifty cents per diem with coarse fare by his heavy toil, if we deduct from the price of his farm products a moderate interest upon the capital which he employs, and all the other elements of the cost of production, except the manual labor. In the neighboring town, the unionist bricklayer or plasterer scorns to lift his trowel for

less than five dollars per day. There are a thousand farm laborers to one bricklayer. Yet this one tells us that his conspiracy is for the protection of labor! And what shall we say of the myriads of rural artisans who cannot form labor unions; of the hundreds of thousands of poor teachers and school-ma'ams whose wages are twenty-five dollars per month without boarding, for four or five months of the year? And what of the twelve millions of mothers and housewives who labor for their food and clothing in the most wearying of all tasks, year in and year out, not under an eight hour rule, you may be sure! but somewhere between twelve and eighteen and even twenty hours out of the twenty-four? Are all these not laborers because they cannot be "knights of labor?" Yet the direct effect of the arts of the labor unions is: to raise the price of every roof which shelters, of every chimney and every pound of coal which warms, and of every yard of cloth which covers these worse paid laborers in favor of a small minority already overpaid in comparison.

I am not oblivious of the plea that skilled labor is entitled to higher remuneration. The assumption is that all the forms of labor of the unions are skilled labor; while the toils of these ill-paid masses are unskilled labor. This is exactly false. For instance the effective farm laborer is far more a skilled workman than the bricklayer. The latter has one dexterity which is quite admirable: he strews a handful of mortar from his trowel more quickly, and he presses down brick after brick with its face to the line, more deftly than the plowman could. Very true. But that plowman must be able to do with equal deftness a dozen different things neither of which the bricklayer can do, and in attempting several of which he would be likely to wound himself or break his own neck. This farm laborer must be a horse breaker, must know how to guide the plow, to wield the hoe so as to "cut away the spire of crab grass" within half an inch of the tender cotton stalk without scratching it. He must wield the ax, he must be a rough carpenter; he must be butcher, knowing how to dress a mutton or a swine; he must milk the cow; he must mount the dangerous mowing machine and guide it; he must manage the complicated threshing machine and gin; he must pick two hundred and fifty pounds of seed cotton per day, where the bricklayer could not get one

hundred. It is the farmer who is the skilled laborer, and by that principle ought to receive the higher remuneration.

The third point being noted is, the fatuity of the so-called People's party in associating themselves with the labor unionists in their present passionate efforts to right the wrongs of the farmers. They are precisely as wise as would be the shepherd dogs who should insist upon enlisting the wolves along with themselves to guard the flock. The interests of the Granger masses and of the labor unionists are directly hostile. For instance, here is the yeoman farmer who is toiling to pay off a mortgage on his homestead at a real wage of about fifty cents per day (deducting fair compensation for the employment of his capital, teams, implements, etc.) Does he need a cottage, a chimney in it, a farm wagon, a thrasher, a mower, a buggy plow, a rotary harrow?

The labor union men are compelling him to pay much higher prices for each of these things, by their conspiracies. For, of course, all these contractors and manufacturers add in the inflated prices of the unionist labor, in addition to their own profits, upon the cost of every thing they furnish the farmer. But these unionists are drawing from two and a half to five dollars per day for their work, while the farmer gets an half dollar per day for his work. He must sell everything his farm produces (the source out of which he at last gets his scanty earnings) under the resistless law of supply and demand, while they are so juggling with the arts of their conspiracy as to free themselves from that law. Yet we shall find this fatuous Granger enraged against the loan corporation which lent him good money on his own terms, at his earnest entreaty, and fraternizing with the knights of labor who are covertly skinning him!

The principles of the labor unions is virtual Communism. It is instructive to watch the proofs of this truth presented by the development of the union system in Great Britain. The British Liberals in 1845, represented by Joseph Hume and the famous Free Trade Society, announced the *laissez nous faire* free trade in commodities, and free trade in labor, as the very gospel of economics and politics. The first half of the doctrine repealed the protective tariff of Britain and placed her manufactures and commerce upon that enlightened basis of thorough

free trade, which founded the new era of marvelous progress and prosperity. The second half of the doctrine embodied the essence of the Exeter Hall at anti-slavery. Free trade in labor meant for Joseph Hume and his friends that every laborer should be a free man with the right to make his own contracts of labor to suit himself; but to make them, like the farmer, the manufacturer and the merchant, under the common regulation of the law of supply and demand. Obviously, equity demands that if the principle of free trade is to govern other commodities it must also govern labor. For labor is as truly a commodity to be bought and sold, as cloth, or wheat, or iron, or sugar. To enforce the production and sale of all the latter under the free law of supply and demand, while the other commodity, labor, is fenced against that law, is obvious class legislation and injustice to others. Hence, the Anti-Corn Law League hated tariffs and domestic slavery with a hatred equally intense and holy. It is true, that under this free trade *regime* the property and capital of Britain have made an enormous spring and doubled themselves in one generation. It is also true that under the same benignant regimen the labor of the *proletariat* gained greatly in its remuneration, and the comfort of its condition. Measured in gold, the average of their wages has advanced twenty per cent. since 1845; whilst the purchasing power of this increasing wage has been doubled by the results of free trade in commodities and in labor.

But these happy consequences do not at all satisfy the laboring men of Britain or the advanced Liberals. The former have generally adopted, with passion, the system of labor unions and strikes; the latter have pushed their theories through socialism to the verge of communism. Both the laborers and their theorists now reject with heat the dogma of free trade in labor. They declare that it is tyrannical, cruel, and the direct road to a wage slavery as degrading and detestable as African slavery itself. They assert the inherent right of the labor unions to enforce their demands for higher wages by violence if necessary, notwithstanding the facts, that this enforcement is a virtual confiscation of the personal property of the employers at the will of others, in the form of this increment of wage, that it is an infringement of the right of non-union men, their own free equals, to work for such terms as suit themselves; and that the

system organized a rebellious *imperium in imperio civilis*, usurping a part of its functions and forces. The socialists argue that since their strikes are futilities unless employers and non-union men can be prohibited by force from contracting with each other, these "scabs," thus accepting the places which the union men have rejected, make themselves the enemies of labor, and are therefore the proper objects of hostility and coercion. They say there is this essential difference between free trade in commodities (which they admit is all very well) and free trade in labor: that the goods bought and sold under free trade are non-sentient and feel no pangs of destitution; but the laborers have muscles and nerves to be worn by overwork, and stomachs to be pinched by hunger, and hearts to be wrung by the poverty of their families: therefore, the laborers ought to be entitled to protect their commodity, labor, against these consequences of free trade. This is, of course, a very shallow sophism, since the goods subjected to the rigorous law of supply and demand are imbued with the element of labor, since their sale is the only medium through which the labor involved in them can get its wage and thus the price of the goods touches the welfare of the laborers who produce them, just as effectively as the price of the labor itself. The socialists then adopt in substance, though perhaps not avowedly, the Malthusian principle of the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence. They argue thus; let the capitalists enjoy free trade in labor, hiring their operatives at whatever price the relation of supply and demand may dictate; then as the proletariat increases in numbers, wages will go down until they reach the lowest level of that wretched subsistence which enables the laborers only to exist, to be miserable, and to propagate heirs to their misery. Their cry now is, "Down with free trade in labor; up with the labor union, the strike, and the forcible coercion of the scab, the traitorous enemy of his class." Let the student see for instance this drift in the recent work of Mr. Benjamin Kid, entitled, "Social Evolution."

In this new phase and deduction of Malthusianism, there is unquestionable truth. It has been verified a hundred times in the depression, in the deficient compensation and misery of free laborers, in hiring commonwealths. Another admission must be made. No existing commonwealth organized exclusively

upon the hireling labor theory has yet found a full remedy for this deplorable tendency, no matter how liberal or even democratic its constitution. Sentimentalists may kick against a great Malthusian law, may call it antiquated, and may vilipend it; but none the less it remains a true and fundamental law of population. No permanent release from its inexorable operation is found in any economic or political expedient. When the means of subsistence increase in any society, population always tends to increase up to the new level. Then, if that new level of subsistence be not farther raised, population will proceed to press upon it and overpass it. The *proletariat* will accustom itself first to part with its luxuries, and then to submit to a scantier supply of comforts; and as long as their earnings are sufficient to support existence, this laboring class will continue to obey nature's instinct to increase and multiply. It is true that since the days of the Anti-Corn Law League, the wages and the comforts of the *proletariat* in Britain have increased handsomely under free trade. But the advanced Socialists insist that this improvement will stop, and will then ebb, as soon as certain other foreign and temporary agencies cease to operate. These are the wonderful expansion of British commerce (which yet cannot expand forever); the opening to tillage of new and vast food producing areas outside of Britain; the amazing improvements in both land and ocean transportation; the wide openings for emigration; the marvelous new applications of physical science to production; the unbroken prevalence of maritime peace over the whole area of British commerce. Behold how under these new and temporary agencies, the *proletariat* population of Britain has sprung forward, with an increase rivaling the mushroom growth of new American democracies, thus giving us another startling evidence of the truth of the Malthusian law. But all earthly expansions must stop somewhere. A colt may grow wonderfully when placed in a rich, fresh pasture; but after five years of age he must stop growing, no matter what his pasture. All earthly advancements must reach their limits. And the Socialists assert that when Britain reaches her limit the Malthusian principle combined with free trade in labor will at once begin to depress the laboring classes of Britain. And this must go on until they become miserable wage slaves

again, like the peasantry of France and Southern Europe before the Revolution; of the Ireland of 1840.

It is not necessary for me to say whether the whole of this socialist argument will prove correct. My purpose is to point the reader to the violent inconsistency into which it betrays them. They have ever been and still declare themselves the passionate enemies of domestic bondage. No language has been adequate to express their scorn and hatred for the recent social system of the Southern United States. No class of accusers have done more by false accusations, slanders, and vilification to bring upon that fair region an undeserved and remorseless deluge of revolution, war, devastation and tyranny, than these advanced socialists. But now, lo! we find them with equal passion asserting a *doctrine which leads directly back to a form of slavery far more ruthless than domestic bondage*. Every man of sense knows that when he is forbidden by force to work where he chooses, and for the wage which suits himself, even in a lawful occupation, is no longer a free man: he is a slave. The power which commands me where I shall not work is the same with the "slave-power" which commands another where he shall work. Again, when the labor union has forbidden me, a non-union man, to do the lawful work which suits me for the support of my family, I ask them: "To whom then must I look for the subsistence of those I love?" Their answer is: "*Join the union*, and draw your weekly pension from the community fund, which will be issued to you so long as it lasts, and you implicitly obey." Here again I am enslaved; far worse enslaved than the African bondman of the South; for while the labor union may issue to me, for a time, a pittance which may prevent starvation out of a scanty fund created only by a tribute taken out of my own previous wages, the Southern bondman drew all the time his full subsistence, whether the business of the commune was profitable or not. And to the giving of this livelihood the head of the commune was bound, if not by his own humanity, by public opinion, by statute-law, and by a self-interest more imperious than either. And to furnish this undiminished livelihood there was bound, not a scanty fund gathered by exactions from the laborers' wages, but the whole capital and profits of the head of that commune, including the returns of his own personal industry. But this is only

half the story. If the labor union, that is, the commune, is to have full authority to forbid its members to work, then it must make itself responsible for the full subsistence of the laborers and their families. But if the commune is responsible for this, it must have authority to command the members where they shall work and to enforce that command. Without this power the commune could not possibly fulfill its pledges to furnish subsistence to its subjects. But the essence of slavery is the obligation of compulsory labor, and the dependence upon the will of another for subsistence. *Communism is slavery.* Its advocates cheat themselves by explaining: "But the members elect their own rulers, and this is liberty." A very hollow cheat this, indeed! Let communism be established as a rule of a commonwealth, and this will be the real state of the case. In name the majority will elect masters over themselves, and the unwilling minority. But Democracy and universal suffrage have taught us too well what that means. Nominally the majority was really the official wire-pullers, will determine the choice of the masters over both majority and minority. Should this result not follow and should the communistic elections fulfill most honestly the most flattering promises of the system, still we should have this result: that the minority would be slaves to the majority. And the major mob is always the most ruthless of masters. Let us again make the vital point in this discussion thoroughly salient. The ultra socialist will attempt to obscure it by saying that in the best constituted republic the minority has to obey the majority; and this is not slavery for anybody, but liberty for all. I reply, that herein are two profound falsehoods. The first, that in a true republic the minority do not obey the majority, *but both obey the constitution.* The principle of such government is given by the sublime words of Andrew Melville *Lex Rex*: The citizen does not owe his allegiance to the mere will of the accidentally major mob, but to the sacred authority of the constitution which rules the State. The power which this constitution may have conferred upon a majority is only conventional, deputed and limited. The clearest majority may only exercise that power within the limits prescribed for it by the constitution, and when it exceeds these limits, the will of the majority is no more the righteous rule for the citizen than the howling wind. But the second and more essential

falsehood is here: The true republic does not legislate at all concerning the personal rights, the preferred occupations, the compensations therefor, or the subsistence of their families. All these matters belong to their individual sovereignty as citizens. The republic only attempts to regulate those outer relations of citizen to citizen, which render them social beings, under the principles of commutative justice. But the commune undertakes in addition to command me at what to work, to enforce its command, to fix my recompense, and to appoint the subsistence allotted to me and my family. This invades the whole sphere of my personal sovereignty. It is the essence of slavery. Moreover, all history teaches us, that the more "Paternalistic" any government becomes, be its form either imperial, monarchical, aristocratic or democratic, the more will its officials engross the powers of the State, and the earnings of the citizens to themselves. (The experience is universal), either by avowed class legislation or by unavowed chicanery, they always do it. The cause of this result is plain. The more paternalistic the government, the more of the aggregate wealth, services and rights of its citizens does it handle. That is to say, the more of these do the officials of this government handle. But such masses of wealth and power present to the natural greed of men temptations too strong to be resisted. Now of all governments the commune is most completely paternalistic. Therefore the officials of the commune, by which we mean the all-including commune of the local communes, the commonwealth, will have the handling of all the earnings, wealth, services, and subsistence of all the citizens. Therefore the engrossment of all these by the officials will be the most enormous. For instance, the township institutions of the Russians are communistic. The imperial government is an absolute commune. But the Emperor Nicholas himself, the most autocratic of Czars, declared that official peculation and tyranny were more gigantic in Russia than anywhere in Europe. Thus it appears that communism must be essential slavery, under which the citizens are the slaves, and the master is impersonal and therefore the most remorseless and greedy of all masters.

Now of all the things in the nineteenth century, Southern bondage was the one, which the advanced socialists most hotly abused. They condemned the Southern plantation as the sum

of all villainies. But this plantation was virtually the very commune which they desired to establish, except that the Southern had certain saving differences, which made it better than their proposed form. The capital of the plantation and the earnings and services of all upon it composed the common fund. The labor of the members was compulsory. But the common fund was bound to them for the subsistence of them and their families, fully as comfortable as that provided by the United States for their enlisted soldiers, including housing, fuel, clothing, food, medical attendance, rearing for their minor children and the pensioning of the old, when past active service. The net earnings of the active members, after subtracting the cost of their own subsistence, and a small interest upon the capital furnished them, went into the common fund, to meet the last two drafts. Here was a small but true commune. The head of the commune was not elected by the slave-members, but was hereditary; and this was a great gain, saving all concern upon the waste of time, money and morals, which always attends pretended elections in a paternalistic democracy. But the grand, saving feature in this Southern commune was that one which our socialist most abhors; the legal establishing in the head of the commune of a right of property in the involuntary labor of the members. Our opponents exclaim that this is the essence of slavery! I reply this is very true; but I have shown that their plan must vest in the commune itself (that is in its officeholders) the power of control over the involuntary labor of the members, and the disposal of their earnings, else the society must speedily be bankrupt, and starve its dependents. But this is giving the commune, that is the officeholders, property in this involuntary labor, except in this all important respect: that it failed to enlist any domestic feeling, or any self-interest of the heads in the welfare of members. In such an association what need the officeholders care if a laboring member dies, or if the infants of his family perish of destitution, he loses no property! He has just so many the fewer cares to worry him. For instance, when the crews of the patriot British fleet which conquered the Invincible Armada at Gravelines were decimated by the spoiled beer, which their commissaries furnished, what did these care? Their private profits upon their beer contracts were safe in their pockets. If many

soldiers of General Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, died in the hospitals, this was but so much to his advantage, for he could continue their names upon the pay rolls of the army, and quietly pocket their wages and allowances. The greater the suffering and mortality, the more his riches grew. When British paupers died in the work-house, under the late poor law system, who cared; what official, what tax-payer? The United States had a brief experience in this line, under its notorious Freedman's Bureau. We presume that when these wards of the nation dropped off, the average officeholder felt no emotion but relief. So now, when a hireling sickens or dies, his employer has lost nothing: he has but to hire another in his place. But our Southern communism, by making the labor the master's property, awoke an all-powerful motive for taking the best care of it.

If the laborer died, from over-work or destitution, so much of the master's property was totally lost; if he sickened, its value was impaired. Hence, the statute law, which required a master to provide reasonable subsistence under all conditions of production however profitless, for his bondmen, their aged and their offspring, and which made this provision a first lien, not only upon the annual products of the estate, but upon its fee simple value, and even upon his personal earnings in his separate profession, was an enforceable law; and it was always enforced, if not by affection and self-respect, by all-powerful self-interest. It was not like the rules of ultra-democratic societies, which speciously requiring all officers to use their powers for the public good alone, so commonly remain a dead letter. Hence, while a few masters were tyrannical and stingy, the bondmen in general had better food, clothing, housing, fuel, medical attendance, than any other peasantry in the world. While the employer of hireling labor pushing forward his railroad, his canal, his malarial farm, his mine, his chemical works, cares not whether the laborers lose wealth or life or not, the Southern master, in hiring his bondman to another, always made a part of the contract that he should not be employed in any unhealthy occupation.

The late Southern form of communism was therefore the only one defensible. The theory, combined with the other dogmas of the socialists, outrages every fundamental principle of

human nature and of human actions. It appeals to the prevalent principle of self-interest precisely in the wrong place, stimulating it powerfully in the officeholder's selfishness, neglect and malversation; while it loses its impulse in the work of production for the general behoof. This communism ignores man's desire for personal possessions, his right to an individual home, blest according to his own choice in the use of those possessions, his zeal for the welfare of his children, his right to bequeath to them the proceeds of his own labor. No system can endure, which thus discards the fundamental laws of nature. A structure built without a foundation must tumble. But the folly of ideologues and demagogues may persuade some discontented and misguided commonwealth to attempt the general commune. But it is impossible the attempt should continue. Its only permanent result will be destruction, or enormous mischief to the material civilization, morals and happiness of the society. The people disgusted with the experiment, will speedily struggle back to some political order, less insane; usually to one more despotic and less benignant than that which they deserted. Or else, communism will destroy their wealth and civilization and bring it down to chronic barbarism.

An authentic incident of one of the great "unining strikes" in Pennsylvania well illustrates this. A yeoman farmer was harvesting the products of his little orchards and fields, when a sturdy loafer demanded a bag of apples and potatoes, with the plea that he had neither money nor provisions for his family. "And who might you be?" asked the farmer. "A striking miner, out of work for many weeks, with the Reserve Fund of the Union utterly exhausted, and the strike unadjusted." "And," inquired the farmer, "why did you strike at first?" "Because the company," said the miner, with sundry indignant epithets, "refused to raise our daily wages from one and a half dollars to one and three-fourths." "So," said the honest farmer, "I earned my farm, working at one-half dollar per day, and you reject work at three times that price. None of my apples or potatoes are for such as you." The farmer was right. The acts of the oligarchies are aggravated in injustice by the fact that they were already better paid than the majority against whom they would enhance prices.

The system also carries intrinsic injustice to the capital-

ists in two ways: First, that it demands virtually the right of making both sides of the bargain in this contract of labor and wages. Each party is entitled to make his own side of the bargain; or if the offer made him from the other side does not suit him, to withdraw. There is no visible limit to the degree of this injustice. Strikers say they strike, because wages go below the limit of comfortable support. But what is a comfortable support for a working man? If the strikers are to decide, it may mean Havana cigars, canvass-back ducks and truffles, with *Chateau Margaux* wine. The system encourages limitless extravagance and waste; all at the expense of other people's capital and of the other parts of the working public; second, the capitalists in selling the products of their factories, have to submit to the great law of supply and demand. But the laborers, in selling their labor to the capitalists, insist on evading that law. There is no equity there.

As to the rights of public order and of other laborers, the system tends constantly and violently to pass from a method of mutual protection, into a criminal conspiracy. The sole object of a threatened strike is to compel employers to pay prices for labor in advance of those indicated by supply and demand. If the supply were not full, demand alone would raise the price of labor, and the strike would be superfluous. Now, the strikers, as free men, have an undoubted right to decline work and wages they think unfair. They may be very unwise in declining; but it is their right. And here their right ends. But if the policy stops there, the employers will naturally defend themselves from this coercion, by going into the labor market and hiring at the market price that substituted help which the full supply offers. Thus, if the strike stops where the lawful rights of the strikers end, it is inevitably futile. Of course then it will not stop there. They will go farther to violate the rights of others, who have an indefeasible right to take up any lawful work and wages they choose. Strikers will go to attack this right, by "boycotting," by obloquy, by threats, by terrorism, by violence, by murder. And when dynamite is introduced to punish with death innocent persons, happening to use the appliances of obnoxious employers, the crime is worthy only of devils. To sum up: If the equal rights of other laborers to accept the work and wages rejected are respected; strikes are futile. If

those rights are obstructed by force, strikes are criminal conspiracies. And our point is that the latter is their logical tendency. Unfortunately, the frequency of these outrages as the sequels of strikes, fully confirms the charge. In fine, only three modes are possible for adjusting the wages of labor and interest of capital. One is to leave the adjustment, under equitable laws, which shall hold laborer and property-holder equals, to the great law of supply and demand. The second is, to have the Government fix maximum and minimum prices by statute. The third is to leave these combination of laborers and employers against each other. For, if the one combine, of course the others will. The second plan is mischievous despotism. See its working in the French Revolutions. The third splits society into warring factions, and tends to barbarism.

Such is an impartial estimate of the tendencies of the "Trades Unions." The gravity of the prospect is increased, when we consider the passionate determination of their members. They seem more and more in love with their plans and cherish them as their final and complete hope. We are told that the movement spreads continually. It has its propagandists and newspapers. It confederates the different branches of mechanical labor more and more widely. It aspires to hold the balance of power in elections, and will before long, claim to control legislatures and congresses.

Will primary education be its antidote? The negative to this hope seems to be pronounced by the fact, that, thus far, these projects have grown just as primary education has extended, and precisely in the places which most rejoice in its means. The same discouragement follows from observing the species of development produced—an initial grade of knowledge and intelligence, just adequate to the suggestion of a number of unsatisfied desires, and the adoption of the shallow plausibilities of sophistical theories for their gratification; while the breadth of wisdom needed to show the hollowness of them has not been attained; and this dangerous Sciolism is aggravated by the self-sufficiency inspired by a conceit of culture. This primary education exactly prepares a population for the reading and acceptance of superficial newspapers. Without the circulation of newspapers, there would be no "Trades Unions" and no strikes of any moment. The primary school and the newspaper press

play into each others hands in assisting these dangerous organizations. In human hands all the best things are perverted to some mischievous uses, and here we have the perversions of these two good things, the School and the Press. The primary school enables the youth to read. Poor human nature usually craves the less wholesome pabulum for its powers, and here, the superficially cultivated reader uses his little talent to read the newspaper, instead of his Bible. The demagogue, the designing agitator sees at once in the newspaper an engine for swaying just such minds, and he makes one low, sophistical and shallow enough to suit his audience. Thus the country has its literature of "Strikes," Communism, Confiscation and Dynamite, with myriads of readers.

The more rapid progress of the late Confederate States, in the creation and accumulation of wealth, as demonstrated by the successive census returns of 1840, 1850 and 1860, was accounted for, in part, by the absence of strikes. The Negro laborers could not combine; the white found no motive to do so. Thus far the emancipated Negroes have not formed this species of Trades' Unions by the race lines. But the Southern people are now magnanimously giving them a universal common school education. The result will be, as sure as the cycle of the seasons, that before long they will also form their own "trades' unions" on the "color line." They will form them, because their partial culture will exactly prepare them for their sophisms and attractions; because they have already shown a marked tendency toward co-operative associations, and a passionate fondness for them; because, as now free laborers, they must feel the *stimuli* to that course, now almost omnipotently felt by white artisans among us. They will form them on the "color line," if for no other reason, because the whites have already applied that line everywhere in their trades' unions, and that with a passionate vigor.

One of the future problems and perils of the country is this race contest. Where the industrial centers have a million of Negroes, educated up to the use of the stump-speech, the radical newspaper and the revolver, closely organized in trades' unions, then the peace of the country will hang in constant suspense.

Two antidotes have been proposed for the poisons involved

in these unions. One is, the application of the co-operative plan, which has been so successfully applied in England in the work of "distribution," to the industries of *production*? In retail distribution, the Rochdale plan has, indeed, wrought wonders, at least in England. It is still to be seen whether the system can be made to work among Americans, with their eager and intense individuality.

But there appears, on reflection, a fatal difficulty when we attempt to apply it to industries of production. It proposes to identify the relations and interests of the employers and the laborers. It says, these shall be as truly stockholders in the joint concern, and capitalists, as those. But, unfortunately, the difference between employers and laborers, between the property-class and the property-less class, has arisen out of natural and acquired differences of personal attribute, for changing which the methods of co-operation are as weak as "the Pope's bull against the comet." In a country like this, where the laws are already equal, the whole difference between those who have property, and those who have not, has been made by the presence, or lack of "talents of acquisition" in themselves or their parents. The well-to-do families are so, because their working members have energy, skill, prudent foresight, self-denial as also, perhaps, selfishness. Especially does the creation of "saved-up capital," the feature which makes the man an employer instead of an employe, depend on self-denial. The common proverb says: "Riches come more by saving than by making." Political economy teaches the same; showing us that each man's saved-up capital represents exactly so much self-denial, either in him or his forefathers, in reserving present income from the indulgence of present desires, for the distant and remote uses of capital in the future.

Again, sagacity in applying, in investing, in using the previous savings, is more important than either rapid skill in earning, or self-denial in not spending. Here is your rapid, effective worker, who does earn large wages. Neither does he eat them up in immediate indulgences. His mind is keenly bent on accumulation. But somehow, his money is ever "put into bags with holes." His ventures in investment are ill chosen and unlucky. He has an infinite amount of mental activities about plans and investments, but he ever lacks that "mother-

wit," that sagacious insight, which is a natural gift. And this picture is seen, in this country, more frequently than the instances of poverty from sheer indolence.

Now, if the industry is to be truly co-operative—if the smaller shareholders are not to be deprived of their votes in it, and directed both in their labors and the use of their earnings, by the will of the large capitalist in the concern—which means, simply their slavery—these votes which represent rashness, unthrift, self-indulgence, imprudence, must be equivalent with the votes of the sagacious—of course, then, "the concern" must come to grief. This directive will, which represents the aggregation of all the unwise who have remained among the small, or laboring shareholders, simply because they are unwise, cannot compete with the rival concern, which is directed by the best practical wisdom. The co-operative factory will be a failure; and the association will dissolve in disgust of mind, where the factory of the successful capitalist will succeed. The resolve that the present plan shall be replaced by co-operative factories, which shall succeed, amounts simply to this: "Resolved, that all laborers have the personal attributes of a Peter Cooper!" Nature and Providence concur to make men unequal; they cannot be made equal by the "resolutions" of theorists.

Once more: however co-operative, a factory must have executive officers, directors, salesmen, treasurers. These must handle all its earnings and assets. Supposing the system to receive the wide extension necessary for its healing fully the relations of labor and capital, shall we find enough *honest laboring men* in America to fill all these responsible places? Or would so large a portion of the ventures break down through defalcations of officials, as to spoil the experiment? The *morals* of the strike system do not seem very well adapted to breed strict honesty!

The other proposal is, that the quarrels of labor and capital shall be prevented, by making the National Government itself the general industrial manager. The Democratic theory is, that the Government reflects the combined will of all the people. This, then, is the right agency to direct industrial pursuits. Let the Government be in place of the corporations and capitalists.

Here several plain thoughts give us pause:

First. If this plan will be good, it will be because the Government direction will be better than that of the corporation or personal will. If, then, the Government is to confer this advantage on some industries, it must confer it on all. Otherwise we shall introduce inequalities and favoritisms most odious to Democratic theory. If it undertakes to operate all industries, it becomes a worse than Chinese despotism, a machine so vast as to crush out all individuality, and to break down hopelessly by its own weight.

Second. The success of the Government's management in all these industries must depend supremely on the competency and honesty of the Government's officials. They must constitute an immense host. Personal motives to zeal and fidelity will be largely annihilated. Is there enough of this high integrity in America, to work the huge machine? The present Government seems to have a deal of trouble in finding enough honest officials for its present small functions!

Third. The Government is practically represented in the person of the magistrate. But, by the nature of Government, "he beareth the sword." His power is essentially punitive. Transgressions against his will must be held as "crimes" and "misdemeanors." Shall his industrial functions as the manager of numberless laborers be enforced by this species of sanction? Shall the Government hold that the *employee* who has not watched his power loom, or chiseled his stone aright, is to be corrected as the petty larcener is? If not, how else? Under slavery, this negligent laborer might have been corrected by the birch; under our present hireling system, he is corrected by dismissal; but under this Governmental plan all industries, as we saw, must be equally the Government's; and whither shall it dismiss the lazy *employee*? To banishment from his country? Hardly. To idleness? If he is still to have from the Government his subsistence, this would be a mockery of punishment; rather a reward for idleness and an injustice to the true workers. There appears no mode of dealing for this industrial Government, except to treat defect of work in the citizens as larceny is treated.

This suggests the fourth and hardest question of all. If Government is to be general, not to say universal, industrial agent, it must see to it that all whom it employs and subsists do

their honest share of the work. For otherwise, the idlers would be rewarded for their sin by being set up as an aristocracy above the faithful workers, to live at ease at the others' expense. Each citizen then must be held responsible to Government for the diligent and useful employment of his time, under some efficient penalty. But the "Government" as such is an abstraction, which directly touches no man. It must act through persons clothed with official power. The meaning, then, would be that the citizens must answer to some *officeholder*, representing this sovereign Government, under some penalty, for doing his share of work. But this means *slavery* in its exact definition. The conception of this governmental plan is communistic; and every thoughtful man knows that communism means either anarchy or slavery. It may be objected: The Government's clerks and postmasters now work precisely under that system, and are not slaves. The reply is first, that probably they sometimes do feel that they are virtual slaves; but chiefly, that they become *employees* of Government now by their own free application, and may resign when they feel oppressed by their superiors, and thus free themselves by returning to private life. But on the plan discussed, all this would be different; the Government would be compelled to exact the adhesion of its workers,—as it does of its conscripted soldiers, whose condition is that of bondage for their term of service—and to refuse this privilege of resigning.

There appears then, no remedy, except in the firm and just administration of the laws, coupled with wise and equitable commercial and industrial legislation and the propagation of industry—economy and contentment among the people by means of Christian principles. There is no attitude for the Government towards "strikes" except the legal and righteous one. If operatives choose to form a society to forward their own interests, they have a right to do so, provided they do not infringe other people's. If the society chooses to "quarrel with their own bread and butter" by rejecting a certain work at certain wages; they have a right to do so. *But their recent employers have equal right to go into the labor market and hire others for that work at those wages; and all other laborers have equal right to that work if they are willing to the wages.*

The moment the "union" goes an inch beyond the mere

withdrawal—the moment it begins to obstruct, terrorize, or beat, or murder the employers and the new *employes*, it has become a criminal conspiracy; the State should put it down with as prompt and firm a hand as they would put down highway robbery or foreign invasion. To the clear and just mind this is clear. But is there any American State which performs this duty? Alas no! We are more likely to see the State Governors corresponding with and conciliating the “strike,” the power whose very end of existence is “to be a terror to evil doers,” bowing to the conspiracy of evil-doers, who ought to be howed before the majesty of the law. Pitiful sight!

Property is always cautious, apparently timid, at the beginning of collisions, for it is conscious it is valuable; it has much to lose. But, because it has much to lose, property always defends itself resolutely when pressed to the wall. And when the period of caution has passed, property defends itself successfully. For money is power, and the talents of acquisition which gained the money are power. One thing has already become clear to the thought of property: that when the hour of forcible defense comes, the militia of the States will be worthless. They are too near the rioters. Property will invoke, as the only adequate force, the standing army of the United States. And, as the industrial centers are numerous and populous, the United States must have a large, a widely diffused standing army to invoke. Thus the property-holder will be educated by his needs and experiences in the hour of trial, to think of his State as the *Cipher*, the Washington Government as the only *Power*. The discontented classes, who must at last be restrained by force, will be educated to regard State authority as a shadow, and Federal authority as the substantial fear. The surest result of the approaching strife will thus be to complete the practical extinction of State sovereignty, and the consolidation of the federation into one empire. It will be an empire governing by the bayonet.

NATURE CANNOT REVOLUTIONIZE NATURE.¹

"And the gates of hell shall not prevail against it."

There are some things which can be done, and there are some others which obviously cannot. The curious thing about this very trite fact is, that people continue trying to do these other things, as though they were feasible. This they do both in the mechanical and moral world. Thus: there are some people always, who are inventing perpetual motion, and just on the point of effecting it. Many and diverse, says the *Scientific American*, are the machines invented for this purpose; but it recommends to all future experimenters, as the cheapest and simplest, and equally effective with the best, the plain *tub*. The machine of the tub is operated thus. The vessel chosen is a large one, with handles. It is placed on the floor; the operator then gets into it, and laying hold of the handles with his hands, lifts the tub up to the ceiling. Succeeding in this, he has perpetual motion in its simplest principle.

In every generation, the social, political, and religious tub-lifters are numerous. "Mother Anna Lee," patron saint of the Shakers, was going to abolish sin by abolishing matrimony. The plan was simple, and perfectly effectual. Convert all the adult sinners, and agree that when converted they shall have no more children. As all actual transgression comes out of original sin, and all original sin is transmitted by birth, one generation more would happily finish the work of Satan on earth. The good mother only made one little mistake in the project. Who were to carry out this excellent plan? The men and women, of course. But men and women usually have a natural propensity, which is more fundamental and regulative than the desire to arrest original sin. So it turns out that poor human nature doesn't lift itself in Mother Lee's tub; but goes on multiplying and increasing, and replenishing the earth with

young sinners; leaving the world's redemption to the less symmetrical plan of the Gospel.

So Mr. John Stuart Mill proved to his own satisfaction that all individual title to real estate is adverse to the public weal; and the "International" communists, going a little farther, declare, *La propriete c'est le crime!* "Establish community of goods; and public spirit will make the best of everything, and procure the greatest good to the greatest number." Here again, man is to lift himself in his tub. It is forgotten that nature has made the desire for the special welfare of one's self, and of one's own family, far stronger than the desire for the general good. Hence the only possible result of the theory is, not that private property shall be happily substituted by communism; but that happy civilized societies may be plunged into anarchy; and what little private property is left be held with a far fiercer grasp, and defended by personal violence instead of by regulated and benignant law. Natural selfishness will never lift itself into disinterestedness, least of all by force of an infidel creed which makes selfish pleasure its *summum bonum*.

Another instance of the tub-movement is seen in Mrs. Cady Stanton's "Women's Rights." Woman is to be freed from her subordination to man! By whom, forsooth? Not by the selfish, masculine despot, of course; for every impulse of his selfishness prompts him to perpetuate the tyranny. It is to be done, then, by woman. She is to make herself independent of man! But the Creator, who made men and women, has laid down the law, "Unto him shall be thy desire," as the foundation of woman's nature. So that the amount of the claim for women's rights is, again, that the inventor shall lift herself in her tub. Were the realizing of the revolution the only danger, men might safely give Mrs. Cady Stanton their full leave to succeed. She would then find that her real difficulty was unsurmounted; that every one of her "oppressed" sisters, who was a true woman, would voluntarily desert her and seek to be beloved, cherished, and protected by one of the masculine "tyrants"; and this by the inevitable force of a nature a thousandfold more imperative than her zeal for Mrs. Cady Stanton's revolution. And hence again, the only possible result of this movement will be, not the independence and equality of woman, but the substitution of the savage dependence of the

slave-concubine, the "weaker vessel" held and abused by brute force, for the benignant order of scriptural marriage.

These attempts to do the impossible illustrate the most absurd enterprise of all: the attempt of our modern materialistic infidels to abolish religion. The Commune shouted, "Down with property and religion, the two chief enemies of human progress." The only result of success in destroying religion would be to replace it with some mischievous superstition. This is sufficiently evinced, to any sober mind, by a review of the past. Every people, in every age, has had either its religion or its superstition; either its God or its Fetich. Now, a universal result is an index of a permanent cause: there must be something in human nature which compels it to recognize the supernatural. When our would-be philosophers assume that they can exist without this necessity, it is only the very modest pretension that they are themselves supernatural; that is, more than men. That religion is inevitable to man may be inferred again from the uniform result of every attempt which has been made to exclude, or even to omit it from human thought and life. They have always been predestined failures. Thus, those who profess to understand the system of Confucius, nominally so dominant in China, tell us that it is not really a religion, but a social system of morals; that it offers the Chinese mind no object of divine homage save an abstraction; and that it is in fact only a system of moral rules enforcing the idea of civic subordination; the only worship inculcated, that of dead ancestors, being designed merely to strengthen the impulse of filial respect. What now, is the result? There is no people who make a more frequent recognition of the supernatural. To say nothing of the vast system of Buddhism, the whole nation seems enslaved to demon worship, and to the bondage of "the evil eye," "the influence," and the *genii* of localities. Yet the Chinese are at once the most astute and the most materialistic of the Oriental races.

But we may come nearer home. The materialist Thomas Hobbes, of Malmesbury, was said to be more afraid of ghosts than any educated man in England. Atheistic French Democracy professed to abrogate God, the Church, and the Sabbath; but so strong was the religious necessity, that even these madmen enthroned the "Goddess of Reason." Auguste Comte spent

his life in teaching that his "Positive Philosophy" necessarily excluded every supernatural notion. But at its close he finished by establishing a new religion, and a proposed hierarchy with Comte as its hierophant, and the soul of his deceased mistress as a sort of "Queen of Heaven."

These facts may be set in a light still more mortifying to the enemies of Christianity, and more conclusive against their hopes. The weakest religions have always been strong enough to outvie infidelity upon a fair trial. What has it then to hope, in the presence of a true Christianity, with its purity and power? Even popery, the fruitful mother of infidels, has Saturnian strength enough to devour these, her own children. French popery begot Voltaire; and so sorry a religion as French popery was adequate to overthrow Voltaireism. We are told that the effect of national misfortune and humiliation has been to fill the Romish Church again with Frenchmen (and not women only), and to precipitate the people into sham miracles, the pilgrimages, and the other fooleries of the Middle Ages. The Augustan age of classic paganism gave a similar result. Greek and Roman philosophy deemed itself too wise to retain the old traditionary creed of their fathers. They could laugh at the *auspices*, and explode Pan and Ceres, Castor and Pollux, with the herd of imaginary gods. But none the less must the Augustan age have gods from some whither; so philosophic Athens had its altar to "The Unknown God," and imperial Rome imported Judaism, the mystery of the Egyptian Isis, and the magic of the East. Now, gentlemen infidels, we may heartily concur with you in your scurvy estimate of these ancient and modern paganisms, the religions of Jupiter and the Pope. But we remind you, that scurvy as they were, they were sufficient to conquer you. "If these things were done in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" If mankind is compelled by the constitution of the soul, in ages when it seemed to have no better choice than between these wretched creeds and you, to prefer either of these to you; what are your prospects against the universal diffusion of the Christian religion, with its ennobling and satisfying truths?

The rational account of these results is in the law with which we set out. Nature cannot revolutionize nature. The human soul has certain original, constitutive, universal laws

of thinking and feeling, the presence of which qualify it as a rational human soul. Hence, whatever any soul thinks or feels is a result of these regulative laws. It is, then, infallibly certain that these cannot be abrogated or expunged by their own results, for the same reason that streams cannot change their own fountains, and children cannot determine the being of their own parents. Let men, for instance, throw any light of plausibility they may around materialism; let them please themselves with the fancy that they have identified mind with matter; let the physiologist pretend to trace the power of thought into his "nerve-force," and to resolve this in turn into electricity. There remains still the stubborn and fundamental fact of psychology, which the common sense of men will, in the end, always construe for themselves, without or against the pretended helps of science; that the consciousness of that which thinks, the subjective Ego, is necessarily prior to all possible perception of objective matter. So that the only terms upon which man can know matter at all involve *a priori* the recognition of mind as inevitably contrasted with matter. That is, the very law of our cognition is, that we must first know mind as not matter in order to know matter.

Our most recent infidelity asserts that nothing is valid except that which is formed on the perceptions of the senses. But unless they accept with us the supersensuous rational belief, that what sense gives us is valid, it is impossible for sense itself to show them any truth.

Again, man must cease to be man before he can strip himself of conscience, of the conviction of moral responsibility, of the sense of guilt for transgression, of hope, of fear, and of the inextinguishable desire for his own well-being. These sentiments are the universal results of fundamental intuitions. All that can be done is to forget them or to obscure them for a time; but when they are revived by the touch of affliction, danger, remorse, or death, man will derive and seek a propitiation for his guilt, a preparation for judgment, and a way to future happiness, as surely as he is man. The sentiment of religion is omnipotent in the end. We might rest in assurance of its triumph, even without appealing to the work of that Holy Ghost which Christianity promises as the omnipotent coadjutor of the truth. While irreligious men of science explore the facts of

natural history, and the fossils of earthly strata, for fancied proofs of a creation by evolution which may dispense with a Creator, the humble heralds of our Lord Christ will continue to lay their hands upon the heart-strings of living immortal men, and find there always forces to overwhelm unbelief with defeat. Does the "Positivist" say these propositions are only of things spiritual? Ay, but spiritual consciousnesses are more stable than all his primitive granite! Centuries hence, if man shall continue in his present state so long, when the current theories of unbelief shall have been consigned to that limbus where polytheism and the Ptolemaic astronomy, alchemy, and judicial astrology lie contemned, the servants of the Cross will be winning larger and yet larger victories for Christ, with the same Gospel which was preached by Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Isaiah, Paul, Augustine and Calvin.

Hampden Sidney, Va., Oct. 1st, 1873.

THE LATEST INFIDELITY.

A REPLY TO INGERSOLL'S POSITIONS.

The phase of infidelity most current among those who do not profess to accept the gospel is marked by two qualities: It is aggressive, and it is extreme. It refuses to stop short of that last result, blank atheism, or, at least, blank agnosticism, from which even the skepticism of previous ages recoiled with abhorrence. This ultraism of the present adversaries is in one respect very shocking; but in another it is promising. They are practically teaching the world that conclusion, on which James Mills justified his atheism, that when once a man's sense rejects the gospel theory, he finds no stopping place between that rejection and atheism; because, as Bishop Butler has forever established, every difficulty which besets the old gospel plan equally embarrasses the deistic plan. This disclosure is useful. Our atheists are teaching people that there is no decent middle ground for them to stand on; but the voice of nature and conscience never permits decent people to stand long on the ground of atheism. This outrages both head and heart too horribly. Were a son to insist, contrary to sufficient evidence of the fact, upon denying and discarding the very existence of his father, we see plainly enough how his position involves every phase of filial transgression, because it involves the absolute neglect of every filial duty. The position may involve, in the form of a sin of omission, the crime of parricide. The atheist discards the very existence of his heavenly Father; so, unless he has justified his denial by sound evidence, he includes in that act every sin of impiety. We see here the simple reason why the good sense of mankind has always regarded atheism with moral abhorrence. But this is the creed which the assailants of our day prefer to urge upon us, and that with boundless

audacity. Colonel Robert Ingersoll seems to be the leader who holds this "bad eminence" amidst this host; he seems ambitious of a large share of this dreadful responsibility. This fact justifies my occasional reference to his name as representing the code of opinions I propose to discuss.

His various essays and speeches—especially his recent large essay in the *North American Review*—appear to build his opposition to Christianity upon four grounds: One is composed of specific objections to points in Bible history and precept, which, he intimates, intuitively appear to him immoral. Another is his assertion of moral irresponsibility for opinions even upon ethical subjects. This he claims for himself, and of course for everybody else, as the only adequate basis for freedom of thought, which we all regard as an inalienable right. A third ground is his total denial of all punitive aspect and quality in the evil consequences of free human actions. He absolutely denies the element of rewards and punishments in the experienced course of human existence. He says that the evils which follow the mistakes of our free agency are nothing but natural consequences, following from the natural laws of the universe, which are necessary and invariable; so that these experiences give no evidence whatever of a moral providence over men. His fourth and chief ground is the old cavil, how God, if there were a God, could even permissively ordain natural and moral evil in his kingdom.

I. The first class of assaults I propose to follow to a very short distance. They could be all disposed of by pointing to the dense ignorance of their authors concerning the Bible, its real facts and its real doctrines. They are such criticisms as their authors would never have made had they read their Bibles with attention and candor. They are all absolutely exploded by simple explanations which the teachers of the church have been accustomed for generations to give even to the children of their Bible classes. It would be wearisome and useless to go over all of this thoroughly-trodden ground. One or two points will serve for illustration. In general I would only remark, that it would be well for the critics to get some little knowledge of the Christian literature before exposing themselves in a way both ludicrous and pitiable, by attacking subjects about which they have been too proud to learn anything.

For instance, we are hotly told by one that Joshua must have been a very wicked man, because he not only punished Achan capitally for disobeying a police regulation, but murdered his wife and children along with him. But the old testament makes Joshua a very pious hero; wherefore it also is a very wicked and foolish book. The simple and sufficient reply is, that the execution of Achan's family was none of Joshua's doings. He had no more discretion about it than about Noah's flood. God was the agent, and Joshua his merely involuntary instrument. So that the moral question in the given case resolves itself into this: Has Almighty God a right to punish a contumacious and immoral family of his creatures with death for a special wise end, death being the final just penalty of all sin? No man, after provisionally admitting the condition of this question, even for argument's sake, is silly enough to assert that, if there is such a God, such retribution from him would be necessarily unjust. Or, do they reinforce their cavil by saying there is no evidence that Achan's wife and children were accomplices in his theft? The simple reply is, that undoubtedly God knew them to be a bad family, worthy on general grounds of his eternal displeasure. For the principle of imputation on which this case proceeds is that God righteously imputes part of the guilt of wicked parents to children, but only to wicked children.* So that we are certain the family also was vicious and disobedient. Had God punished them some years after with death, or rheumatism, or cholera, nobody who admits that there is a God, would have dreamed of impugning the justice of that providential dispensation. Who, then, can blame the Sovereign Judge if, for the sake of an important and wise object, he anticipated the deserved punishment and connected it with that of the criminal head of the family? But I also deny the asserted ground of the cavil, that persons were punished along with Achan who, however otherwise sinful, were innocent of his particular breach of military orders. No doubt they were implicated with him by receiving and concealing the plunder. The receiver is as bad as the thief. If there were infants in the family, death removed them to the bliss of heaven.

*Ex.xx. 5; Ezek. xviii.

Or, they object to Joshua's invasion of Palestine, and charge that his war of extermination there showed him no better than a land pirate and a murderer; and that, as the Old Testament represents God as sanctioning these horrors, they feel intuitively it is a very wicked book. I reply, that here a very large sophism is foisted in under a very small jugglery of words. This shallow little trick consists in the phrase "God sanctioned," instead of "God ordained." Thus it injects into the mind this conception of the transaction: that after Joshua, a human sinner, who had no right to dispose of other people's property and lives, had conceived his murderous project, God granted it his approval. Of course that would be exceedingly ugly. But the actual fact is that Joshua never conceived the plan at all. The war of extermination against the Amorites was no plan of Joshua's. There is not a particle of proof that he ever thought he as a mere man had any right to dispose of other people's property and lives. The plan of extermination was God's alone. He dictated it to Joshua. And again we say this general had no more discretion about it than he had about God's infliction of the deluge. God's purpose employed Joshua as a mere executioner; and if the Sovereign Judge had a right to pass the decree, it is nonsense to blame the mere servant who was compelled to execute it. The logic of this accusation is just as silly as that of a man who, after admitting the righteousness of the laws of New York, should call Mr. Cleveland a murderer, because when he was sheriff at Buffalo he hung some convicted assassins. Now, then, the only question involved in this piece of history is, whether Almighty God has the right to punish a tribe of his own creatures, whose iniquity was now full, with the death penalty. We can get a pretty accurate conception of what the morals of these gross idolaters had become. Their habits, like those of other advanced idolaters, were doubtless defiled by every vile excess of lust, avarice, cruelty, unnatural affections, human sacrifice, infanticide. If God has any title at all to judge the world in righteousness, he certainly had a right to rid the world of this plague spot in his own way. He had adopted another instrumentality to burn out a similar plague-spot, Sodom, and he was justified for that by Jesus, by the apostles, and every honest man that ever read the

administrative reason for God's dealing: that he was planning to preserve a pure religion and morality in Israel, which required their effectual protection from the contamination of this pagan example.

Third, Colonel Ingersoll himself has been in the habit of attacking the Bible passionately, because he found that, when candidly explained, it countenanced slavery—the Old Testament actually ordaining it, and the New Testament allowing it. But inasmuch as slavery appears very abominable to his moral intuitions, this compels him to regard them as wicked books. Here, again, the critic's whole difficulty arises out of a sheer misconception. Let me ask him what that thing is which appears so evil; he defines it substantially thus: the usurpation by a stronger individual at his own violent will over the being of his weaker fellow-man, whereby the victim is reduced from a human personality, with a moral responsibility and destiny, to a mere chattel, a brute possession, whose labor, happiness and very existence may then be exhausted by the usurper for his own selfish behoof. I am happy to be able to console the critic by assuring him, first, that everybody else would abhor such a relation just as he does; and, second, that the two Testaments, instead of ordaining or allowing it, even adjudged it just as he and I do. And here is the triumphant proof that this very conception of the usurpation which Colonel Ingersoll erroneously supposes to be the conception of slavery, is precisely the crime which both Testaments condemn. (As in N. T. the act of the *andrapodistes*, and in O. T. *nogebh ish*.) The Bible abhorred it so much that whilst Moses made only a few crimes capital he made this one of them; and the New Testament usually recites it along with the enormous wickednesses that incur the damnation of hell. What, then, was that relation of human bondage which Moses ordained and the apostles allowed? Not the usurpation of a personal will over a fellow-creature, not the reduction of the bondman from a responsible human person to a chattel (which injustice is nowhere countenanced or excused by Holy Scripture, or by any modern Christian that ever I heard of), but it was wholly another thing, to-wit: the regular institution, by the legislative sovereignty of the commonwealth, of a personal and domestic authority for life over the involuntary labor of the bondman, who was deemed by the law unfitted

for his own safe control, in the hands of a citizen supposed by the law to be more competent, and this authority to be exercised by the master under the restraints of statute law, which also treated the hondman as a responsible agent, and guaranteed to him his life, limbs and subsistence against the aggression even of his master. Now, it is apparent that he would be a very bold man who would undertake to argue that this relation is essentially unjust, and the code which established it under any possible circumstances a wicked one. When arguing thus he would have to attack the righteousness of the parental authority over minors, and indeed every form of governmental restraint of magistrates over individuals not grounded in conviction of crime.

I have shown in these three specimens how completely they are exploded by a little tincture of Bible knowledge and common sense. I assert that all the other objections of this class can be shown to be equally worthless, but they are too numerous and trivial to detain the reader.

II. The second general ground for rejecting Christianity is the doctrine so dear to skeptics, that no man is morally responsible for any of the opinions which he sincerely holds. They assert that this position is the only basis for true intellectual freedom. They argue from it that our charge of sinfulness, or possibly impiety, or even our manifestation of moral disapproval against their most extreme speculations, is unjust, and is of the nature of wicked persecution of the free-thinkers. They also argue that the Christian system is absurd, in that it makes faith its cardinal condition for enjoying God's favor, inasmuch as no man's faith has any moral character, and cannot be a subject of moral responsibility, or approval or disapproval. Colonel Ingersoll is certain that to whatever extremes of atheism, or even of what appears to other people blasphemy, he is really led (not feignedly) by his thinking, he is as innocent therein as a man is for the color of his hair or the height of his stature. And here is his proof: that if the evidence appears before the mind, intellectual credence is purely involuntary, being the logical result of the evidence, and metaphysically necessitated; that such credence is exclusively the result of intellectual activities of the mind, with which neither emotion nor will has anything to do; that our responsibility is limited to

those acts of the spirit which have a voluntary source. So, he thinks, it would be as unjust to blame him for his atheistic conclusions to which his thought has led him, as to blame a man for being wet when he has been thrown into the water.

If he were not extremely ignorant of philosophy and theology he would be aware that this is but the old sophism in psychology, which has been a thousand times refuted. When we hear Colonel Ingersoll assert that his anti-Christian convictions are the fruit of his pure intellection, without any element of emotion or will, we picture to ourselves the huge laughter of his own votaries at so vast and obvious an irony; for their own eyes and ears tell them that his agnosticism is all passion. What means that labored torrent of fiery and vindictive eloquence with which he assails the theologians and the Bible? Do not his auditors hear him ascribe his opposition to the Scriptures in part to his passionate abhorrence of slavery? Do they not see hatred of Christianity and its restraints blazing amidst the whole frame-work of his pretended logic? His unbelief pure passionless intellection indeed! Why, he is incarnate passion! It is supremely ludicrous! And we surmise that every applauder of his atheism who does any thinking is conscious of this; every one sees that there is really no logic at all in this agnostic eloquence, but it is all feeling, and it is acceptable simply because it harmonizes with the conscious hatred of his hearers against the holiness of the Bible and its restraints on their proud self-will. We have only to remember that the object of every moral judgment is a moral object which unavoidably engages and interests the disposition, affections and will of every rational moral agent, and all who can reason see that no moral conclusion can be a pure intellection, but that some voluntary element must enter for good or for evil into the sources of every such judgment. No man on earth reasons towards objects which he either likes or dislikes strongly, with the same complete intellectual impartiality with which he reasons about pure mathematics. If he claims that he does, it is because "a deceived heart hath turned him aside." This is the analysis of common sense. This is the philosophy on which every sensible man in the world accounts for the multitude of these familiar facts, to-wit: that all people, while agreeing perfectly upon the truths of mathematics and numbers, differ more

or less upon questions of property rights, law-suits, character, politics, medicine, and religion. It is because all these objects of thought involve elements which appeal to the feelings and the will. Now the false argument itself concedes that where a voluntary element is involved in the sources of any spiritual action, it is to that extent responsible. This is all I claim. Here is a man who has reached true conclusions on moral subjects. He is virtuous and approvable for them just to the extent to which a right heart has co-operated in his reaching them. Here is another man who holds erroneous opinions on a moral subject, and he is responsible and blamable therefor just to the extent in which a proud and evil heart has helped to bring them about.

So absurd is Colonel Ingersoll's position that he clearly discloses the fact that he does not believe it himself. He claims not to be responsible or blamable for his anti-religious conclusions; then, of course, all the rest of us should be equally irresponsible for our conclusions held with similar honesty. Now here is a man whose thinking has honestly led him to this conclusion, which he really believes from the bottom of his heart he has fairly reached, to-wit: that Colonel Ingersoll's agnosticism is erroneous, that it is morally blamable, that he is consequently responsible for it (not indeed to man, but to his God, and this is the vital distinction which guarantees to all of us all the mental and religious liberty to which we are entitled), and consequently that the reproaches suggested by this evil creed which he hurls against his God, and his fatal misleading of his immortal fellow-men, are extremely sinful. Now, does Colonel Ingersoll view this honest conviction of mine with any of that philosophic nonchalance which he requires me to use towards his? Not he! He blames me for it extremely, as unjust to him, as tyrannical, tending towards the wickedness of persecution for opinion's sake. He fulminates his indignant rhetoric against the wrong I am doing him. He fills the atmosphere with his complaints of me. Now this excites our huge laughter. The unbeliever himself demonstrates the absurdity of his own position, and refuses to stand on it at the first change of the case. So he teaches us he does not believe his own philosophy.

It is in fact impossible to be believed by anybody, because

it involves us in absolute contradictions. If honesty in error were all that is needed to hold us innocent, truth would have no practical value above that of error. But truth has its eternal intrinsic value. Again, our decisive conclusions according to the necessary laws of our spirits direct us in our actions. It is proper that they should, or otherwise our actions might always be irrational, aimless, and worthless. Now if we allow the man to hold himself irresponsible for his moral opinions, of course we must hold him irresponsible for all the actions which they logically direct. After you have justified the tree in being the species of fruit-tree it is, you cannot blame it for bearing that species of fruit. So that this philosophy requires us to justify some of the most mischievous and abominable crimes that are done on earth. Let us see again whither it carries its advocate. Colonel Ingersoll knows that the slave-holders were generally sincere in their belief of their right; therefore he would have to justify the slavery he so abhors. He knows that Messrs. Davis, Lee and Jackson were perfectly sincere in their convictions; so he must justify them in all those blows at "the life of the nation" which his patriotism abhors. Supposing the magistrates of the old-fashioned State of Delaware, honest and sincere in the advocacy of that antiquated statute which, we are told, still makes atheistic utterances a misdemeanor punishable at the whipping-post, and supposing the gallant Colonel's zeal for his truth to have led him to that Pauline grade of heroism which makes men glory in stripes for the truth's sake, his philosophy would require him to justify those magistrates, even at the moment the constable's scourge was descending on his back. But would it? We trow not. Again he provokes the inextinguishable laughter of the on-lookers. His theory of free thought is "unworkable."

Again, the position leads to a consequence yet worse. It is entirely possible that two sincere reasoners may reach opposite conclusions concerning the same moral object. If each is irresponsible and innocent in his conclusion, he must be equally so in the action to which it directs him. So our philosopher has on his hands this strange case: A has a logical right to execute an action touching the disputed object, which B, the other party, has an equally logical and moral right to re-

sist as a wrong to himself! "The force of nature could no further go."

In conclusion of this head, we remind the "free-thinkers" (whom the above argument proves to be not free-thinkers, but crazy-thinkers), that their doctrine is refuted by every analogy of nature and every experimental fact of their own observation. The natural laws which regulate the results of our free actions invariably hold us responsible for our erroneous opinions. When we make honest mistakes as to the state of facts, nature makes no allowance for us, but inexorably holds us to the results of the real facts. The youth who goes sailing in a rotten boat, really supposing it to be sound, gets his ducking just the same. The farmer who exposes his grain, honestly thinking the fair weather will hold, if he proves mistaken in the weather, has his grain mildewed just as though he had wilfully neglected it. The sick man who swallows three grains of morphia, really supposing it to be quinine, dies just as the intentional suicide. But why multiply instances? We thus see universal nature repudiates this shallow philosophy. And so we return to our conclusion, that men are and ought to be responsible for their moral opinions; that the psychological reason why, is this: erroneous moral opinions cannot be adopted by the rational creature except there be some voluntary element at work amidst these sources of the wrong judgment; and to this voluntary element blame justly attaches; that, therefore, men are justly held responsible for their wrong actions, though logically dictated by their own opinions; that all penal responsibility for wrong opinions is reserved to God alone, and is never to be usurped by human beings unless those opinions be embodied in criminal actions; that the resistance of the errorist's fellow-men must be limited to disapprobation and argumentative refutation; and thus the truth is established without opening the door to the hateful doctrine of penal persecution for opinion's sake.

III. The third ground of objection, as given above, is his total denial of all punitive aspect and quality in the evil consequences of free human actions. He absolutely denies the element of rewards and punishments in the experienced course of human existence. He says that the evils which follow the mistakes of our free agency are nothing but natural consequences, following from the natural laws of the universe, which are

necessary and invariable; so that these experiences give no evidence whatever of a moral providence over men. Colonel Ingersoll roundly asserts that in the course of nature and experience there are no punishments, but only natural consequences. He also admits that the laws which dispense these consequences are invariable. The only possible method by which evil can be averted is to reform the mistakes which incurred it. The object of this strange doctrine is manifestly to escape that argument for the being and the moral providence of a God, which is written so plainly all over human events. We have two points here: First, his denial is abortive. Had he read, or read dispassionately, the second chapter of Part I. in Bishop Butler's *Analogy*, he would never have written those paragraphs in which he stated his doctrine. Bishop Butler shows by arguments which no man can refute, that the happy consequences of good conduct are of the nature of rewards, and evil consequences of misconduct have every trait and characteristic of true penalties, even down to the most minute; that this general law of nature is therefore a moral law as well as a natural one; that it is a disclosure of a righteous personal will above nature, and that it holds men under a moral probation for their conduct. And since this is universally true of man's moral estate, as soon as we learn his continued rational existence after death, the utmost probability arises, that we must meet the consequences of our probation in a future world as well as the present. All this follows without the light of Scripture. It is scarcely necessary to weary the reader by repeating the points of that masterly argument. It is a shame for any educated man, especially an English-speaking man, to handle this doctrine without informing himself of Bishop Butler's argument. No man who ever informs himself candidly of it will ever dispute its conclusions. I will, only for confirmation, make these two remarks: Every suffering transgressor in the world intuitively recognizes in his own consciousness the conceptions of guilt and punishment as soon as he recognizes the causal connection between his own error and the natural evil consequences. Let any such case be taken at random. Let it be, for instance, the case of a man who, by sensual excesses in the use of stimulants (alcohol, opium, tobacco), has ruined his digestion. His reason has admitted this proposition—that his own excesses have caused

his own sufferings. Has there ever been such a man in the world whose consciousness contained only the physical feelings of pain, nausea, lassitude, and so-forth, and the self-calculated personal feelings of fear, sorrow, and so-forth? Is this all that is in his consciousness? Never. There is always the additional element of self-blame. There is always self-reproach for having done what he *ought not*. The man knows intuitively that he has been guilty in the case, and not merely mistaken; and that these sufferings are penal, and not merely painful. Men not seldom incur severe physical sufferings in the magnanimous performance of duties, as, for instance, the faithful fireman who is burnt in rescuing human life. Now the burn hurts him just as badly as the drunkard's gastritis hurts him; but is it possible for the consciousness of these two men under the sufferings to be the same? Never. This brave, honest man suffers, but cannot reproach himself. This guilty sensualist also suffers, and is compelled to reproach himself. According to Colonel Ingersoll's theory, the two men ought to have the same consciousness. Such test-cases show that the human mind intuitively, and necessarily, recognizes those very moral elements of blameworthiness and punishment which are so rashly denied. My other remark is, that all men, when spectators of the natural penalties of transgression, intuitively recognize the penal relation. What they say is always something like this: "We are sorry for him, but it serves him right"; or, "Well, the fellow has got what he deserves." Now, what does the common sense of mankind mean by these words "right," "desert?" We thus see that the world is against that doctrine. Colonel Ingersoll is a lawyer. We would request him to attempt an explanation upon his philosophy of the penalties which civil society visits upon secular crimes. If there is any logic in his composition, a half-hour's meditation on that problem will convince him that his philosophy lands him in a Serbonian bog. For instance, would the conscience of mankind have universally justified such inflictions by civil society if it had not been instructed and supported by the analogy of these penalties of nature? Is not civil society itself one of the inevitable results of this constitution of human nature? Yes. Must it not follow, then, that the evils which civil society visits on secular crimes are also natural consequences of these natural laws, as truly so as the

drunkard's gastritis? But those are avowedly penal. Once more, Colonel Ingersoll on his theory would have to explain the imprisonment which he visits on a felon, as precisely parallel to the detention in a quarantine ship of a virtuous citizen who has just had the bad luck to sail recently from a yellow-fever port. Are the two inflictions precisely the same expediences for the public good, equally unfounded on an imputation of guilt to the sufferers? That is the explanation to which his philosophy would lead him; but he dare not accept it. He knows that the virtuous traveler is detained in spite of his innocence; but the felon is detained because of his guilt. He who says that the natural evils incurred by misconduct are not penalties, but mere consequences, ought also to say that evils which society, itself a natural institution, inflicts on criminals are also mere consequences, and not just penalties. But against this every conscience revolts.

Our second point of objection is: that Colonel Ingersoll's doctrine about natural evils, if true, would be unspeakably harsher and more repulsive than the Christian doctrine, which he thinks too harsh to be endured. For, first, it places us erring mortals not under the dominion of a righteous personal will, which is also wise, benevolent, and merciful, but under the rule of invariable natural laws. Under these, the evils which men experience, saith he, are not penalties, but mere consequences. Now a code which has no penalties of course has no pardons. There is no room in it for the conception of forgiveness. It tells a suffering transgressor that, when once his mistake is made, his suffering must be as inevitable as the attraction of gravitation or the rotation of the earth. Can mere natural law hear a prayer? Does it understand repentance? Can it feel pity? Ask the ocean storm or the devouring fire these questions. Here truly we have humanity with a vengeance! The skeptic is too humane to endure the conception of penal chastisement directed by a personal God, who is both just and merciful; and to help matters, he proposes to consign his fellow-creatures to the iron and remorseless dominion of natural law, which is equally ignorant of repentance, mercy, and forgiveness. But, he says, let the erring man reform his mistake, and thereby he will emerge from the painful consequences. Is this true? Does he not know that the constant tendency of natural

evil is to proceed to the irreparable stage? This drunkard's gastritis, for instance, even if he reforms early, is only palliated, not wholly eradicated. At best he goes the rest of his life a crippled man, and death, the supreme natural evil, falls upon him at last; but in a multitude of instances the gastritis retains its virulence in spite of the reform. For all these innumerable sufferers the skeptic has only a gospel of despair. He tells his fellow, "You are in the clutches of inexorable physical law; you have transgressed it; you perish."

Next, it is impossible for Colonel Ingersoll to rid either himself or his fellow-creatures of the sentiment of moral desert in their conduct. It is at once the deepest and the keenest of human sentiments. There is no craving of the human soul so profound as the demand for justice to its merits, and a righting for the wrongs done to it. There is no anguish so keen, so inconsolable, as that inflicted by their refusal. Now the skeptic's theory proposes to take these moral creatures, with these exquisite sensibilities, and subject them to a system of laws which neither knows nor cares anything about moral deserts. Which is about as humane as to consign the feeding, nursing, and consolation of all the orphan, the sick, and the sorrowing children in the world to a huge steam engine. For our part, we would rather leave our orphans to an all-wise parent, who would whip them well when they deserved it, but who could also hear their prayers, understand their penitence, and forgive their waywardness.

Once more, our skeptic confesses that he cannot tell us whether we shall live beyond bodily death or not. Then, for all he knows, we may. And if we do, it follows of course from his theory, that we must pass our immortal existence also under this blind natural code of laws, which, knowing nothing of penalties, can know nothing of pardons. When we observe the system of nature, as expounded by him, the clearest and most ominous feature about it is, that these evil consequences of human error are continually tending to pass, under our own eyes, into the irreparable. The longer the career of error is continued, the more certainly is this result reached. Thus the only inference from his scheme of naturalism is this, that if we should not have the luck to die like the pig or the dog, we must face the violent probability, that these "mere consequen-

ces" of human error will, in every case, become irreparable and eternal. And this is the sort of comfort gravely offered to his sinning and sorrowing fellow-men, by one who professes to be too humane and tender-hearted to endure the Christian system, with its divine equities, and divinely wrought grace and pardon, offered to the whole world without money and without price.

IV. But the chief ground of objection which seems to prevail with the modern impugnors of Christianity is the old one of God's permission of evil in his kingdom. It is as old as human literature, having been discussed by Job, by the Psalmist, by the Greek philosophers, by Seneca, and by a multitude of divines of subsequent ages. The theodicy, or vindication, of God from this cavil, makes a part of almost every book on natural theology, and has engaged the greatest intellects of the world—as a Leibnitz, a Chalmers. Of course I profess to advance nothing new. Neither is there need of doing it; for the recent school of cavillers advance nothing which has not been pondered and rejected a thousand times before. And they differ from the more thoughtful and decent skeptics of previous days only in the superficiality and insolence of their objections. But I will use in dealing with them a candor they do not employ in opposing us. I will state the difficulties which attend God's permission of evil frankly, and with all the force which even the ablest objector can claim for them.

The theistic scheme professes to demonstrate the existence, attributes, and providence of God. It says that he is self-existent and the creator of all temporal beings; that he is absolutely supreme in authority; that he is of infinite knowledge and power; that he is perfectly holy, and must therefore prefer holiness to sin in all rational creatures; and that he is infinitely benevolent as well as just. The argument is, that it is incredible such a divine sovereign should freely choose the prevalence of evil in the kingdom which he made and absolutely governs, and especially that dreadful aggregate of remediless evil embodied in his hell. But if he is incapable of freely choosing such horrors they should have no place in his kingdom; since his knowledge and prescience are infinite, and his will efficacious and sovereign in his whole providence. Amidst this circle of attributes, it is urged, it ought to be impossible that hell

should find a place, not to speak of the lesser evils of our mortal state. The Christian apologists have been wont to offer these palliations: That while all these are real evils, and so repugnant in themselves to the divine nature, we actually see them made in his providence the occasions of excellent results and beautiful virtues. Evil evokes the virtue of fortitude, which would be otherwise not energized. Evil trains the soul to patience, submission, and heavenly-mindedness. Suffering is necessary to evoke the lovely virtue of sympathy. Hence we may hold that a benevolent God permissively ordains the evil, not for its own sake, but for the sake of those results which it occasions. This palliation our opponents sweep aside with disdain. They say if your God is omnipotent, he is certainly able to work all these admirable results by painless means. If he is benevolent, as you say, he must have chosen the easy means instead of the bitter, because he would thus have realized the whole aggregate of good and virtue for his kingdom, minus the miseries of the present plan. They confirm this point by reminding the Christians that, according to them, there actually is a splendid order of moral creatures for whom God has done this very thing. The virtue and bliss of Gabriel are certainly not inferior to those promised redeemed men; for their prototype "was made a little lower than the angels." And the utmost the Christian's Jesus dares to promise is that his redeemed shall be as *angelloi*. Here, then, they urge, is a whole world of happy and holy creatures, endowed with every desirable virtue, including sympathy and fortitude, and yet without any discipline of evil. Here, then, God has actually done the thing for them without the permission of evil; why does he not do the same thing for human creatures in the same way? Thus the caviller "refuses to be comforted" by any such palliation as this. Let us pause here and weigh this reply carefully. To what extent does it really damage the theodicy advanced? I candidly admit, that it does prove this class of palliations to be insufficient as a full solution of the difficulty. But I assert that the skeptic's position here is overweening and sophistical in this: when he so ingeniously cites to us the fact that God does cultivate in the elect angels, as free agents, a complete bliss and purity without the discipline of evil, he cunningly begs the question, whether God could succeed in this,

not only without evil among them, but without evil anywhere in the universe. What mortal can certainly know but that one of the means which God found necessary in the training of the elect angels, was some wholesome example of suffering for sin among some other order of free agents? But unless the skeptic can certify us about this, his instance remains inconclusive. It is more important to remark, that the facts cited in the above theodicy do give us a pleasing probability, which points in the direction of God's consistency in the permission of evil. For the beautiful feature which is common in the results cited is that we here see providence bringing good out of the evil. That fact is undeniable. Does the skeptic rejoin, "Yes, but why didn't your God bring about the whole good, minus the evil?" I grant that this solemn question is not answered. But let it be allowed for a moment, and for argument's sake, that God may see a good reason, then the fact that he does bring good out of the permitted evil will be of invaluable force to reinstate our confidence in his infinite benevolence in the midst of the unsolved mystery.

We proceed now to the next advance in the argument of the theodicy. The theologians set up these unquestionable premises. There is no natural evil in the universe which is not the result and penalty of moral evil, that is to say, of sin. God's higher glory is to be a moral governor of rational free agents. If the creatures are to remain such they must be governed by moral inducements. Should God depart from that method he would derationalize them and reduce them to the grade of brutes. Does any skeptic desire to see that done, and the creation stripped of its noblest order? Surely not. It follows, then, that God, in leaving men their free agency, must follow out punctually this plan of moral sanctions; and if his creatures choose to sin, he must needs allow the penalty to follow with the same regularity with which his rewards follow their virtues. Moreover, God's distributive righteousness not only justifies, but requires this course from him as a moral ruler; as the chief magistrate of the universe he is actually under moral obligations to his own perfections to be impartial, even if wilful transgressors do incur deserved miseries which his benevolence would fain see them escape. And this view is powerfully reinforced by the further fact, that the larger part of the penal

evils that follow transgression have not only a judicial connection, but a necessary natural connection with their sins, that, namely, of effects with their efficient causes. There is a true sense in which it is not God that volunteers to punish sin, but it is sin which punishes itself. "He that soweth to his flesh *shall of the flesh* reap corruption" (literally *perdition*. "Sin when it is finished bringeth forth death." To sum up, then, God's permission of natural evil in the world is all accounted for by the presence of moral evil, that is to say, voluntary transgression, and the entrance of the moral evil is an incident liable to emerge under any moral government of free agents.

Still our skeptics "refuse to be comforted." They retort, that the Christian scheme ascribes to God regenerative power; and that it holds that he can, and does, exercise it in a multitude of cases, without infringing the free agency of its subjects, or making any disruption in his general plan of governing them by rational and moral means. If the Christian's scheme relinquished this claim it would commit logical suicide. For it holds that the natural heart of men fallen in Adam is invariably determined to self-will and ungodliness; hence if God did not exercise a sovereign power of regeneration, he could never get one of them converted. They would all continue with absolute certainty to prefer the unconverted state. The scheme also claims that God has pledged himself to keep all redeemed men and elect angels in their heaven forever. But the voluntary apostasy of any of them must result in their exclusion from heaven. Now, therefore, if God had not the power of efficaciously determining their holiness without subverting their free agency, he has promised what he cannot be sure of performing, which would be dishonest. Once more; the Christian scheme says, that the promises of grace in answer to prayer are all yea and amen. So that if God had not this power these promises would also be uncandid. Now, then, since God has this power of preserving the sanctity of the unfallen, and of sovereignly regenerating the fallen (a power which they say he frequently exercises), and if he foresaw that whenever a free agent perverted himself, his own high judicial obligations would require him to bring misery on that creature, if he is infinitely benevolent, and truly prefers holiness to sinfulness in his creatures, why did he not preserve them all in holiness as he is said to have preserved

Gabriel? Or why does he not regenerate them at once instead of coming under this painful necessity of employing penal miseries, which he foresees, moreover, to be futile for curing their sinfulness? Why does he not regenerate Satan instead of chastising him endlessly, and that without bettering him? Here is a parent who has a delicate child; he foresees that this child is liable to eat a certain rich but unwholesome viand with a morbid appetite; he foresees also that the consequences will be a colic. Now, this parent may be entirely unable to break the pathological connection between a surfeit and a colic; but of course he will use his superior physical strength to remove that dish beyond the child's reach. If God is a parent, why does he not act in a similar way? I take the ablest skeptics to witness that I have extenuated nothing, but have stated their difficulty as strongly as they ever state it.

There is here solemn difficulty arising from our contemplation of the divine providence, and the thoughtful and benevolent mind will recognize it most impressively. I expressly admit also that its exhaustive solution is beyond human reach. The dread mystery which remains after all the efforts of human explanation is doubtless one instance of the exercise of that high prerogative of God in which he claims that secret things belong to him, but the things which are revealed belong to us and our children that *we may do* all the words of this law. If once the existence and attributes of God are granted, then every mind not wickedly and insanely arrogant will instantly admit that it is reasonable such a sovereign should have counsels of his own, a part of which it is his just prerogative to reserve to himself. There is not an inferior chief magistrate on earth that does not claim a right to the same. Moreover, it is impossible that God should impart a full comprehension of his whole counsel to any mind that is finite and sinful, even if we supposed him to make the effort. Omnipotence itself could not put an ocean of water into a quart pitcher. But because God has not succeeded in working this impossibility in the agnostic's little clouded mind he flies off in a pet, and says he will not have any God at all! If theism is true, the plan of God's administration is universal and everlasting. It must, therefore, be literally infinite. Manifestly even he cannot put another mind in full possession of it without making that mind also infinite.

Whence it strictly follows that if these questioners could be gratified by giving them a religion without a mystery, verily they "should be as gods." (The Bible reader knows the satanic origin of that ambition.) This simple argument for modesty of thought in our theology is powerfully reinforced by another great fact, which is, that our acquaintance with all other sciences is conditioned and limited in precisely the same way. And every intelligent man knows that this is especially true of those physical sciences which the agnostics love to put in contrast with theology for superior clearness and certitude. I would like to know how it is that they are all perfectly willing to believe in the sciences of physics, chemistry, botany, zoology, astronomy, notwithstanding the insoluble mysteries involved in each, and refuse theism because of its mystery, when they ought to know that this is the very science in which the largest mysteries must reasonably be expected. Is it because they have a special dislike to the God whom theism discloses, sharpened by the apprehension that he has a just dislike for them? Let it be settled, then, that the real question in debate is not whether anybody can clear up the whole mystery of God's permission of evil, but whether that mystery justifies anybody in repudiating his heavenly Father, and all the duties he owes to him, which are the highest and holiest duties of his being.

Next, it must be settled which party is logically bound to assume the burden of proof on this question. I shall now show that it is the agnostic's. For why? Because the theist is in possession of all the rightful presumptive probabilities on the other side. The law gives every indicted man the right to assume his presumptive innocence, and throws the burden of the proof of his guilt upon the accuser. So here the facts previously demonstrated, or at least rendered presumably probable in this theistic inquiry, all give the theist the right to the initial presumptive. For instance, "the earth is full of the goodness of the Lord," that is, the *a posteriori* marks or signs of the divine benevolence appear in every department of creation and human experience. The whole structure of the human faculties presents the most beautiful evidences of the benevolence of "the Father of our spirits." Here is one point among many: The psychologist finds in the human spirit a class of affections called the malevolent affections, that is, their prac-

tical objective impulse is to hurt somebody; but they all have this invariable trait in addition—even the few among them which are sometimes justifiable—that they are also painful to the person that feels them. There is a large opposite class called the benevolent affections; their objective impulse is to do good to somebody, and these have this invariable trait, that they are pleasant in their exercise to the persons who feel them. He is wilfully blind who cannot see the design of this pair of general facts. It is obviously to discourage and limit all hurtful human actions, and to stimulate and reward all beneficent human actions. In other words, the framer of our spirits is benevolent. But the most extensive and grandest disclosure theism makes about God is of his righteousness, and that both in natural and revealed theology. The ways of providence are always so devised that virtue is practical beneficence, and vice practical maleficence. Therefore when theology tell us that God likes the former and hates the latter more than he likes or hates anything else, it is but saying he is supremely benevolent. But we must not pursue this delightful line of argument.

Another great class of facts which authorize us to throw the burden of proof upon the accusers of God's providence, is that while he mysteriously permits evils, it is his dearest prerogative to bring good out of those evils. Are we to hold, then, that God's mysterious permission of evil has in his mind some sufficient ground, both just and benevolent, though above the reach of human comprehension? I say, Yes. Colonel Ingersoll says, No. Here is the issue clearly made up by the pleadings. Now I say I am entitled to hold my side as presumptively true until it is positively disproved. I say the burden of proof lies on him. He must assume it or the court will properly dismiss the case. The court says to him: "Mr. Prosecutor, you undertake to prove that an infinite God cannot have a conscious ground for his voluntary permission of evil in his kingdom which satisfies him as both just and benevolent. You must do all that, sir, or we will put you out of court. Your opponent, the theist, is under no more obligation to prove what that ground is than a citizen indicted for horse-stealing is bound to prove affirmatively that he did not steal the horse. He is entitled to stand on the defensive; the prosecutor must prove that he did steal the horse or he has no case. Sir, your duty here is similar."

But what sort of testimony will this accuser need in order to prove that affirmative? Manifestly it must be a testimony which explores the whole extent of God's omniscience, and his whole eternal providence toward the universe; otherwise it will be a dead failure; for the defense will rejoin, that it is supposable always that God has seen his sufficient reason for his permission of evil in that portion of his infinite counsel and providence left unexplored by the witness. The accuser has as yet done nothing effectual to exclude the presumptive hypothesis that God may be justifiable; but this is what he undertook to do. He will say, perhaps, that his witnesses have proved so much namely: that God has full physical power to make and keep all his creatures holy and happy, so that he cannot justify himself in his permission of evil (as the Pelagian proposes he shall), by the plea of inability. Let the accuser say that God did not find the obstacle in the way of making his universe all holy and happy in a lack of personal power. Granted. But may not his infinite mind have seen a proper obstacle in some other quarter? That is the question. The man who undertakes to deny that ought to be omniscient himself. In other words, the accuser has undertaken an impossible task. He has rashly undertaken to establish affirmatively a proposition which none but infinite beings would be competent to discuss. The decree of the court therefore is, "The indictment is not proved."

To this extent, then, the providence of God is not convicted of wrong. I again admit candidly that its solemn mystery remains, and a questioning mind is not yet furnished with an exhaustive solution.

There is a species of *argumentum ad hominem*, which, the books on logic tell us, is unfair. It consists in attempting to transfer some odium attaching to the adversary from his person to his proposition and argument. I shall not use that form. There is another kind which consists in holding the opponent bound to any inconvenient or absurd consequences which proceed logically out of his positions, though we ourselves do not concede those positions. This kind is perfectly fair. The Saviour himself used it against the Pharisees. I am entitled to use it in this debate.

In this direction my first point is the following: The practical point of the cavil against God's permission of evil is, that,

if there is a God, he is culpable for it. He is exceedingly blamable for all this misery which should have been prevented by him. That is to say, the caviller is altogether in sympathy with these creature sufferers as against their hard master. Of course, then, this humane and sympathizing caviller is doing everything in his power to minimize the hardships so blamably inflicted upon his fellow-creatures. Of course he is steadily devoting his best energies, his time, talents, and money, to repairing the cruelties which this bad God has let loose upon poor fellow-mortals, to comforting the sorrowful, to supplying their destitutions, and especially to removing their ignorance and vices and irreligion, which he knows to be the practical proximate cause of so much of these pitiable sorrows. Of course this just accuser thinks he has no money to waste upon the pomps and luxuries of life, no time for any needless amusements, no time or talent to expend upon personal ambitions or any selfish aim. Of course he hushands all conscientiously for the sacred object of minimizing these evils of human existence, and mending so much as may be mended of the neglects of this cruel God. If he does not, is he not himself like the cruel God? Is not this accusation of God, coming from such as he, too much like "Satan reproving sin?" Does this agnostic waste any money upon Havana cigars and costly wines, which he would he better without; upon expensive architecture and furniture, where he sees more honored men than himself do with plainer; upon partisan political campaigns, which, whichever way they go, only leave the country more corrupt—sacred money which might have been used to ease the sick of their agonies, to feed the starving, to wipe the tears from the face of the orphan, to make the desolate widow's heart sing for joy, to dissipate the ignorance and vice and ungodliness from the heart of the youth who must otherwise reap the harvest of temporal perdition from these seeds? I bring no charge; but I submit that, unless the agnostic is truly acting in this philanthropic way, decency should close his mouth. For shame's sake let him not blame God for the results of a neglect which he himself practices.

The most probable rejoinder of the agnostic will be, that he sees the majority of the professed Christians also practicing this unphilanthropic neglect. My answer is, that I admit with sorrow that it is partly true. It is also true that nearly all the

great and blessed charities of this poor world come from these imperfect Christians. How much of them comes from agnostics? I do not know. But let that pass. My word to the agnostic is this: suppose we let this good exalted God alone, and turn all the blows of our criticisms on these inconsistent Christians. I say to the agnostic, with all my heart, "Lay it on them well; but let alone the heavenly Father whom they misrepresent."

My second point is this: When we showed in defense of the divine providence that, supposing free agents choose to sin, their suffering ought to follow, and must follow, because judicial fidelity requires it, and because sin *is* suffering; the reply of the agnostic was this: that if there is a God, he must have foreseen that, and he ought to have felt bound to protect his moral creatures from sinning by making their souls holy, or else regenerating them when they made themselves unholy. And we saw that this is really the agnostic's final stand in this contest. I will now ask a typical agnostic, say Colonel Ingersoll, "Sir, how would you like God to regenerate you?" Perhaps he will seek to evade me by answering, "But I do not now believe there is any God or regeneration." "Yes; but supposing you did believe them, how would you like to be regenerated yourself? Stay, do not answer till I tell you what this means. Regeneration means a complete revolution of the principles and ends of life. It means surrendering ambition and worldiness for spiritual good. It means the absolute subjugation of self-will under a superior and sovereign will, which will order you to obey and ask no questions. It means a thoroughgoing crucifixion of natural pride. It means the instant surrender of all cherished sins. It means the honest assumption for the whole remaining life of a career of new duties, many of which are known to be repugnant, and all arduous. It means praying, and Bible-reading, and watching one's self. It means, in a word, taking up for life the yoke of a complete self-denial and self-surrender. Regenerate persons will tell you that still they have found a new species of spiritual happiness in this arduous cross-bearing. But that pleasure is to you purely visionary, as you never felt anything like it. The Bible also tells you that this regeneration will finally bring you, after a severe discipline, the happiness of heaven. But that is all out of sight to you, lying beyond the boundaries of this world, which now en-

close all your wishes and aspirations—so completely enclose them that you remain in doubt whether it would not be better for you to die like a pig than to have any future world. Now, Sir, you told us there was a time when you had a speculative belief in God and his gospel. At that time how would you have liked this regeneration for yourself? You know very well that you disliked and resisted it with every fibre of your heart. Sometimes when conscience seemed to be leading you towards it, you recalcitrated, silently perhaps, but with the stubbornness of a wild bull in a net. You jealously cherished your self-will, your pride, your worldliness. You would have blushed to have been caught praying. One chief source of that secret but inveterate enmity which your heart cherished toward the gospel was just this: that it required of you such a regeneration and also offered it to you as a boon. Well, you are the same man yet in heart. The child has been father to the man. Could I re-convince your speculative intellect that this gospel which you have discarded is true, the desperate repugnance to its regeneration would doubtless revive in you. Remember, now, that we have agreed that there was one final method feasible for God, by using which he could have rescued all his creatures effectually from all moral and physical evil, namely, the regeneration I have described; and the very *gravamen* of your accusation against God is that he ought to employ that method in every case, but does not. But, lo! when this kind God comes to *you* and says, ‘Ingersoll, let me take you at your word; let me regenerate you, here and now, and thus bestow on you this glorious and eternal security,’ you are violently opposed to his doing it. Here is the one and only way which remained to God for avoiding the permission of any evil in his kingdom, and to this way you have as to yourself a violent objection. There is one medicine with which God could have cured the whole matter. You have been blaming him vehemently because he has not administered it to everybody; but when he offers the cup to you, you repel it with abhorrence. Do not you think, Sir, that for shame’s sake it is time for you to stop blaming him?”

I have just asserted the innate enmity of the human heart to God’s law. Here is a consideration which has a vital influence on this discussion, but for which agnostics never make allowance. Yet, “whether they will hear, or whether they will

forbear," it is the right of the Christian pursuing this discussion, and his high duty, to bear his serious testimony to this indisputable fact of human nature. The point it contains is very plain, that a person who has a fixed and wrongful hatred to a government cannot be a just and correct critic of it. What man endued with common sense will gainsay that? And the agnostics stubbornly refuse this caution and protest their impartiality, when to everybody else but themselves their inveterate hostility to the holiness of God's law is apparent! But I claim more. We are all voluntary culprits. We are all obnoxious to the displeasure of the divine Judge. If his grace does not arrest us we all continue pertinacious transgressors, and this justifies his continued retributions. Now, every item of that aggregate of misery which presents the pretext of the cavil, is the just judicial consequence of the creature's own voluntary sin. There is not a pang of natural evil in the moral universe which is not the appropriate fruit of transgression. Hence, however hard to bear that natural evil may be, the culprits are certainly not the parties that are entitled to accuse the government. As soon as they appreciate their own guilt they always learn that this is outrageously unseemly. If any criticism of the divine management is to be made by any finite intellect, it ought to be at least an unfallen intellect, without sin of its own. The effectual way, then, of terminating these indictments of God would be for the agnostics to learn the real quality and aggravations of their own sins of heart, nature, and life. And could I teach them this, I should be conferring on them the most inestimable blessing. Not only would this sinful debate end absolutely, but this righteous humiliation of their own spirits would prove to them the beginning of everlasting good. Job was tempted to be an agnostic, and to make tedious efforts to argue himself into the assertion of God's harshness. His effectual cure came only when he was compelled to say: "I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye seeth thee; wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes." The best wish I can offer to all the agnostics is, that they may become honest enough with themselves to look fairly at God until they appreciate his infinite sovereignty, wisdom, justice, and benevolence, and learn in the light of his holiness to see the exceeding sinfulness of their own sin. All this

debate will then he happily ended for them as well as for us.

One more point remains of this branch of my reply. I make it by asking them what will be gained for them and their fellow-men if they establish their indictment? What will they have proved? This: that the theistic scheme of the universe is incredible, because of the prevalence in it of this dreadful mass of natural and moral evil. That is, the doctrine of a personal, rational God is abolished. What hypothesis of the universe is left us? Only the materialistic and mechanical one. The flow of events in the universe is not directed by any personal or moral will at all. (Certainly our wills are impotent to control it.) All is governed by natural laws, which can mean nothing more than the irrevocable methods of blind natural forces. These forces are unknowing and reasonless; they are resistless; they are eternal; they are unchangeable. They can no more be prayed to than the whirlwind can. Thus the agnostic, in rejecting theism, unavoidably gives us the scheme of a universal mechanical fate. His universe is but an immense machine.

Now, I solemnly ask him: By forcing upon us this ghastly doctrine, has he diminished one iota of this volume of miseries, the conception of which so distresses us all? Does he stop the flow of a single tear? Does he arrest a single pang of disease? Does he diminish by one unit the awful catalogue of deaths? Does he take anything from the reality of any single human bereavement? Is there one particle of agency in this doctrine to check in any soul that sinfulness which is the spring of all our woes? None. Even agnostic arrogance does not dare to claim it. On his scheme every evil which he so bitterly objects against God's scheme remains. All that he has done is to rob suffering humanity of its sole true consolation, which is found in that fact the gospel alone shows us, that it is the darling prerogative of the Father of mercies to bring good out of this sore evil for all who will accept his grace and make it work out, bitter as it may be now, "a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." Thus their doctrine can take nothing from the miseries of mankind; all it can do is to rob men of the only possible solace, and to tell them while they suffer that their woes are as futile of better results as they are inevitable. In a word, they give us as the true conception of our existence this somber picture, which F. D. Strauss substantially avows at the

end of his great agnostic argument. Our world is a huge and terrible machine of stone and iron; its motive power eternal, resistless, and blind; its revolutions impossible to be ever arrested or changed in the least, and the corn between its upper and nether millstones is an ever-flowing stream of human hearts, with all their precious affections and hopes and keen sensibilities, bleeding and crushed under the remorseless grind. And to the yawning jaws of this hellish mill each one of us knows he is traveling, and must be caught by them sooner or later.

And this is the scheme pressed upon us by gentlemen who affect too much humane sensibility to endure the harsh injustice of God's gospel! What, is this scheme rejected for this doctrine of despair? I repeat, it is the one which, while it recognizes God's holy sovereignty and right to punish sin, and to keep in his own breast the dread secrets of his infinite purpose, teaches us his wise, merciful, and holy control over this terrible blind machine of nature, and offers to all who do not contumaciously reject his goodness an almighty redemption which terminates these sufferings of time into eternal blessings. May God save us all from such humanity as that of the agnostics!

Proceeding now to a more independent line of attack, I request the reader to inspect the process of the agnostic's logic at its cardinal place. It is simply this: the line of argument for the being, attributes, and providence of God leads him up to a great mystery, which cannot be fully resolved for him. What then? He will stop and weigh the amount of validity it may contain, notwithstanding the mystery in its conclusion. Now, all men would deem this mere logical lunacy if applied to any other line of evidence. We know very well that evidence apparently valid which leads to an inevitable self-contradiction is defeated by its own result, whether we can put our finger upon its flaw or not. We justly claim that it cannot be correct. This, in fact, is the quality of the disproof of an argument by the *reductio ad absurdum*. But manifestly the case which the agnostic has made against theism is wholly different. A mystery in our conclusion is not a necessary self-contradiction; that it cannot be shown to be such, follows from the very fact that it is a mystery. Since we cannot comprehend it, we cannot assert its contradictoriness. And this I confirm by the assertion that ev-

every other line of scientific evidence, in every department of human knowledge, leads sooner or later to some such insoluble mystery. So that, if the agnostic's method of procedure against theism were proper, he ought to reject every science known to man and announce himself an absolute ignoramus.

For instance, what physicist can answer this question: What is electricity? There is good and sufficient empirical evidence that this mysterious energy exists; but what is it? Why does it imbue some material bodies and not others? Why do only a few conduct it fully? If it is ponderable matter, why cannot the chemist weigh it in his most delicate scales? If it is not, how does it hit hard enough to rive the gnarled oak? Every good physicist knows he cannot answer these questions. Every agnostic, then, ought to say, if he will be consistent, and proceed in physics as he does in theology, "I will have none of this science of electricity. I will not avail myself of its conveniences, lightning-rod, telegraph, electric light, electric motors. I will not believe in electricity; even if the lightning strikes me I will not believe in it." The intelligent reader knows that if I cared to detain him, I could cite instances equally pungent from every one of those physical sciences which agnostics love to place in contrast with theology for their superior clearness. Now my point is, that no man can proceed upon this wilful method, which the agnostics would have us apply to the theistic argument, without incurring the charge of lunacy. But they ought to be more willing to apply that wanton method in physics than in theology; because in the latter we have more ground to expect mysteries from the infinitude of the Being whom we study. When a line of evidence leads a sensible man to a startling and mysterious conclusion, what does he do? He would be prompted to revise the evidence carefully. That is all. If he finds it valid, he admits the conclusion in spite of the mystery. The sensible man bestows credence upon any proposition in any science, not because he comprehends the predicate, but because he apprehends perspicuous evidence supporting the copula. Now the several lines of evidence, rational and scriptural, for the being, attributes, and providence of God, are of invincible force; they cannot be resisted in their own appropriate spheres. Every successive attempt to weaken them in that way perishes under the light of true philosophy. I con-

clude this point by firmly asserting that agnostics have no right thus to discount the whole force of this evidence, treating it as non-existent, when it has so substantial an existence, not because they can refute it, but simply because they do not like its result. The process is utterly illicit.

Superficial opponents of God's retributive justice frequently argue that this is a different attribute from his love, and indeed so antithetic that they cannot find a place for it in a nature declared to be infinite love. A little correct thinking will show that this reasoning is not only groundless, but absurd. In fact, the principle of righteousness in every moral being is not dual, but single. The plurality of its actions arises solely from the contrast of the objects to which the principle directs itself. The magnetic needle in the compass is endued with one energy or magnetic principle, not two. This single energy will cause either end of the needle to act in opposite ways to the two opposite poles of the earth; and because the upper end is attracted towards the north pole, for that very reason it is repelled from the south pole. I prove it by this fact, that it is impossible to make a needle such that its upper end would be attracted to the north pole and not repelled from the south pole. Should any sailor tell you that he had such a needle, nobody would believe him. This instance presents us with a correct parallel to the action of the moral principle in a moral agent. The principle is and can be only one. It acts in opposite ways towards virtuous and vicious objects, because it is one, and because it rationally apprehends the objects as opposites. Hence it follows, that this central principle would not be capable of acting in the amiable way of approbation, complacency and reward towards a virtuous object, unless it were certain from its own nature to act in the opposite and severer way of reprehension towards towards a vicious and repulsive object. I repeat, that unless this principle is so constituted as to repel the repulsive action, it cannot be so constituted as to be attracted to the attractive action. One might as well talk of a yard-stick with only one end, or of a house with its south side, and no north side. Every man when he thinks knows that this is the condition upon which all correct moral principle exists, and he is incredulous about any other. Let me construct a little parable. I ask the agnostic, or the universalist, to come with me

and watch the proceedings of a certain stranger, of whom all we know as yet is that he claims a high reputation for amiability, philanthropy, equity and charity. He tells us that it is a perennial pleasure to him to witness and reward all benevolent and generous actions. I say to him, "Stranger, so far, well. I must now point you an opposite object. There stands a young reprobate, the son of a devoted widowed mother, who is known to have robbed her of her little property, to neglect her wants in her destitution, to heap reproaches and curses upon her, and even to strike her venerable face. What are your feelings towards that object?" We suppose the stranger to answer, "Oh, sir, I assure you I am too thoroughly amiable to have any feeling about it. True, I see nothing in it to admire, but I am too affectionate to detest anything. I have no feeling at all towards that reprobate." I ask, would anybody believe him? Or, if we believe his statement that he felt no reprehension for so detestable a son, must we not set him down also as a cold-blooded villain, whose pretended charity was all sheer hypocrisy? Such is the judgment of every man's common sense.

Let us pass now from the virtuous principle in man to God. I assert that my argument only becomes the stronger. The perfectness of God's virtues only renders it more conclusive, because the purity, the equity, the truth, the love of God are infinite. It is therefore only the more certain that the central principle which makes him approve and love the virtuous must prompt him to reprehend the vicious. Men vainly imagine that it would be a delightful theology to have a God so amiable as to be sure to reward all good things, but also too amiable to be capable of punishing any evil thing. They demand an impossibility. The only way to reach it would be to have a God without any moral qualities at all. Who would wish to live under an omniscient and omnipotent Ruler who was not capable of knowing or caring whether he was rewarding the wicked and punishing the good? If we must desire such moral principle in our Supreme Ruler as will be always certain of acting amiably and justly towards the good, then we must be willing that he shall be equally certain to reprehend the wicked. If they would have a God too amiable to maintain a hell, they must accept one who is also too careless and heartless to provide any heaven.

Does one say that still the mystery of God's permission of evil is not fully explained? I did not promise to explain it fully, which I believe will never be done in this world. What I promised was to satisfy the just and humble mind that God has his sufficient explanation, which we are sure is consistent with his wisdom, benevolence, and holiness, without knowing what it is. Natural theology gives sufficient ground for this consoling conclusion from its splendid evidences that he is all-wise, righteous, and benevolent, which have their preponderating force notwithstanding the unanswered question, and especially from this important trait, which runs through the whole mystery, that the plan of his providence is to bring good out of the evil.

But revealed theology gives us a crowning and all-sufficient satisfaction. It is found in the fact that God is so infinite in benevolence and mercy, that at his own mere option he has made the supreme sacrifice for the redemption of his enemies. He provides this infinite blessing for them at the cost of the humiliation and death of his eternally begotten and co-equal Son, whom he knows to outrank, in the dimensions of his infinite being and in his moral desert, all his rational creatures combined together. The gospel tells us that this transcendent sacrifice will not redeem the apostate angels, and will not receive full application to all human beings. These are awful truths. But, be the cause of this limitation found where it may, it cannot be sought in any lack or stint of goodness in God. For had there been any such stint in his nature, one fibre of neglect, or injustice, or cruelty, this would inevitably have prevented the supreme sacrifice for the behoof of any one. There is the triumphant theodicy in the infinite love which prompted redemption—redemption as apprehended by the evangelical trinitarian. There, no doubt, is the supreme glory of this gospel by which the apostle tells us God is making known to all worlds his manifold wisdom through the church of ransomed men. I will set forth the point of this argument in a closing parable. We see a surgeon enter a dwelling. A mother calls to her pallid, limping child, and seizes her in her arms. The surgeon produces one of those treacherous cases—so beautiful without with their ornamented woods and gilded clasps, so terrible within with the cold glitter of

forceps, bistouries, amputating-knives, and bone-saws. The child beholds with wide-eyed wonder and then with terror, ere she perceives that these instruments are to be employed on her body. As the surgeon approaches she appeals to her mother with agonizing screams and tears: "Oh, mother, mother, save me!" But we see the woman, with stern eye, compressed lips, and pallid cheek, bare the child's swollen joint, and hold her struggling in her relentless arms, while the cruel knife cuts the tender skin, carves the bleeding flesh, and pierces even to the very marrow of the diseased joint. Is this a mother or a tigress? The simple explanation is, that she is a true mother, wise and tender, who knows that this severe remedy is needed to save the precious life of her child, who would otherwise be the victim of a slow, loathsome, and torturing death. Has she not shown the truest love? and has not her fidelity cost her inward pangs of sympathy more cruel than the bodily smart of the surgery, which she has heroically borne for love's sake? But now steps forward the caviller, and says: "Stop, this woman is herself a wondrous leech. She knows all healing lotions, and all the herbs of virtue, some of which would have cured the diseased limb without a pang while the child slept; or, at least, she could have secured for her child the unconsciousness which chloroform gives during the operation. Why, then, did she not use the gentler means to save this life, when she had them at her option? No, she must be intrinsically cruel and heartless. She must find pleasure in the gratuitous suffering of her own child." I am compelled to reply: "I do not know her reasons. Her social station is far above mine. She has never taken me into her domestic confidence. I had no right to demand that she should. But I can testify to another fact. A few months ago the cry of fire drew me to a dwelling not far from this place which was wrapped in flames, and evidently near the final crash. The parents had been busy rescuing their children, and, for the moment, supposed they had saved them all. But a cry issued from another window. A little white-robed figure was seen at it through the eddying smoke, crying: 'Father, mother! O save me.' All declared that it was too late. Even the father, amidst his bitter tears, acquiesced. But I saw the mother tear herself from the restraining hands of the firemen, who told her that any effort at rescue was mad-

ness and suicide, leaving the shreds of her raiment in their clutches, and dart up the fuming stairway. The stern men turned their faces away from the horror and stood wringing their hands. But in a minute the woman returned, her silken tresses blazing, her garments on fire, one of her fair cheeks scorched, shrivelled by the blast, one eye blistered in the socket, but with her child in her arms wrapped safely in a blanket. After only pausing to extinguish the flames that were threatening her life, I saw her fall on her knees, and say: 'Thank God; I have saved my child.' Pass around this lady's chair, Mr. Caviller, you will see upon the other side of her face the scars of that rescue which, in one moment, blighted the beauty of her young motherhood for life. This is that mother; and this is the same child. Now, sir, I cannot satisfy your curiosity about the disuse of the chloroform, but I know this heroic mother's heart has its reason. For why? Because I saw her make the supreme sacrifice for this child. After such a demonstration of boundless love, your cavil is impertinent, if not brutal."

THE ATTRACTIONS OF POPERY.¹

Dr. John H. Rice, with the intuition of a great mind, warned Presbyterians against a renewed prevalence of popery in our Protestant land. This was when it was so insignificant among us as to be almost unnoticed. Many were surprised at his prophecy, and not a few mocked; but time has fulfilled it. Our leaders from 1830 to 1860 understood well the causes of this danger. They were diligent to inform and prepare the minds of their people against it. Hence General Assemblies and Synods appointed annual sermons upon popery, and our teachers did their best to arouse the minds of the people. Now, all this has mainly passed away, and we are relaxing our resistance against the dreaded foe just in proportion as he grows more formidable. It has become the fashion to condemn controversy and to affect the widest charity for this and all other foes of Christ and of souls. High Presbyterian authority even is quoted as saying, that henceforth our concern with Romanism should be chiefly irenical! The figures presented by the census of 1890 are construed in opposite ways. This gives the papists more than fourteen millions of adherents in the United States, where ninety years ago there were but a few thousands. Such Protestant journals as think it their interest to play sycophants to public opinion try to persuade us that these figures are very consoling; because, if Rome had kept all the natural increase of her immigrations the numbers would have been larger. But Rome points to them with insolent triumph as prognostics of an assured victory over Protestantism on this continent. Which will prove correct?

Both logic and Holy Writ teach us that "the thing which hath been is the thing which shall be." Like causes must be expected to produce like effects. For Presbyterians of all others to discount the perpetual danger from Romanism is thoroughly thoughtless and rash. We believe that the Christianity

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left by the apostles to the primitive church was essentially what we now call Presbyterian and Protestant. Prelacy and popery speedily began to work in the bosom of that community and steadily wrought its corruption and almost its total extirpation. Why should not the same cause tend to work the same result again? Are we truer or wiser Presbyterians than those trained by the apostles? Have the enemies of truth become less skillful and dangerous by gaining the experience of centuries? The popish system of ritual and doctrine was a gradual growth, which, modifying true Christianity, first perverted and then extinguished it. Its destructive power has resulted from this: that it has not been the invention of any one cunning and hostile mind, but a gradual growth, modified by hundreds or thousands of its cultivators, who were the most acute, learned, selfish, and anti-Christian spirits of their generations, perpetually retouched and adapted to every weakness and every attribute of depraved human nature, until it became the most skillful and pernicious system of error which the world has ever known. As it has adjusted itself to every superstition, every sense of guilt, every foible and craving of the depraved human heart, so it has travestied with consummate skill every active principle of the gospel. It is doubtless the *ne plus ultra* of religious delusion, the final and highest result of perverted human faculty guided by the sagacity of the great enemy.

This system has nearly conquered Christendom once. He who does not see that it is capable of conquering it again is blind to the simplest laws of thought. One may ask, Does it not retain sundry of the cardinal doctrines of the gospel, monotheism, the trinity, the hypostatic union, Christ's sacrifice, the sacraments, the resurrection, the judgment, immortality? Yes; in form it retains them, and this because of its supreme cunning. It retains them while so wresting and enervating as to rob them mainly of their sanctifying power, because it designs to spread its snares for all sorts of minds of every grade of opinion. The grand architect was too cunning to make it, like his earlier essays, mere atheism, or mere fetishism, or mere polytheism, or mere pagan idolatry; for in these forms the trap only ensnared the coarser and more ignorant natures. He has now perfected it and baited it for all types of humanity, the most refined as well as the most imbruted.

I. Romanism now enjoys in our country certain important advantages, which I may style legitimate, in this sense, that our decadent, half-corrupted Protestantism bestows these advantages upon our enemy, so that Rome, in employing them, only uses what we ourselves give her. In other words, there are plain points upon which Rome claims a favorable comparison as against Protestantism; and her claim is correct, in that the latter is blindly and criminally betraying her own interests and duties.

(1.) A hundred years ago French atheism gave the world the Jacobin theory of political rights. The Bible had been teaching mankind for three thousand years the great doctrine of men's moral equality before the universal Father, the great basis of all free, just, and truly republican forms of civil society. Atheism now travestied this true doctrine by her mortal heresy of the absolute equality of men, asserting that every human being is naturally and inalienably entitled to every right, power, and prerogative in civil society which is allowed to any man or any class. The Bible taught a liberty which consists in each man's unhindered privilege of having and doing just those things, and no others, to which he is rationally and morally entitled. Jacobinism taught the liberty of license—every man's natural right to indulge his own absolute will; and it set up this fiendish caricature as the object of sacred worship for mankind. Now, democratic Protestantism in these United States has become so ignorant, so superficial and wilful, that it confounds the true republicanism with this deadly heresy of Jacobinism. It has ceased to know a difference. Hence, when the atheistic doctrine begins to bear its natural fruits of license, insubordination, communism, and anarchy, this bastard democratic Protestantism does not know how to rebuke them. It has recognized the parents; how can it consistently condemn the children? Now, then, Rome proposes herself as the stable advocate of obedience, order, and permanent authority throughout the ages. She shows her practical power to govern men, as she says, through their consciences (truth would say, through their superstitions). Do we wonder that good citizens, beginning to stand aghast at these elements of confusion and ruin, the spawn of Jacobinism, which a Jacobinized Protestantism cannot control, should look around for some moral and reli-

gious system capable of supporting a firm social order? Need we be surprised that when Rome steps forward, saying, "I have been through the centuries the upholder of order," rational men should be inclined to give her their hand? This high advantage a misguided Protestantism is now giving to its great adversary.

(2.) The Reformation was an assertion of liberty of thought. It asserted for all mankind, and secured for the Protestant nations, each man's right to think and decide for himself upon his religious creed and his duty towards his God, in the fear of God and the truth, *unhindered by human power, political or ecclesiastical*. Here, again, a part of our Protestantism perverted the precious truth until the "manna bred worms, and stank." Rationalistic and skeptical Protestantism now claims, instead of that righteous liberty, license to dogmatize at the bidding of every caprice, every impulse of vanity, every false philosophy, without any responsibility to either truth or moral obligation. The result has been a diversity and confusion of pretended creeds and theologies among nominal Protestants, which perplexes and frightens sincere, but timid, minds. Everything seems to them afloat upon this turbulent sea of licentious debate. They are fatigued and alarmed; they see no end of uncertainties. They look around anxiously for some safe and fixed foundation of credence. Rome comes forward and says to them, You see, then, that this Protestant liberty of thought is fatal license; the Protestant's "rational religion" turns out to be but poisonous *rationalism*, infidelity wearing the mask of faith. Holy Mother Church offers you the foundation of her infallibility, guaranteed by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. She shows you that faith must ground itself in implicit submission, and not in human inquiry. She pledges herself for the safety of your soul if you simply submit; come, then, "trust and be at rest." Many are the weary souls who accept her invitations; and these not only the weak and cowardly, but sometimes the brilliant and gifted, like a Cardinal Newman. For this result a perverted Protestantism is responsible. If all nominal Protestants were as honest in their exercise of mental liberty as the fear of God and the loyalty to truth should make them; if they were as humble and honest in construing and obeying God's word in his Bible, as papists profess to be in submitting to the authority of the Holy Mother Church, honest inquirers would

never be embarrassed, and would never be befooled into supposing that the words of a pope could furnish a more comfortable foundation for faith than the word of God.

(3.) To the shame of our damaged Protestantism, popery remains, in some essential respects, more faithful to God's truth than its rival. For instance, while multitudes of scholars, calling themselves Protestant Christians, are undermining the doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures, Rome holds fast to it in her catechisms and formal declarations. True, she claims inspiration for others than the prophets, evangelists, and apostles for her popes, namely, and prelates, holding to "the apostolic succession." But if one must err, it is better to err by excess than by defect on a point like this, where negation cuts the blinded soul of man off absolutely from the divine guidance. Thousands of pretended Protestant believers are advancing their destructive criticism to assert that the Pentateuch is a literary fraud. Rome firmly maintains that it is God's own work through Moses. A thousand deceitful arts are plied to degrade the conception of inspiration, as giving only thoughts, and not the words, or as consisting only in an elevation of the consciousness by poetic genius, and such like treacherous views. Rome still teaches the old-fashioned, honest view. What right have such deceitful Protestants to scold Rome for dishonesty of those historical and spiritual impostures upon which she founds the claims of the popes? Truly, they are dirty enough; for the forged decretals, for instance, too much contempt and reprehension cannot be expressed. But they are not a whit dirtier than the mental dishonesty of the men who, after asserting that they have proved the Pentateuch mostly a literary fraud, done by priestcraft more than a thousand years after its pretended date, still assure us that its value as Scripture and divine rule of faith is not wounded. These recent justifiers of pious fraud cannot convict the older ones. The old imposture, like a rotten roof, has become moss-grown with age, and is picturesque and venerable in many eyes. The new imposture stands ugly and malodorous in its rank freshness.

Again, multitudes of pretended Protestants utterly deny the trinity, the very corner-stone of a theology of redemption. Rome affirms it in all the fullness of the creeds of Nice, Chalcedon, and Athanasius. Myriads of pretended Protestants revere their own ethical philosophy so much more than they do their

God that they must needs utterly reject Christ's vicarious satisfaction for the guilt of sin. Rome continues to assert it, in spite of spurious philosophy, although she does add to it superstitious claims of human merit. Myriads of our men have become such "advanced thinkers" that they cannot away with supernatural regeneration. Rome teaches it invariably, even if it is in the form of baptismal regeneration, and still ascribes it to the power of God. Such are a few of the biting contrasts. We cannot wonder that many, even of honest and reverent minds, when they witness this ruthless destruction of the essentials of the gospel, draw two plain inferences. One is, that all such men pretending to be Protestant believers are, in fact, nothing but infidels wearing a mask, probably for the sake of the loaves and fishes as yet connected with the clerical calling; so that it is mere impudence for such men to assume to warn them against popish impostures—rather too near akin to Satan reproving sin. The other is, that the Romanist theologians must have been right in asserting, ever since the days of Luther, that our Protestant way of establishing a divine rule of faith by a rational and explicit credence must turn out nothing but rationalistic infidelity. Souls which value a divine redemption for man shudder as they behold this wild havoc of everything characteristic of a saving gospel; and they naturally exclaim, "There is no security except in going back to that old foundation, implicit trust in the witness of 'Holy Mother Church' to the Scriptures!" Now, true Protestants know that this conclusion is wretchedly sophistical, but it is dreadfully natural for honest, half-informed men.

(4.) The best argument for any creed is the godly living of its professors. Protestantism used to have a grand and victorious advantage on that point. She is ceasing to wield it. The wealth begotten by her very virtues of industry, thrift, and probity has debauched many of her children. "Jeshurun has waxen fat, and kicked." An unbounded flood of luxury sweeps Protestant families away. A relaxed and deceitful doctrine produces its sure fruits of relaxed and degraded morals. Church discipline is nearly extinct. Meantime spurious revivalism, relying upon all species of vulgar clap-trap and sensational artifice, upon slang rhetoric and the stimulating of mere animal sympathies, instead of the pure word and spirit of God, is hur-

rying tens of thousands of dead souls into the Protestant churches. These evils have gone so far that a profession of faith in these churches has come to mean nearly as little as a professed conformity to Rome means. No shrewd man regards such a profession as any sufficient guarantee for truth or common honesty in dealing. The lawyers tell us that litigation unmasks about as much intended fraud, purposed extortion, and loose swearing in these church members as in other people. Worldly conformity is so general that the line between the church and the world has become nearly as indistinct as that between spiritual and profane living in the Romish communion. Meantime, Rome gets up no spurious revivals; she works her system with the steadiness and perseverance which used to characterize pastoral effort and family religion among Presbyterians. It is true that her cultus is intensely ritualistic; but, at least, it does not offend decent people by irreverent slang; her worship is liturgical, but her liturgies, however erroneous in doctrine, are, at least, genteel, and marked by aesthetic dignity. Rome does not venture on sham miracles very much in these United States. It is true she has her spurious relics and other superstitious impostures for impressing the people; but wherein are they less of human artifices and less deceptive than the machinery of our pretended revivals, with their marchings, hand-shakings, choruses, and ephemeral conversions? Rome's confessional is, indeed, a terrible organ of spiritual tyranny; but still it is a strong organ of church discipline, and it is steadily employed as such in every Romish chapel. The average Protestant church member feels that any assumption of real presbyterial authority over him by his pastor would be an impertinence, which he would resent with scorn. The Romish priest still wields a potent, ghostly authority over his people. One may cry that he wields it by virtue of superstition, by the threat of withholding his absolution or extreme unction. Yet he wields it, and usually for the credit of his church. He teaches his members to practice the forms of their daily devotion with diligence and regularity, holding out a powerful motive in the promise of merit thus wrought out. The Protestant may exclaim, These are but machine prayers, vain repetitions told off by the dozen along with the beads! Very true, the most of it may be very poor stuff; but nothing can be quite

so poor and worthless as the living of many Protestant members, who have no family altar and no closet, who say no prayers either in form or in spirit, and who have no conscience of keeping either Sabbaths or saints' days. It is a very bad thing in the Romanist to join the worship of Mary and the saints with that of God; but we surmise that it is a still worse thing to be a practical atheist, and statedly to worship nothing, neither saint nor God, as many an enrolled member of a Protestant church now does.

The Romanist's machine prayers and vain repetitions have, at least, this tendency, to sustain in his soul some slight habit of religious reverence, and this is better than mere license of life. While the two communions wear these aspects, we need not wonder that those Americans, at least, whose early prejudices lean towards Rome should honestly regard her as the better mother of piety and morals.

(5.) We Protestants are also giving away to Rome another powerful influence over honest and thoughtful Christian minds. This we do by secularizing our whole State education. The bulk of the Protestants in the United States have betrayed themselves, through their partisan political zeal, to an attitude concerning the rearing of youth which must ever be preposterous and untenable for sincere Christians. The statesmen and divines of the Reformation, the Luthers, Calvins, Knoxes, Winthrops, and Mathers, were strong advocates of State education; they were such because they believed in the close union of church and State; because their conception of the State was thoroughly theocratic. Had these men been asked, What think you of a theory of education which should train the understanding without instructing the religious conscience; which should teach young immortal spirits anything and everything except God; which should thus secularize education, a function essentially spiritual, and should take this parental task from the fathers and mothers, on whom God imposed it, to confer it on the human and earthly organism, expressly secular and godless? they would have answered with one voice, It is pagan, utterly damnable. But they thought that the State might educate, because the State with them was Christian. Thus State education was firmly grafted into the Puritan colonies. New England, with her usual aggressiveness, has pushed her usage

all over the empire. Meantime the Jeffersonian doctrine of the absolute severance and independence of church and State, of the entire secularity of the State, and the absolutely equal rights, before the law, of religious truth and error, of paganism, atheism, and Christianity, has also established itself in all the States; and still the politicians, for electioneering ends, propagate this State education everywhere. By this curious circuit "Christian America" has gotten herself upon this thoroughly pagan ground; forcing the education of responsible, moral, and immortal beings, of which religion must ever be the essence, into the hands of a gigantic human agency, which resolves that it cannot and will not be religious at all. Surely some great religious body will arise in America to lift its Christian protest against this monstrous result! But, lo! the chief the only organized protest heard in America comes from the Romish Church. It is she who stands forth pre-eminent, almost single-handed, to assert the sacred rights of Christian parents in the training of the souls they have begotten, of Christ in the nurture of the souls he died to redeem. To-day it is this Romish Church which stands forth precisely in the position of the Luthers, Calvins, Knoxes, and Mathers as to the main, central point, which is, *that the education of the young should be Christian, and should be committed to Christian hands.* And what are our representative Protestants saying? Instead of admitting this truth of the ages, and confessing the fatal error into which their haste and Jacobinism have betrayed them, they are only shouting that Rome objects to the American State school because Rome hates republicanism, and wishes to overthrow it. The best they can do is to place themselves in this absurd and dishonest position: To boast in one breath of their loyalty to the principles of the Reformers concerning education, and in the next breath to vilify the Roman Church for reasserting the very principles of these same Reformers. What can they expect save a miserable defeat upon this false position, if, indeed, common justice and common sense are to continue traits of the American mind; unless, indeed, America is to make up her mind to be atheistic or pagan instead of Christian? These misguided Protestants may be assured that there are hundreds of thousands of serious, devout parents who will be much more likely to honor Rome as the faithful champion of

Christ's rights over their children than to condemn her as the designing enemy of free government. In this unnatural contest Protestantism can only lose, while Rome gains; and she will gain the approval not only of the superstitious, but of the most thoughtful and devout minds.

(6.) It is with this most valuable class of minds that Rome is now gaining another far-reaching advantage. This is by her doctrine concerning marriage and the relations of the sexes. On these points she continues to hold and teach the highest views. It is very true that Rome errs in making marriage a sacrament of the church; but she makes it, as Scripture does, a divinely appointed and religious institution, while Protestant laws and debauched Protestant thought tend all over America to degrade it to a mere civil contract. The Roman doctrine and canon law recognize no divorce except by the pope himself. They teach that marriage is inviolable. The divorce laws in our Protestant States provide so many ways for rending the marriage tie that its vows have become almost a farce. We are told that many Protestant women in America scornfully refuse to take the vow of obedience to their husbands, appointed by God in his word; and Protestant parsons are so cowardly that they dare not mention it in the marriage ceremony. But Rome still exacts this conjugal obedience of her daughters. Romish pastors also stand almost alone in teaching their people the enormous criminality of those nameless sins against posterity at which fashionable Protestantism connives. Moral and thoughtful men who know history know how fundamental the sanctity of marriage and the family is to society and the church, how surely their corruption must destroy both and barbarize mankind, look on aghast at this spreading taint in American life. Many an educated patriot is beginning to say that Romanism is the only firm and consistent opponent.

Protestants may exclaim that Rome has ever been a corrupting religion; that even the confessional has been made the instrument of profligacy. No doubt these things have often been true; yet another thing is visibly true in these United States: that while degrading views of the marriage relation and of the honor of parentage are eating out the life of so many nominal Protestant families, and bringing them to total extinction, the families of Romanists are better protected from

this blight. Their houses are peopled with children, while the homes of rich Protestants are too elegant and luxurious for such nuisances. By the very force of the Malthusian law of population Romanism is growing, while Protestantism stands still.

I have thus described six distinct lines of influence which our unfaithfulness to our principles has betrayed into the hands of the Romanist. They are using them all with constant effect, and we, at least, cannot blame them.

II. I now proceed to explain certain evil principles of human nature which are concurring powerfully in this country to give currency to popery. These may be called its illicit advantages. I mention:

(1.) The constant tendency of American demagogues to pay court to popery and to purchase votes for themselves from it, at the cost of the people's safety, rights and money. Nearly two generations ago (the men of this day seem to have forgotten the infamy) William H. Seward, of New York, began this dangerous and dishonest game. He wished to be Governor of New York. He came to an understanding with Archbishop Hughes, then the head of the popish hierarchy in that State, to give him the Irish vote in return for certain sectarian advantages in the disbursement of the State revenues. Neither Rome nor the demagogues have since forgotten their lesson, nor will they ever forget it. It would be as unreasonable to expect it as to expect that hawks will forget the poultry yard. It is the nature of the demagogue to trade off anything for votes; they are the breath in the nostrils of his ambition. The popish hierarchy differs essentially from the ministry of any other religion, in having votes to trade. The traditional claim of Rome is that she has the right to control both spheres, the ecclesiastical and the political, the political for the sake of the ecclesiastical. The votes of her masses are more or less manageable, as the votes of Protestants are not, because Rome's is a system of authority as opposed to free thought. Rome instructs the conscience of every one of her members that it is his religious duty to subordinate all other duties and interests to hers. And this is a spiritual duty enforceable by the most awful spiritual sanctions. How can a thinking man afford to disobey the hierarchy which holds his eternal destiny in its secret fist; so that

even if they gave him in form the essential sacraments, such as the mass, absolution, and extreme unction, they are able clandestinely to make them worthless to him, by withholding the sacramental intention. Hence it is that the majority of American papists can be voted in "blocks"; and it is virtually the hierarchy which votes them. The goods are ready bound up in parcels for traffic with demagogues. We are well aware that numerous papists will indignantly deny this; declaring that there is a Romanist vote in this country which is just as independent of their priesthood and as free as any other. Of course there is. The hierarchy is a very experienced and dextrous driver. It does not whip in the restive colts, but humors them awhile until she gets them well harnessed and broken. But the team as a whole must yet travel her road, because they have to believe it infallible. We assure these independent Romanist voters that they are not "good Catholics"; they must unlearn this heresy of independent thought before they are meet for the Romanist paradise. Men of secular ambition have always sought to use the hierarchy to influence others for their political advantage; the example is as old as history. Just as soon as prelacy was developed in the patristic church, Roman emperors began to purchase its influence to sustain their thrones. Throughout the Middle Ages, German kaisers and French, Spanish, and English kings habitually traded with Rome, paying her dignities and endowments for her ghostly support to their ambitions. Even in this century we have seen the two Napoleons playing the same game—purchasing for their imperialism the support of a priesthood in whose religion they did not believe. If any suppose that because America is nominally democratic the same thing will not happen here, they are thoroughly silly. Some Yankee ingenuity will be invoked to modify the forms of the traffic, so as to suit American names; that is all.

Intelligent students of church history know that one main agency for converting primitive Christianity first into prelacy and then into popery was unlimited church endowments. As soon as Constantine established Christianity as the religion of the State, ecclesiastical persons and bodies began to assume the virtual (and before long the formal) rights of corporations. They could receive bequests and gifts of property, and hold them by

a tenure as firm as that of the fee-simple. These spiritual corporations were deathless. Thus the property they acquired was all held by the tenure of *mortmain*. When a corporation is thus empowered to absorb continually, and never to disgorge, there is no limit to its possible wealth. The laws of the empire in the Middle Ages imposed no limitations upon bequests; thus, most naturally, monasteries, cathedrals, chapters, and archbishoprics became inordinately rich. At the Reformation they had grasped one-third of the property of Europe. But Scripture saith, "Where the carcass is, thither the eagles are gathered together." Wealth is power, and ambitious men crave it. Thus this endowed hierarchy came to be filled by the men of the greediest ambition in Europe, instead of by humble, self-denying pastors; and thus it was that this tremendous money power, arming itself first with a spiritual despotism of the popish theology over consciences, and then allying itself with political power, wielded the whole to enforce the absolute domination of that religion which gave them their wealth. No wonder human liberty, free thought, and the Bible were together trampled out of Europe. When the Reformation came, the men who could think saw that this tenure in *mortmain* had been the fatal thing. Knox, the wisest of them, saw clearly that if a religious reformation was to succeed in Scotland the ecclesiastical corporations must be destroyed. They were destroyed, their whole property alienated to the secular nobles or to the State (the remnant which Knox secured for religious education); and therefore it was that Scotland remained Presbyterian. When our American commonwealths were founded, statesmen and divines understood this great principle of jurisprudence, that no corporate tenure in *mortmain*, either spiritual or secular, is compatible with the liberty of the people and the continuance of constitutional government.

But it would appear that our legislators now know nothing about that great principle, or care nothing about it. Church institutions, Protestant and Romanist, are virtually perpetual corporations. Whatever the pious choose to give them is held in *mortmain*, and they grow continually richer and richer; they do not even pay taxes, and there seems no limit upon their acquisitions. And last comes the Supreme Court of the United States, and under the pretext of construing the law, legislates a new

law in the famous Walnut-street Church case, as though they desired to ensure both the corruption of religion and the destruction of free government by a second gigantic incubus of endowed ecclesiasticism. The new law is virtually this: That in case any free citizen deems that the gifts of himself or his ancestors are usurped for some use alien to the designed trust, *it shall be the usurper who shall decide the issue.* This is, of course, essentially popish, yet a great Protestant denomination has been seen hastening to enroll it in its digest of spiritual laws.* The working of this tendency of overgrown ecclesiastical wealth will certainly be two-fold: First, to Romanize partially or wholly the Protestant churches thus enriched; and, secondly, to incline, enable, and equip the religion thus Romanized for its alliance with political ambition and for the subjugation of the people and the government. When church bodies began, under Constantine, to acquire endowments, these bodies were Episcopal, at most, or even still Presbyterian. The increase of endowment helped to make them popish. Then popery and feudalism stamped out the Bible and enslaved Europe. If time permitted, I could trace out the lines of causation into perfect clearness. Will men ever learn that like causes must produce like effects?

(2.) The democratic theory of human society may be the most rational and equitable; but human nature is not equitable; it is fallen and perverted. Lust of applause, pride, vain-glory, and love of power are as natural to it as hunger to the body. Next to Adam, the most representative man upon earth was Diotrephes, "who loves to have the pre-eminence." Every man is an aristocrat in his heart. Now, prelacy and popery are aristocratic religions. Consequently, as long as human nature is natural, they will present more or less of attraction to human minds. Quite a number of Methodist, Presbyterian, or Independent ministers have gone over to prelacy or popery, and thus become bishops. Was there ever one of them, however conscientious his new faith, and however devout his temper, who did not find some elation and pleasure in his spiritual dignity? Is there a democrat in democratic America who would not be flattered in his heart by being addressed as "my lord?" Distinction and power are gratifying to all men. Prelacy and

See* Dabney's Discussions, Vol. II., p. 261.

popery offer this sweet morsel to aspirants by promising to make some of them lords of their brethren. This is enough to entice all of them, as the crown entices all the racers on the race-course. It is true that while many run, one obtaineth the crown; but all may flatter themselves with the hope of winning. Especially does the pretension of sacramental grace offer the most splendid bait to human ambition which can be conceived of on this earth. To be the vicar of the Almighty in dispensing eternal life and heavenly crowns at will is a more magnificent power than the prerogative of any emperor on earth. Let a man once be persuaded that he really grasps this power by getting a place in the apostolic succession, and the more sincere he is, the more splendid the prerogative will appear to him; for the more clearly his faith appreciates the thing that he proposes to do in the sacraments, the more illustrious that thing must appear. The greatest boon ever inherited by an emperor was finite. The boon of redemption is infinite; to be able to dispense it at will to one sinner is a much grander thing than to conquer the world and establish a universal secular empire. The humblest "hedge-priest" would be a far grander man than that emperor if he could really work the miracle and confer the grace of redemption which Rome says he does every time he consecrates a mass. How shall we estimate, then, the greatness of that pope or prelate who can manufacture such miracle workers at will? The greatest being on earth should hardly think himself worthy to loose his sandals from his feet. The Turkish ambassador to Paris was certainly right when, upon accompanying the King of France to high mass in Notre Dame, and seeing the king, courtiers and multitude all prostrate themselves when the priest elevated the Host, he wondered that the king should allow anybody but himself to perform that magnificent function. He is reported to have said: "Sire, if I were king, and believed in your religion, nobody should do that in France except me. It is a vastly greater thing than anything else that you do in your royal functions." As long as man is man, therefore, popery will possess this unhallowed advantage of enticing, and even entrancing, the ambition of the keenest aspirants. The stronger their faith in their doctrine, the more will they sanctify to themselves this dreadful ambition. In this respect, as in so many others, the tendency of the whole

current of human nature is to make papists. It is converting grace only which can check that current and turn men sincerely back towards Protestantism. I am well aware that the functions of the Protestant minister may be so wrested as to present an appeal to unhallowed ambition. But popery professes to confer upon her clergy every didactic and presbyterial function which Protestantism has to bestow; while the former offers, in addition, this splendid bait of prelatie power and sacramental miracle-working.

(3.) All the churches which call themselves Protestant, even the strictest, now betray the silent influence of those Romanizing tendencies which have been and are hereafter to be explained. There is an almost universal letting down of the old standard of doctrine and worship. A comparison of prevalent usages of to-day and of seventy years ago in the Methodist, Baptist, Congregational and Presbyterian Churches (except those of the Secession) would startle any thinking mind. Every one of them now admits usages which were then universally rejected by them, such as architectural pomps, pictured windows, floral decorations, instrumental and operatic music. One may say, that these are matters of indifference which cannot be proved anti-scriptural; but every sensible man knows that they proceed from one impulse, the craving for a more spectacular and ritualistic worship. This is precisely the impulse which brought about prelacy and popery in the patristic ages. The strictest Protestant communions are now moving upon the same inclined plane. The descent is gentle, at first, but as it proceeds it grows steeper; and at the bottom is popery. The prelatie churches of America now notoriously occupy the middle and advanced parts of this course. Forty years ago, when things were not near so bad with them as now, the head of the American popish hierarchy pointed an eminent Presbyterian divine to a dainty Puseyite clergyman tripping by, and said, with a sardonic smile: "Doctor, those are the cattle who do our plowing for us gratis. They leave us little to do. My only objection to their work is, that they make their perverts rather too popish to suit my taste as a Romanist." This Right Reverend was, of course, an Irishman. Episcopalians who teach baptismal regeneration, the real presence, the apostolic succession and such like dogmas, must inevitably propel their

pupils towards popery. If their favorite doctrines have any foundation in logic or Scripture, that foundation sustains popery as fully as prelacy. When one fixes the premises in the minds of his pupils, he should expect to see them sooner or later proceed to the logical consequence; as all rivers run to the ocean, so the ultimate destiny of all high churchism is Rome. These covert educators for popery are more efficient for evil than the overt ones. I fear those who are on the road to the Eternal City more than those who have fixed their abode there. This head of my argument is, then, that Romanism is sure to win in America, because most of those who profess to be Protestants are really helping her by preparing her way.

(4.) In sundry respects I perceive a sort of hallucination prevailing in people's minds concerning old historical errors and abuses, which I see to have been the regular results of human nature. Men will not understand history; they flatter themselves that, because the modes of civilization are much changed and advanced, therefore the essential laws of man's nature are going to cease acting; which is just as unreasonable as to expect that sinful human beings must entirely cease to be untruthful, sensual, dishonest, and selfish, because they have gotten to wear fine clothes. Of certain evils and abuses of ancient history men persuade themselves that they are no longer possible among us, because we have become civilized and nominally Christian. One of these evils is idolatry with its two branches, polytheism and image-worship. Oh! they say, mankind has outgrown all that; other evils may invade our Christian civilization, but that is too gross to come back again. They are blind at once to the teachings of historical facts and to common sense. They know that at one time idolatry nearly filled the ancient world. Well, what was the previous religious state of mankind upon which it supervened? Virtually a Christian state, that is to say, a worship of the one true God, under the light of revelation, with our same gospel taught by promises and sacrifices. And it is very stupid to suppose that the social state upon which the early idolatry supervened was savage or barbaric. We rather conclude that the people who built Noah's ark, the tower of Babel, and the pyramid of Cheops, and who enjoyed the light of God's recent revelations to Adam, to Enoch, to Noah, were civilized. Men make a strange confusion here:

They fancy that idolatry could be prevalent because mankind were not civilized. The historical fact is just the opposite: Mankind became uncivilized because idolatry first prevailed. In truth, the principles tending to idolatry are deeply laid in man's fallen nature. Like a compressed spring, they are ever ready to act again, and will surely begin to act, whenever the opposing power of vital godliness is withdrawn. First, the sensuous has become too prominent in man; reason, conscience, and faith, too feeble. Every sinful man's experience witnesses this all day long, every day of his life. Why else is it that the objects of sense-perception, which are comparatively trivial, dominate his attention, his sensibilities, and his desires so much more than the objects of faith, which he himself knows to be so much more important? Did not this sensuous tendency seek to invade man's religious ideas and feelings, it would be strange indeed. Hence, man untaught and unchecked by the heavenly light always shows a craving for sensuous objects of worship. He is not likely, in our day, to satisfy this craving by setting up a brazen image of Dagon, the fish-god; or of Zeus, or the Roman Jupiter; or of the Aztecs' Itzlahuitl. But still he craves a visible, material object of worship. Rome meets him at a comfortable half-way station with her relics, crucifixes, and images of the saints. She adroitly smoothes the downhill road for him by connecting all these with the worship of the true God. Again, man's conscious weakness impels him almost irresistibly in his serious hours to seek some being of supernatural attributes to lean upon. His heart cries out, "Lead me to the Rock that is higher than I." But when pure monotheism proposes to him the supreme, eternal God—infinite not only in his power to help, but in his omniscience, justice, and holiness—the sinful heart recoils. This object is too high, too holy, too dreadful for it. Sinful man craves a God, hut, like his first father, shuns the infinite God; hence the powerful tendency to invent intermediate gods, whom he may persuade himself to be sufficiently gracious and powerful to be trusted, and yet not so infinite, immutable, and holy as inevitably to condemn sin. Here is the impulse which prompted all pagan nations to invent polytheism. This they did by filling the space between man and the supreme being with intermediate gods. Such, among the Greeks, were Bacchus, Hercules, Castor and Pollux, Theseus, Aesculapins, etc. It is a great mistake to suppose that thoughtful

pagans did not recognize the unity and eternity of a supreme God, "Father of gods and of men." But sometimes they represent him as so exalted and sublimated as to be at once above the reach of human prayers and above all concernment in human affairs. Others thought of him as too awful to be directly approached, accessible only through the mediation of his own next progeny, the secondary gods. Here we have precisely the impulse for which Rome provides in her saint-worship. Mary is the highest of the intermediate gods, next to the trinity, the intercessor for Christ's intercession. The apostles and saints are the secondary gods of this Christian pantheon. How strangely has God's predestination led Rome in the development of her history to the unwitting admission of this indictment! Pagan Rome had her marble temple, the gift of Agrippa to the Commonwealth, the Pantheon, or sanctuary of all the gods. This very building stands now, rededicated by the popes as the temple of Christ and all the saints. So fateful has been the force of this analogy between the old polytheism and the new.

The attempt is made, indeed, to hide the likeness by the sophistical distinction between *latría* and *dulia*; but its worthlessness appears from this, that even *dulia* cannot be offered to redeemed creatures without ascribing to them, by an unavoidable implication, the attributes peculiar to God. In one word, fallen men of all ages have betrayed a powerful tendency to image-worship and polytheism. Rome provides for that tendency in a way the most adroit possible, for an age nominally Christian but practically unbelieving. To that tendency the religion of the Bible sternly refuses to concede anything, requiring not its gratification, but its extirpation. This cunning policy of Rome had sweeping success in the early church. The same principle won almost universal success in the ancient world. It will succeed again here. Many will exclaim that this prognostic is wholly erroneous; that the great, bad tendency of our age and country is to agnosticism as against all religions. I am not mistaken. This drift will be as temporary as it is partial. M. Guizot says in his *Meditations*: "One never need go far back in history to find atheism advancing half way to meet superstition." A wiser analyst of human nature says: "Even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge,

God gave them over to a reprobate mind." "Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." This is the exact pathology of superstition. When the culture of the Augustan age taught the Romans to despise the religious faith of their fathers, there was an interval of agnosticism. But next, the most refined of the agnostics were seen studying the mysteries of Isis and practicing the foulest rites of the paganism of the conquered provinces. Atheism is too freezing a blank for human souls to inhabit permanently. It outrages too many of the heart's affections and of the reason's first principles. A people who have cast away their God, when they discover this, turn to false gods. For all such wandering spirits Rome stands with open doors; there, finally, they will see their most convenient refuge of superstition in a catalogue of Christian saints transformed into a polytheism. Thus the cravings of superstition are satisfied, while the crime is veiled from the conscience by this pretence of scriptural origin.

(5.) I proceed to unfold an attraction of Romanism far more seductive. This is its proposal to satisfy man's guilty heart by a ritual instead of a spiritual salvation. As all know who understand the popish theology, the proposed vehicle of this redemption by forms is the sacraments. Romanists are taught that the New Testament sacraments differ from those of the Old Testament in this: that they not only symbolize and seal, *but effectuate grace ex opere operato* in the souls of the recipients. Rome teaches her children that her sacraments are actual charismatic power of direct supernatural efficiency wrought upon recipients by virtue of a portion of the Holy Spirit's omnipotence conferred upon the priest in ordination from the apostolic succession. The Bible teaches that in the case of all adults a gracious state must pre-exist in order for any beneficial participation in the sacrament, and that the only influence of the sacraments is to cherish and advance that pre-existing spiritual life by their didactic effect, as energized by God's Spirit, through prayer, faith, watchfulness, and obedience, in precisely the same generic mode in which the Holy Spirit energizes the written and preached word. Hence, if watchfulness, prayer, obedience, and a life of faith are neglected, our sacra-

ments become no sacraments. If thou be a breaker of the law, thy "circumcision is made uncircumcision." But Rome teaches that her sacraments, duly administered by a priest having apostolic succession, *implant spiritual life* in souls hitherto dead in sin, and that they maintain and foster this life by a direct power not dependent on the recipient's diligent exercise of gospel principles. Provided the recipient be not in mortal sin unabsolved, the sacrament does its spiritual work upon the sinful soul, whether it receives it in the exercise of saving grace or not. (See the article, "Prelacy a Blunder," in *Collected Discussions*, Vol. II., p. 218.)

Now let no Protestant mind exclaim: "Surely this is too gross to be popular; surely people will have too much sense to think that they can get to heaven by this species of consecrated jugglery!" History shows that this scheme of redemption is almost universally acceptable and warmly popular with sinful mankind. Apprehend aright the ideas of paganism, ancient and modern: we perceive that this popish conception of sacraments is virtually the same with the pagan's conception of their heathen rites. They claim to be just this species of saving ritual, working their benefit upon souls precisely by this *opus operatum* agency. What a commentary have we here upon this tendency of human nature to a ritual salvation. The evangelists and apostles reintroduced to the world the pure conception of a spiritual salvation wrought by the energy of divine truth; and not of church rites; received by an intelligent faith in the saved man's soul, and not by manual ceremonial; and made effectual by the enlightening operation of the Holy Ghost upon heart and mind in rational accordance with truth, not by a priestly incantation working a physical miracle. The gospels and epistles defined and separated the two conceptions as plainly as words could do it. But no sooner were the apostles gone than the pagan conception of salvation by ritual, instead of by rational faith, began to creep back into the patristic church. In a few hundred years the wrong conception had triumphed completely over the correct one in nearly the whole of christendom, and thenceforward sacramental grace has reigned supreme over the whole Roman and Greek communions, in spite of modern letters and culture. How startling this commentary upon that tendency of human nature! Surely there are deep-seated prin-

ciples in man to account for it.

These are not far to seek. First, men are sensuous beings, and hence they naturally crave something concrete, material, and spectacular in their religion. Dominated as they are by a perpetual current of sensations, and having their animality exaggerated by their sinful nature, they are sluggish to think spiritual truths, to look by faith upon invisible objects; they crave to walk by sight rather than by faith. The material things in mammon, the sensual pleasures which they see with their eyes and handle with their fingers, although they perfectly know they perish with the using, obscure their view of all the infinite, eternal realities, notwithstanding their professed belief of them. Need we wonder that with such creatures the visible and manual ritual should prevail over the spiritual didactic? Does one exclaim, "But this is so unreasonable—this notion that a ritual ceremonial can change the state and destiny of a rational and moral spirit!" I reply, "Yes, but not one whit more irrational than the preference which the whole natural world gives to the things which are seen and temporal, as it perfectly knows, over the things which are unseen and eternal; an insanity of which the educated and refined are found just as capable as the ignorant and brutish." But the other principle of human nature is still more keen and pronounced in its preference for a ritual salvation. This is its deep-seated, omnipotent preference for self-will and sin over spiritual holiness of life. The natural man has, indeed, his natural conscience and remorse, his fearful looking for of judgment, his natural fear of misery, which is but modified selfishness. These make everlasting punishment very terrible to his apprehension.

But enmity to God, to his spiritual service, to the supremacy of his holy will, is as native to him as his selfish fear is. Next to perdition, there is no conception in the universe so repulsive to the sinful heart of man as that of genuine repentance and its fruits. The true gospel comes to him and says: Here is, indeed, a blessed, glorious redemption, as free as air, as secure as the throne of God, but instrumentally it is conditional on the faith of the heart; which faith works by love, purifies the heart, and can only exist as it co-exists with genuine repentance, which repentance turns honestly, unreservedly, here and now, without shuffling or procrastination, from sin unto God,

with full purpose of and endeavor after new obedience; which is, in fact, a complete surrender of the sinful will to God's holy will, and a hearty enlistment in an arduous work of watchfulness, self-denial, and self-discipline, for the sake of inward holiness, to be kept up as long as life lasts. Soul, embrace this task, and this splendid salvation shall be yours; and the gracious Saviour, who purchases it for you, shall sustain, comfort, and enable you in this arduous enlistment, so that even in the midst of the warfare you shall find rest, and at the end heaven; but without this faith and this repentance no sacraments or rights will do a particle of good towards your salvation. Now, this carnal soul has no faith; it is utterly mistrustful and skeptical as to the possibility of this peace of the heart in the spiritual warfare, this sustaining power of the invisible hand, of which it has had no experience. This complete subjugation of self-will to God, this life of self-denial and vital godliness, appears to this soul utterly repulsive, yea, terrible. This guilty soul dreads hell; it abhors such a life only less than hell. When told by Protestantism that it must thus "turn or die," this carnal soul finds itself in an abhorrent dilemma; either term of the alternative is abominable to it. But now comes the theory of sacramental grace and says to it with oily tongue: "Oh! Protestantism exaggerates the dilemma! Your case is not near so bad! The sacraments of the church transfer you from the state of condemnation to that of reconciliation by their own direct but mysterious efficiency; they work real grace, though you do not bring to them this deep, thorough-going self-sacrifice and self-consecration. No matter how much you sin, or how often, repeated masses will make expiation for the guilt of all those sins *ex opere operato*. Thus, with her other sacraments of penance and extreme unction, Holy Mother Church will repair all your short-comings and put you back into a salvable state, no matter how sinfully you live." Need we wonder that this false doctrine is as sweet to that guilty soul as a reprieve to the felon at the foot of the gallows? He can draw his breath again; he can say to himself: "Ah, then the abhorred dilemma does not urge me here and now; I can postpone this hated reformation; I can still tamper with cherished sins without embracing perdition." This is a pleasant doctrine; it suits so perfectly the sinful, selfish soul which does not wish to part with its sins, and also does not wish to lie down in everlasting burnings.

This deep-seated love of sin and self has also another result: The soul is conscious that, if it must do many things which it does not like in order to avoid perdition, it is much pleasanter to do a number of ceremonial things than to do any portion of spiritual heart-work. After I stood my graduate examination in philosophy at the University of Virginia, my professor, the venerable George Tucker, showed me a cheating apparatus which had been prepared by a member of the class. He had unluckily dropped it upon the sidewalk, and it had found its way to the professor's hands. It was a narrow blank-book, made to be hidden in the coat-sleeve. It contained, in exceedingly small penmanship, the whole course, in the form of questions from the professor's recitations with their answers copied from the text-book. It was really a work of much labor. I said, "The strange thing to me is, that this sorry fellow has expended upon this fraud much more hard labor than would have enabled him to prepare himself for passing honestly and honorably." Mr. Tucker replied, "Ah, my dear sir, you forget that a dunce finds it easier to do any amount of mere manual drudgery than the least bit of true thinking." Here we have an exact illustration. It is less irksome to the carnal mind to do twelve dozen pater-nosters by the beads than to do a few moments of real heart-work. Thoughtless people sometimes say that the rule of Romish piety is more exacting than that of the Protestant. This is the explanation, that Rome is more exacting as to form and ritual; Bible religion is more exacting as to spiritual piety and vital godliness. To the carnal mind the latter are almost insufferably irksome and laborious; the form and ritual, easy and tolerable. And when remorse, fear, and self-righteousness are gratified by the assurance that these observances really promote the soul's salvation, the task is made light. Here Rome will always present an element of popularity as long as mankind are sensuous and carnal.

(6.) To a shallow view, it might appear that the popish doctrine of purgatory should be quite a repulsive element of unpopularity with sinners; that doctrine is, that notwithstanding all the benefit of the church's sacraments and the believer's efforts, no Christian soul goes direct to heaven when the body dies, except those of the martyrs, and a few eminent saints, who are, as it were, miracles of sanctification in this life. All the

clergy, and even the popes, must go through purgatory in spite of the apostolic succession and the infallibility. There the remains of carnality in all must be burned away, and the deficiencies of their penitential work in this life made good, by enduring penal fires and torments for a shorter or longer time. Then the Christian souls, finally purged from depravity and the *reatum paenae*, enter into their final rest with Christ. But the alms, prayers, and masses of survivors avail much to help these Christian souls in purgatory and shorten their sufferings. It might be supposed that the Protestant doctrine should be much more attractive and popular, viz.: that there is no purgatory or intermediate state for the spirits of dead men, but that the "souls of believers, being at their death made perfect in holiness, do immediately enter into glory." This ought to be the more attractive doctrine, and to Bible believers it is such, but there is a feature about it which makes it intensely unpopular and repellent to carnal men, and gives a powerful advantage with them to the popish scheme. That feature is, the sharpness and strictness of the alternative which the Bible doctrine presses upon sinners: "turn or die."

The Bible offers the most blessed and glorious redemption conceivable by man, gracious and free, and bestowing a consummate blessedness the moment the body dies. But it is on these terms that the gospel must be embraced by a penitent faith, working an honest and thorough revolution in the life. If the sinner refuses this until this life ends, he seals his fate; and that fate is final, unchangeable, and dreadful. Now, it is no consolation to the carnal heart that the gospel assures him he need not run any risk of that horrible fate; that he has only to turn and live; that very turning is the thing which he abhors, if it is to be done in spirit and in truth. He intensely desires to retain his sin and self-will. He craves earnestly to put off the evil day of this sacrifice without incurring the irreparable penalty. Now, Rome comes to him and tells him that this Protestant doctrine is unnecessarily harsh; that a sinner may continue in the indulgence of his sins until this life ends, and yet not seal himself up thereby to a hopeless hell; that if he is in communion with the Holy Mother Church through her sacraments, he may indulge himself in this darling procrastination without ruining himself forever. Thus the hateful neces-

sity of present repentance is postponed awhile; sweet, precious privilege to the sinner! True, he must expect to pay due penance for that self-indulgence in purgatory, but he need not perish for it. The Mother Church advises him not to make so bad a bargain and pay so dear for his whistle. But she assures him that, if he does, it need not ruin him, for she will pull him through after a little by her merits and sacraments. How consoling this is to the heart at once in love with sin and remorseful for its guilt! The seductiveness of this theory of redemption to the natural heart is proved by this grand fact, that in principle and in its essence this scheme of purgatorial cleansing has had a prominent place in every religion in the world that is of human invention. The Bible, the one divine religion, is peculiar in rejecting the whole concept. Those hoary religions, Brahmanism and Buddhism, give their followers the virtual advantage of this conception in the transmigration of their souls. The guilt of the sinner's human life may be expiated by the sorrows of the soul's existence in a series of animal or reptile bodies, and then through another human existence, the penitent and purified soul may at last reach heaven. Classic paganism promised the same escape for sinners, as all familiar with Virgil know. His hero, Aeneas, when visiting the under world, saw many sinners there preparing for their release into the Elysian fields. *Ergo exercentur poenis, et veterum malorum supplicia expendunt.* Mohammed extends the same hope to all his sinful followers. For those who entirely reject Islam there is nothing but hell; but for all who profess "There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet," there is a purgatory after death, and its pains are shortened by his intercession. The Roman and Greek Churches flatter the sinful world with the same human invention. No stroug is this craving of carnal men to postpone the issue of turning to God or perishing. We now see its effect upon the most cultured minds of this advanced nineteenth century in the New England doctrine of a "second probation." Rome has understood human nature skilfully, and has adapted her bait for it with consummate cunning. Her scheme is much more acute than that of the absolute universalist of the school of Hosea Ballou, for this outrages man's moral intuitions too grossly by rejecting all distinction between guilt and righteousness. This bait for sin-loving men is too bald.

It must be added that the doctrine of a purgatory and of an application of redemption after death is intensely attractive to other principles of the human heart, much more excusable; to some affections, indeed, which are amiable. I allude to the solicitude and the affection of believers for the souls of those whom they loved in this life, "who died and made no sign." The Bible doctrine is, indeed, a solemn, an awful one to Christians bereaved by the impenitent deaths of children and relatives. It is our duty to foresee this solemn result, and to provide against it by doing everything which intercessory prayer, holy example and loving instruction and entreaty can do to prevent such a catastrophe in the case of all those near to our hearts. But human self-indulgence is prone to be slack in employing this safeguard against this sorrow. Let us picture to ourselves such a bereaved Christian, sincere, yet partially self-condemned, and doubtful or fearful or hopeless concerning the thorough conversion of a child who has been cut down by death. Of all the elements of bereavement none is so bitter, so immedicable, as the fear that he whom he loved must suffer the wrath of God forever, and that now he is beyond reach of his prayers and help. To such a one comes the Romish priest with this species of discourse. See now how harsh and cruel is this heretical Protestant dogma! Instead of offering consolation to your Christian sorrow it embitters it as with a drop of hell fire. But Holy Mother Church is a mild and loving comforter; she assures you that your loved one is not necessarily lost; he may have to endure keen penances in purgatory for a time, but there is a glorious hope to sustain him and you under them. Every minute of pain is bringing the final heaven nearer, and the most blessed part of our teaching is that your love can still follow him and help him and bless, as it was wont to do under those earthly chastisements of his sins. It is your privilege still to pray for him, and your prayers avail to lighten his sufferings and to shorten them. Your love can still find that generous solace which was always so sweet to you amidst your former sorrows for his sins and his earthly sufferings—the solace of helping him and sharing his pains. Your alms also may avail for him; masses can be multiplied by your means, which will make merit to atone for his penitential guilt and hasten his blessed release. Who can doubt that a loving heart will be

powerfully seduced by this promise, provided it can persuade itself of its certainty, or even of its probable truth? Here is the stronghold of Romanism on sincere, amiable, and affectionate souls. Of course, the real question is, whether any pastor or priest is authorized by God to hold out these hopes to the bereaved. If they are unwarrantable, then this presentation is an artifice of unspeakable cruelty and profanity. Under the pretence of softening the pain of bereavement to God's children, it is adding to wicked deception the most mischievous influences upon the living by contradicting those solemn incentives to immediate repentance which God has set up in his word, and by tempting deluded souls with a false hope to neglect their real opportunity. If the hope is not grounded in the word of God, then its cruelty is equal to its deceitfulness. But the suffering heart is often weak, and it is easier to yield to the temptation of accepting a deceitful consolation than to brace itself up to the plain but stern duty of ascertaining God's truth.

I have thus set in array the influences which Rome is now wielding throughout our country for the seduction of human souls. Some of these weapons Protestants put into her hands by their own unfaithfulness and folly. God has a right to blame Rome for using this species of weapon in favor of the wrong cause, but these Protestants have not.

There is another class of weapons which Rome finds in the blindness and sinfulness of human nature. Her guilt may be justly summed up in this statement: That these are precisely the errors and crimes of humanity which the church of Christ should have labored to suppress and extirpate; whereas Rome caters to them and fosters them in order to use them for her aggrandizement. But none the less are these weapons potent. They are exactly adapted to the nature of fallen man. As they always have been successful, they will continue to succeed in this country. Our republican civil constitutions will prove no adequate shield against them. Our rationalistic culture, by weakening the authority of God's word, is only opening the way for their ulterior victory. Our scriptural ecclesiastical order will be no sufficient bulwark. The primitive churches had that bulwark in its strongest Presbyterian form, but popery steadily undermined it. What it did once it can do again. There will be no effectual check upon another spread of this error except the work of the Holy Ghost. True and powerful revivals will save American Protestantism; nothing else will.

POPISH LITERATURE AND EDUCATION.¹

WHILE the Roman empire continued, it may be said that Latin was the common tongue of the whole Western church. But after the empire fell, the modern languages of Europe gradually formed themselves and displaced the Latin in popular use, until it remained only the language of courts and scholars. But Rome, in her fear of change and blind fondness for prescriptive things, persisted in retaining all her creeds, hymns and liturgies in the old tongue, as well as the only version of the Scriptures accessible to Europeans. From Gregory the Great, near the end of the sixth century, a continued warfare was waged, until Gregory VII., in the eleventh century, finally triumphed by driving all the vernacular languages from religious worship, and imposing the formularies, with the dead language of Rome, on the whole church. The Scriptures could only be read, even by the clergy, from the Latin Vulgate. Even to this day, the prayers in which the priest leads the aspirations, or presents the wants of his people to God are in words unknown to them. No hymn echoes through "fretted vault or long-drawn aisle," which does not hide its praise in a tongue barbarian to those who join it.

The constant policy of Rome has also been to exalt this liturgy at the expense of the preaching of the gospel in vernacular languages. The mass is long and pompous; the sermons few, brief and trivial. The very structure of her churches betrays her contempt for this potent means of enlightening and arousing the popular mind, for they are not auditories in which to hear the words of instruction, but ghostly theatres for the display of superstitious pantomime. The altar and the chancel, the stage of the sacred mummeries, are the centre of all eyes, and not the pulpit, the pillar from which shines the lamp of life. Now the formation of a cultivated vernacular tongue is absolutely necessary to national improvement. The reason is obvious: there

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cannot be diffusion of thought, unless there is a language refined enough to be its medium, and the bulk of a people can never know two languages, one living and common, the other dead and learned, so well as practically to use them both. The consequence is, that when the literature of a people is in a dead tongue, knowledge is not the inheritance of the masses, but the distinction of the few; the native language of the people is left in its rudeness, and they remain as uncultivated as their speech. Hence, those who have first taught their countrymen to employ the native language of their homes and their daily life in literature, a Boccaccio and Petrarch in Italy, a Luther in Germany, a Wickliffe and Chaucer in England, have ever been regarded by thinking men as high in rank among the fathers of civilization.

But what ideas and topics so kindle the activity of the mind, and crave for its teeming productions the fitting dress of a cultivated language as the religious? Among every people, the first sentiments which attune for themselves the voice of eloquence, are the aspirations of the soul towards its God. The oldest regular compositions in the world are the inspired books of the Hebrews. The first poem in Greece was probably the *Theogony* of Hesiod. And there are no sentiments so potent to unloose the stammering tongue of an awakening people, and to form its utterance, as those proceeding from man's relations to his Maker. It is hard to conceive how Rome could have devised a more ingenious and efficient mode to prevent the cultivation of the modern languages, and thereby, of the mind of Christendom, than when she compelled all people to retain their worship and religious lore locked up in a dead language. Let us suppose that she had done for every tribe to which she gave Christianity what the primitive and Protestant missions have done, had seized their barbarous tongues and ennobled them by making them the vehicles of holy truth and sacred worship. Europe would scarcely have known the dark ages, but the glorious day of the sixteenth century might have followed the declining light of the Augustan era without an intervening night. It may be, indeed, that when the popes thus postponed the dawn of civilization, "it was not in their hearts, and they meant not so." When they commanded all people and tongues to speak to their God and to listen to his words only in a dead language, it was

in their hearts to magnify the venerable age and hoary unity of their communion. But the result is one among the numerous instances of that guilty fatality which seems to make Rome, in all her plans and policies, the instinctive and unerring enemy of all human welfare.

She has always been the enemy of a free Bible. What Chinese, Indian, Hindu version of the Scriptures have her missionaries ever given to those on whom they conferred the fatal gift of Romish dogmas? Her priests import cargoes of relics and rosaries, puppets and pictures, missals and vestures, but no Bibles. From that day when the language of her Latin Vulgate became a dead one in Europe to ours, in which we have seen her convulsions of helpless rage and storms of curses against the present glorious diffusion of God's word, Rome has never willingly given to the world a Bible in a vulgar language. She has permitted a few versions, as the French of Lefevre, of Etaples, and the English Douay. But it was only to countermine the influence of Protestants. Her people are only permitted to possess these partial versions, because else they would persist in reading the Protestant, and even her own are circulated as reluctantly as possible. No layman may read them without a license from his pastor, and no priest except at the will of his superior; and then none must dare to think on them for himself, or have an opinion of their meaning, except as his soul's masters dictate. In all her processes of education, her forms and "*fathers*" are taught in preference to the Bible, and no religious literature is desired except the literature of superstition. The thinking man cannot but see how hostile all this is to mental improvement. The Bible is the great school-teacher of mankind; its truths are of all others the most stimulating and fructifying, and its presentation of them the most successful. They move the secret foundations of man's soul, stirring the mightiest of his hopes and fears, filling the mind with vast and ennobling conceptions of an infinite God, a perfect holiness, an immutable truth, an immortal destiny. The Scriptures present examples of the most forcible reasoning, the grandest eloquence, the most burning animation, the sweetest poetry, the most tender pathos, and instances of most admirable virtue and goodness. In one word, they bring the mind of their reader into contact with God's,

not mediately, as Rome would have it, through the dim, deformed transmission of a murky, human soul, but face to face. What education can equal it? In opposing an open Bible, Rome shows herself the great enemy of popular intelligence. The results of the Reformation illustrate this charge by contrast. Wickliffe, "the morning star of the Reformation," introduced the dawn by his English New Testament. One of Luther's first acts was to give the Scriptures in German to his countrymen; and this great work, with the attendant discussions, gave form to that language as a vehicle for literature, and generated a nation of readers.

But more, while Rome makes religious discussion the privilege of the hierarchy, Protestantism makes it the right and business of every man. Hence, its very nature is an appeal from the ghostly throne beneath which the conscience and reason lay crushed, to the great tribunal of the common understanding. The audience to which it speaks is the whole race. It restores to every man his spiritual liberty, and thereby his responsibility; it urges upon him the great issue between his soul and his God, and in urging, it elevates every man who will hearken to the level of his immortal destiny. Hence, the first work of the reformers was to throw open the Bible, create a popular religious literature, and invite all Europe to the work of examination, and thereby of self-education. To see how much the popular intelligence owes to this, imagine that our venerable English version were blotted out of existence, and along with it, all the noble thought which it has stimulated in Britain and America; and that in its place we had the corrupt, cunning Douay version of a corrupt Latin translation, only here and there in the hands of a priest or layman, whose supersition was known to be so dense as to permit no risk of its illumination.

The Popish prohibition of free enquiry and private judgment in religion is, if possible, still more fatal to the mind. The Council of Trent ordained that no one should presume to understand the Scriptures, except according to the doctrines of Rome and the unanimous consent of her Fathers. Rome enjoins on her children an implicit faith, which believes on authority without evidence. The faith of the Protestant is an intelligent conviction, the result of the free and manly exercise of the faculties

God gave him, guided by divine fear and help. The papist collects the *dicta* of Fathers and Councils, only to wear them as shackles on his understanding. The Protestant brings all *dicta* to the test of reason, and still more, of that *Word*, to which his reason has spontaneously bowed as the supreme and infallible truth. Rome bids us listen to her authority and blindly submit; Protestantism commands: "Prove all things; hold fast to that which is good." Happily, the prohibition of private judgment is as impossible to be obeyed as it is absurd. In the very act of commanding us not to think for ourselves, Rome invokes our thought to comprehend the proofs of her command. In the very breath with which she tells us not to reason, she calls upon reason to understand the justice of the prohibition. In truth, the exercise of private judgment is the exercise of thought; for if the mind is to think at all, it must be its own free thoughts which it produces. If I *see* at all, it must be with my own eyes, and in such shapes and colors as they of themselves reveal to me. To command me to see only with the eyes of another, is to make me blind. And so, the attempt to banish private judgment from religion is an attempt to make man cease to think, or, in other words, to reduce him on that subject below the level of a rational being. If it were successful, man would no longer be a religious being, but a clever brute. And this is, indeed, the very ideal of that result in which Rome would most delight; to make men a docile herd of human beasts, incapable of insubordination, yet apt and skilful above other animals to toil for the pampering of her lordly luxury and pride. Nor is this mental bondage limited to sacred learning; it is also inculcated in secular studies, lest perchance the habit and spirit of free thought formed in the domain of human science should invade that of theology. The confines of every realm of thought are overspread with darkness, lest some side-light should gleam upon the foul delusions of her spiritual tyranny, revealing them to her victims. By how many odious restrictions, censorships, inquisitions and tortures is this despotism over thought sustained! How many prisons, racks and faggots have been employed to crush the freedom of the mind!

To Rome belongs the diabolical preëminence above all pagan priesthoods and political despots, of punishing with the direst

death which the human frame can endure, the crime of being too wise and truthful to believe all her absurdities. The Index of Prohibited Books, a stout volume composed of the mere titles of the works she has proscribed, gives curious evidence of her instinctive hatred of all human intelligence; for we find there, not only all the great works of her assailants, as we would expect, but of nearly all the great masters who have extended the domains of knowledge. Whether they wrote of Philosophy, Geography, History, Poetry, Rome could not forgive them the attempt to ennoble the minds which it was her purpose to enslave. When we read in the Index such names as these, which a few minutes' search has collected: Bacon, Cudworth, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Villers, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Locke, Bentham, Grotius, Bayle, Basnage, Burnet, Hallam, Mosheim, Brucker, Robertson, Selden, Sismondi and Milton, does it not seem as though Rome had designedly proclaimed herself the patroness of ignorance, by arraying against herself all that is most glorious in human intellect? To repress the free activity of the mind in religion is the most effectual mode to curb all expansive thought in every department. The truths of religion are the most pervasive and stimulating of all others. Christianity sits as queen and directress of all man's exertions, controlling every duty, modifying every relation, influencing every interest of humanity, ennobling and fructifying every speculation. The conscience is the central power of the soul, so that he who is fettered there is a slave in his whole being. When the conscience is chained, there can be no free development of the faculties by bold and manly exercise. The Reformation, says Guizot, was, in its mental character, but the insurrection of the human mind against the mental impression of Rome, which had weighed so heavily on the irrepressible activity of thought as to provoke a resistless reaction. How beneficent the impulse which every science and every institution received from that great movement. Roman Catholicism itself was aroused by the collision into a reaction, to which is due nearly all the subsequent activity which has rescued it from stagnating into barbarism. The attempt may be made to refute these conclusions, by pointing to the many illustrious men who, living and dying in the Romish communion, have helped to adorn every department of knowledge, human and di-

vine; or, by boasting of a few great *entrepots* of science in the old foundations of Popish Europe. "Was it not a son of the Holy Mother Church," it may be asked, "who first taught us the true theory of the stars? Was it not a Papist who gave to Europe a new world? Were they not Papists who exhumed the Greek and Latin classics out of the dust of the middle ages, and who have since produced the best editions of all the works of Christian antiquity? Did not Papists invent gunpowder, the art of printing, the mariner's compass, the galvanic machine? Yea, were not the very Reformers themselves, in whose pretended light and learning Protestants so much glory, reared in the bosom of Popery? And did they not acquire in her schools the knowledge which they ungratefully turned against her? How, then, can that system be justly charged as the mother of ignorance, from beneath whose patronage have proceeded the most glorious elements of human progress?" This is our reply: "True, the human mind, thanks to its benevolent Creator, has a native activity which despotism cannot crush, however it may curb it. It may be that Rome has been so far aware of this as not to attempt an impossibility—except once, when her judicial blindness provoked the triumphant insurrection of the Reformation. It may be that she has permitted or encouraged certain forms of mental activity, even to a high degree of cultivation, as a safe outlet for the indomitable elasticity of man's spirit, selecting those forms which were least important to his true welfare, in order that she might be able to suppress the most precious and fruitful exertions of the mind with sterner force. But these instances of mental activity in her subjects have not been because of, but in spite of her influences. But for the baleful paralysis of that system, they would have been a hundred fold more; and Papists have usually made their happy exertions just in proportion to the weakness of the hold which Romanism had upon their real spirit and modes of thought.

It is true, again, that the innate energies of some great souls among Papists have prompted them to attempt and accomplish mental exploits of high emprise, but Rome has usually resisted their exertions, and punished their success. *Roger Bacon*, the inventor of gunpowder, *was* a Papist; but the reward which his church apportioned him for his chemical knowledge and spirit

of free enquiry was a long imprisonment in a monastery on the charge of magic. *Reuchlin*, another son of Rome, introduced to Europe the long lost treasures of the Hebrew literature. This is true; and his church so appreciated his labors as to prompt the German Emperor to order the burning of all the Hebrew books in the realm, and the great scholar's pupils were nearly all found in the next generation among the Protestant Reformers. *Erasmus* also was a nominal Papist, who published the first critical edition of the Greek New Testament. But his work provoked a general howl of contumely and curses from the priests and monks of all Europe, some of whom charged him with committing thereby the sin against the Holy Ghost. Columbus did indeed "give to Castile and Leon a new world," but his theory of geography was the mock of all the popish clergy and doctors of Ferdinand's court, so that it was impossible for him to secure patronage for his enterprise, till the womanly piety of Isabella was moved in his behalf. *Galileo* also was a son of Rome, that great man, who revolutionized astronomy and mechanics, who first made the telescope reveal the secrets of the skies, and thus prepared the way for that wondrous science which, among its other beneficial results, has taught the mariner to mark his beaten track across the pathless ocean, thus making possible the gigantic commerce of our century. How did Rome reward him? She made him languish in her Inquisition, till he was bowed to the shame of denying the truth, of which the demonstration was his glory.

And this Index of Prohibited Books is found crowded with the names, not only of heretics, but with a part of the works of nearly all Rome's own sons, whose genius or learning has illuminated her history; a proof that their improvements were the offspring of fruitful nature, borne in despite of the novercal envy of Holy Mother Church. Upon the fact that so many of the benefactors of human knowledge, including even the Reformers, were reared under Rome, it may be said, so have the greatest liberators been ever reared under despots. Harmodius and Aristogeiton under Pisistratus, Brutus under Tarquin, the Maccabees under Antiochus, Tell under Rudolph of Hapsburg, Hampden, Pym and Cromwell under the Stuarts, and our own Washington under George III. With as much reason might we

argue hence, that despotism is the proper soil to nourish liberty, as infer from the instances of freedom of thought under Rome that they were her proper gift to the human mind. And finally, it is not a handful of particular cases which proves a general law: "One swallow does not make a summer." When we inquire for the general influence of a system, we consider not the few exceptions which exist under it, but the condition of the masses.

We trust this discussion has educed principles which, among other valuable applications, will enable us to value at their proper worth the merits of Roman Catholic education and scholarship. Ever since the Reformation urged the human mind forward on its great career of improvement, Rome has perceived that Christendom will no longer endure the shackles of ignorance, in which that tyrant church would be best pleased to bind the mind, and that men will no longer permit the boon of knowledge to be plucked openly away. Hence she has adopted the policy of *countermining* the intelligence which she fears, by becoming the patroness of a pseudo-education. And she has committed the management of this policy especially to the order of Jesus, the most slavish and most thoroughly popish of all papal societies. Hence the eager activity of this order in the establishment of colleges, especially to catch the children of Protestants; hence the boasts of superior scholarship, which have deceived many unthinking and ill-informed men. The treachery of all their pretended zeal for letters is betrayed by this question even; why does it exhaust its efforts on providing for the education of *our* sons, and the sons of other similar Protestant states, who least need their help, while the benighted masses of Ireland, Spain, Italy, the Danube are left unenlightened? Why expend their exclusive exertions to educate heretics, while so many of the sons of their own church sit in Boëtian night? We *suspect* this over-generous zeal; we fear lest this education which they offer be the gift of another Trojan horse.

Our good, unsuspecting Protestants have especially been gulled by pretensions of peculiar classical and linguistic accomplishments. It is claimed that their Latinity, for instance, is to the best attainments of Protestant schools as Hyperion to a

Satyr. "Their pupils do not merely stumble through a slow translation of a Latin sentence : they can talk Latin. So thorough is their learning that the higher classes actually receive lectures in philosophy in that learned tongue." But look beneath the surface. That fluency is but the recitation of a parrot, accompanied with no thorough apprehension of grammatical principles, and leading to no awakening of thought. These Latin lectures on philosophy are but the slow mechanical dictation of some miserable syllabus of the contracted antiquated bare-bones of scholastic pedantry. It does not suit the purpose of Rome or Jesuits to do that which is the true work of mental training, to teach the mind to think for itself. That habit, so deadly to the base pretensions of the hoary deceiver, once learned in the walks of secular literature, would be too probably carried into the domains of theology. Hence, the Jesuits' policy is, to form in secular learning the desired mental temper of servile docility, inordinate respect for authority and impotence of independent thought, so that even mechanics, optics, chemistry, must be taught by the memorizing of *dicta*, not by the exercising of the understanding in their investigations. Then, if to this servile temper there can be added any accomplishments, by which the bondage of the mind can be concealed and a false *éclat* thrown upon the church, they think it is very well. The policy of Rome in her education is that of the lordly Roman slave-owner towards his bondsmen. To promote the amusement, the interest, or the pomp of their lords, slaves were trained to be masterly musicians, scribes, rhetoricians, and even poets and philosophers ; but still they must exert their attainments only for their masters. And so would Rome lay hold on our children, the sons of freemen, of free America, and make them only accomplished slaves. But above all, does their system sap the very foundations of virtue and nobleness. It substitutes an indolent and weak dependence on authority for honest conviction, and policy for rectitude. It poisons the health of the moral being. He who is spiritually enslaved is wholly a slave, every noble faculty is benumbed by the incubus of spiritual tyranny, and the soul lies prone in degradation.

THE INFLUENCE OF FALSE PHILOSOPHIES UPON CHARACTER AND CONDUCT.¹

Thoughtful men who read the various schools of philosophy are struck with one feature common to the erroneous theories. This is the lofty assumption by their authors of complete irresponsibility for results. Let the corollaries of their positions be destructive to either ethics or theology, that does not concern them. They say, philosophy has its supreme rights, let them prevail, whatever else perishes. This, of course, clearly implies the cool assumption by each author that his philosophy is the absolutely true one; which again implies that he believes himself infallible in it. Yet each contradicts the sound philosophers, and also each of his fellow heretics. Schwegeler disdains all the great scholastics, pronouncing them incapable of real philosophy, because they avowed the supremacy of the Roman theology over all speculation. He evidently knows little about them, or he would have been aware how little their license of philosophic speculation was really curbed by pretended respect for Bible, councils, or popes. They could always evade their restraints by their distinction—that what was theologically true, might yet be philosophically false.

Now it is as plain as common sense can make it, that if there are any propositions of natural theology logically established, if any principle of ethics impregably grounded in man's universal, necessary judgments, if any infallible revelation, any philosophy that conflicts with either of these is thereby proven false. Now, I believe there is an infallible revelation. Therefore, unless I am willing to become infidel, the pretended philosopher who impinges against revelation has no claim on me to be even listened to, much less believed; unless he has proved himself infallible. There are also fundamental moral principles supported by the universal experience and consent of mankind, and regulating the laws of all civilized nations in all ages. All

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human history and God's Word testify, moreover, that the dominancy of these moral principles is the supreme end for which the universe exists, and for which Providence rules (read Butler's "Analogy"). The rule of God's final judgment is to be: everlasting good to the righteous, condemnation to the wicked. Here then is a criterion, as firmly established as the foundations of human reason and the pillars of God's throne. He who discards this criterion makes man a reasonless brute, and the world an atheistic chaos; that man has no longer any right to any philosophy, any more than a pig. For has he not discarded the essential conditions of all philosophy, intuitive reasons in man, and rational order in the series of causes and effects? We may, therefore, safely adopt this criterion as a touchstone for every philosophy—that if it unsettles conscience and God, it is erroneous.

I have now brought my reader to the eminent point of view from which he sees that the real tendency of all false philosophy must, in the end, be against good morals and religion. Lord Bacon has nobly said that all the lines of true philosophy converge upward to God. The ethical criterion, which is the final, supreme rule of God, mankind, and the universe, must be the apex of a true philosophy. The philosophic lines which curve aside from God and right morals must therefore, in the end, pervert character and conduct.

I shall be told that many speculators, whose philosophy I hold wrong, lived better lives, perhaps, than mine. A Spinoza, a Fichte, a Littré, a Stuart Mill, a Tyndall, were virtuous men; even Helvetius was an amiable neighbor, and an honest fiscal officer. Granted. Again, they resent my conclusion, as a bigot's insult, and a tyrannical bond upon philosophic freedom of thought. I reply: Nobody has any freedom rightfully to think against God and righteousness. I reply again: I have asserted this evil tendency, as only a tendency, in many, not always a present result. Personally, I am glad to give full credit to the good character of individual opponents. Again, the virtues of these errorists were really the fruits of the side influences and social habitudes of the very religion and philosophy which they tried to discard. Spinoza was reared by Jewish parents under monotheism and the ten commandments. Fichte, like Kant, was a candidate for the Lutheran ministry. Tyndall and Dra-

per were both sons of pious non-conformist ministers in England. But the real question is: What of the moral influence of their philosophies on the untrained and ignorant masses? Lastly, whatever the civic virtue of these gentlemen, none of them ever pretended to spiritual sanctity; which is the higher and only immortal phase of virtue. The character which regards man, the less, but disregards God, the greater, can not be wholly sound, and can not retain its partial soundness permanently. This is the inspired argument; and it is *a fortiori*:

"A son honoreth his father, and a servant his master; if then I be a father, where is mine honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear? saith the Lord of hosts unto you, O priests, that despise my name" (Mal. i. 6).

I. A question concerning the influence of a false philosophy may be tried historically. Here are the facts. The national philosophy of China is that of Confucius, which, we are told, is simply modern agnosticism. The civil administration of China, and the domestic morals, are rotten with corruption. Lying, opium drunkenness, cruelty, bribery, cheating, infanticide are current. India has a great and ancient philosophy—pantheism. Her religions, Brahmanism and Buddhism, are pantheistic. When the British went there, despotism, bribery, polygamy, the suttee, infanticide, official plunderings, lying, and cheating were prevalent institutions. Oaths in court counted for nothing at all in administering justice. Thuggism was a religion. In Greece, the sounder philosophy was supplanted by that of the Epicureans, Sophists, Skeptics, and the New Academy. Then the glory departed, and Greece became vile enough for her slavery. Then Roman virtue also died, and a vast moral rottenness brought on the "decline and fall" of the empire. In the eighteenth century, France adopted the sensualist philosophy of Voltaire, and the selfish ethics of Helvetius. The fruit was the Reign of Terror. In Russia, the Nihilism of Bakunin is a philosophy, that, namely, of materialism and agnosticism; its products are anarchy, prostitution, and assassination. The same philosophy has shown us the same fruits in Paris, New York, and Chicago. Lastly, everybody sorrowfully admits the decadence of political, commercial, and domestic virtue in this country. We need not detail the melancholy instances, or paint the contrast between the Americans of to-

day and the America of Monroe and J. Q. Adams. Since the latter epoch, the philosophy of Comte, Stuart Mill, and Darwin has been rapidly gaining ground.

Shall I be told that these are only chance coincidences and not causal sequences? According to the inductive logic, sequences so regularly recurring raise a strong probability, if not a certainty, of a true causal relation. Again, could instances be adduced of the reverse order, where the incoming of a true philosophy resulted in a decay of morals, our opponents might have some offset to our facts: but there are no such cases.

II. And I now proceed to show that the sequences are causal, by disclosing in these false philosophies obvious causes of corruption.

Here an important fact should be brought forward. Man's moral nature is diseased. Some perversion of will is inherited by every man. Hence, farther moral decay is natural and easy; while the ascent back toward a higher virtue is arduous. Human souls are like a loaded train upon a down grade, whose slight inclination, below the horizontal, increases as it advances. The natural tendency of the train is to descend slowly at first, then with accelerated speed toward the final crash. A good brake (a true philosophy) is quite efficient to keep the train stationary; thus much of good it can do. But the best brake can not push the train up-grade, while a false one, failing to lock the wheels, insures the descent and ruin of the train. Divine grace furnishes the only sure power for driving the train upward against nature.

I know that it is the trick of all erroneous philosophies to omit or deny this natural evil qualifying the moral disposition of man; to pretend not to see it, to philosophize as though righteousness were as natural to man as sin is. To this arrogance I shall not yield an inch. As a philosophic analysis, it is false; it dishonestly refuses to see a fact in human nature as plain and large as any other fact in psychology. This evil disposition now qualifying man's *essentia* is as clearly proved as any other fundamental instinct, faculty, or appetency. How do they find out that man, unlike the pig or the ox, is an esthetic creature? In the very same way, were they consistent, they should find out that he is by nature a sinning creature. All human experience, all expedients of legislation, all history, every candid con-

sciousness, confirm it. I say, therefore, plainly, that I shall postulate, throughout this discussion, this tendency in man toward moral decadence. It is a fact, and my argument shall be that every dogma in theology, philosophy, politics, or business, which lifts off the soul any form of moral restraint, tends to moral corruption. Let us see whether each of these false philosophies does not abolish some moral check.

The key-note of Buddhism is, that since feeble man's pursuit of the objects of his appetencies results in failure and pain, his true virtue is to annihilate all appetencies, and thus win *nirvana*. Then, of course, not only the animal, but the social appetencies—sympathy, benevolence, pity, friendship, conjugal, filial, and even parental love—must be expunged out of the philosopher's soul in order to make him holy, forsooth! For the appetencies set in motion by these affections are the occasions of far the deepest and most pungent griefs of human existence. That is to say: the Buddhist saint, in order to be perfect, must make himself a cold, inhuman villain, recreant to every social duty. Such, indeed, their own history makes their chief "hero of the faith," Prince Gautama, who begins his saintship by absconding like a coward, and forsaking all his duties to his wife, his son, his concubines, his parents, and his subjects. But they say he afterward showed sublime altruism by offering his body to be eaten by a hungry tigress, which had not succeeded in torturing and devouring enough antelopes to make milk for her cubs. Bah! methinks he would have done better to care for his own deserted human cub!

Once more, the scheme founds itself on an impossibility. Man can not by his volition expunge native appetencies, because these furnish the only springs of volitions. Can the child be its own father? Eating results in dyspepsia; therefore, not only cease eating absolutely, but cease being hungry. That is the recipe for the distress of dyspepsia! But first, it is impossible; second, were it done, all mankind would be destroyed in a few weeks. Common sense says that when a man goes to professing the impossible he begins to be a cheat. And this is the practical trait of Buddhism.

They say the doctrine of transmigration is a great moral check, teaching the Hindus to avoid sin by the fear of migrating at death into some more miserable animal form. Is it not a

better check to teach them that at death they will at once stand in judgment before an all-wise, just, and almighty Judge? May not that Buddhist doctrine also frequently incite living men to the fiercest brutality to animals, by the supposition that those animals are now animated by the souls of hated enemies?

The pantheism of China, India, and the moderns has common moral features. And the fatal influences are so plain that, while they are of vast and dreadful importance, they may be despatched in few words.

Then, first, when I act, it is God acting. You must not condemn me, whatever villainies I act, because that would be condemning God! Second, whatever men and devils act is but God acting. Then where is the possibility of God's having, in himself, any rational standard of right, by which to condemn our sins? Does God's will in himself judge and condemn his same will emitted in our actions? Or can that will be any moral standard at all which is thus self-contradictory? Such a moral ruler would be worse for the pulpit, than none at all—atheism less confusing and corrupting than pantheism. Third, God's existence and actions are necessary, if any actions are; but God acting, I have no free agency. But if not a free agent, I can not be justly accountable. Fourth, God is an absolute unit and unchangeable being, eternal and necessary. Therefore, if all happiness and misery in creatures are, at bottom, God's own affections, there can be no real difference between happiness and misery (Spinoza's own corollary). What will be the effect of this inference upon that excellent quality, mercy? The dogma must breed indifference to others' suffering, as much as stoicism under one's own. Its tendency is toward a hard-heartedness as pitiless as the tiger, the fire, and the tempest. Fifth, if God is all, there is but one substance in the universe. All other seeming personal beings are modal manifestations of the One. Hence, each creature is but a temporary phenomenon, a wavelet upon this ocean of being. Death, therefore, is a re-absorption into the One. It is *nirvana*, the absolute, eternal extinction of personality and consciousness—thus all pantheists. Then for this other reason there can be no personal responsibility, or reward, or punishment in the future. All the moral restraints of the doctrine of future judgment are as much swept away as by atheism.

We must be brief. Hartmann and Schopenhauer have shown that idealistic pantheism must lead to pessimism. But all our new-fangled philosophies seem to think pessimism a very naughty thing. It is their favorite bad word, with which to pelt a Calvinist, a conservative, or any other whom they dislike—to cry: “Oh, he is a pessimist!” But seriously, is pessimism a hopeful or healthy outlook for a good man? What room does it leave for the trio of supreme virtues: faith, hope, and charity? On this head it is enough to name the charge, often and justly made against the Darwinian doctrine of the “survival of the fittest,” and the fated extinction of the naturally weaker; that it tends to produce a pitiless hardheartedness. The inference is logical; look and see.

The old saw, “Extremes meet,” was never truer than it is of pantheism and atheism. The latter says: “There is no God at all”; the former: “Everything is God.” But the moral results of both are closely akin. In this, my indictment includes genuine Darwinism; for there is now no doubt that Dr. Darwin, like his most consistent pupils, Haeckel, Buchner, etc., believed that the doctrine ought to exclude both spirit and God. Their logic is consistent; for if all teleology is banished out of nature, and if that in man which thinks, feels, and wills is but an evolution of brute impulses, inherent in sensorial matter, there is no spiritual substance. We must have materialistic monism. Then every moral restraint arising out of the expectation of future responsibility, rewards, and punishments, is utterly swept away. Why should men conclude anything but, “Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die?” To borrow Carlyle’s rough phrasing: “If mine is a pig’s destiny, why may I not hold this ‘pig philosophy’?” Again, if I am but an animal refined by evolution, I am entitled to live an animal life. Why not? The leaders in this and the sensualistic philosophy may themselves be restrained by their habits of mental culture, social discretion and personal refinement (for which they are indebted to reflex Christian influences); but the herd of common mortals are not cultured and refined, and in them the doctrine will bear its deadly fruit.

Our opponents say that they can discard these old-fashioned restraints of theologic superstitions, and apply better and

more refined checks upon the coarser vices, viz., by showing men that the refined pleasures of temperance, esthetic tastes, culture, and altruism are higher and sweeter than the coarse pleasures of vice; and that the two classes are incompatible, so that the lower should be sacrificed for the higher. Yes; the world has known of that subterfuge from the days of Epicurus; and knows its worthlessness. Here is the fatal reply; and its logic is plain enough to be grasped by the coarsest: "*porcus de grege. Epicuri cute bene curata.*" Refined Mr. Epicurus, it depends entirely upon each man's natural constitutional tastes which class of pleasures shall be to him highest and sweetest. You say that to you music, art, letters are such; you were born so. I am so born that these are but "*caviare*" to me, while my best pleasures are gluttony, drink, lust, gambling, and prize-fights. The philosopher is answered.

Little space remains to me for unmasking the evil tendencies of other sensualistic, expediency, and utilitarian philosophies. The reader must take hints. Their common key-note is: no *a priori*, common, ruling intuitions of necessary, rational truths, either logical or moral. *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu.* Very well! Neither spirit nor God is cognized by any sense-faculty. Therefore, philosophy should know nothing about either. Secondly, the concept of the moral good, or virtuousness in actions, is not cognized by any sense-faculty. Is it seen as a fine color, smelled as a perfume, heard with the ears as a harmony, tasted with the mouth as a savor, felt with the fingers as satin or velvet? No. Then philosophy should know nothing about it. It should say there are no such things in the soul as distinctly ethical feelings; nothing but sensitive ones and their combinations. For mind can only feel as it sees; where it sees nothing it should feel nothing. Then there are two results; there is no science of ethics, nothing but a psychology of sensibilities, which being merely personal, there is no source for any altruism; it is a silly fiction. And, next, since the sensibilities are only moved by objective causes, there is no free agency. Look and see. Hume was logical in becoming fatalist and atheist. So Hobbes, the father of modern sensualism.

Finally, there is a modern class of professed religionists who seem to regard Mill, Darwin, Spencer, and Huxley as very

apostles of philosophy (why, we know not); and when thereafter proclaiming their agnosticism, add, that they still leave room for religion; that while religion has no standing-ground in philosophy, she may be admitted in the sphere of feeling. Our pious neighbors are very thankful! This is the "advanced thought" destined to sweep everything before it; and we are so grateful that it still leaves us a corner for our dear religion! But common sense says: "Thank you for nothing, Messrs. Agnostics. You have not left any corner for our precious religion. Better speak out as honest atheists. The universal law of mind is that it can only feel normally as it sees intelligently. Where there is no logical ground for credence, there should be no source for feeling."

In truth, they let me keep my religion at the price of turning fool!

MEMOIRS OF FRANCIS S. SAMPSON, D. D.

PREFACE.

The board of directors of Union Seminary, at their annual meeting after the death of Dr. Sampson, determined that it was proper to present to the churches, his brethren, and former pupils, some memorial of his Christian and professional character. They requested me to prepare such a sketch; and the following sketch is the result. So far as a full and intimate acquaintance with his life, first as a pupil, and then as a colleague, can qualify one for such a task, that qualification I possess. And if an ardent personal attachment unfits one to draw the character of its object impartially, I must confess to this disqualification. It is for those who knew Dr. Sampson as well as I did, to judge whether the portraiture is accurate. I can express no better wish towards all his brethren and former pupils, than that the reading of this humble tribute to their lost friend, may give them the same mournful delight, and the same elevating and purifying lessons, which its preparation has given me. It is now affectionately dedicated to the Alumni of Union Theological Seminary, to the candidates for the ministry, and to the Christian young men of the Synods of North Carolina and Virginia.

A life, spent, like Dr. Sampson's, far from the stormier scenes of the world, amidst scholastic shades, offers little material for narrative. I have, therefore, only attempted, after giving a brief outline of his uneventful life, to unfold the nature of his work and his character, and to indicate some of those lessons which they teach us.

ROBERT L. DABNEY,

Union Theological Seminary, Va.

May 28th, 1855.

INTRODUCTORY OUTLINE.

Dr. Sampson was the son of Mr. Richard Sampson, an eminent and respected agriculturist in the neighborhood of the Dover Mills, in the county of Goochland. He was born between the 1st and 5th of November, A. D. 1814. In 1830, he was placed at the school, and in the family of that man of God, Rev. Thornton Rogers, of Albemarle, who was his maternal uncle. Here he made a profession of religion, was baptized, and became a member of the Presbyterian church in Charlottesville, then in charge of Rev. Francis Bowman, on the 13th of August, 1831. The 10th of September of the same year, he entered the University of Virginia, and continued his studies there till July, 1836, taking a very extensive and thorough course of study, not only in the academic departments, but in the schools of junior law, anatomy and physiology, and securing the degree of M. A. which was then, as now, attained by very few. November 9th, 1836, he entered Union Theological Seminary, Va. On the resignation of Professor Ballantine, in the spring of 1838, he was made teacher of Hebrew, and from that time continued to perform other duties of the oriental department. He was licensed by East Hanover Presbytery in October, 1839, and ordained as an evangelist by the same Presbytery in October, 1841. In July, 1848, he took a journey to Europe, for the prosecution of his oriental studies, and returned in August, 1849, having spent the year chiefly at the Universities of Halle and Berlin. In October, 1848, he was elected professor of oriental literature and languages in the Seminary; but he had for many years performed the work of a full professor, though with the title and compensation of an assistant, and had long been esteemed as second to none of his colleagues in the value of his labors. About the time of his return from Germany, he also received the honorary degree of D. D. from Hampden Sidney college. He fell asleep Sabbath, the 9th of April, 1854, only thirty-nine years and five months old.

Thus brief and uneventful is the record of his life, which was passed almost wholly in the quiet shades of colleges. But the results of this life have not therefore been unimportant. The attempt will be made to draw the features of his character as a Christian and Christian minister, a scholar and an instructor, in order that we may praise God for his grace manifested in him, and may receive the advantages of an example most modest, and yet illustrious.

CHAPTER I.

Person and Constitution. Dignity and Courtesy of Manner. Early Habits and Maxims. Influence of Example in a Different Sphere

Dr. Sampson was in person light and graceful, and of a florid complexion. Although his family has shown pulmonary tendencies in several of its members, and his own lungs were ultimately much impaired in their soundness, for the first thirty years of his life he enjoyed, by virtue of great temperance, most uniform health, and endured an immense amount of severe study. After he reached that age, he was gradually broken down by several attacks of acute disease, and though his health gave a delusive promise of restoration the last year of his life, he finally fell before a short and violent attack of pneumonia.

His personal habits, as to diet, sleep and recreation, were simple, methodical and temperate, without being ascetic. His dress was scrupulously neat and appropriate, without the faintest approach to display. In his approaches to his fellow men there was the happiest union of unaffected modesty and graceful quietude with Christian dignity. Yet his was a dignity which repelled no advances of affection or confidence, nor anything but impertinence. His friends who most desired to see him shine in society as his solid worth entitled him, sometimes accounted him too modest. Yet, with a modesty which almost amounted to diffidence, he was the farthest of all men from a timid or truckling expression of his opinions. When an erroneous sentiment which he conceived to be of any importance was thrust upon him in conversation, he most distinctly defended his own opinion, with a singular union of inflexible, even impracticable mental honesty and courteous deference. He was the last man in the world to be wheedled into the softening of a truth down, or the admission of a faint shade of the error he had been opposing, by any of the blandishments of politeness, or by the fear of seeming too pertinacious. Much of the singular amiability of his social character is no doubt to be attributed to the influence of grace. Had he grown up un-

converted, he would have been known as a man of high and determined temper, of energetic will, and persevering activity. Divine grace softened what was violent, and refined what was valuable in this temperament, until the result was a rare and lovely union of the strong and the sweet.

One of Dr. Sampson's most striking and valuable natural traits was his methodical industry. To any one who knows his ancestry, it is very plain that this quality was received from them, both by inheritance and inculcation. That whatever is worth doing, is worth doing well; that each task must be done with one's might, in just so much time as is needed to do it perfectly, and no more; that no task is to be left till all is perfected which can be done to advantage; these were the rules of working which he carried with him from the home of his boyhood to the school, the university, the study, the lecture room. The same thoroughness, the same deep ploughing, the same complete harrowing, the same utter extirpation of obstructions, the same perfect finish which characterized the farm of his father, prevailed in his scholarship and instructions. It would be hard to estimate how much of his usefulness and ability was due to the example and habits thus impressed on his youth. And we cannot but admire the wisdom of Providence in training, on such a field and by agencies so unconscious of the divine purposes, a quality which was afterwards to do so much good in a higher and nobler sphere of duty. Dr. Sampson, the eminent hebraist, the profound expositor, the masterly instructor, was but the far-seeing, energetic, able farmer reproduced on another field of action.

CHAPTER II.

Enters Rev. Thornton Rogers' School. Religious Impressions. Decision. Personal Covenant. Diary. University of Virginia. Christian Activity there. Dr. White's Testimony. Goes to Union Theological Seminary. Zeal. Devotional Spirit. Humility. Liberality.

We cannot proceed farther, without attempting to draw his Christian character. This was in several respects singular: but in most, singularly excellent. The neighborhood in which he grew up, was very irregularly supplied with the preaching of

the Gospel, and was wholly unblest with a sound pastoral influence. Consequently, domestic religion and pious training were nearly unknown. From a brief diary which Dr. Sampson kept during a part of the session of 1833-4, we learn that when he went to the Rev. Mr. Rogers' school, he did not possess a Bible of his own, and had never read more than very limited portions of it in his life. His character was wholly irreligious; and he was given to all the light and corrupting amusements of fashionable young persons. But he tells us, that the only out-breaking vice in which he indulged, was profane swearing; and this he contracted at the age of twelve, from vexation in a game of whist, in which he had an unusually bad hand. With such a character, he found himself in a new world, in the well-ordered, Christian family of his uncle. There the word of God was daily read, and his name reverently worshipped in the family. Although little personal exhortation was addressed to him concerning his sins and impenitence, he saw daily illustrations of the excellence and peace of Christian principles, in the harmonious happiness of a pious house, where "brethren dwelt together in unity"; and above all, where the beauty of holiness shone from the example of the godly father, as he presided in the family and school room. In consequence chiefly of these silent teachings, he gradually fell into a state of profound religious concern, which continued about twelve months. His feelings were studiously concealed from all, through fear of ridicule; and the love of sin led him to put forth many and bitter struggles against the Spirit. But the God who loved him would not let him go; and his convictions were from time to time strengthened. In the spring of 1831, he chanced to hear a sermon from the Rev. Mr. Staunton, then of Prince Edward, from the text, "Secret things belong unto the Lord thy God," which was the means of sweeping away all his objections and excuses. His convictions now became so pungent that they compelled him to an outward reform of his life, and to set about seeking a present Saviour in earnest. But the fear of reproach and love of sin still made desperate struggles. On one occasion, while several of his school fellows were engaged with him in a game of marbles, one of them sneeringly observed, "Frank must be getting pious. Do you notice, boys, that he has not been heard to swear for a fortnight?" This taunt stung

him to the quick; and to show that he was not justly liable to their insinuation, he took the very first plausible occasion to throw out a most profane oath! But this heaven-daring act was made the crisis of his rebellion. For, his remorse, alarm of conscience, and fear of having grieved the Holy Spirit, together with his convictions of the corruption of his nature, and impotence of his own resolutions for piety became immediately so agonizing, that he was compelled to retire, and cast himself at once upon the Saviour's mercy. From this hour, his soul seems to have been built upon the rock Christ Jesus; and his face was turned decisively heavenward. He now first divulged his religious feelings to his uncle, in a letter which he handed him without seal or signature, and which detailed his struggles, his ignorance, his decision to be on the Lord's side, and his dawning peace.

Mr. Rogers had often made his salvation the subject of his secret wrestling with God. But so complete had been the concealment of Dr. Sampson's convictions, that his uncle was at this very time almost in despair of his conversion. And though Dr. Sampson had ever been docile and industrious in everything else, so impressed was his uncle with the evil influence which his profanity might exert in his family, that he had seriously considered the best means of removing him. As he was the son of a beloved sister, he had seriously thought of disbanding his school for a time, as the least painful mode of securing this end. Indeed, he had only been deterred by intercessions of others, from carrying this purpose into effect. How delightful, then, must have been the surprise with which he received this letter, telling him that the great work had gone on so far underground? This curious incident may carry home two truths to us, "That we should not be weary in well doing; for in due season we shall reap if we faint not"; and that much of the seed of truth which we sow is often lost, or smothered, for want of more constant and tender nursing.

But Dr. Sampson was more the spiritual child of the Rev. Thornton Rogers, than of any other person. He has often said that the means which efficaciously awakened him out of death in trespasses and sins, was not so much any particular sermon or warning, as the holy and consistent life of his uncle. This

was to him the sermon, the rebuke, the "living epistle," which revealed to him his spiritual necessities.

No man since the Apostle Paul could use more truthfully his language, "When it pleased God who separated me from my mother's womb, and called me by his grace, to reveal his Son in me, immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood." Dr. Sampson was about to leave his uncle's roof, where alone he could expect to find any religious sympathy among his own friends, to return for a few weeks to his native neighborhood, in which every affectionate attention of his relatives would be a temptation, and where there were no sanctuary privileges nor Christian communings to help him on his way. Thence he was to go, in the early autumn, to the University of Virginia—an institution opened only six years before under infidel auspices, without prayers, chaplain, Bible class, Sabbath school—yea, we may say, without Sabbath; so that almost all godly parents kept their sons away from it with a pious dread; and vital religion was nearly unknown among its students.

We have seen the strong and almost fatal hold which the fear of ridicule had on his natural heart. Yet, from the moment his stand was taken, although but a youth of sixteen, fear was at an end. A courage more fixed than that of man, had taken possession of his breast. One of his first acts after confessing Christ, was to prepare a written address to his school-mates, intended for the close of the session, in which he urges upon them the claims of Christianity. These were the same school mates, whose ridicule had a little before almost driven him to reject the Holy Ghost! In his address, he discusses the following causes, which induce irreligious men to postpone attention to the Gospel: "An unwarranted dependence on the general mercy of God; objections to the incomprehensible mysteries contained in the Bible; and especially, the incomprehensibility of the doctrine of a Trinity; cavils against the number of sects into which Christians are divided, and their bickerings; and skeptical doubts of the truth of the Scriptures." These points are discussed, without striking originality indeed, but with a distinctness of thought, order and justice, most remarkable in a school boy: and the temper of the address is marked by a happy union of Christian boldness and affection.

The same decision of religious character marked all his

Christian course. His religion was now everything. His Bible was almost his only companion, among *books*. The fact that he learned so little of Christianity through the colored and somewhat distorted medium, in which it is presented by the prescriptive religious habits and expressions of even good people, but drew his religious ideas direct from the Word of God, under the teachings of the Holy Spirit, may account for much of the excellence and symmetry of his religious character. In all his intercourse with relatives and associates, in his amusements and devotions, in everything, the desire to please God was uppermost.

There yet exists a correspondence of considerable bulk, extending through the five years of his University course, and later, with two favorite female cousins. In these letters, the desire to benefit their souls and his own, is ever the prominent, almost the sole concern. The great topic is approached at once, without squeamish circumlocutions, but with affectionate dignity and delicacy. His correspondents are continually reminded, that the chief aim and glory of a Christian friendship should be, to give and receive edification, by the interchange of experiences and advice. He has no news or gossip to detail. Even from the first year of his Christian life, these letters show a depth of experience and a range and fullness of Christian knowledge, such as we would expect from a mature saint. From them and his brief diary, we learn with what punctuality and solemn diligence he engaged in the study of God's Word, searching his own heart, and secret prayer, as the first great business of each day.

We learn he declined living with a room mate during his second session, because his room mate the previous session, though amiable and moral, was unconverted; and his presence robbed him of his regular hours for secret devotion. In this exigency he was accustomed to resort to a wooded mountain hard by, for communion with God. And when, at the beginning of his third session, he received into his room a young gentleman like-minded to himself, who afterwards became a most intimate Christian friend, an arrangement was made for retirement, as well as daily social prayer. From this friend we learn that when the hour of secret prayer found him languid and indisposed to devotion, instead of making such a state a pretext

for the postponement of the duty, he found in it a powerful motive for his more diligent performance. However fatigued or overworked, he would take his Bible and read and meditate till he could bow his knees in the proper frame, saying that this languor and coldness were the very evidences that he needed fervent prayer at that special time.

The first of January, 1834, he held a solemn review of the past year, and the state of his soul, and entered into a formal written covenant, to which his name is attached, engaging, with divine assistance, to live a life of entire devotion. The form of covenant is marked as a quotation. Although conceived very much in the terms of the one given in Doddridge's *Rise and Progress*, for the young Christian covenanting with God, it is not copied thence; and the source from which it was taken is not known. Perhaps it is enough to say that it is couched in terms of most devout and humble confession, ardent breathings after holiness, and adoring reverence of the divine perfections. Though the subsequent diary shows that those alternations of strength and weakness, joy and sorrow, were not wholly unknown to him, which are found in the experience of all eminent saints, yet this era was no doubt a new starting point to his soul in its religious race.

It is a characteristic fact that this diary, after having been punctually kept for several months, was discontinued. The ground assigned at its close was, that he began to suspect himself of coloring the statements of his feelings, from an involuntary reference to their being some day seen by others, and he feared that thus his Christian sincerity might be corrupted!

Such holy diligence in prayer, such singleness of aim and such watchfulness, could not fail of their reward. He seems to have lived in the habitual exercise of religious joy; and often his soul mounted up with wings like eagles. It is believed that from his conversion to the day of his death, no serious cloud ever overshadowed his assurance. He lived continually under the peaceful light of a sure hope! How fully was the truth verified, in his Christian courage, consistency and intense activity for God, "The joy of the Lord is your strength?"

His position as a pious student among two hundred and fifty thoughtless young men, gave ample occasion to illustrate his Christian decision. But yet, this quality was so admirably

tempered with modesty and kindness, that it secured, instead of enmity, almost universal respect. His manner was quiet, simple, and unobtrusive. His religion was never thrust upon the notice of any one; but when any assault was made upon his principles, they were found immovable. He was obliging to all, even to the profane, wherever the sacrifice of conscience was not asked for. So kindly and unpharisaic was his demeanor, that many, then entirely irreligious, became warmly attached to him, and his usual college name was "Neighbor Sampson." Yet, so sincere was the respect for his principles, a thoughtless and profane student was heard once to remark, "I *can't* swear before Neighbor Sampson"; adding that there was no other Christian student in the University to whom he would pay the tribute of such a self-restraint. It is doubted whether a single taint, or one word disrespectful to his religion, was ever offered him with malicious intent among all the hundreds of ungodly young men by whom he was surrounded.

Let this be an effectual lesson to every young person, who shall read the character of this man of God, never more to be held in bondage by the fear of reproach or ridicule. An honest, Christian courage commands the involuntary homage of the worst. It is weakness and inconsistency which provoke the gibe and sneer. Dr. Sampson was not protected from them by any of those brilliant popular talents which dazzle the imagination of young men; for his abilities were not then appreciated. He was regarded as a plain and unpretending young man, whose conduct was spotlessly consistent, and whose Christian courage was unshakable. It was this which covered him, amidst the most heaven-daring sinners, with a shield of affectionate respect.

The next trait of his Christian character to be noted, was: His strict conscientiousness. Never have we known a Christian who seemed more habitually to walk

"As ever in his great task-master's eye."

This conscientiousness was seen in the minutest pecuniary transactions, and in the scrupulous care with which he used the interests and property of the Seminary, and of those who entrusted their concerns to him. That word of our Lord was to him a living precept, "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much; and he that is unjust in the least, is unjust also in much."

Instances of his scrupulousness might be mentioned, which some might almost regard as showing a "morbid conscience." We can only say—Would to God that all his people were infected with the same disease. There was nothing morbid or exaggerated in his Christian character. On the contrary, uniformity and good sense were its peculiar traits.

As instances of his conscientiousness, take the following:

We find him determining that he cannot lend his notes of the professors' lectures (for he was a famous note taker) to fellow students who studied them on the Sabbath. Although, in all other cases, unbounded in his kindness, where he had reason to believe that they would be so abused, he inflexibly exacted their return on Saturday. We find him, in every friendly letter, zealous to communicate some spiritual gift; and on his return from social visits, he frequently taxed himself with unfaithfulness, because he had been satisfied with the innocence of his social enjoyments, and had not enough watched for openings to speak for Christ.

On a visit to his beloved Christian relatives in Albemarle, he not only seeks to do good to his cousins, but seized an opportunity to "go into the kitchen at his grand-father's and talk with old aunt Betty, the cook, about Christ, his righteousness and atonement, our weakness and dependence on him, and the glorious prospects of the Christian, and encourage her to constant prayer. She thanked me for my advice; and said she rejoiced in the Lord, and prayed that the Lord would make me happy and useful. She said she was so glad that I had come and talked with her about Christ. How happy is it, to be with a Christian, whether white or black! How good is my God, who revealeth himself to the poor and the ignorant, that feel their need of him! While I talked with this kindred spirit, my own soul was quickened, and the tear of sympathy dropped down my cheek. The old woman cannot read. Lord bless her soul, and give her grace, knowledge and true religion, with all its comforts. Let thy blessing rest on all with whom I conversed about Christ."

A few lines further we read this:

"Was detained by rain longer than I intended. Uncle Thornton lent me a horse to ride back. Conversed with the servant who came with me, about the danger of his immortal soul;

endeavored to make plain to him the way of salvation, and showed him how reasonable it would be for God to cut him off in his sins, before he could repent. Lord bless him with salvation."

And this, reader, was not in the glow of a first love, nor in a season of religious excitement. He had been a professed Christian nearly three years. How many ministers of the gospel may feel rebuke from these examples of evangelical zeal in a young college student!

In a like diligent spirit we find him performing each daily task, "as unto God and not man," regulating his diet with solemn Christian self-denial, because he found himself sometimes indisposed, by partial excess, to prayer and meditation, and exerting his influence for good over his comrades by every means.

In his walks for recreation, he met with a plain but respectable countryman, seriously inclined, though not a believer; and this casual acquaintance was improved, to set on foot a Sabbath school in the mountains, and to seek the salvation of the farmer and his wife, by repeated visits, and careful instruction.

When he had fully dedicated himself to the ministry, and to the foreign missionary work, which, he then supposed, was to be his destination, he thrust aside obstacles to his great purpose, with a heroic self-denial, which can never be known, until the day which reveals the secrets of all hearts. In all the domestic relations of his subsequent life, in the duties of family devotions, in his functions as master and father, the inmate of his household could clearly perceive that God was continually before his eyes. As an officer of the Seminary he was ever at his post, with conscientious diligence. No sickness, which was not extreme, could detain him from his class room; and the first day of his last, fatal illness, he attempted to rise and attend to his classes, and only desisted from his purpose when literally overpowered by weakness.

The Christian reader will hardly need to be told, that such a believer as is above portrayed, abounded in active exertions, and the labors of love for Christ and perishing souls. To appreciate the strength of this active principle in him, we must remember the modesty, the almost shrinking diffidence of his Christian character. A few instances of his zeal to do good

have already been mentioned. When he went to the University of Virginia, there was no chaplain, nor religious observance of any kind. Occasional public worship had been held perhaps, by transient ministers of distinction; and the sound religious sentiment which distinguishes the bulk of our people, was beginning to make itself felt among the governors of the institution; so that they were not unwilling to pay the tribute of some outward religious observance to this public opinion. Soon after Dr. Sampson went there, the Rev. Mr. Hamet, a Methodist minister of great fluency, and popular rhetorical powers, preached in Charlottesville; and the most thoughtless students were fascinated with his abilities. Advantage was taken of this, to introduce a permanent chaplain, and Mr. Hamet was the first who filled that office. The chaplain is usually selected by the faculty, with some conference with influential ministers of his own denomination, and is supported wholly by a voluntary subscription among the professors, students and other residents. He is chosen alternately from one of the four leading denominations, Methodist, Baptist, Episcopal and Presbyterian; and served at first one, but now two years. Dr. Sampson was very active in supporting this new enterprise, and gave valuable aid to Mr. Hamet, though his short stay in that office promised no very valuable religious results. He was succeeded by men of a more evangelical type; and to them all Dr. Sampson was a right hand, during his stay at the University, whatever their denomination. He was also the most active agent in originating the first Sabbath school in the University, and was its superintendent. We are assured by an eminent citizen, who was then a child in one of the families connected with the institution, that he was taught in this Sabbath school by Dr. Sampson, and there received his first saving impressions. The first private prayer meeting among the pious students of the University was equally indebted to his agency for its maintenance. It met every Sabbath evening; and we find in his short diary frequent references to his enjoyment of its Christian communion, and to his having addressed a word of exhortation to his brethren there.

The following sentences, communicated by the Rev. Dr. White, who was pastor of the Charlottesville church from the

spring of 1836 to 1848, happily express the position which Dr. Sampson then held there:

"My acquaintance with Dr. Sampson commenced in the spring of 1836. He was then just closing his course at the University of Virginia; and on the 4th of July of that year, he took the degree of M. A. with great credit. The South Plains church then embraced the Presbyterians living in the University and Charlottesville. There were not more than sixteen members living at these places. On my arrival, he called on me, and although very modest, yet convinced me in one short interview, that he was a youth of no ordinary talents and piety. He was then, I should suppose, about twenty years of age—between twenty-one and twenty-two. He entered with great interest into conversation on the subject of religion; and had evidently thought and prayed much for the prosperity of Zion. He gave me more information respecting the condition of the church, and both said and did more to cheer me in the work I was about to undertake, than any one with whom I met. I well remember the first attempt I made to have evening service in the dirty and dilapidated church. When I reached the house, I found it was neither lighted nor unlocked. As I stood in front of the building with half a dozen others, none of whom seemed to know what to do in this great emergency, Sampson came up, accompanied by several of his fellow students from the University. I was on the point of abandoning the undertaking in despair, when he, with his accustomed quickness and energy, said, 'Don't go yet—I'll see what can be done.' He hurried away, and very soon returned with candles in one hand, and the means of lighting them in the other—entered the house by raising one of the windows, and soon had the church opened, lighted, and ready for service. I preached to just one dozen hearers, and found no little help in doing so from the part he had acted.

"Through his whole course at the University, he was as much distinguished for his firmness as for his modesty, and as eminent for his piety as for his scholarship and talents. My impression is, that he established the first Sabbath school ever taught, and the first prayer meeting ever held in the University. I am sure he took a very active part in both these departments of benevolent and Christian effort.

"A few weeks before he graduated, the lamented Professor Davis said to me, with a very sad expression of countenance, 'We are about to lose Sampson; and a sad loss it will be to the University. With a modesty and reserve seldom, if ever, equalled, he combines a firmness of purpose, and an openness and energy in seeking to check evil and do good, which have made him a great blessing to the whole institution. His influence over all classes of persons is astonishing. Has your church no more such young men to send to us? The University might well afford to furnish any number of such with their board and tuition gratis.'

"I have always believed that the course he pursued and the influence he exerted contributed immensely to the great change which, from that time, began to take place in the religious character of that institution. My connection with him there ceased after some two or three months. In a pleasant interview with him just before he left, he said to me, 'I must preach the Gospel, or die in the attempt.' He left in the state of mind indicated by this remark; and you know the rest."

We cannot refrain from adding the closing paragraphs of Dr. White's remarks concerning him, though more confidential in their tone, and not relating to the subject immediately before us. His words give a touching and truthful picture of the impression made by the lovely Christian simplicity and modesty of his demeanor:

"He spent two or three days with me, and preached twice for me during the summer preceding his death. The impression he made both upon my congregation and family, was of the most salutary and pleasing kind. His meekness and gentleness, his freedom from all ostentation and reserve, won the confidence of the youngest member of my household. So much so, that for weeks and months afterwards, his visit was frequently mentioned at my fireside, as an event to be remembered with mingled emotions of pleasure and pain. With pleasure, because we enjoyed the privilege of entertaining him; and with pain, because we feared we should never enjoy this high privilege again. When this fear was realized by the announcement of his death, the deepest gloom passed over my family circle, and tears were shed that we should see his face no more."

If every pious student and other young Christian were thus

diligent in doing good, how different would be the aspect of our churches and colleges. What a new impression of the solemn reality and urgency of the work of redemption would replace in the minds of their thoughtless associates, that unreal and dreamy idea which they now entertain!

At the Union Seminary, which Dr. Sampson joined the fall after he left the University, his Christian activity was similar. No man was farther than he from that misplaced zeal, which aspires to do the work of an evangelist, while still a student, at the expense of a student's proper duties. In preparation for the class room, in punctual attention to the routine of his duties, in accurate scholarship, he was among the foremost. But to do good was one of the recreations of his leisure hours. During a season of religious interest, which visited the College in the immediate neighborhood of the Seminary, he, with others, labored much in a modest way; and some of the subjects of that work, if ever they attain to that blessed world where we believe he now is, will have occasion to acknowledge their debt to his wisdom and love, to all eternity.

As soon as he was licensed to preach the Gospel, by the Presbytery of East Hanover, he began to abound in evangelical labors, which, to his death, were increasingly acceptable to the churches. Besides the labors of his vacations, in his native county, and others at a distance from the Seminary, he preached statedly at different times, in the College and Farmville churches, at Guinea in the county of Cumberland, Charlotte courthouse, Walker's, Forest and Appomattox churches in the county of Prince Edward. Some of these labors were wholly gratuitous. For a considerable period, his stated labors not being more urgently needed in any of the churches of convenient access, he preached regularly to a congregation of colored people, for no other reward than the pleasure of doing good.

Another marked trait of his Christian character was the uniformity and healthfulness of his devotional spirit. While his private habits in this matter were covered with a sacred veil, which none dared to attempt to lift—drawn alike by the reverence and the modesty of his spirit—his profiting was so outwardly evident to all, that no one could doubt his diligence in the closet. While his brief diary laments occasional spiritual declensions, there is reason to believe that he never knew what

it was to lose the assurance of hope; and that the flame of devotion burned in him with a glow unusually steady. In public, his prayers were eminently edifying to believers, marked by scriptural tone, humble sincerity, appropriateness and comprehensiveness. But to know the sweetness of his spirit of prayer fully, one must have enjoyed the privilege of being an inmate of his house and frequenting his domestic altar. Family prayers were, in his house, no hurried, unmeaning form. The whole air and tone of the exercise showed deep sincerity and earnestness. After a daily catechising of children and servants, the reading of the Word of God, and a hymn of praise, he bowed his knees with a composed awe and seriousness, which seemed to communicate itself to all the circle. What deep sincerity, what discrimination and justice, what point, what fullness, what grave tenderness characterized those prayers, as he brought before the throne of grace his household—his children, his servants, his relatives, his brethren in Christ, the Seminary, the church, and the whole interests of a perishing world! To those who were so happy as to be often present, it was not difficult to believe that these services would leave their calm and holy savor upon the spirit, throughout all the toils and cares of the day, like "the dew upon Heron, and as the dews that descended upon the mountains of Ziou."

His religious principles were strikingly illustrated also, by the manner in which he felt the call to the ministry.

As has been already indicated, his definite purpose was fixed, in this matter, during his residence at the University. It was formed in the face of the strongest influences and the most brilliant allurements to more worldly and ambitious pursuits. He has left on record the great benefit which he received in this respect, as well as in others, from the Biography of James Brainerd Taylor, edited by Dr. John H. Rice. The principles illustrated in the life of that devoted young Christian had a powerful influence in fixing his resolution to consecrate himself to the work of preaching the Gospel. But this purpose began to dawn in his soul from the very beginning of his Christian life. On one occasion the writer asked him, what were the time and means for bringing the claims of the ministry home to his conscience. He answered, "There never was a time, in my Christian life, when I did not feel the claims of the ministry."

In reply to the question, how this was, he continued, "I simply reasoned thus: I had given myself wholly up to God, to be used for his highest glory, and if he needed me most in the work of the ministry, as seemed every way probable, as a thing of course I was bound to be a minister."

His settled purpose, during a large part of his University and Seminary course, was, to prepare himself thoroughly for the work of a translator in some important foreign mission. He was led to this purpose by his success and accuracy as a linguist, and his humble estimate of his own talents, and his capacities for public speaking. He seems to have thought that he was deficient in all those more brilliant gifts, which secure success in the pulpit; that his only talent was a patience, diligence and accuracy, which would make him a correct scholar, and that this humble talent he could best use for his master's glory, in the unobtrusive drudgery of rendering God's Word into the tongue of some Pagan people. With this object, he devoted himself most diligently to languages, drilled and cultivated his mind as thoroughly as possible in his preparatory course, and, in the Seminary, mastered as thoroughly as possible the languages of the Scriptures. But his master thought not so. When his Seminary course was but two-thirds done, he called him, by his Providence and the voice of his church, to a responsible work at home; and speedily rewarded his humble fidelity, by giving him fame and influence in the pulpit, of which he had judged himself unworthy.

Now, here is a lesson for those young Christians, who make a lack of special capacity for speaking or of similar qualifications, their pretext for declining the claims of the ministry. This servant of God had a *sincere* distrust of his own capacities; but with a heart consecrated with equal sincerity to his Saviour's service, he humbly offered himself to the work, to do what he could, believing that God would accept him according to that which he had, and not according to that which he had not. Yea, and he was accepted; and not only used his scholastic accuracy for the service of God in a high and honorable sphere, but became one of the most admired and impressive preachers of the land.

Young Christian, if thy self-distrust is genuine, go thou and do likewise. But if it is feigned, remember that "all things

are naked and opened unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do."

Our portraiture would be recognized by all the friends of Dr. Sampson as incomplete, if we omitted those which were, to all, his most obvious traits: modesty and disinterestedness. One of his most faithful friends was accustomed to say of him, "If Brother Sampson has a fault, it is that he is too modest." This virtue was impressed upon his social demeanor, upon all his acts of conscientious decision, and upon his deportment in all the courts of the church. There, he was usually a respectful listener, and a rare and brief speaker. When his sense of the importance of a measure called him out, his remarks were direct, lucid and weighty, and offered with an air which showed that he shrank from occupying the time and attention of the body longer than was unavoidable. Self-display and self-seeking were ideas which none that knew him associated with his name. Always estimating his own talents and knowledge below their real worth, he rather shrank from promotion than sought it. He waited for the call of his brethren and Providence; and it is believed that there never existed a case, in which he consented to lift a finger, directly or indirectly, to promote his own advancement, even by honorable means. Before he became a student of divinity, he refused very flattering offers of literary employment, not inconsistent with clerical duties. And after he engaged in the service of the Seminary, and received the assurances of his brethren that they judged his labors essential to the cause of God in that institution, no inconveniences in his post, and no advantages offered from without, weighed a feather towards leaving it. During this time, several offers of employment, such as professorships, more lucrative, and not unworthy of a Christian minister, were made to him. His answer always was, that God seemed to have work for him to do where he was; and as long as this was so, he had no right to leave it for any increase of his personal comforts or emoluments. Meantime, those emoluments were so stinted for many years, in consequence of the financial embarrassments of the Seminary, as scarcely to afford the means of comfortable subsistence. Up to his formal election to the professorship in which he died, while he performed the full duties of a professor in fact, and was acknowledged by all to be second to no one in

the value of his labors, he received less than two-thirds of the emoluments belonging to the office of a professor in this institution. This continued for ten years—years of activity, and growing reputation and usefulness—second to none of the years of his life. When he left his post temporarily, to improve his knowledge and health in Europe, the directors of the Seminary continued to him this inadequate salary during his absence—feeling that his tour was, in fact, in the service of the Seminary, and that this was no more than a just reparation for the unavoidable scantiness of his previous compensation. But even this he declined to retain, and refunded it to the Seminary after his return, in annual installments. So that the last year of his life may be said to be the only one in which he received the full salary which he had all along deserved. Yet in refunding this sum, he considered himself as repaying a debt, and not conferring a gift.

A very few years before his death he came into possession of a part of his ample patrimony, and then his benefactions increased with his ability. His donations to the Seminary and to other institutions of public interest, were bestowed with a generous hand.

His conscientiousness in the use of wealth, might well be imitated by many other Christians. Whether his circumstances were scanty or affluent, he was simple in his tastes, unostentatious in his person, and economical from principle. In accordance with the general system of all his habits, he kept an exact account of all expenditures—a thing which is, indeed, a necessary foundation for the proper practice both of Christian liberality and Christian economy. He was economical only in order to have the means to be liberal. His Christian hospitality was overflowing; and it was truly the hospitality of a Christian minister, designed not for its own display, but for the bestowal of comfort on others. To every good cause he gave, always with the heart, and when his means became ample, with the hand of a prince. It was one of the secrets which his Christian modesty never revealed, that he kept a strict account between himself and God, in which all sources of income were stated with scrupulous exactness, and a fixed and liberal portion of the sum was set apart to almsgiving; and this account was balanced with as much regularity as his bank book. Mean-

time, he was not without the pretext, which many professors of religion find for stinting their liberality, in the claims of a growing family.

CHAPTER III.

Dr. Sampson as a Student. Wise and Resolute Plan. Thoroughness. Intense Application. His Scholarship—Its Range and Accuracy.

The third general topic proposed to the reader, will be the habits of study and scholarship of Dr. Sampson. A brief statement of his methodical and thorough system of study has already been made. It may perhaps be said with truth, that the only peculiar indication of *talent*, which the beginning of his scholastic life gave, was the wise and resolute plan of study which he set before himself, and pursued from the first, with all the determination of his character. For surely, such wise determination is a talent—it is a trait of mental and moral greatness—and one rare and invaluable in a stripling of sixteen. He seems to have begun his collegiate course with a fixed reference to the greatest ultimate benefit. While he was a most punctual and laborious student, exact in all collegiate duties, allowing himself, for years, only six hours in bed, and but a scanty season for recreation, he did not fall into the temptation which overthrows so many at the University of Virginia. This is the ambition to run rapidly over the course, by an extraordinary and spasmodic exertion, and thereby to excite admiration, and to pass speedily into the duties of active life. Dr. Sampson's course, on the contrary, was long and deliberate, covering five years. Many distinguished citizens, who were his fellow students, state that he was at first only known as "an excellent student," of good sense and accurate habits; but that with every session, the appreciation of his abilities and learning increased. He seems to have practiced, from the first, the wisdom so rare in youth, of leaving nothing behind unmastered, of never weakening the accuracy of his faculties and perceptions by half prepared tasks, and half understood views. His scholarship was matured and digested, as he progressed. And this character was found eminently in all his subsequent acquisi-

tions. It has been said that, as a Seminary student, he showed equal diligence and method. As a professor, his diligence was great, and his toil in study excessive, until increasing infirmities compelled him to relax his labors. It is well remembered by some of his pupils, that once, when taking a class over the Epistle to the Hebrews, which he had gone over more than once before, he spent, on an average, thirty hours of active study on each lesson, in additional preparation. But alas! here the intensity of his zeal reached its crisis. This was the last year of his firm, unbroken health; and henceforth, "while the spirit was willing, the flesh was weak."

If all our young ministry was inspired with such zeal, how glorious would be the result? Perhaps the number might be increased by those who, like our lamented brother, would have to say of themselves, "The zeal of thy house hath consumed me," and whose premature loss the church would bemoan just as their harvest of usefulness was beginning. But would not this spirit endue the ministry of reconciliation with an influence, a weight, a might, a glory, which would be cheaply purchased, even at so precious a cost? A costly price hath our Zion paid for this example, which she now offers to her young ministers, to teach them what is the diligence they should exercise! May God forbid that it should be lost on them. Happy is that man who falls at the high noon of his career, and on the spring tide of his success, at his post of duty; but happier is he who can so temper a burning activity with a holy prudence, and so avoid both a corroding sluggishness and a rash over exertion, as to rise brightly to the meridian of his powers, and then decline gently towards their serene evening, and thus to bless the church both with his earlier strength and his riper experience.

By such system and diligence, Dr. Sampson became one of the best educated men of our country. In all the departments of letters he was able, above the average. His knowledge of systematic theology was profound and extensive. Of church history he retained a knowledge far superior to that which most young ministers bring to their ordination, although his department called him away from these studies; and he was accustomed to complain that his memory was treacherous with regard to those of its stores which he had no opportunity to re-

view. His mastery of Latin and Greek, and of most of the polite languages of modern Europe, would have abundantly qualified him for the highest posts of instruction in America. To say that it was such as becomes a well educated minister, would be utterly inadequate to the truth. But his ripest acquirements were in the Hebrew literature and the exposition of the Scripture. Here, as is well known, he was pre-eminent for thoroughness, accuracy and philosophical arrangement. While there may be many who possess an equal familiarity with these departments of learning, it may be safely asserted that, as a *teacher* of Hebrew, there was not his superior on our continent.

CHAPTER IV.

Characteristics as a Teacher. Tact. Vivacity. Earnestness. Patience
Intercourse with Pupils. Hebrew Prelections.

This naturally suggests another subject of remark—his character as an instructor. In his practical skill as a teacher, was his peculiar value to the church of our day; for as a master of the art of communicating knowledge, he was, in our view, unrivaled. It was not that his lectures presented those grand sayings which electrify for the moment, nor that any one of his efforts produced on the pupil an impress of pre-eminent talent—but there was just the combination of that justness of mind, steady animation, thorough knowledge, patience and tact, which gave the highest skill in teaching, both as it is a trade and as it is a science. He was equal to its profoundest researches. He shunned none of its most irksome drudgeries. One of the foundation stones of his success was his own indisputable scholarship. No man ever passed through one of his classes without a profound and admiring conviction of this. Another was in his unfailing animation and vivacity of mind, which was so keen, even on subjects usually esteemed dry, as to seem unaccountable to many. The exertion of voice and body which he unconsciously employed, when thoroughly warmed to his work, was often the subject of playful remark between him and his colleagues. This animation communicated itself to his pupils—so that usually their highest diligence was exerted in his department, though it was one not most at-

tractive to all minds. But to this result another quality, which is invaluable to the teacher, also contributed. This was the energy of his own will, which pressed on towards the objects of his exertion with an impetus which swept all along with it, and communicated its own life to the most sluggish. In every act of his in the class room, there was expressed the idea of work; and all who frequented it soon felt instinctively that it was not the place for loitering. It might be said that his watchword was *thoroughness*. With an admirable patience, he expounded his subject so as to make it luminous to the weakest eye; and if his questions revealed the fact that there was still some one who did not fully comprehend, he would resume his explanation, and repeat in varied forms, till his ideas were thoroughly mastered. Out of this habit, and the propensity of his mind to thorough work, probably grew that which might have been considered his prominent fault as an instructor. His explanations sometimes degenerated into excessive amplification, which became wearisome to those who had given him a moderate degree of attention from the beginning; and he thus unduly protracted his prelections.

His intercourse with his pupils was marked by a happy union of modest dignity, which repelled improper encroachments, and cordial, ingenuous kindness, which conciliated confidence. In his presence, each one felt that there was a simplicity and candor which set the stamp of reality on every kind attention. It is believed that there is not one of his pupils who did not feel for him not only respect, but warm affection; and many can join in the sad words of one who remarked, when speaking of his death, "Well, I never expect to meet with another minister of the Gospel, whom I shall love and revere as I did that man." Often it was a subject of wonder to his colleagues, how so much affection could be retained from those towards whom he exercised so much fidelity in admonishing.

The distinctive traits of his expository instructions may perhaps be described as justice of thought, neatness, and impartiality of mind. He believed the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures. His soul loved their spiritual truths; and often in the lecture room he soared away from the dry dissection of words and propositions, into regions of devout meditation, and made his class forget for the time the exercises of the head, in the nobler exercises of the heart.

It was in his Hebrew prelections that his mental excellence shone most distinctly. He had applied the broadest principles of etymology to the elements of this language, in a manner original and philosophical; and had thus reduced them to an order which, so far as we know, is not equaled by any published grammar. His lectures unfolded the Hebrew etymology with a lucid order, beauty and simplicity, which could not fail to delight every intelligent learner. Indeed, if we may be permitted to introduce our own judgment, after frequenting the halls of three separate institutions of learning, and sitting under some of the most gifted and learned men who have appeared on this side of the Atlantic, Dr. Sampson's lectures on the Hebrew language, and some other departments, seem to us the most philosophical, the most complete, *the best teaching* to which we ever listened. None who attended his prelections on the canon of Scripture (of which there remains a brief specimen in his "University Lecture") will forget the masterly nature of the argument there constructed. It is one not servilely copied or compiled from previous writers, but constructed on his own plan. He has there built, upon a foundation of adamant, a structure whose ribs of steel are knit together with the strength of mathematical demonstration. No part is wanting, and every part is in its exact place. It stands *totus teres et rotundus*, impenetrable everywhere to refutation.

Alas! that there remain no permanent records of most of these invaluable instructions, except in the scanty and scattered notes of his pupils. In his later years, Dr. Sampson regretted often that he had not found time to fix upon paper more of his course of instruction. But such was his unambitious and self-sacrificing spirit, that he always yielded to the urgent demands of the present, and preferred the thorough performance of his duties to his classes, to the gathering of those fruits of his researches, which would have promoted the fame of his authorship. He said, that if he became an author, he must be a less diligent teacher. There was not time to be, thoroughly, both at once. And he preferred rather to leave his record written on the minds and hearts of the rising ministry of our Synods, where it might be fruitful in the enlightening of souls, than in volumes which would hand down his name to future ages. But besides this, he was cut down just when the fruits of his

arduous studies were coming to their rich maturity. Had he lived to old age, he might have gathered some of them into books, for the benefit of a wider and more remote circle.

CHAPTER V.

Dr. Sampson as a Preacher. Simplicity of Style. Logical Arrangement. Elevation of Thought. Steadily advancing Reputation. Lesson of Encouragement to young Divines.

The reader will almost be able to surmise, from what has now been said, the character of his preaching. It exhibited always the lucid order, and the animation of mind which marked everything which he produced. His best sermons rose to a grade of excellence which is seldom displayed in any part of the church. And it was an excellence which was most appreciated by the most cultivated and mature minds. Whilst there were other preachers, who would be more sought after by the masses, he was preferred by the men of thought and acquirement. His plans of discussion were marked by a just and comprehensive view, which showed both the profound theologian, and the ripe biblical scholar, who had drunk deep into the spirit of the Word of God. His propositions were usually stated with singular accuracy and beauty of language; but it was a beauty rather logical than theoretical, rather chaste than florid. In deed, his whole method of discussion wore an appearance of directness, too severe to admit of any license of ornament. Yet, in the judgment of all those who are capable of appreciating a felicitous purity and aptness of language, and thoughts of vigorous symmetry, many passages in his sermons rose to the highest grade of eloquence, coupled as they were with his genuine fervor and fire. His preaching was rich in matter, and eminently scriptural, such as is best fitted to feed the spiritual mind. It was always remarkable for its elegance and elevation, which were never tarnished by anything coarse in allusion, ludicrous in association, or bungling in structure. But it was, the least of all men's, a finical elegance. It was rather that of an energetic and lofty simplicity. That men of strictly scholastic training and pursuits should excel in the particular work of

the pulpit, is rather the exception; but he was certainly one of the most brilliant of these exceptions. By the intelligent public his preaching was even as highly esteemed as his professional labors were by intelligent students.

This fact is dwelt on, because it contains most instructive encouragement to all beginners in the pulpit work. When Dr. Sampson first began to preach, he was far from being an easy or impressive speaker. His first attempts had little to commend them, except that excellence of composition which was the unavoidable result of his thorough training and good mind. He labored under a constraint and embarrassment, painful to himself and his hearers. His voice was not modulated, and his gesture was scant and unformed. But every effort showed improvement; and a few years of diligent exertion placed him in the front rank of impressive, pungent and fervent pulpit orators. His voice became resonant and musical; his action dignified and energetic.

Such an example should effectually remove the discouragements of those who suppose they are deficient in pulpit gifts; and it should teach all to feel their responsibility to set up for themselves a high standard of excellence, and to be satisfied with no dull mediocrity in sacred oratory. Provided they have good sense and diligence, let them not persuade themselves that the road is closed up to them, which leads to the higher grades of excellence in this art. The things by which Dr. Sampson was enabled so thoroughly to overcome his original defects, were undoubtedly these: First, there was his superior scholarship, which gave him mental furniture, and supplied the best material upon which to build a style. Had he not been a superior scholar, had his mind not been thoroughly drilled and invigorated by its inner training, his early manner would never have been improved into one so eminently good. Next, should be mentioned the modesty, humility and ingenuousness of his Christian character. He learned to preach well, because he aimed to preach not himself, but Jesus Christ. Those words of our Saviour proved strictly true, in their application to his understanding of the art of expressing religious truth: "If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light." His eye was single. His prevailing purpose was to show forth the way of life: and his taste was not perverted,

nor his manner poisoned, by the itchings of conceit, or the ambition for display. And, in the third place, he was diligent. Not only did he preach much, "in season and out of season," but he preached with careful and laborious preparation. And where there is a natural substratum of good sense, unfettered by any physical defect, these means will usually be sufficient to overcome any amount of incipient difficulties or failures, and to make any man, if not an orator of the first rank, an impressive and pleasing speaker.

CHAPTER VI.

Intellectual Traits. Genius and Talent. Symmetry. Analytic Faculty. Imagination. Memory. Candid Estimate of his Powers.

It is in the life and acts of a man that the faculties and traits of his mind make themselves known to others. Consequently, the preceding exhibition of Dr. Sampson's character as a scholar, teacher and preacher, is also a portraiture, in some sense, of his intellect. No more is necessary, therefore, than to sum up the whole with a few general remarks. Dr. Sampson could not be called a genius. He was what is far better—a man of high talent. His mind presented nothing that was salient or astonishing. But this was not so much because there was not power, as because it was power symmetrically developed. His was just one of those excellent minds, which grow most, and longest, by good cultivation. In wide and adventurous range, his speculative powers were not equal to those of some other men; but in power of correct analysis, in soundness of judgment and logical perspicacity, he was superior to all we have ever known, except a very few. Indeed, when a speculative subject was fully spread out before his mind for consideration, his conclusions seemed to be guided by a penetration and justness of thought almost infallible. This consideration was deliberate; and his decision was very rarely expressed with haste, or even with promptitude. Hence his writings and conversation never exhibited any of that paradox, or that bold novelty and dangerous originality, which are too often mistaken for greatness. His talents, if they had less to

awaken an empty astonishment and admiration, were far safer, more reliable and more useful. It was hard for anything so sophistical or unsatisfactory to escape detection under his steady gaze. He was particularly free from that common fault of many minds of large grasp: the adopting of major propositions so large that they will contain the conclusion which the reasoner desires to derive from them; but at the same time so shadowy that they contain he knows not how much more.

In his powers of arrangement, he was undoubtedly superior to any man we have ever known. In his mind, the elements of thought seemed to group themselves always, and spontaneously, into the most philosophical order possible, with a regularity like that of the atoms of limpid water, when they crystallize into transparent ice.

The efforts of Dr. Sampson's imagination were rather of that kind which Mr. Macaulay describes in Sir James Macintosh. They consisted not so much in the original grouping of elements into new, but lifelike forms, as in selecting appropriate forms already shaped out, from the stores of a well furnished memory. In those severer exercises of the imagination, which are required in mathematical thought and in the bodying forth of scientific conceptions, this faculty was eminently distinct and vigorous. But in its more poetic exercises it was limited. His power of calling up that species of illustration which is flowing and graceful, was scanty; and while the operations of his faculties, especially in lecturing and preaching, were unusually fervent, it was rather, so far as it was not spiritual, the dry heat, if we may so term it, of intellectual animation, than the glow of genial fancies. And yet, there were a few occasions on which he showed a high measure of the graphic or pictorial power; which might indicate that this faculty was rather disused by him than lacking in him. Another of his mental peculiarities has been already hinted: his almost impracticable honesty. He could never be induced to accept a proposition unless it wholly commended itself to his mind as true. His memory was most retentive, for all things which were arranged in it by any logical association; but for things sole, or merely verbal, it was sometimes treacherous.

Upon the whole, considering the admirable justness and perspicacity of his mind, its vigor and accuracy in analysis, its

wonderful capacity for philosophical arrangement, and the energy of its purposes, he might have been truthfully called a man of great powers. The symmetry of those powers, his modesty in their display, the very accuracy of thought which repressed all those paradoxical brilliancies that catch the admiration of the crowd, forbid that he should be promptly appreciated. Hence his proper grade will probably only be assigned him by those who, like the writer, had opportunities to contemplate his mental powers deliberately. But it is his deliberate judgment—a judgment formed maturely, in advance of that warm personal attachment which he will ever esteem one of the chief blessings and honors of his life, that Dr. Sampson, for his particular work, possessed capacities unsurpassed by any man which our country has produced, and equaled by very few. Happy would it have been for our churches if they had fully known his worth.

CHAPTER VII.

Failure of Health. Fluctuations of Disease. Flattering Hopes. Increased Diligence. Dr. Sampson's last Sermon. Final Attack. Concern of the whole Community. Prayer in Presbytery. Dying Exercises.

In the early spring of 1846, Dr. Sampson's ill health began with a terrible pleurisy; which was immediately provoked by fatigue and exposure in preaching the Gospel, but doubtless owed its more remote origin to the prostration of vital energy, produced by the intense application we have described above. After imminently threatening his life, this disease was subdued, but it did not leave him with a sound constitution. He seemed to be nearly re-established: and especially, on his return from Europe, his appearance of health and vivacity allayed all the fears of his friends. But not long after, he experienced another irreparable shock, in a severe nervous fever which overtook him on a journey. This left him with a nervous system and liver painfully deranged, and some threatening indications of pulmonary disease. From this time forth, he seldom knew what it was to enjoy comfortable strength. His most

distressing symptoms were a feverish excitability of pulse, sleeplessness, and occasional attacks of biliary derangement, which prostrated his muscular system for the time. But during his last session, his health, cheerfulness and hopefulness seemed to revive; and there was again a flattering promise of re-established strength and a long life. The returning prosperity of the beloved Seminary, the renewed and substantial assurances of interest and affection on the part of the churches and ministry, and the steps taken towards filling the vacancies in its faculty and dividing his responsibilities, seemed to be cordials to his mind and body. His enjoyment of the innocent blessings of life and its domestic affections, was intense, and his hold upon it was strong.

During this flattering season, he seemed to be conscientiously husbanding his strength, and employing all the means for preserving health. Once or twice he referred to the repeated and grievous blows, which a mysterious Providence had inflicted on the Seminary in the death of its most useful servants, and pleasantly said to his colleagues, "It is our duty to live just as long as we can, in order that the institution may have time to root itself." But alas! another blast was nearer than any of us feared, which shook its still unsettled strength, not less grievously than any which has burst upon it, since that which smote down its great founder in the flower of his strength and success. Nor did Dr. Sampson seem to be without anticipations of its approach. While he said nothing directly, and seemed rather to avoid any allusions to the previous symptoms, threatening his health, as a painful subject, yet the thought seemed to be ever treading close after his eager footsteps, and spurring him to greater diligence, "The night cometh, when no man can work." More than once, when others expostulated with him for taxing himself beyond his strength, either by the fervency of his preaching, or the vigor with which he pushed through his Seminary duties, he answered, "Perhaps I have but a few days or weeks more in which to do my task. I must work the works of him that sent me, while it is day."

And even so, the summons came, to him not unawares, but to us "like a thunderbolt from a cloudless sky." Sunday, the second of April, the venerable pastor being absent, he preached in the college church, from Prov. xi, 18. "The wicked

worketh a deceitful work; but to him that soweth righteousness, shall be a sure reward." In this sermon he urged the contrast between the delusiveness of the objects pursued by the unbeliever, and the glorious sufficiency and certainty of the believer's reward, with a power of thought, an energy of manner and a fervor of affection, which could not have been surpassed, if he had foreseen that this was his last message to his fellow men, and had poured the whole soul of a dying man into this final appeal. As we left the church that day, we felt that in this discourse his powers as a preacher of the gospel culminated. From that meridian height and splendor he fell—nay, rather, he rose; for the next Lord's day his soul (doubtless) ascended to those heavenly courts,

"Where congregations ne'er break up,
And Sabbaths have no end."

After attending with zest upon all the religious services of the day, he retired to rest, apparently in his usual health—his last act having been to minister to the comfort of a sick servant. Before the next morning he was violently seized with what seemed at first to be one of the customary bilious attacks; but it proved a fatal and insidious pneumonia. Perhaps it was the more fatal, because he was providentially deprived of the assistance of his faithful family physician for nearly twenty-four hours after his first attack. When he first secured medical aid, his symptoms were most ominous; and after one or two delusive promises of relaxation, the disease finished its deadly work on Sabbath, April the 9th. His shattered frame had not the springs of an effectual resistance, and succumbed soon before a malady which is terrible even to the strongest.

The Wednesday after he was seized, West Hanover Presbytery convened at Brown's church, Cumberland, about fifteen miles from the Seminary. Perhaps the last business act which Dr. Sampson performed was one eminently characteristic of his punctuality. It was to send, by one of his colleagues, his excuse for absence from Presbytery, and a business paper of some importance to a third person, which he directed, with a special charge, to be placed without fail in the hands of the moderator. When the Presbytery learned his threatening condition, it proceeded at once to set apart a season of special in-

tercession on his behalf. Highly as he had been appreciated by his brethren before, when they began to look in the face the consequences of his loss, they seemed to awaken to a new sense of his value to the Seminary and the church. On Friday, and again on Saturday, when persons were recognized approaching the church, who were known to come direct from him, the house was almost deserted by the members, who came out, by an irrepressible impulse, to learn his state. Friday, when it was reported that there was a faint promise of amendment, it was agreed that the Presbytery should again unite in a season of intercession on his behalf; and prayer was offered, by the revered pastor of the College church, with a faith, tenderness, fervency and devout submission, which will never be forgotten to the dying day of those who heard it. Could such a prayer fail to enter into the ears of the *Lord of Sabaoth*? Doubtless it *was* heard and accepted; accepted even as that more bitter cry of our divine Exemplar was accepted: "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not my will, but thine, be done." "It is enough for the disciple to be as his Master." In all the congregations which received the news of our brother's danger, prayer was also made of the church unto God for him. The anxiety of the whole community concerning him revealed that he had a hold upon their respect and affections, which would not have been expected, if we remembered that his pursuits had been chiefly those of the study, and that he was rather among the people than of them. Persons going from the Seminary were everywhere stopped in the road by enquirers after his condition, in which there was a deep concern and tenderness, which came from the heart.

His religious exercises were just those of which his Christian life gave promise—without fear, for he had long lived in the assurance of hope; and without transport, for a disease so violent and prostrating left no animal spirits for such feelings, foreign as they were at all times, to his religious habits. Early in his sickness, but after his disease had manifested itself as a dangerous one, he remarked to one of his nurses, "I find now, what I have always felt, that a sick bed is no place to prepare for eternity. But I have not *that* to do. I long ago made my peace with God. The God I have feebly preached to others is my support."

His disease, attacking as it did the lungs, made talking both painful and injurious; and he and all about him were strongly inhibited by the physicians to converse much. He yielded an implicit obedience, remarking several times, "My life belongs not to myself, but to the church, the Seminary, my family, and to society; and it is my duty now not to consult my own inclinations, but conscientiously to observe the means of preserving life, as long as there is any hope." Indeed, he seemed to study calmness of emotions, and even to avert his mind from those objects which would excite the more near domestic affections, which were, to one blessed as he was, so tender, and in the prospect of their interruption, so harrowing. Thus he observed the means of life with the same composed, conscientious principle with which he had usually addressed himself to any other duty.

During the later and more decisive assaults of his disease, reason at times wavered on her seat. In his lucid moments he complained that his mind was filled with a teeming multitude of thoughts, new, varied, strange—some of them perplexed and troublous, some luminous and interesting. May it not be that this was the strife between the bedimming, enervating dominion of the flesh on the one hand, and the dawns of that nobler life to which the spirit rises when it bursts from the mortal coil, on the other; and as the doubtful tide of combat rolled to and fro, the shadows of earth-born dimness and confusion were alternating with gleams of Heaven's own light over his soul?

In these seasons the influence of his predominant tastes and pursuits was strongly visible. His mind was busy with the Word of God, expounding, or investigating its treasures in the original tongues.

Three days before his death he said, "It seems to me that all the difficult passages of Scripture I have ever investigated are present to my eye now, in Greek, Hebrew, or Chaldee, and all clamoring for settlement. But I tell them all, Go away, I am sick, and cannot attend to you." The last of these seasons of wandering was the morning of the Lord's day on which he died. During this he said to one of his nurses, "See that wall—it is all written over with Scripture promises; and they are in letters so large that I can read them every one." It was an

swered, "Oh no, there is nothing there, except the plastering." But he persisted, "Yes—they are there—cannot I see them? Lay your head here, beside mine, and then you will see them plain." She wishing to beguile him into more composure said, "Oh, don't think of these things—shut your eyes, and try to be quiet." "Why," replied he, "may I not read them? I know it is the Sabbath; but they are all Sunday reading—they are all from the Scripture."

Now, whence were those characters, invisible to all others, but so distinct to his failing eye-sight? Doubtless, they were recalled from the stores of recollection, where they had lain hid, apparently lost to himself, by a memory stimulated into preternatural activity, either by the approach of the spirit's release from material bonds, or by the inexplicable influence of disease. And now the vivid conception was so bodied forth to the mind's eye, in the season of excitement, as to seem to him actually pictured on the diseased retina, where the real images of the external world were fading dimly into darkness. And thus the walls were covered, to his eye, with the ample scrolls of a memory enriched by years of study. How mercifully does God deal with his children? Here it was so ordered, that those hours, which, in our apprehensions, we only think of as filled with anguish and fear, were beguiled with the contemplation of those sacred truths which had been his delight in health. And is there not here another illustration of that theory which seems so like truth—that every impression ever made on the memory, though it may seem to us obliterated, is still there, and will some day be revived, that man's soul is but a fearful "*Palimpsest*,"* where the earlier records are, only in seeming, removed to make way for the later, and all the labyrinthine history will stand out in letters of light, genial or lurid, to be re-read by the soul in eternity.

But after this, Dr. Sampson became more composed, and his self-possession returned completely; nor did it leave him again till the last moment. The strife between the powers of life and disease was decided; pain ceased, and he gently passed away. A few hours before the closing scene, his children were placed around his bed side, to receive his last words: but the

*DeQuincey.

effort to speak to them was so laborious, that at the suggestion of one of the physicians, he relinquished it. After they retired, he said with the most extreme difficulty, gasping a word at a time in whispers, between his labored respirations: "I had some things which I wished to say to them; but perhaps it is most wisely ordered that I should not say them. They know how I have lived. I have always taught them that God's Word is the only supreme rule of life. They have that—and it is enough. Perhaps they might have put my last words before God's Word." This was the last connected sentence he spoke.

How could he, whose business was to expound the Sacred Scriptures, have closed his life more appropriately, than with such an acquiescence in their complete sufficiency—coming as it did from the heart of a dying father?

Thus he quietly passed away, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The following Tuesday, he was borne to the grave, in the Seminary burying ground, by the hands of his pupils, and in the presence of a multitude, every one of whom seemed a sincere mourner.

CHAPTER VIII.

Practical Teachings of such a Life. Reward of Patience and Faith. Humility crowned with Honor. The Price of great Usefulness. Home Institutions must be sustained. Men of deep toned Piety and profound Scholarship demanded.

And here we should end our task, if we listened only to the promptings of our own feelings—leaving this life and this death to speak for themselves. But it is necessary that we should endeavor to enforce, more pointedly, a few of the impressive lessons which Providence has taught us in giving, and then taking, such a man. Of the appeal which his example speaks to the pious youth of our churches, to devote themselves wholly to God, of the loss which the Seminary and the Presbyterian church has sustained, of the darkness of this act of her head, and of the duty of implicit trust in the righteousness of his mysterious dealings, nothing will be said.

But looking back to the source of Dr. Sampson's Christian life, in the holy example, prayers and instructions of the Rev. Thornton Rogers, we see a delightful illustration of the truth, that "he which converteth the sinner from the error of his ways," not only "saveth a soul from death, but hideth a multitude of sins." When that good man labored in faith for the salvation of his irreligious pupil, he little knew what he was doing. His thought was to pluck him from perdition, and to make him a Christian, possibly an humble minister. He did not know that he was instrumentally contributing the most essential part towards the raising up of a master in Israel, whose steady and benign light was to be a blessing to two great commonwealths, and whose Christian virtues were to be reproduced in many scores of pastors, many of them, in their turn, pillars in the church, and fountains of an influence, national in its extent! Nor do we know, when we endeavor to do good, with how glorious a result our generous Master may reward us. Let us, then, not be weary in well doing. Mr. Rogers died in the prime of his life, and his friends mourned over the mystery of such a stroke upon such a man, as we have lately over the loss of his more eminent pupil. But, if his ministerial life had resulted in nothing else but the gift of one such man to the church, would it not have been a sufficient result?

Again. The weakness of our faith often staggers at sacrifices of worldly good to be made, and difficulties to be encountered, in the path of duty. Let all to whom the voice of God comes, learn by the example of our brother, to dismiss these fears, and trust the united command and promise, "Trust in the Lord and do good; so shalt thou dwell in the land, and verily thou shalt be fed." It was required of Dr. Sampson, in order to become a minister of the Gospel, to relinquish, apparently, the direct road to wealth and distinction. In following the beck of his master, he was compelled to brave many obstacles, and face threatening privations. But they were, at last, little more than threats. By the divine blessing on his own economy and industry, he was able at all times to surround himself, and those dear to him, with the comforts and decencies of life; and these increased ultimately to an ample competency. His temporal life knew no real want; and there

was no actual sacrifice of that external comfort with which unbelief would have scared him from his duty. And after all—in seeking the testimony of a good conscience towards God, he found that distinction which he had not sought; he gratified his friends by winning a far higher social position than that which he seemed to relinquish to serve God; and became the ornament and pride of his family. Let no man be afraid to trust God.

We find in the foregoing history also, a beautiful example of the honor which comes to true humility. If there was one moral trait pre-eminent in Dr. Sampson, it was modesty. The desire for self-display seemed to be foreign to his nature. He ever thought others better than himself. He never schemed or planned for promotion, but was guided by a magnanimous and elevated delicacy, which refused to lift a finger, even by any honorable competition, to secure distinction for himself. And in every public position, on the floor of every church court, his humility shrank from that prominence to which his wisdom entitled him. But while, with a single eye, forgetful of self, he was taking care of his Master's interests, that Master took care of his reputation. Though his position was one of scholastic privacy, and his talents were rather solid than brilliant, he steadily grew upon the appreciation of his brethren, until his early death found him enjoying a confidence, love and admiration, solid and extensive enough to satisfy any ambition. Where is the man, of only thirty-nine years, within the limits of the whole Presbyterian church, whose death would now leave a gap harder to be filled, or excite a sorrow more general and sincere?

While our brother sought out the lowest seat, God said to him, and the church repeated, "Go up higher." Would that this example might seal upon the heart of every young minister in our church the lesson, "Every one that exalteth himself shall be abased, and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted." Would that all the unworthy arts of an unsanctified ambition were as unknown in the church as they were in the conduct of this pure, Christian gentleman. They are as foolish and suicidal as they are unworthy.

The results of Dr. Sampson's life and labors present a painful—yea, almost a cruel illustration of the evils which have

more than once flowed from the tardy and partial co-operation, extended by our churches at the South, to their own public institutions. Here were industry, talents and acquirements that would have been sought after and valued by the largest theological schools in the land. Believing that God's providence pointed him to Union Seminary as his post, he poured out the riches of his mental treasures in her service. And to purchase what? Was it a worthy result of such a life, or a sufficient recompense for such an expenditure, to train a body of pupils, ranging, during the sixteen years of his labors, from eleven to twenty? Let us not be misunderstood. We know that, intrinsically, the training of one true minister—yea, the salvation of one soul, is worth the whole labors of an army of the most learned divines during their whole life. And were there but the one soul in the world, liable to perdition, it would be the part of sober wisdom to expend all of this labor in its behalf alone. But while the field is so vast, and so white to the harvest, and opportunities for doing good open so immeasurably before the eye of Christian enterprise, it is a waste to expend, for a very few, labors and talents which might elsewhere have blessed a multitude. We may securely ask this question, Suppose that the warmest friends of Union Seminary in 1838, being also the true friends of Dr. Sampson and of Christ's cause, could have foreseen that he had just sixteen precious years to labor; that he would soon attain such eminent capacities for his work; and that in spite of his acknowledged abilities, the lack of hearty co-operation and wise and seasonable effort on the part of others, would cabin and confine his field of usefulness to this narrow bound—would they themselves have been willing, would they have dared, to urge him to make the unequal sacrifice? A regard to the interests of Christ's kingdom would have forbidden it. They would have said, "We dare not selfishly expend so much, for so small a result. The field is the world. Let him go where, being better sustained, he can effect something larger for his Master." But they hoped better things for their own enterprise; and hoping, they honestly invited him to enlist in that important cause, in which they were sincerely struggling. He obeyed the call. He toiled on, hoping against hope, with magnanimous self-devotion; and most likely, sacrificed not only his labors, but his life, an expenditure

partially useless, in endeavoring to bear his unequal burden. And now, after the catastrophe, as his friends stand over the grave of so much that was noble in morals, wise in understanding and vigorous in action, they feel a regret, cruel, yea, immedicable, except by the submissiveness of faith, that his precious life was, in part, spent in vain. Not in vain, thank God! as to *his* reward, nor useless as to those indirect results, which, we trust, the wisdom and grace of God will bring out of his labors and example. But he was permitted to reap but a part of those abundant fruits which such labors should have earned, in his own life time, in such a country and such an age as ours. And this regret is ever embittered by the symptoms of returning prosperity and extending usefulness, which now appear in his darling institution. How touching the fate, that after sixteen years of toil, and hopes deferred, he was snatched away just as the smiles of success began to gladden his heart! But here, our regret is softened by the thought, that he has entered upon a reward of his labors far sweeter than that of a visible success.

But this is not the first (would that it might be the last) instance, in which our people have been half aroused by a partial sense of our social necessities, so as to set on foot some weak and half endowed effort for their supply. And then they supinely relax, and even make the half starved weakness of those institutions which they call their own, and whose ill success is their own loss and shame, the pretext for bestowing their indolent and heedless favors on foreign institutions, which are flourishing and popular because their natural owners and supporters, with a wiser forecast and energy, stood by them in their weakness. Meantime, those nobler spirits, who have been thrust forward into the breach, and whose clearer vision sees the vital importance of home enterprises to all our vital interests, wear away the springs of life, in a generous but useless sacrifice. And meantime the commonwealth, for the lack of these home institutions, lags farther and farther in the rear, and sends forth her money, her sons, her energies, her life blood, to fecundate the soils and adorn the fame of rival states! Must a hecatomb of her noblest lives be immolated, before the slumbering spirit of Virginia will awake to know and embrace her own interests?

But yet, as long as there is hope of Virginia, that "she is not dead, but sleepeth," let her sons hear the voice which demands that they shall be satisfied with none but the highest acquirements. In the example which we have been contemplating, the young ministers of our church may see the importance, and the solemn obligation of aiming at the highest standard of theological learning. If the church, if our Synods, would retain their respectability and influence, they must have a reserved corps of men, whose well-trained faculties, wide scholarship, and elevated character, will fit them to step at once into any of our places of trust and responsibility. Otherwise, we are reduced to one of two equally mortifying and ruinous alternatives, to commit those responsible posts to ill-furnished and incompetent men, who will betray the influence and character of our enterprises, in this age of honorable competition and vigorous progress in all other sections of our land, or else go begging to other sections, to get such men as they can afford to spare us. Have these Synods such a body of reserved talent and learning now? If the valuable men, who now fill the professorships and presidencies of our Presbyterian Colleges and State Universities, were removed by death, could the Synods point with confidence to sons of theirs, and tell them to step into the breaches, and account them fitted to take up the fallen mantles? If the chairs of our Seminary were vacated, would or would not the Synods be at fault, in their search for successors, to whom they could confidently commit those important posts? When Dr. Sampson fell prematurely, did they feel that it was easy to find many men in their borders, from among whom to select his successor?

It is not necessary that these questions be answered here. There may be an evil in the church far more portentous than a stinted supply of ministers. It is that which comes, when her younger ministry are satisfied with those more shallow attainments, which secure them a modicum of popular applause and favor, indolently recline upon the dependence of a facile and plausible pulpit talent, and relax those severer studies, by which the profound scholar is formed. It is an evil which strikes at the root of our prosperity, and when it prevails, can only be repaired at the root, and therefore, repaired tediously. For these

surface men cannot even reproduce their kind, sorry as is their kind, and the general prevalence of such a type of ministerial acquirement renders inevitable a subsequent dearth of even second rate ministers, and a state of starveling dependence on other sections.

We therefore beseech our young brethren, as for our life, to imitate the noble example which God has mercifully given our Zion in our lost brother, and to resolve that they will be satisfied with nothing short of the fullest development of faculties, the soundest acquirements, and the most scriptural, humble and manly piety, which are within the reach of the most sustained diligence. This is no less the command of duty, than of a sanctified ambition. We are to love and serve God with all our heart, and mind, and strength, and soul. We are partially guilty of burying our talents, unless we prepare ourselves to meet the highest exigencies which are within the possibilities of our natural gifts.

In the life of Dr. Sampson, we see how directly that kind of scholarship which is usually esteemed least practical in a minister of the gospel, an extensive acquaintance with oriental literature, was made to subserve the interests of the church—yea, how immediately and necessarily those interests would have suffered, for the lack of them.

If there is one thing proved by an experience of some twenty-five years, it is, that none but first rate men can now effectually subserve the institutions and interests of these Synods, in their prominent posts. To secure so many such men as they will need, there must be a liberal number, especially among their younger ministry, capable of the greatest things, from among whom they may choose. We do not expect to find plants of tallest and most vigorous growth among the few untimely shoots which spring up here and there in the season of wintry sterility. We expect to find them all puny, for the same reason which makes them few. And if one is found truly vigorous, it is a true *lusus naturae*. We look for the full grown plant amidst the teeming abundance of the fruitful summer, and in the thickest part of a thick and emulous crop.

Unless we have, then, such a body of noble men, "whose hearts God hath touched," we do not say our cause is lost, but we say that success, worthy of the cause, is impossible. The

church expects every man to be the greatest he can be. She needs men who have begun, in the first place, by laying the foundation of a thorough and full academical course, which entirely transcends that scanty range of scholarship which is too often the limit of our collegiate courses; or else, if this is lacking, men who have repaired the lack by the herculean exertions of later years. Then, they must be men who superadd to this not only such a theological training as will pass them creditably through Presbyteries, and suffice for the making of genteel little sermons, but a thorough and ever widening knowledge of the original languages of the Scriptures, and the doings and doctrines of the great masters of theology in all ages. They must also be men free from trivial but odious tricks of personal indulgence or weakness—men, whose directness of aim, whose humble dignity of character, whose self possession, whose fervent energy in doing good will impress and awe the popular mind. For, without these moral traits, brilliant faculties and acquirements will be to the church little more than splendid vexations. And last—they must be men whose eye is single, whose hearts and purposes are governed by a profound and steady love of God. Such was Francis S. Sampson. Would that all the sons of our church might be such. She has had no more pure, more symmetrical, more elevated example, to which she may point her young ministers and members, and say, “Be ye followers of him, even as he also was of Christ.”

TRUE COURAGE.

A Discourse Commemorative of Lieut.-General Thomas J. Jackson.

Note: General Jackson died May 10th, 1863. In June following, the author was urgently requested to deliver a memorial sermon for him in Richmond. Having acceded to this request, he prepared the following discourse, and delivered it in the First Presbyterian Church, the evening of the first Sabbath of June, before a vast assemblage of officers, soldiers, and citizens. If the reader has happened to have seen also the Life of General Jackson, he will notice a certain similarity of thoughts, and even of language, in the sermon and in some parts of the narrative. The author has not been careful to suppress the whole of these in republishing the sermon, because he was not afraid of the charge of repeating his own matter, where it formed so appropriate, and indeed, so necessary a part of both compositions.

"Be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that, have no more than they can do. But I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear: Fear him which, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell; yea, I say unto you, fear him."—Luke 12:4-5.

A little wisdom and experience will teach us to be very modest, in interpreting God's purposes by his providences. "It is the glory of the Lord to conceal a thing." His designs are too vast and complex for our puny minds to infer them, from the fragments of his ways which fall under our eyes. Yet, it is evident, that He intends us to learn instruction from the events which occur before us under the regulation of his holy will. The profane are more than once rebuked by him (as Is. 5: 12) because "they regard not the work of the Lord, neither consider the operation of his hands." And our Saviour sharply chides the Jewish Pharisees: "O ye hypocrites! ye can discern the face of the sky; but can ye not discern the signs of the

times?" (Matt. 16: 3.) We are not therefore to refuse the lessons of those events which Providence evolves, because caution and humility are required in learning them. We have a guide, which will conduct us securely to the understanding of so much of them as God intends us to study: That guide is the Holy Scriptures. Among the several principles which they lay down for the explanation of God's dealings, it is sufficient for our present task, to declare this one: That the characters of his children, which exhibit the scriptural model, are given as examples, to be studied and imitated by us. He would thus teach us more than those abstract conceptions of Christian excellence, which are conveyed by general definitions of duty; he would give us a living picture and concrete idea. He thus aims to stimulate our aspirations and efforts, by showing us that the attainments of holiness are within human reach. He enstamps the moral likeness on the imitative soul by the warmth of admiration and love. That such is the use God intends us to make of noble examples, the Apostle James teaches us (5: 10)—"Take, my brethren, the prophets, who have spoken in the name of the Lord, for an example of suffering affliction and of patience"; and the Epistle to the Hebrews (6: 12) when it desires us to "be followers of them who, through faith and patience, inherit the promises."

Common sense teaches us then, from these texts, that the lesson is important and impressive, in proportion as the example given us was illustrious. By this rule, God addresses to us instruction of solemn emphasis, in the character, and the death, which we have now met to commemorate. Our dead hero is God's sermon to us, his embodied admonition, his incorporate discourse, to inculcate upon us the virtues with which he was adorned by the Holy Ghost; and especially those traits of the citizen, the Christian, and the soldier, now most essential to the times. He calls us, not to exhaust the occasion in useless sensibilities, but to come and learn the beauty of holiness, by the light of a shining example; and to let our passionate love and grief burn in upon the plastic heart, the impress of his principles. Happy shall I be, if I can so conceive and execute my humble task, as to permit this character to speak its own high lesson to your hearts. The only reason which makes you think this task appropriate to me, is doubtless this: that I had the

privilege of his friendship, and an opportunity for intimately observing his character, during the most brilliant part of his career. The expectations which you form from this fact, must be my justification from the charge of egotism, if I should allude to my own observations of him, in exemplifying these instructions. But I must also forewarn you, that should there be any expectation of mere anecdote to gratify an idle curiosity, or of any disclosures of confidential intercourse, now doubly sanctified by the seal of the tomb, it will not be gratified. And let it be added, that however the heart may prompt encomiums on the departed, these are not the direct object, but only the incidental result, of this discourse. I stand here, as God's herald, in God's sanctuary, on his holy day, by his authority. My business is, not to praise any man, however beloved and bewailed, but only to unfold God's message through his life and death. Among that circle of virtues which his symmetrical character displayed, since time would fail me to do justice to all, I propose more especially, to select one, for our consideration, his Christian courage.

Courage is the opposite of fear. But fear may be described either as a feeling and appreciation of existing danger, or an undue yielding to that feeling. It is in the latter sense, that it is unworthy. In the former, it is the necessary result of the natural desire for well-being, in a creature endued with reflection and forecast. Hence, a true courage implies the existence of fear, in the form of a sense, that is, of a feeling of danger. For courage is but the overcoming of that feeling by a worthier motive. A danger unfelt is as though it did not exist. No man could be called brave for advancing coolly upon a risk of which he was totally unconscious. It is only where there is an exertion of fortitude in bearing up against the consciousness of peril, that true courage has place. If there is any man who can literally say that "he knows no fear," then he deserves no credit for his composure. True, a generous fortitude, in resisting the consciousness of danger, will partly extinguish it; so that a sensibility to it, over-sensitive and prominent among the emotions, is an indication of a mean self-love.

There are three emotions which claim the name of courage. The first is animal courage. This is but the ferment of animal passions and blind sympathies, combined with an irrational

thoughtlessness. The man is courageous, only because he refuses to reflect; bold because he is blind. This animal hardihood, according to the obvious truths explained above, does not deserve the name of true courage; because there is no rational fortitude in resisting the consciousness of danger. And it is little worthy of trust; for having no foundation in a reasoning self command, a sudden, vivid perception of the evil hitherto unnoted, may, at any moment, supplant it with a panic, as unreasoning and intense as the previous fury. The second species of courage is that prompted by the spirit of personal honor. There is a consciousness of risk; but it is manfully controlled by the sentiment of pride, the keener fear of reproach, and the desire of applause. This kind of fortitude is more worthy of the name of courage, because it exhibits self-command. But after all, the motive is personal and selfish; and therefore the sentiment does not rise to the level of a virtue. The third species is the moral courage of him who fears God, and, for that reason, fears nothing else. There is an intelligent apprehension of danger; there is the natural instinct of self-love desiring to preserve its own well-being; but it is curbed and governed by the sense of duty, and desire for the approbation of God. This alone is true courage; true virtue; for it is rational, and its motive is moral and unselfish. It is a true Christian grace, when found in its purest forms, a grace whose highest exemplar, and whose source, is the Divine Redeemer; whose principle is that parent grace of the soul, *faith*. "David, and Samuel, and the prophets, *through faith* subdued kingdoms, * * * waxed valiant in fight, turned to flight the armies of the aliens." (Heb. 11: 33, 34.) Trust in God, in his faithfulness, his approbation, his reward, his command to brave the risks allotted to them, was their motive. But "Christ dwelleth in our hearts by faith." (Eph. 3: 17.) This is the principle by which the soul of the believer is brought into living union with Christ; and the heart, otherwise sapless and withered, is penetrated by the vital sap of his holy Spirit. He is the head; men of faith his members; he the stock; they the branches; his divine principles circulate from him into their souls, and assimilate them to him. But the whole mission of Jesus Christ on earth is a divine exemplification of moral courage. What was it, save the unselfish sentiment of duty, overruling the anticipations of personal

evil, which made him declare, in prospect of all the woes of his incarnation, "Lo I come, in the volume of the book it is written of me; I delight to do thy will Oh my God?" What else caused him to press forward with eager, hungering haste, through the toils and obloquy of his persecuted life, to that baptism of blood, which awaited him in Jerusalem? What else nerved him, when deserted, betrayed, and destined to death, desolate, and fainting, amidst a pitiless flood of enemies, one word of disclaimer might have rescued him, to refuse that word, and assert his rightful kingship over Zion, with a tenacity more indomitable than the grave? Jesus Christ is the divine pattern and fountain of heroism. Earth's true heroes are they who derive their courage from him.

Yet it is true, the three kinds of bravery which have been defined, may be mixed in many breasts. Some who have true moral courage may also have animal hardihood; and others of the truly brave may lack it. No Christian courage, perhaps, exists without a union of that which the spirit of personal honor, in its innocent phase, inspires; and many men of honor have perhaps some shade of the pure sentiment of duty, mingled with the pride and self-glorifying, which, chiefly nerve their fortitude. *But he is the bravest man who is the best Christian. It is he who truly fears God, who is entitled to fear nothing else.*

I. He whose conduct is governed by the fear of God, is brave, because the powers of his soul are in harmony. There is no mutiny or war within, of fear against shame, of duty against safety, of conscience and evil desire, by which the bad man has his heart unnerved. All the nobler capacities of the soul combine their strength, and especially, that master power, of which the wicked are compelled to sing: "It is conscience that makes cowards of us all," invigorates the soul with her plaudits. In conscious rectitude there is strength.

This strength General Jackson eminently possessed. He walked in the fear of God, with a perfect heart, keeping all his commandments and ordinances, blameless. Never has it been my happiness to know one of greater purity of life, or more regular and devout habits of prayer. As ever in his great task-master's eye, he seemed to devote every hour to the sentiment of duty, and only to live to fulfill his charge as a servant of God. Of this be assured, that all his eminence and success as

a great and brave soldier, were based on his eminence and sanctity as a Christian. Thus, every power of his soul was brought to move in sweet accord, under the guidance of an enlightened and honest conscience. How could such a soul fail to be courageous for the right?

But especially did he derive firmness and decision, from the peculiar strength of his conviction concerning the righteousness and necessity of this war. Had he not sought the light of the Holy Scriptures, in thorough examination and prayer, had his pure and honest conscience not justified the act, even in the eye of that Searcher of hearts, whose fear was his ever-present, ruling principle, never would he have drawn his sword in this great quarrel, at the prompting of any sectional pride, or ambition, or interest, or anger, or dread of obloquy. But having judged for himself, in all sincerity, he decided, with a force of conviction as fixed as the everlasting hills, that our enemies were the aggressors, that they assailed vital, essential rights, and that resistance unto death was our right and duty. On the correctness of that decision, reached through fervent prayer, under the teachings of the sure word of Scripture, through the light of the Holy Spirit, which he was assured God vouchsafed to him, he stood prepared to risk, not only earthly prospects and estate, but an immortal soul; and to venture, without one quiver of doubt or fear, before the irrevocable bar of God the Judge. The great question: "What if I die in this quarrel," was deliberately settled; so deliberately, so maturely, that he was ready to venture his everlasting all upon the belief that this was the path of duty.

II. The second reason which makes the man of faith brave, is stated in the context: "Are not five sparrows sold for two farthings, and not one of them is forgotten before God? But even the very hairs of your head are all numbered: Fear not therefore; ye are of more value than many sparrows." God's special providence is over all his creatures, and all their actions; it is over them that fear him; for their good only. By that almighty and omniscient providence, all events are either produced; or at least permitted, limited, and overruled. There is no creature so great as to resist its power, none so minute as to evade its wisdom. Each particular act among the most multitudinous which confound our attention by their number,

or the most fortuitous, which entirely baffle our inquiry into their causes, is regulated by this intelligent purpose of God. Even when the thousand missiles of death, invisible to mortal sight, and sent forth aimless by those who launched them, shoot in inexplicable confusion over the battle-field, his eye gives each one an aim and a purpose, according to the plan of his wisdom. Thus teacheth our Saviour.

Now, the child of God is not taught what is the special will of God as to himself; he has no revelation as to the security of his person. Nor does he presume to predict what particular dispensation God will grant to the cause in which he is embarked. But he knows that, be it what it may, it will be wise, and right, and good. Whether the arrows of death shall smite him or pass him by, he knows no more than the unbelieving sinner; but he knows that neither event can happen him without the purpose and will of his Heavenly Father. And that will, be it whichever it may, is guided by divine wisdom and love. Should the event prove a revelation of God's decision, and this was the place, and this the hour, for life to end; then he accepts it with calm submission; for are not the time and place chosen for him by the All-wise, who loves him from eternity? Him who walks in the true fear of God, God loves. He hath adopted him as his son forever, through his faith on the righteousness of the Redeemer. The divine anger is forever extinguished by the atonement of the Lamb of God, and the unchangeable love of God is conciliated to him by the spotless righteousness of his substitute. The preciousness of the unspeakable gift which God gave for his redemption, even the life of the Only-begotten, and the earnest of the Holy Ghost, bestowed upon him at first while a guilty sinner, are the arguments to this believer, of the richness and strength of God's love to him. He knows that a love so eternal, so free, so strong, in the breast of such a God and Saviour, can leave nothing unbestowed, which divine wisdom perceives to be for his true good. "He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things." (Rom. 8: 32.) And this love has enlisted for his safeguard, all the attributes of God, which are the security of his own blessedness. Why dwelleth the divine mind in ineffable, perpetual peace? Not because there are none to assail it; but

because God is conscious in himself of infinite resources, for defense and victory; of a knowledge which no cunning can deceive; of a power which no combination can fatigue. Well, these same attributes, which support the stability of Jehovah's throne, surround the weakest child of God, with all the zeal of redeeming love. "The eternal God is his refuge; and underneath him are the everlasting arms." (Deut. 33: 27.) Therefore saith the Apostle, that the believer hath "his heart and mind garrisoned by the peace of God which passeth all understanding." (Phil. 4: 7.) And therefore our Saviour saith, with a literal emphasis of which our faint hearts are slow to take in the full glory: "Peace I leave with you; *my* peace I give unto you." (John 14: 27.) In proportion as God's children have faith to embrace the love of God to them, are they lifted in spirit to his very throne, and can look down upon the rage of battle, and the tumult of the people, with some of the holy disdain, the ineffable security, which constitute the blessedness of God. "Their life is hid with Christ in God."

It has been said that General Jackson was a fatalist, by those who knew not whereof they affirmed. He was a strong believer in the special providence of God. The doctrine of a **Fate** is, that all events are fixed by an immanent, physical necessity in the series of causes and effects themselves; a necessity as blind and unreasoning as the tendency of the stone towards the earth, when unsupported from beneath; a necessity as much controlling the intelligence and will of God as of creatures; a necessity which admits no modification of results through the agency of second causes, but renders them inoperative and non-essential, save as the mere, passive stepping stones in the inevitable progression. The doctrine of a Providence teaches that the regular, natural agency of second causes is sustained, preserved, and regulated by the power and intelligence of God; and that in and through that agency, every event is directed by his most wise and holy will, according to his plan, and the laws of nature which he has ordained. Fatalism tends to apathy, to absolute inaction: a belief in the providence of the Scriptures, to intelligent and hopeful effort. It does not overthrow, but rather establish the agency of second causes, because it teaches us that God's purpose to effectuate events only through them (save in the case of miracles) is as steadfast, as

his purpose to carry out his eternal plan. Hence it produces a combination of courageous serenity,—with cheerful diligence in the use of means. My illustrious leader was as laborious as he was trustful; and laborious precisely because he was trustful. Every thing that self-sacrificing care, and preparation, and forecast, and toil, could do, to prepare and to earn success, he did. And therefore it was, that God, without whom “the watchman waketh but in vain,” usually bestowed success. So likewise, his belief in the superintendence of the Almighty was a most strong and living conviction. In every order, or dispatch, announcing a victory, he was prompt to ascribe the result to the Lord of Hosts; and those simple, emphatic, devout ascriptions were with him no unmeaning formalities. In the very flush of triumph, he has been known to seize the juncture for the earnest inculcation of this truth upon the minds of his subordinates. On the momentous morning of Friday, June 27th, 1862, as the different corps of the patriot army were moving to their respective posts, to fill their parts in the mighty combination of their chief, after Jackson had held his final interview with him, and resumed his march for his position at Cold Harbour, his command was misled, by a misconception of his guides, and seemed about to mingle with, and confuse, another part of our forces. More than an hour of seemingly precious time was expended in rectifying this mistake; while the booming of cannon in the front told us that the struggle had begun, and made our breasts thrill with an agony of suspense, lest the irreparable hour should be lost by our delay; for we had still many miles to march. When this anxious fear was suggested privately to Jackson, he answered, with a calm and assured countenance: “No; let us trust that the providence of our God will so overrule it, that no mischief shall result.” And verily; no mischief did result. Providence brought us precisely into conjunction with the bodies with which we were to co-operate; the battle was joined at the right juncture and by the time the stars appeared, the right wing of the enemy, with which he was appointed to deal, was hurled in utter rout, across the river. More than once, when sent to bring one of his old fighting brigades into action, I had noticed him sitting motionless upon his horse with his right hand uplifted, while the war worn column poured in stern silence close by his side. At first it did not ap-

pear whether it was mere abstraction of thought, or a posture to relieve his fatigue. But at Port Republic, I saw it again; and watching him more narrowly, was convinced by his closed eyes and moving lips, that he was wrestling in silent prayer. I thought that I could surmise what was then passing through his fervent soul; the sovereignty of that Providence which worketh all things after the counsel of his own will, and giveth the battle not to the strong, nor the race to the swift: his own fearful responsibility, and need of that counsel and sound wisdom, which God alone can give; the crisis of his beloved country, and the balance trembling between defeat and victory; the precious lives of his veterans, which the inexorable necessities of war compelled him to jeopardize; the immortal souls passing to their account, perhaps unprepared; the widowhood and orphanage which might result from the orders he had just been compelled to issue. And as his beloved men swept by him to the front, into the storm of shot, doubtless his great heart, as tender as it was resolute, yearned over them in unutterable longings and intercessions, that "the Almighty would cover them with his feathers, and that his truth might be their shield and buckler." Surely the moral grandeur of this scene was akin to that, when Moses stood upon the Mount of God, and lifted up his hands, while Israel prevailed against Amalek! And what soldier would not desire to have the shield of such prayers, under which to fight? Were they not a more powerful element of success than the artillery, or the bayonets of the Stonewall Brigade?

III. The true fear of God ensures the safety of the immortal soul. United to Christ by faith, adopted into the unchanging favor of God, and heir of an inheritance in the skies which is as secure as the throne of God, the believing soul, is lifted above the reach of bodily dangers. But the soul is the true man, the true self, the part which alone feels or knows, desires or fears, sorrows or rejoices, and which lives forever. It is its fate which is irrevocable. If it be lost, all is lost; and finally lost; if it be secure, all other losses are secondary, yea, in comparison, trivial. To the child of God, the rage of enemies, mortal weapons, and pestilence are impotent. True, he has no assurance that they may not reach his body, but they reach his body only, and,

"If the plague come nigh,
And sweep the wicked down to hell,
T'will raise the saints on high."

This is our Saviour's argument, "Be not afraid of them that kill the body; and after that *have no more that they can do*" Pagan fable perhaps intended to foreshadow this glorious truth, when it described its hero with a body made invulnerable by its bath in the divine river, and therefore insensible to fear, and indifferent to the weapons of death. But the spiritual reality of the allegory is found only in the Christian, who has washed his soul from the stain of sin (which alone causes its death), in the Redeemer's blood. He is the invulnerable man. "The arrow cannot make him flee; darts are counted as stubble; he laugheth at the shaking of a spear." He shares, indeed the natural affections and instincts which make life sweet to every man, and bodily pain and death formidable. But these emotions of his sensuous being are counteracted by his faith, which gives to his soul a substantial, inward sense of heavenly life, as more real and satisfying than the carnal. The clearer the faith of the Christian, the more complete is this victory over natural fears. To the mere unbeliever, this mortal life is his all-in-all, bodily death is utter extinction, pain is the master evil, and the grave is covered by a horror of great darkness unrelieved by one ray of hope or light. And Christians of a weaker type, in their weaker moments, cannot shake off the shuddering of nature in the presence of these, the supreme evils of the natural man. But as faith brightens, that tremor is quieted; the more substantial the grasp of faith on eternal realities, the more does the giant death dwindle in his proportions, the less mortal does his sword appear, the narrower and more trivial seems the gap which he makes between this life and the higher; because that better life is brought nearer to the apprehension of the soul. Does the eagle lament to see the wolf ravage its deserted nest, as it betakes itself to its destined skies, and nerves its young pinions and fires its eyes in the beam of the king of day? The believer knows also, that should his body be smitten into the grave, the resurrection day will repair all the ravages of the sword, and restore the poor tenement to his occupancy, "fashioned like unto Christ's glorious body." He can adopt the boast of inspiration: "God is our refuge and strength;

a very present help in trouble. Therefore will not we fear though the earth be removed, and though the mountains be carried into the midst of the sea." (Ps. 46: 1, 2.) Amidst the storm of battle, and even the wreck of defeat, his steadfast heart knows no fear.

But that the enemy of God should have courage in battle, is incomprehensible to me. It can only be explained by thoughtlessness. When the danger which assails the body reaches the soul also, when the weapon that lays the body in the dust, will plunge the soul into everlasting and intolerable torments, by what philosophy can a reasoning being brace himself to meet it? He who has not God for his friend, has no right to be brave. But we should be far from inferring thence, that the citizen who is conscious of his enmity to God, is therefore justified in shunning the exposure to this risk, at the expense of duty and honor. This would be but to add sin to sin, and folly to folly. If safety is not found in the path of duty, still more surely it will not be found, when out of it. He is in the greatest danger, who is disobeying God; and infinite wisdom and power can never be at a loss for means to strike their enemy, however far removed wounds and weapons of war may be. To refuse a recognized duty is the surest way to alienate the mercy of God, and to grieve that Holy Ghost, on whom we depend for faith and repentance. The only safe or rational course therefore, for the ungodly soldier, is to make his peace with God at once; and thus advance with well-grounded confidence in the path of his duty, and of all men, the soldier has the strongest reasons to become a Christian!

Such was the foundation of the courage of Jackson. He walked with God, in conscious integrity; and he embraced with all his heart "the righteousness of God which is by the faith of Jesus Christ." His soul, I believe, dwelt habitually in the full assurance that God was his God, and his portion forever. His manly and vigorous faith brought heaven so near, that death had slight terrors for him. While it would be unjust to charge him with rashness in exposure to danger, yet whenever his sense of duty prompted it, he seemed to risk his person with an absolute indifference to fear. The sense of his responsibilities to his country, and the heat of his mighty spirit in the crisis of battle, might sometimes agitate him vehemently; but

never was the most imminent personal peril seen to disturb his equanimity for one moment. It is a striking trait of the impression which he has made upon his countrymen, that while no man could possibly be farther from boasting, it always became the first article of the belief of those subject to his command, that he was, of course, a man of perfect courage.

But courage alone does not explain the position which he held in the hearts of his people. In this land of heroic memories and brave men, others besides Jackson have displayed true courage. God did not endow him with several of those native gifts which are supposed to allure the idolatry of mankind towards their heroes. He affected no kingly mien nor martial pomp; but always bore himself with the modest propriety of the Christian. Nor did he ever study or practice those arts, by which a Bonaparte or an Alexander kindled the enthusiasm of their followers. The only manifestation which he ever made of himself was in the simple and diligent performance of the duties of his office. His part on the battle-field was usually rather suggestive of the zeal and industry of the faithful servant, than of the contagious exaltation of a master-spirit. Nature had not given to him even the corporeal gift of the trumpet tones, with which other leaders are said to have roused the divine phrensy in their followers. It was only at times that his modest and feeble voice was lifted up to his hosts; and then, as he shouted his favorite call: "Press forward," the fiery energy of his will, thrilled through his rapid utterance, rather like the deadly clang of the rifle, than the sonorous peal of the clarion. His was a master-spirit; but it was too simply grand to study dramatic sensations. It impressed its might upon the souls of his countrymen, not through deportment, but through deeds. Its discourses were toilsome marches and battles joined, its perorations were the thunder-claps of defeat hurled upon the enemies of his country. It revealed itself to us only through the purity and force of his action; and therefore the intensity of the effect he has produced.

This may help to explain the enigma of his reputation. How is it that this man, of all others least accustomed to exercise his own fancy, or address that of others, has stimulated the imagination, not only of his countrymen, but of the civilized world, above all the sons of genius among us? How has he,

the most unromantic of great men, become the hero of a living romance, the ideal of an inflamed fancy in every mind, even before his life had passed into history! How did that calm eye kindle the fire of so passionate a love and admiration in the heart of his people? He was brave, but not the only brave. He revealed transcendent military talent; but the diadem of his country now glows with a galaxy of such talent. He was successful; but we have more than one captain, whose banner never trailed before an enemy. I will tell you the solution. It was, chiefly, the singleness, purity, and elevation of his aims. Every one who observed him was as thoroughly convinced of his unselfish devotion to duty as of his courage; as certain that no thought of personal advancement, of ambition or applause, ever for one instant divided the homage of his heart with his great cause, and that "all the ends he aimed at were his country's, his God's, and truth's," as that he was brave. The love of his countrymen is the spontaneous testimony of the common conscience, to the beauty of holiness. It is the confession of our nature that the virtue of the Sacred Scriptures, which is a virtue purer and loftier than that of philosophy, is the true greatness, grander than knowledge, talent, courage, or success. Here, then, as I believe, is God's chief lesson in his life and death (and the belief encourages auspicious hopes concerning God's designs towards us.) He would teach us the beauty and power of pure Christianity, as an element of our social life, of our national career. Therefore he took an exemplar of Christian sincerity, as near perfection as the infirmities of our nature would permit, formed and trained in an honorable retirement; he set it in the furnace of trial, at an hour when great events and dangers had awakened the popular heart to most intense action; he illustrated it with that species of distinction which above all others, attracts the popular gaze, military glory; and held it up to the admiring inspection of a country grateful for the deliverances it had wrought for us. Thus he has taught us, how good a thing his fear is. He has made all men see and acknowledge that, in this man, his Christianity was the fountain head of the virtues and talents, which they so rapturously applauded; that it was the fear of God which made him so fearless of all else; that it was the love of God which animated his energies; that it was the singleness of his aims

which caused his whole body to be so full of light, that the unerring decisions of his judgment, suggested to the unthinking, the belief in his actual inspiration; and that the lofty chivalry of his nature was but the reflex of the Spirit of Christ. Do not even the profane admit this explanation of his character? Here then, is God's lesson, in this life, to these Confederate States: "It is righteousness that exalteth." Hear it ye young men, ye soldiers, ye magistrates, ye law-givers; that "he that exalteth himself shall be abased; but he that humbleth himself shall be exalted."

But what would he teach us by his death, to our view so untimely? To this question, human reason can only answer, that God's judgments are far above us, and past our finding out.

One lovely Sabbath, riding alone with me to a religious service in a camp, General Jackson was talking of the general prospects of the war, hopefully, as he ever did. But at the close, he assumed an air of intense seriousness, and said: "I do not mean to convey the impression that I have not as much to live for as any man, and that life is not as sweet. But I do not desire to survive the independence of my country." Can this death be the answer to that wish? Can the solution be, that having tried us, and found us unworthy of such a deliverer, God has hid his favorite in the grave, in the brightness of his hopes, and before his blooming honors received any blight from disaster, from the calamities which our sins are about to bring upon us? Nay; we will not believe that the legacy of Jackson's prayers was all expended by us, when he died; they will yet avail for us all the more, that they are now sealed by his blood. The deliverance of the Jews did not end with the untimely end of Judas Maccabee. The death of William of Orange was not the death of the Dutch Republic. The lamented fall of John Hampden was not the fall of the liberties of England. And, if we may reverently associate another instance with these, the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth, was, contrary to the fears of his disciples, but the beginning of the sect of the Nazarenes. So, let us hope, the tree of our liberties will flourish but the more for the precious blood by which it is watered.

May it not be, that God, after enabling him to render all the service which was essential to our deliverance, and showing us in him, the brightest example of the glory of Christianity,

has hid him enter into the joy of his Lord, at this juncture, in order to warn us against our incipient idolatry, and make us say: "It is better to trust in the Lord, than to put confidence in princes?" No man would more strongly deprecate this idolatry of human instruments, than Jackson, and never so strongly, as when addressed to himself. None can declare more emphatically than would he, if he spoke to us from the skies, that while man is mortal, the cause is immortal. Away then, with unmanly discouragements, God lives, though our hero is dead.

That he should have toiled so hard for the independence of his country, and so ardently desired it; and then at last, be forbidden to hail the day of our final deliverance, or to receive the grateful honors which his fellow-citizens were preparing for him; this has saddened every heart with a pang both tender and pungent. The medicine to this pain, my brethren, is to remember, that he has entered into a triumph and peace, so much more glorious than that which he hied to achieve for his country. It would have been sweet to us, to hail him returning from his last victory to a delivered and enfranchised country; sweet to see and sympathize with the joy with which he hung up his sword, and paid the sacrifices of thanksgiving in the courts of the Lord's house; sweet to witness, with reverent respect, the domestic bliss of the home for which he so much sighed, solacing him for his long fatigues. That happiness *we* have lost; but *he* has lost nothing. He has laid down his sword at the footstool of his Father God; he now sings his thanksgiving song in a nobler sanctuary than the earthly one he loved so much; he "hathes his weary soul in seas of heavenly rest."

We who loved him, while we hewail our own loss, should not forget the circumstances which alleviate the grief of his death. Surely, it was no ill-chosen time for God to call him to his rest, when his powers were in their undimmed prime, and his military glory at its zenith; when his greatest victory had just been won; and the last sounds of earth which reached him were the thanksgivings and blessings of a nation in raptures for his achievements; in tears for his sufferings. I love to remember, too, that his martyr-life had just been gladdened by the gratification of those affections which were in him so sweet and strong, and which yet, he sacrificed, so patiently, for his country.

Still more do we thank God that it was practicable, as it might not have been at an earlier, or a later period, for him to enjoy those ministrations of love, in his last days, which were the dearest solace of his sufferings. Into the sacredness of those last communings, and of the grief which survives them in his widowed home, we may not allow even our thoughts to intrude. And yet, may not a mourning nation venture to utter their blessing on the mourning heart which blessed him with its love; and to pray, that the breast which so magnanimously calmed its tumult, to make a quiet pillow for the dying head of their hero, may be visited by God, with the most healing balm of heavenly consolation? Will not all the people say: amen?

Nor will they forget the tender flower, sole off-shoot of the parent stock, born to bloom amidst the wintry storms of war, which he would fain have forbidden the summer breeze to visit too roughly. The giant tree which would have shielded it with pride so loving, lies prone before the blast. But His God will be its God; and as long as the most rugged breast of his hardy comrades is warm, it will not lack for a parent's tenderness.

And now, with one more lesson, I leave you to the teachings of the mighty dead. If there was one trait which was eminent in him above the rest, it was determination. This was the power, before whose steady and ardent heat obstacles melted away. This was the force, which caused his battalions to breast the onset of the enemy like ramparts of stone, or else launched them irresistibly upon their shivered lines. It was his unconquerable will, and purpose never to submit or yield. Every one who was near him imbibed something of this spirit, for they saw that in him the acceptance of defeat was an impossibility. To that conclusion no earthly power could bend his iron will. Let this example commend to us the same steadfast temper. In his fall and that of the noble army of martyrs, every generous soul should read a new argument for defending the cause for which he died, with invincible tenacity. Surely their very blood might cry out against us from the ground, if we permitted the soil, which drank the precious libation to be polluted with the despot's foot! Shall it ever be, that our discouragement or cowardice shall make the sacrifice vain? If we consent to this, then was it not treacherous in us to invite it?

We should rather have warned them to restrain their generosity, to save the lives they were so ready to lay upon their country's altar, as too precious to be wasted for a land occupied by predestined slaves and cowards, and to carry their patriotism and their gifts to some more propitious clime, and some worthier companionship.

Such are the thoughts which should inspire the heart of every one who stands beside the grave of Jackson. Around that green and swelling hill stands the circle of solemn mountain peaks keeping everlasting watch over the home which he loved and the tomb where his ashes sleep, majestic when the summer sunset bathes them in azure and gold, but only more grandly steadfast, when they are black with storms and winter. So, let us resolve, we will guard the honor and the rights for which he died, in the hour of triumph, and more immoveably in the hour of disaster.

MEMORIAL OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN T. THORNTON, OF THE THIRD VIRGINIA CAVALRY, C. S. A.

Amidst the great company of Christian heroes whom Virginia has sacrificed for the independence of the Confederate States, few names, next to her Jackson's, shine more brightly than that of Lieut. Col. John T. Thornton, of Prince Edward, Va. The son of Mr. Wm. Thornton, of Cumberland county, he inherited from his father an honorable name, a vigorous understanding, and an ample estate. After the most careful literary training, he adopted the profession of law, and chose the town of Farmville for his residence. From the very beginning, his high honor and qualifications secured him the respect of his fellow-citizens; and he stepped into a husy practice, in which he was fast winning the highest grade of distinction. Here the present war found him, although still a young man, diligently engaged in his profession, the pride, the trusted counsellor, and chosen servant, of his county, and surrounded with all the domestic bliss which an elegant home, and an engaging family could confer. This happiness he was peculiarly fitted to enjoy. But although a liberal supporter, and habitual attendant, of the offices of religion, he was not yet a Christian: this crown was lacking to his character.

Mr. Thornton was in temper a conservative; and accordingly, in politics he was no extremist. Of the convention which dissolved the connection of Virginia with the Federal Union, he was chosen a member. There, and in the primary meetings of the people, his chaste and masculine eloquence was frequently heard, advocating, on the one hand, all the conciliation and forbearance towards our assailants consistent with honor and righteousness, and on the other, the most determined assertion of our essential rights. After witnessing the scornful rejection

of all the overtures our magnanimous Commonwealth made for the sake of peace, he heartily concurred in the act which made her independent of the betrayers of the Constitution; and when the convention adjourned, he immediately returned home, and accepted the command of a company of horse, composed of his friends and neighbors. This troop was embodied in the 3rd Virginia Cavalry. Although at first a novice in military affairs, he rapidly became a well-instructed and efficient officer, while his courage, fortitude, and impartiality, made him the idol of his men. As the first year of the war approached its end, all the volunteer regiments were reorganized; when he was chosen Lieutenant Colonel. Concerning this promotion he thus writes to his wife:

"In the reorganization of this regiment, I was chosen Lieutenant Colonel. This promotion was unexpected; but I shall accept it, and endeavor with all my powers to discharge its duties. I pray God to give me the requisite skill and courage for this position, that I may so bear myself in it, as to do good service to my country."

This place he filled with eminent success, and like a good soldier, "bore the heat and burden of the day." His former associates remarked with wonder, that he seemed formed by nature for a soldier; that although reared in elegance, and devoted hitherto almost exclusively to literary pursuits, he seemed to sleep anywhere, eat anything, and to endure any hardship, without inconvenience. He appeared thus, only because his manly spirit refused to complain of his trials; while in truth, both body and mind were suffering acutely under them. Throughout the bloody campaign of 1862, he was always at his post. In the expedition into Maryland, he was in command of the 3rd Regiment, then a part of General Fitzhugh Lee's Cavalry Brigade. In the combat of Boonsboro', when this brigade covered the retreat of the Confederate Army against the whole host of McClellan, the light of that clear autumn sun was turned into darkness by the smoke and battle dust. Down that famed causeway, as terrible as the jaws of hell, swept by cannon shot and shells, and by clouds of sharpshooters on the front, and right, and left, Colonel Thornton led his regiment again and again, in impetuous charges; until the purpose of the commander-in-chief was secured, in bringing off his artillery and trains.

In this fiery ordeal, though his horse was killed under him, he escaped unscathed. But on the bloody morning of Sharpsburg, as he was bringing his regiment into position to protect the left of the army, his punctilious obedience to orders led him to expose himself during a few minutes' halt, to a battery of the enemy; and almost the first shot which opened the fearful drama of the day, gave him a fatal wound. It exploded beside him, and one fragment tore his saddle to pieces, inflicting an irreparable shock on his body, while another crushed his arm almost from the hand to the shoulder. His frightened horse was arrested by his men, he sunk fainting into their arms, and was carried to a little farm house near the field. There, the surgeons endeavored to save his life by amputating his mangled limb; but in vain. After lingering for twelve hours insensible or delirious, he fell asleep.

His friends were aware that since he entered the service, his religious character had undergone a revolution. God, "whose thoughts are not as our thoughts," had employed the solemnities of this dreadful war, together with the death of two beloved brothers, to mature the convictions, which the sanctuary, and the pure Christian example that blessed his home, had implanted, but could not perfect. Numerous passages from his letters illustrate the birth and growth of his remarkable religious character.

Among the sad remains which were brought along with his corpse, to his widow, were a few of his prayers, written amidst the confusion of the bivouac, on bits of paper, and folded into his pocket-Bible. These precious relics of his piety I am permitted to copy; and the purpose of this introductory narrative is to present them to his personal friends, to his comrades in arms, and to the soldiers of our patriotic and suffering army, as his own solemn testimony to the religion of the Lord Jesus Christ. In them, "he being dead, yet speaketh." The object is to permit him to speak chiefly for himself: no attempt is made to do more than place the necessary links of connection between the pieces which unfold his religious emotions. This brief portraiture cannot be made without a partial disclosure of those dearer affections, which Colonel Thornton's sensitive honor was wont to cover jealously in the sanctity of his own heart and home. But no brave man will be capable of reading

it with any other than emotions of reverent sympathy. Nor will any such fail to recognize, in the spirit which has yielded these sacred mementoes to the inspection of his brothers-in-arms, the same self-consecration, and preference of duty over feeling, which made him the Christian hero. It has only been done because of the belief, that, could the soul of the departed speak from that blest abode, where it is now, as we humbly trust, solaced for its pains, it would pronounce the commending of Christ to its fellows a dearer object than any earthly tie.

In the opinion of all who have been permitted to read them, these prayers are peculiarly excellent. They show a maturity of Christian feelings, a propriety in the selection of topics and language, a tenderness, fervency, and humility, remarkable in one who was so young in the faith. It is hoped that they will furnish to many a young disciple a pattern for his breathings after the Saviour, and to many a Christian husband and father in the army, a vehicle for transmitting to heaven his yearnings for "loved ones at home."

The reader's attention is especially called to the powerful awakening of the sense of parental responsibility in Colonel Thornton's bosom, as soon as he became a Christian. His most cherished desire for life, was, that he might return and aid his beloved wife in guiding the steps of his sons heavenward. It is noteworthy also, how frequently his servants are included in these Christian affections. He rarely forgets to send them his kindly salutations. He feels his obligations, as their master, to their souls, and prays for their temporal and eternal welfare. Colonel Thornton, a large slaveholder, the son of a large planter, reared near his father's servants, was the fairest type of that character, as developed under Southern institutions. The affectionate relations existing between him and his servants, and the bending of such a mind and heart to their good, are the clearest proofs of the wickedness of those who are shedding so much blood to destroy these ties. Another purpose of this little tract is, to show the world, in this specimen among a thousand of our Christian patriots, how high and holy are the principles which nerve their arms in this war. There is here, no lust of power, notoriety, or wealth; no unsanctified revenge; but the resolve of the virtuous soul, sadly, yet firmly accepting the mournful alternative of resistance, rather than recreancy

to duty. The enemies of our country, however they may condemn our material strength, may well tremble at the guilt of the wholesale murders they perpetrate to crush this righteous spirit of defense. It is the spirit of God's Word; it is sustained and prompted, in its noblest instances, by his Holy Ghost. Do they not see that, although God may chastise our ingratitude and irreligion towards him, by using their wicked hands as the instruments of correction, they are fighting against him, and their murders will yet be avenged in calamities so dire, that both the ears of them that hear shall tingle?

But it is time to proceed directly to the narrative of Colonel Thornton's religious life. His brief expressions of feeling must be weighed by the reader with this fact: that his character was always marked by a strong abhorrence of meaningless professions. He seems to have been, at the beginning of the war, not a stranger to prayer; but the death of two brothers in rapid succession, one of whom, a citizen of Texas, coming to Virginia with the soldiers of that State, only reached Richmond to die, profoundly deepened his religious emotions. October 18th, 1861, he writes from Camp Bethel, on the Peninsula:

"I feel sometimes very sad and solitary in this long absence from you. The death of S**** stunned by its suddenness and unexpectedness. I am left alone of all my brothers in this Confederacy. * * * I would draw closer to your side than ever before.

"It is hard to bear my griefs alone; but I pray that I may see clearly in these bereavements, the hand of a wise and merciful God. I try to believe that 'He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men'; that 'though he cause grief, yet will He have compassion according to the multitude of His tender mercies.' But my skepticism is sometimes painful, and it looks as though heaven were covered with a cloud through which my prayers could not pass."

The next extract which we make, may illustrate the habitual temper of his mind as to the issue of the war before him:

"Six O'clock P. M.

"Camp in Lee's Field, April 9th, 1862.

"We have now a large army in this Peninsula. Our men are in fine spirits, and I look with confidence to the God of battles, to give us the victory. I pray he may be my shield in the

hour of conflict. I have much to make life sweet to me. * * * Let us implore humbly and earnestly the Father of mercies, who has showered so many blessings on us, that he will guide us through the perils of the dark hours of war, to the sunny, bright days of peace."

June 1st, 1862, he writes, making a definite avowal of his hope in Christ, and purpose to live a new life. After a tribute to the Christian fidelity of her to whom the letter is addressed, tender and glowing, he thus proceeds:

"This service in the army has not been without its benefits, and as I trust, great, lasting, and eternal benefits, to me. The busy, bustling life, that I had led ever since I left college, until I left home for the war, gave me but little time for calm, serious, sober thought on my past history and future life. In the quiet of the outpost, in the stillness of the camp at night, in the weary, solitary journeys to visit the chain of sentinels, I find ample time for reflection. With no books to read, with no business cares to engross or distract my attention, my mind has turned back upon myself, and often has the path I have trod been traveled over again by me. Thoughts of you * * * restrained me from those vulgar vices of the camp, drinking and card-playing. Thoughts of you * * *, kept back my tongue from profanity, and then thoughts of the words you had spoken and written to me * * *, and thoughts of the goodness of God, and of my sins, and of my need as a sinner, led me to seek salvation through the mercy of God, and the atonement of Jesus. I trust * * *, that I truly believe, and shall prove faithful to the end, and be an inheritor of the promises

"If I am spared to return home, I trust that you and I * * * will live through long years, to serve our Heavenly Father who has been so kind to us, if such be his holy will. But and honor and praise thee. Bless the children thou hast given to us. Aid us to train them up in thy knowledge and in thy fear, and to make them thy servants, pure, holy, and obedient.

"For my servants, Oh Lord God! I pray. Teach me how to act as their master, and instruct them how to discharge their duties as servants. Fill their hearts with love for thee; teach them to shun all evil, to live purely and uprightly, and finally save them with an eternal salvation.

"Into thy hands of love and mercy I trustingly commit myself, Oh Lord God Almighty. If it be in accordance with thy wise and great purposes, I beseech thee, bear me safely through all the perils of this war. Carry me back to my wife and home and children; and make me faithful to thee, walking in thy statutes, observing thy commandments, and honoring thee in all pureness and holiness of living. But if, Oh Lord! according to thy righteous decree, I am to fall by the hands of the enemy, or to die from any cause, then I implore thee, Heavenly Father, receive my soul, and take me to heaven to dwell forever in the light of thy holiness.

"If I have asked, Oh Lord, any thing wrong, I pray thee, forgive the evil thought, and blot out the wicked petition. If my prayers are pure and right, I beseech thee in the name of Jesus, and by reason of his death and sufferings, and because of his merits, to answer them. Add, I pray thee, Heavenly Father, every blessing on me and my household we are worthy to receive; and to thee let all honor and glory be ascribed. Amen."

The following letter displays his Christian trust as to the issues of the great struggle in which his country was engaged:

"Camp near Richmond, *June 20th*, 1862.

"It is now within four days of a year, since I left you and home to enter the army. It has been a year crowded with incidents of most momentous importance to our State and Confederacy; of events that will be read with interest for generations to come, by the student of history and the statesman. It will tell of a government erected by wise patriots, overthrown by mad ambition, sectional hate, and unreasoning fanaticism. It will tell of a powerful people summoned to arms to resist invasion and subjugation. The nations of the earth have looked with complacency upon the spectacle of a fierce and strong democracy, in a spirit of direst hate and meanest vengeance, striving in every way to crush and subjugate a feeble people who only ask to be let alone. This people, few in numbers compared with their adversaries, with an inadequate supply of arms and munitions of war, shut up from intercourse with any portion of the world, have kept them at bay for one year, and at the end of that time have forced them to call for a large increase of their military force. It is true, we during this time have sustained grievous reverses. In the future, we have sad

and severe trials before us. But God in his mercy has borne us up, and sustained us thus far, in our struggle for independence, and I have an abiding faith that he will crown us in the end with victory. I acknowledge with gratitude his mercy to me in this year of affliction. While so many have fallen around me, from disease and the enemy, he has graciously given me health and strength. He has mercifully protected you and our dear children, and our servants, during these twelve months of tribulations. Let us praise his holy name, and give thanks with grateful souls, for his loving kindness and mercy. He is a 'God of comfort' to us, as St. Paul calls him. I do sincerely pray that all this tender care of me may excite lively emotions of piety in my soul, and may constrain me to unite in your prayer that God will strengthen me and enable me to persevere in the new life I am striving to lead."

June 25th, he writes:

"It is useless to speculate as to the period when the war will end. I hear opinions of various shades expressed. It is still more idle to indulge in thoughts of what is to become of you and me in the progress of the conflict. Our lives and fortunes are in the hands of an all-wise and merciful God, and we must give our souls repose in the faith that he will do all things for us better than we could for ourselves. This is the truest, best, and firmest consolation we can have in these days of trouble. When I can visit home, it is impossible for me to say. How much I would like to drop in on you this morning, and see you with our children all around you. Let us trust such joy is laid up in store for us, and without perplexing our hearts, look forward to the future with confidence and courage. I doubt not, your faith is firmer than mine; but by mutual encouragement, we can strengthen the hearts of each other, to bear misfortune, if it is sent upon us, or to receive with joy and gratitude whatever blessings may be vouchsafed."

July 4th, 1862, he thus announces the results of the campaign before Richmond:

"The papers will give you an account of the triumphs vouchsafed to our arms by God, in the late battles around Richmond. He has mercifully protected me, but our loss in killed and wounded is fearfully large. Our whole land will be clothed in mourning. I pray God to console the bereaved hearts, and

to turn the charities of all our people upon those whose earthly protectors have been taken from them."

The reader will now be able to understand the allusion of the following

PRAYER.

July 4th, 1862.

My Father in Heaven, I come before thee this morning with a song of praise and thanksgiving for the victory thou hast given us over our enemies. Oh Lord, thou hast heard the prayers of thy people; their supplications and petitions have ascended to thy throne, and in the abundance of thy mercies thou hast heard them and answered them, by granting to our arms a triumph over our invaders. I feel and confess it is all from thee, Lord God Almighty; and to thy holy and glorious name do I ascribe all the praise. Continue, I pray thee, thy mercy and kindness to us as a nation. Give wisdom from on high to our rulers and generals, and all others in authority. Strengthen the hearts of our soldiers, shield their heads, and with thy strong arm bear up our banner in the conflict that is before us. Confuse and confound the counsels of our adversaries, drive them from our territory, and compel them by thy providence, to grant us a just and honorable peace. I pray thee, Oh Lord, to send thy Holy Spirit into the hearts of our soldiers, and make them soldiers of the Cross. Convert them to thy service, and make the people of the Confederate States a pious people, whose God is the Lord. I pray thee Oh Lord, to be with the sick and wounded of our army, in the hospitals and in the camps; alleviate their sufferings, soothe their pains, turn their hearts to thee, and bless them whether they live or die. I pray, Oh God, for a blessing on the regiment in which I serve. Make all connected with it godly men and brave soldiers. Grant them grace to serve thee, and give them courage for the discharge of every duty.

"I pray thee, Oh Lord, to forgive my sins, to wash away my iniquities, to renew my heart. Pour upon me thy grace, so that I may always do thy will. I pray, most merciful Father, that thou wilt make me pure, give me strength to put away all evil thoughts and impure desires, to resist all temptations and wicked suggestions. Make me to love thee supremely, and to prefer above all things else to do thy will, and to enjoy more

than any other employment, thy holy service. Enable me, Oh Father, to live near to thy Divine Son, my Redeemer, the Lord Jesus Christ, the Saviour of men. Be thou, Oh Son of God, if, in his wisdom and justice and mercy, he determines otherwise, and either of us be shortly taken from the other, then may the other bear the chastisement with meekness, and look forward to a reunion in God's own good time, on that blessed shore, where adieus and farewells are sounds unknown. * *

* Kiss all the boys for me. Give my love to Mrs. —; I hope she has recovered. Remember me kindly to the servants. Farewell, * * *. May God keep you and our dear children."

June 4th, 1862, he writes thus:

"Tell the dear boys I think often of them, and trust they will be obedient to you, and industrious in their studies. I have high hopes and expectations of our boys, and it would be a mercy of God for which we should pray, that you and I may be spared to see them reared to manhood, and to use our exertions to lead them to the paths of piety and honor."

The same hopes are pursued in his next:

"Camp near Richmond, *June 12th*, 1862.

"It is one of my earnest petitions to God, that if it be in accordance with his wise decrees, he may spare you and me, to train our dear boys under his guidance. I feel how weak and feeble I am in the Christian life. I trust, with fear and trembling, that my faith is sincere, and my hopes are well grounded. Certainly I could not object to your telling our friend L—, or any other friend you might desire to talk with on the subject, of my hope that my sins are pardoned, and that I am a true believer. But, I do not wish you to be deceived as to the state of my heart, and I know you would not deceive any one else. I have sinned much and long. I try, with a sincere penitence, I trust, to ask forgiveness of those sins from our Heavenly Father, by reason of the atonement made by our loving Saviour, whose righteousness I implore may be imputed to me. I feel the risings of sin in my heart every day. I endeavor to drive impure thoughts from my heart, to banish wicked words from my tongue, and to keep my hands from unclean deeds, but despite my striving, my prayers, my penitence, I sin. Conscious of my guilt, praying for forgiveness, I am a poor, weak Christian. You must not then expect to see high Christian graces in

me. I hope, I trust, I pray for increase of faith. I try to believe and implore God to help my unbelief. I notice all you say in reference to conversation with old and tried Christians. I should be rejoiced to have such friends to commune with, but I never could unveil my heart to any one except you; and even now, I do not know how I could speak to any one of my desire to be a Christian, of my communings with our Heavenly Father, of my faith in our adorable Saviour, of my prayers for the influence of the Holy Ghost. You must be my guide * * * in the Christian walk * * * and to you I must look for advice and counsel. I pray that the war may end, and you may take my hand in yours, and that we may pass along life's journey, aiding and encouraging each other in all our Christian duties."

About this time was written the first of these prayers which has been preserved; its date is June 10th. The bloody, but indecisive battle of Seven Pines had then been fought. The vast hosts of Federals were pressing close up to the beleaguered city. The army of Jackson was seemingly involved past hope in those complications of danger, from which it was soon to emerge in a blaze of glory. Every where, the condition of the Confederacy seemed to anxious patriots perilous, in the extreme. It was at this juncture Colonel Thornton penned these devout and solemn petitions:

A PRAYER.

"I beseech and implore thee, merciful Father, to look down with tender compassion on thy unworthy servant, to forgive his sins, to strengthen his faith, to fill his heart with thy grace, to shed upon his soul the influences of thy Holy Spirit; to give him bodily strength and courage for the discharge of all his duties, to illumine his mind with thy divine intelligence, to guide his feet in the path of holiness, to deliver him from every temptation that may assail him, to shield him from every assault of man or devil, to maintain him in health of body and purity of spirit, and finally to receive him in heaven, thy holy dwelling place; there to live forever in the joy and delight of thy presence.

"I pray thee, Oh God! to blot out my sins. I feel how vile and impure I am and have been. I feel that I can find refuge alone in the abundance of thy tender mercies: that nothing but

the blood of Jesus, our adorable Saviour can cleanse my vile heart of its pollution. Under the shadow of thy mercy I seek to hide: in the flood that flows from Calvary, I wash my soul.

"Preserve me, Oh Lord! from presumption, from a vain and foolish reliance on my own strength, from a silly confidence in the power and efficacy of my own good works; cause me at all times to know my folly and weakness; keep me continually mindful that salvation is all of free, unmerited grace; and never allow me for an instant to forget that the works of man, even the best he can perform, are marked by folly, and stained with guilt."

"In thy hands, Oh merciful Father, are the fortunes of my beloved State and Country. I recognize thy chastening hand in the afflictions thou hast sent upon our land and upon our people. Teach us all to submit with Christian humility to these sad tribulations, to bear with Christian resignation these severe trials, to bow beneath the rod, and with reverence to honor the hand that smites. In thine own appointed time, Oh God! thou wilt deliver us from the hands of our enemies and of those who hate us. Thou, Oh Lord! wilt, in thy good time, lead us by a path that thou wilt open to our feet, to safety and independence. Be thou, Oh Lord! our stay and our deliverance. In the day of battle be with us; uphold our hands, strengthen our hearts, and give us victory over our foes. Oh Lord! smite with thy righteous indignation the cruel invaders who now drive us from our homes and besiege our capital. Send thy angel, armed with the sword of justice, to execute vengeance upon our cruel foes. Make our army a holy instrument in thy hands, to punish the insolent tyrants who are now endeavoring to subjugate our people, to free our slaves, to confiscate our lands, and to take from us all that in thy goodness, thou hast given us. Drive the enemy, Oh Lord! from our soil. Give us, merciful Father, the blessings of peace. Shed the influences of thy Holy Spirit upon the hearts of our rulers and people, upon the hearts of the officers and privates of our army, and make us a God-fearing nation, whose ruler is the great Jehovah. I implore thee, Oh God! for thy blessing and especial favor on the regiment in which I am serving. Make them pure and holy. Make them a band of Christian warriors, who shall fight in thy strength. Cover their heads in the hour of conflict; crown them with vic-

tory over our Northern foes, and over the wiles and machinations of the Evil One.

"I beseech thee, Heavenly Father, to guard and guide, and console, and sustain, thy handmaiden and servant, the wife whom thou hast given me. Bless her, Oh Lord! at all times. Write thy law upon her heart. Shield her from all evil, and if it be thy holy will, unite her and myself once more, and permit us together, as heads of a Christian family, in peace to serve my elder Brother; thou hast atoned for my sins; hear my prayers for forgiveness and acceptance to our Father, and bring me back rich spiritual gifts. I pray thee, Oh God, to grant me health of body and steadiness of purpose, and cool, deliberate courage, and intelligence, to discharge all the duties of my position. Be with me in every trial: if thou wilt, shield me from every danger; if it be thy will that I fall in battle, receive my spirit, and take me to thy heavenly mansion, to dwell there forever in peace and rest, and joy and bliss, praising and serving thee.

"Oh merciful Father, I implore thy blessing upon my beloved wife. Comfort, console, and sustain her, I pray thee; fill her heart with thy grace; give her strength sufficient for all the severe labors she has to perform; grant her wisdom from on high to discharge every duty. Reunite her and myself, and let us through long years of peace, worship thee, and train our children and servants in thy service. I pray thee, Heavenly Father, to bless my children; and fill their tender hearts with love for thee; make them thy children; make them thine by election and adoption. Give their parents wisdom and grace, to train them for a heavenly inheritance. Bless my servants, I implore thee, most merciful God. Enable me to instruct them properly, and to govern them wisely. Make them thy servants, zealous in every good work; and finally receive them to thyself in heaven.

"I ask all these blessings in the name of my Saviour Jesus. I offer these petitions in the name of thy Holy Son. Hear me, and answer me, Oh God. Pour upon me every blessing thou in thy mercy and loving kindness, wilt grant. Amen."

ANOTHER PRAYER.

July 21st, 1862.

"I approach thy throne, my Heavenly Father, this day, to acknowledge the benefits with which, in thy loving kindness and mercy, thou hast crowned me all the days of my life: to confess my sins, to implore forgiveness, to ask for thy grace and the influences of thy Holy Spirit; and to beseech thee to continue to regard me with favor, to load me with blessings, and to grant me courage of heart and strength of body to discharge rightly and properly all the duties of my position. Oh God, wash me clean in the blood of thy Son, Christ Jesus, my Saviour. Let me go to the cross, and live near to him who died that I may live. Raise me from the grave to sit beside him who first rose from the grave that he might show to men the way to heaven. In his name I offer my petitions; through his intercession I ask forgiveness; by reason of his sufferings and atonement, I expect salvation. I know that I am guilty, polluted, undone, and ruined; but I thank thee, Oh merciful Father, that on Calvary thou didst open a fountain, in whose stream the vilest and filthiest sinner may wash his guilt away. To that fountain filled with blood I would come, and cleanse my heart from every stain. Pity, forgive, and save me, Lord God Almighty. I pray thee, merciful Father, to shield me from all the perils that assail my life; from the pestilence that is abroad in the land, and from the cruel enemy that has invaded, and is now ravaging and destroying my State and Country. Be with me, Oh Lord God, at all times; shield me in the hour of conflict, and make my hand strong to strike for truth, and justice, and right. Save me, merciful Father, and restore me, when the war is over, and thou hast sent peace on our land, to my home, my wife, my children, and my servants.

"Bless, guide, comfort, and console the wife thou hast given me, and the children that have been born of our marriage. Reign and rule in their hearts. Make the mother skilful and apt to teach her children thy law, and turn the hearts of the children to do thy will. Reunite us, merciful Father, and uphold thy handmaiden and myself as the heads of a Christian family, and our offspring and servants as its members, teaching us all to love thy word and thy law, to live as becometh them who are striving for a heavenly inheritance, and finally

receive us all into heaven, thy holy dwelling place, to praise and honor and serve thee through all eternity.

"Oh Lord God! have mercy on my country, these Confederate States, now struggling for salvation from tyranny and oppression, and seeking the rights thou hast given us as a nation, through an agony of blood and suffering. I see, Oh God, the desolations that mark the footsteps of our cruel enemy. Before me are the naked fields, the ruins of the burned dwelling, and far away from the fierce foe are the houseless and homeless wanderers. These cruel tyrants boast of their large numbers, their great wealth, and their power, vastly superior to that of these poor States. They rely on the arm of flesh. We trust in thee, Oh Lord God Jehovah! Be thou our fortress and our defense; God of battles, be with the soldiers of this Confederacy, and give them victory; God of truth and justice, reign in the hearts of the people all over the land; God of wisdom, illumine the minds of our rulers and officers; God of mercy, give us peace; God of nations, give us independence; and to thy name be all honor and glory, forever and ever. Amen."

July 22nd, 1862, he wrote from the region of the Pamunkey, a letter well describing the principles which made him resolute in enduring, without any ambitious aspirations, a separation so irksome to his soul.

"I am amused at the delight you so heartily manifest, at my not meeting the enemy, who were reported as crossing into King William. You say you cannot wish me any opportunity of distinction where my life will be placed in jeopardy. In reply I would say, that I only desire to do my duty. I have no thirst for military fame; for I know it is won through blood and tears and suffering. But I do desire to aid in driving the base invader from Virginia's soil. I am amazed that men can sit quietly at home, when they see the fate that awaits us if the enemy succeeds in subjugating us. I am sitting now, as I write, in full view of what was, before the invasion, one of the loveliest estates in Virginia. It is now a scene of desolation; the fields are naked, the fences destroyed, the houses burned, the laborers stolen away, and the owners fugitives, and, if this were all their wealth, beggars."

His remaining letters, written on the march from lower Virginia to Manassas and Maryland, were little more than

brief notes, penned in moments snatched from the fatigues of the journey. But in all of them, his yearnings for the society of his beloved home were mingled with prayers for faith and strength to bear his lot with fortitude. The last specimen of prayer which he left is incomplete. Perhaps the bugle-call summoned him away from the solemn and pleasing communion of the mercy seat, to the march or the combat.

THE LAST PRAYER.

July 27th, 1862.

"I come before thee, Oh Lord God Almighty, on this thy holy day, to thank thee for the many mercies I have received from thy loving hand, and for the protection thou hast heretofore afforded me; to ask that thou wilt not withdraw thy mercy, favor, and protection from me, but wilt continue to crown me with blessings, and shield me from all assaults of the world, the flesh, and the Devil. I come to implore the forgiveness of my sins, pardon for all my guilt, and eternal salvation for my soul, through the merits and intercession of thine adorable Son Christ Jesus. I come to praise thee for the loving kindness and tender compassion which, at such a cost, and at such a sacrifice, furnished a way of escape for guilty man. Oh Lord! I would live near to thy Son Christ Jesus, our Lord and Saviour. I pray thee to give me grace, to illumine my understanding, to fill my heart with love, to make thy service my delightful work, and obedience to thy law my most pleasant duty. Save me, I beseech thee, from vain-glorying, from boasting, from self-reliance, ——"

Thus the expression of his longings for holiness were broken off unfinished, like his life. But his friends may trust that his life, so full of promise here was but the infancy of a far more blessed and glorious existence in that heaven to which he aspired; and so, that these acts of worship, interrupted here below are now continued with a nobler, sweeter tongue, and with higher raptures, where there are no wars nor rumors of wars to disturb the saints, in the heavenly Sabbath.

These mementoes exhibit, so far as a brief Christian life of less than a year could, the renewing power of the religion of Jesus Christ, in a high degree. The scriptural tone of the petitions shows, in one so young in divine knowledge, the evident teachings of the Holy Ghost. The change in Colonel

Thornton's character was marked. He was, by nature, a proud spirit; we here find his prayers breathing the most profound humility. His character was usually apprehended to be stern; these exercises of soul are instinct with a melting tenderness, for all, except the enemies of righteousness. This attempt to display his inner life is now closed, with the earnest prayer, that God may incline the hearts of all his friends and comrades, and of every brave soldier of our country, to seek his Saviour, to imitate his example so far as he was a follower of Jesus Christ, and to raise to the throne of grace, these, or such-like prayers.

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